prophylactic rule in California

2025(Delgadillo, at pp. 224, 226.) The Delgadillo court reasoned “‘there is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel’ in state postconviction proceedings.” (Id. at p. 226; see id. at p. 227 [reaffirming “‘[t]here is no unconditional state or federal constitutional right to counsel to pursue collateral relief from a judgment of conviction’”].) And “‘Anders established a prophylactic framework that is relevant when, and only when, a litigant has a previously established constitutional right to counsel.’” (Delgadillo, at p. 226; see Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 55

2025(Delgadillo, at pp. 224, 226.) The Delgadillo court reasoned “‘there is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel’ in state postconviction proceedings.” (Id. at p. 226; see id. at p. 227 [reaffirming “‘[t]here is no unconditional state or federal constitutional right to counsel to pursue collateral relief from a judgment of conviction’”].) And “‘Anders established a prophylactic framework that is relevant when, and only when, a litigant has a previously established constitutional right to counsel.’” (Delgadillo, at p. 226; see Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 55

2012Although law enforcement officers are free to question a suspect who knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his rights under Miranda , “if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation.” (Davis, at p. 458 [relying on Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ]].) The prohibition against further questioning in these circumstances is not a constitutional requirement, but rather a prophylactic rule “ ‘desig

2012Although law enforcement officers are free to question a suspect who knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his rights under Miranda , “if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation.” (Davis, at p. 458 [relying on Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ]].) The prohibition against further questioning in these circumstances is not a constitutional requirement, but rather a prophylactic rule “ ‘desig

2012Although law enforcement officers are free to question a suspect who knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his rights under Miranda , “if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation.” (Davis, at p. 458 [relying on Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ]].) The prohibition against further questioning in these circumstances is not a constitutional requirement, but rather a prophylactic rule “ ‘desig

2012Although law enforcement officers are free to question a suspect who knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his rights under Miranda , “if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation.” (Davis, at p. 458 [relying on Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [ 68 L.Ed.2d 378 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ]].) The prohibition against further questioning in these circumstances is not a constitutional requirement, but rather a prophylactic rule “ ‘desig

2000The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [ 86 S.Ct. at p. 1612 ].) In Edwards , the court laid down another rule of a “prophylactic” nature (Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 [ 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 ] (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.); accord, e.g., Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 458 [ 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2354 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 ]), which it reaffirmed in Roberson , in order to protect the prophylactic rule of Miranda itself by preve

2000The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [ 86 S.Ct. at p. 1612 ].) In Edwards , the court laid down another rule of a “prophylactic” nature (Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 [ 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 ] (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.); accord, e.g., Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 458 [ 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2354 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 ]), which it reaffirmed in Roberson , in order to protect the prophylactic rule of Miranda itself by preve

2025(Delgadillo, at pp. 224, 226.) The Delgadillo court reasoned “‘there is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel’ in state postconviction proceedings.” (Id. at p. 226; see id. at p. 227 [reaffirming “‘[t]here is no unconditional state or federal constitutional right to counsel to pursue collateral relief from a judgment of conviction’”].) And “‘Anders established a prophylactic framework that is relevant when, and only when, a litigant has a previously established constitutional right to counsel.’” (Delgadillo, at p. 226; see Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 55

2003Second, the Anders process assists the court in evaluating whether the appeal indeed is frivolous and can be decided without adversary resolution. ( Penson v. Ohio, supra, 488 U.S. at pp. 81-82; McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin (1988) 486 U.S. 429 , 439 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 440 , 108 S.Ct. 1895 ].) The Anders rule is not the result of an "`independent constitutional'" requirement but rather a "`prophylactic framework'" for vindicating the right to counsel established in Douglas v. California, supra, 372 U.S. at pages 357-358. ( Smith v. Robbins, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 273 ; Pennsylvania v. Finle

2000The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [ 86 S.Ct. at p. 1612 ].) In Edwards , the court laid down another rule of a “prophylactic” nature (Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 [ 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 ] (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.); accord, e.g., Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 458 [ 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2354 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 ]), which it reaffirmed in Roberson , in order to protect the prophylactic rule of Miranda itself by preve

2000The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [ 86 S.Ct. at p. 1612 ].) In Edwards , the court laid down another rule of a “prophylactic” nature (Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 [ 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 ] (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.); accord, e.g., Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 458 [ 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2354 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 ]), which it reaffirmed in Roberson , in order to protect the prophylactic rule of Miranda itself by preve

2023(People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 489 ; see People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149 , 1232–1233; People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100 , 1139–1140; Coleman v. Thompson (1991) 501 U.S. 722, 755 (Coleman).) “Anders established a prophylactic framework that is relevant when, and only when, a litigant has a previously established constitutional right to counsel.” (Finley, at p. 555.) “Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review.

