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9 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2017The officer did not restrain her with handcuffs or otherwise, see People v. Breidenbach, 875 P.2d 879, 886 (Colo. 1994), threaten her verbally or with a show of force, id., or remove her to his patrol car or otherwise isolate her in any manner implicating the prophylactic warnings of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), protecting against the inherent pressures of custodial interrogation. 2017The officer did not restrain her with handcuffs or otherwise, see People v. Breidenbach, 875 P.2d 879, 886 (Colo. 1994), threaten her verbally or with a show of force, id., or remove her to his patrol car or otherwise isolate her in any manner implicating the prophylactic warnings of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), protecting against the inherent pressures of custodial interrogation. | 1 | 5 |
People v. Breidenbachgreen2 sentences2017The officer did not restrain her with handcuffs or otherwise, see People v. Breidenbach, 875 P.2d 879, 886 (Colo. 1994), threaten her verbally or with a show of force, id., or remove her to his patrol car or otherwise isolate her in any manner implicating the prophylactic warnings of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), protecting against the inherent pressures of custodial interrogation. 2017The officer did not restrain her with handcuffs or otherwise, see People v. Breidenbach, 875 P.2d 879, 886 (Colo. 1994), threaten her verbally or with a show of force, id., or remove her to his patrol car or otherwise isolate her in any manner implicating the prophylactic warnings of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), protecting against the inherent pressures of custodial interrogation. | 1 | 1 |
Berkemer v. McCartygreen2 sentences2017See Berkemer v, McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Breidenbach, 875 P.2d at 885-86 . ¶16 At the point in time at which the defendant implicated herself in the possession of contraband, she was therefore being lawfully detained pursuant to an investigatory stop based on reasonable articulable suspicion of domestic violence, and her liberty had not been infringed upon to an extent, requiring the administration and waiver of Miranda rights prior to any interrogation. 2017See Berkemer v, McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Breidenbach, 875 P.2d at 885-86 . ¶16 At the point in time at which the defendant implicated herself in the possession of contraband, she was therefore being lawfully detained pursuant to an investigatory stop based on reasonable articulable suspicion of domestic violence, and her liberty had not been infringed upon to an extent, requiring the administration and waiver of Miranda rights prior to any interrogation. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Owensgreen1 sentence2014If "the prosecution has not met its burden of proving that the defendant waived his Miranda rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, then the statements must be suppressed." People v. Owens, 969 P.2d 704, 707 (Colo. 1999). 410 "While due process of law forbids the use of any statements that were actually coerced by law enforcement authorities, the prophylactic warnings formulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), apply only to custodial interrogation." People v. Figueroa-Ortega, 2012 CO 51, ¶ 7 , 283 P.3d 691 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Dickerson v. United Statesred2 sentences2006Id. at 434-35, 120 S.Ct. 2326 . 2006Id. at 434-35, 120 S.Ct. 2326 . | 1 | 1 |
New York v. Quarlesgreen1 sentence1999See id. at 654-55, 104 S.Ct. 2626 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rocky Mountain Hospital & Medical Service v. Mariani
green
2 sentences2019Moreover, Rule 1.8(a) applies to all personal transactions between the lawyer and client, but does not apply to “standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others,” because “[i]n such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client.” Id. 12 ¶24 Thus, Rule 1.8(a) is a prophylactic rule whose purpose is to protect clients—i.e., the public—from lawyers potentially wielding their inherent advantage and influence. 2019Moreover, Rule 1.8(a) applies to all personal transactions between the lawyer and client, but does not apply to "standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others," because "[i]n such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client." Id. ¶24 Thus, Rule 1.8(a) is a prophylactic rule whose purpose is to protect clients-i.e., the public-from lawyers potentially wielding their inherent advantage and influence. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Madrid
green
1 sentence2014For the purposes of M@-ramda, interrogation includes " 'any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know' are reasonably likely to elicit an mcmmmatmg response from the suspect'" Madrid, 179 P.3d at 1014 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Figueroa-Ortega
green
2 sentences2014If "the prosecution has not met its burden of proving that the defendant waived his Miranda rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, then the statements must be suppressed." People v. Owens, 969 P.2d 704, 707 (Colo. 1999). 410 "While due process of law forbids the use of any statements that were actually coerced by law enforcement authorities, the prophylactic warnings formulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), apply only to custodial interrogation." People v. Figueroa-Ortega, 2012 CO 51, ¶ 7 , 283 P.3d 691 (citation omitted). 2014If "the prosecution has not met its burden of proving that the defendant waived his Miranda rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, then the statements must be suppressed." People v. Owens, 969 P.2d 704, 707 (Colo. 1999). 410 "While due process of law forbids the use of any statements that were actually coerced by law enforcement authorities, the prophylactic warnings formulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), apply only to custodial interrogation." People v. Figueroa-Ortega, 2012 CO 51, ¶ 7 , 283 P.3d 691 (citation omitted). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Rhode Island v. Innis
green
2 sentences2014For the purposes of M@-ramda, interrogation includes " 'any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know' are reasonably likely to elicit an mcmmmatmg response from the suspect'" Madrid, 179 P.3d at 1014 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)). 2014For the purposes of M@-ramda, interrogation includes " 'any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know' are reasonably likely to elicit an mcmmmatmg response from the suspect'" Madrid, 179 P.3d at 1014 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Brown v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences2012II. 17 While due process of law forbids the use of any statements that were actually coerced by law enforcement authori ties, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 , 56 S.Ct. 461 , 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936), the prophylactic warnings formulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), apply only to custodial interrogation. 2012II. 17 While due process of law forbids the use of any statements that were actually coerced by law enforcement authori ties, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 , 56 S.Ct. 461 , 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936), the prophylactic warnings formulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), apply only to custodial interrogation. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Oregon v. Elstad
green
2 sentences2002In contrast, because Miranda is a prophylactic rule, it "may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation." Id. at 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285 . 2002In contrast, because Miranda is a prophylactic rule, it "may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation." Id. at 306 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Michigan v. Tucker
green
1 sentence1995Id. at 445 , 86 S.Ct. at 1612-13 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.