11 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
North Carolina v. Pearcered2 sentences1990Holding that fundamental notions of fairness embodied within our concept of due process require that a convicted defendant who would seek to exercise his right to appeal or to attack collaterally his first conviction must be “freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation,” id., the Supreme Court established a prophylactic rule that permits a judge to impose a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial only where his reasons for so doing, and the factual data underlying his reasons, affirmatively appear in the record. 1990Holding that fundamental notions of fairness embodied within our concept of due process require that a convicted defendant who would seek to exercise his right to appeal or to attack collaterally his first conviction must be "freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation," id., the Supreme Court established a prophylactic rule that permits a judge to impose a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial only where his reasons for so doing, and the factual data underlying his reasons, affirmatively appear in the record. | 1 | 2 |
State of Maine v. Wallace W. Ames IIIgreen1 sentence2018See State v. Ames, 2017 ME 27 , 1 12, 155 A.3d 881 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Amesgreen1 sentence2018See State v. Ames, 2017 ME 27 , 1 12, 155 A.3d 881 . | 1 | 1 |
Horace Franklin Dunkins, Jr. v. Morris Thigpen, Commissioner of Alabama Department of Corrections, and W.E. Johnson, Warden, Holman Unitgreen1 sentence2004See Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 397 (11th Cir.1988). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rosegreen2 sentences1992See State v. Rose, 604 A.2d 24, 27 (Me.1992) (“[defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective representation at trial was significantly impaired because the State ignored his formal and unequivocal request for counsel after proceedings had been initiated ... 1992See State v. Rose, 604 A.2d 24, 27 (Me.1992) ("[d]efendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective representation at trial was significantly impaired because the State ignored his formal and unequivocal request for counsel after proceedings had been initiated ... | 1 | 1 |
State v. Truegreen2 sentences1992See State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467-69 (Me.1981); see also State v. Thornton, 485 A.2d 952, 953 (Me.1984). 1992See State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467-69 (Me.1981); see also State v. Thornton, 485 A.2d 952, 953 (Me.1984). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thorntongreen2 sentences1992See State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467-69 (Me.1981); see also State v. Thornton, 485 A.2d 952, 953 (Me.1984). 1992See State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467-69 (Me.1981); see also State v. Thornton, 485 A.2d 952, 953 (Me.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Todd A. Brecht v. Gordon A. Abrahamson, Superintendent, Dodge Correctional Institutiongreen1 sentence1991See generally Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir.1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2018Custodial Interrogation, Defendant's Invocation of tbe Right to Remain Silent, and Whether Trooper Bureau "Scrupulously Honored" Defendant's Invocation of His Right to Remain 6 The State concedes-and the Court also finds-that Defendant was subject to custodial interrogation, which means the prophylactic rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applies. 1996Even less supportive is the decision in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), in which the issue was the application of the prophylactic standard of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), to the testimony of a trial witness discovered through an interrogation of the defendant that violated the Miranda standard. | 3 | 1992–2018 |
State v. Tomah
green
2 sentences2014We then expressly disavowed statements in an opinion issued the previous year, State v. Tomah, 560 A.2d 575 (Me. 1989), that could have been read to favor such a prophylactic rule. 2014We then expressly disavowed statements in an opinion issued the previous year, State v. Tomah, 560 A.2d 575 (Me.1989), that could have been read to favor such a prophylactic rule. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Brown v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1998Cf. id. at 600 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 (stating that the Miranda warnings function “as a prophylactic rule and as a procedural safeguard employed to protect Fifth Amendment rights against the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings”). 1998Cf. id. at 600 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 (stating that the Miranda warnings function “as a prophylactic rule and as a procedural safeguard employed to protect Fifth Amendment rights against the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings”). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Michigan v. Tucker
green
2 sentences1996Even less supportive is the decision in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), in which the issue was the application of the prophylactic standard of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), to the testimony of a trial witness discovered through an interrogation of the defendant that violated the Miranda standard. 1996Even less supportive is the decision in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), in which the issue was the application of the prophylactic standard of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), to the testimony of a trial witness discovered through an interrogation of the defendant that violated the Miranda standard. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1991Given the overwhelming weight of the other evidence admitted against defendant, we need not determine whether the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard announced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) applies to a violation of a prophylactic rule as distinguished from a direct command of the Constitution. 1991Given the overwhelming weight of the other evidence admitted against defendant, we need not determine whether the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard announced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) applies to a violation of a prophylactic rule as distinguished from a direct command of the Constitution. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Weeks v. State
green
1 sentence1972In Weeks v. State, Me., 267 A.2d 641 (1970) this Court recognized the principle established by Pearce as controlling the re-sentencing of a prisoner whose conviction and sentence had previously been set aside by an appellate court. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.