2022(People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 489 ; see People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149 , 1232–1233; People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100 , 1139–1140; Coleman v. Thompson (1991) 501 U.S. 722, 755 (Coleman).) “Anders established a prophylactic framework that is relevant when, and only when, a litigant has a previously established constitutional right to counsel.” (Finley, at p. 555.) “Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review.

2023(People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 489 ; see People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149 , 1232–1233; People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100 , 1139–1140; Coleman v. Thompson (1991) 501 U.S. 722, 755 (Coleman).) “Anders established a prophylactic framework that is relevant when, and only when, a litigant has a previously established constitutional right to counsel.” (Finley, at p. 555.) “Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review.

2022(People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 489 ; see People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149 , 1232–1233; People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100 , 1139–1140; Coleman v. Thompson (1991) 501 U.S. 722, 755 (Coleman).) “Anders established a prophylactic framework that is relevant when, and only when, a litigant has a previously established constitutional right to counsel.” (Finley, at p. 555.) “Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review.

2016The prophylactic rule is designed not only to relieve the defendant who has asserted his right from bearing the burden from 'upping the ante' but also to prevent chilling the exercise of such rights by other defendants who must make their choices under similar circumstances in the future." ( United States v. DeMarco , supra , 550 F.2d at p. 1227 ; see United States v. Griffin , supra , 617 F.2d at p. 1347 ["It is now well established that the mere appearance of vindictiveness may give rise to a presumption of a vindictive motive sufficient to establish a due process violation."].) In United St

2016The prophylactic rule is designed not only to relieve the defendant who has asserted his right from bearing the burden from ‘upping the ante’ but also to prevent chilling the exercise of such rights by other defendants who must make their choices under similar circumstances in the future.” (United States v. DeMarco, supra, 550 F.2d at p. 1227 ; see 28 United States v. Griffin, supra, 617 F.2d at p. 1347 [“It is now well established that the mere appearance of vindictiveness may give rise to a presumption of a vindictive motive sufficient to establish a due process violation.”].) In United Stat

2003(Pennsylvania v. Finley, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 555 ; see In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 972 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 771 , 920 P.2d 716 ].) In Wende , an appeal involving an adult criminal defendant, the California Supreme Court interpreted Anders as requiring that, when appointed appellate counsel finds no arguable issues, the justices must review the entire record to determine whether the appeal is in fact frivolous.

2003Second, the Anders process assists the court in evaluating whether the appeal indeed is frivolous and can be decided without adversary resolution. ( Penson v. Ohio, supra, 488 U.S. at pp. 81-82; McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin (1988) 486 U.S. 429 , 439 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 440 , 108 S.Ct. 1895 ].) The Anders rule is not the result of an "`independent constitutional'" requirement but rather a "`prophylactic framework'" for vindicating the right to counsel established in Douglas v. California, supra, 372 U.S. at pages 357-358. ( Smith v. Robbins, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 273 ; Pennsylvania v. Finle

2000The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [ 86 S.Ct. at p. 1612 ].) In Edwards , the court laid down another rule of a “prophylactic” nature (Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 [ 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 ] (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.); accord, e.g., Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 458 [ 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2354 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 ]), which it reaffirmed in Roberson , in order to protect the prophylactic rule of Miranda itself by preve

2000The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [ 86 S.Ct. at p. 1612 ].) In Edwards , the court laid down another rule of a “prophylactic” nature (Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 [ 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 ] (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.); accord, e.g., Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 458 [ 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2354 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 ]), which it reaffirmed in Roberson , in order to protect the prophylactic rule of Miranda itself by preve

2021This exception recognizes that in circumstances in which an officer’s questions are reasonably prompted by concern for public safety or officer safety, those concerns outweigh the “need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” (New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649, 657 .) In People v. Cressy (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 981 (Cressy), the First Appellate District applied the public safety exception where an officer had asked the defendant, who was arrested for possession of a syringe, whether he had any needles or other paraphernalia on him p

2015No Public or Officer Safety Exception An exception to the Miranda rule applies in circumstances in which an officer’s questions are reasonably prompted by concern for public safety if that concern outweighs the “need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” (New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649, 657 (Quarles).) This exception has been applied in cases in which an officer is searching for a missing weapon to protect public safety (e.g., People v. Simpson (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 854, 857 (Simpson)), and where an officer is 12 concerned fo

2018It was further alleged that he had suffered a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (a)(1) and (d) and 1170.12, subdivision (b). 2 In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 , 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 . 3 Howard reaffirmed the requirement of explicit admonitions and waivers as a prophylactic rule of judicial procedure. ( Howard , supra , 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1178-1179, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ; see also Cross , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 170, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 139 , 347 P.3d 1130 .) 4 We noted that the defendant did not have a federal or state

2018It was further alleged that he had suffered a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (a)(1) and (d) and 1170.12, subdivision (b). 2 In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 , 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 . 3 Howard reaffirmed the requirement of explicit admonitions and waivers as a prophylactic rule of judicial procedure. ( Howard , supra , 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1178-1179, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ; see also Cross , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 170, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 139 , 347 P.3d 1130 .) 4 We noted that the defendant did not have a federal or state

2016The prophylactic rule is designed not only to relieve the defendant who has asserted his right from bearing the burden from 'upping the ante' but also to prevent chilling the exercise of such rights by other defendants who must make their choices under similar circumstances in the future." ( United States v. DeMarco , supra , 550 F.2d at p. 1227 ; see United States v. Griffin , supra , 617 F.2d at p. 1347 ["It is now well established that the mere appearance of vindictiveness may give rise to a presumption of a vindictive motive sufficient to establish a due process violation."].) In United St

2016(United States v. Jenkins (9th Cir. 2007) 504 F.3d 694 , 700–701.) In that case, the defendant was “apprehended twice for attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border while driving a vehicle containing undocumented aliens.

1988(Hall v. State of Iowa (8th Cir. 1983) 705 F.2d 283, 289, fn. 4 .) Within this context, the right to counsel is not an independent right, but rather a prophylactic rule derived from Fifth Amendment principles (2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) § 11.1(c), p. 11) and not from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel which attaches only upon the filing of formal criminal charges (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 428-432 [ 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 425-428 , 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1145-1147 ]).

1988(Hall v. State of Iowa (8th Cir. 1983) 705 F.2d 283, 289, fn. 4 .) Within this context, the right to counsel is not an independent right, but rather a prophylactic rule derived from Fifth Amendment principles (2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) § 11.1(c), p. 11) and not from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel which attaches only upon the filing of formal criminal charges (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 428-432 [ 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 425-428 , 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1145-1147 ]).

2000The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [ 86 S.Ct. at p. 1612 ].) In Edwards , the court laid down another rule of a “prophylactic” nature (Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 [ 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 ] (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.); accord, e.g., Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 458 [ 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2354 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 ]), which it reaffirmed in Roberson , in order to protect the prophylactic rule of Miranda itself by preve

2000The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [ 86 S.Ct. at p. 1612 ].) In Edwards , the court laid down another rule of a “prophylactic” nature (Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 [ 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 ] (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.); accord, e.g., Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 458 [ 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2354 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 ]), which it reaffirmed in Roberson , in order to protect the prophylactic rule of Miranda itself by preve

2000The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [ 86 S.Ct. at p. 1612 ].) In Edwards , the court laid down another rule of a “prophylactic” nature (Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 [ 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 ] (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.); accord, e.g., Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 458 [ 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2354 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 ]), which it reaffirmed in Roberson , in order to protect the prophylactic rule of Miranda itself by preve

2000The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [ 86 S.Ct. at p. 1612 ].) In Edwards , the court laid down another rule of a “prophylactic” nature (Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 [ 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 ] (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.); accord, e.g., Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 458 [ 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2354 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 ]), which it reaffirmed in Roberson , in order to protect the prophylactic rule of Miranda itself by preve

1998(See Michigan v. Jackson (1986) 475 U.S. 625, 636 [ 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1411 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 ].) The court held in the Harvey case that, nonetheless, the prophylactic rule established in Michigan v. Jackson, supra, 475 U.S. 625 , does not require exclusion of such statements when they are offered for impeachment.

1998(See Michigan v. Jackson (1986) 475 U.S. 625, 636 [ 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1411 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 ].) The court held in the Harvey case that, nonetheless, the prophylactic rule established in Michigan v. Jackson, supra, 475 U.S. 625 , does not require exclusion of such statements when they are offered for impeachment.