Frye test in District of Columbia

2011"The third criterion incorporates the so-called Frye test, under which scientific testimony is admissible only if the theory or methodology on which it is based has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community." Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 977 (D.C.2010) (citing Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 47 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923)). [11] 978 A.2d 1257 (D.C.2009).

2011"The third criterion incorporates the so-called Frye test, under which scientific testimony is admissible only if the theory or methodology on which it is based has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community." Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 977 (D.C.2010) (citing Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 47 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923)). [11] 978 A.2d 1257 (D.C.2009).

2016Frye test, under which scientific testimony is admissible only if the theory or methodology on which it is based has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.” (John) Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 977 (D.C. 2010). “[B]ecause expert or scientific testimony possesses an aura of special reliability and trustworthiness, the proffer of such testimony must be carefully 6 scrutinized.” Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 632 (D.C. 1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2016Frye test, under which scientific testimony is admissible only if the theory or methodology on which it is based has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.” (John) Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 977 (D.C. 2010). “[BJecause expert or scientific testimony possesses an aura of special reliability and trustworthiness, the proffer of such testimony must be carefully scrutinized.” Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 632 (D.C. 1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1979These two decisions are instructive on the kinds of expert testimony that are and are not admissible and thus on the proper — and limited — role of the Frye test. [23] Although the third criterion adopted by this court in Dyas, supra, requires the trial court to evaluate the proffered expert's methodology by reference to the degree of "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs," Frye, supra, 54 App.D.C. at 47 , 293 F. at 1014 , the 1972 edition of McCormick on Evidence, supra, encourages courts, in considering scientific evidence, to ignore the third test, relegating any d

1979These two decisions are instructive on the kinds of expert testimony that are and are not admissible and thus on the proper — and limited — role of the Frye test. [23] Although the third criterion adopted by this court in Dyas, supra, requires the trial court to evaluate the proffered expert's methodology by reference to the degree of "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs," Frye, supra, 54 App.D.C. at 47 , 293 F. at 1014 , the 1972 edition of McCormick on Evidence, supra, encourages courts, in considering scientific evidence, to ignore the third test, relegating any d

2025See Motorola II, 147 A.3d at 757 (concluding that “Rule 702, with its expanded focus on whether reliable principles and methods have been reliably applied, states a rule that is preferable to the Dyas/Frye test”).

2024After the trial—but before oral argument of these appeals—this court issued its decision in Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751 (D.C. 2016) (en banc), ending this jurisdiction’s use of the Dyas/Frye test and adopting the test for the admission of expert testimony initially set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and subsequently in Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 7 Motorola, 147 A.3d at 756-57 .

2011Instead, the most these courts have done is to impose guidelines for the presentation of such evidence. [8] *1138 In sum, nothing presented to the trial court (or to us) suggests that the pattern matching methodology is no longer generally accepted, [9] and there was no need for Judge Dixon to expend scarce judicial resources on a Frye hearing. [10] See Jones, 548 A.2d at 40, 42 ("General acceptance means just that; the answer cannot vary from case to case.... [So in evaluating general acceptance,] judicial notice of court opinions and scientific literature is appropriate and, on occasion, eve

2011Instead, the most these courts have done is to impose guidelines for the presentation of such evidence. [8] *1138 In sum, nothing presented to the trial court (or to us) suggests that the pattern matching methodology is no longer generally accepted, [9] and there was no need for Judge Dixon to expend scarce judicial resources on a Frye hearing. [10] See Jones, 548 A.2d at 40, 42 ("General acceptance means just that; the answer cannot vary from case to case.... [So in evaluating general acceptance,] judicial notice of court opinions and scientific literature is appropriate and, on occasion, eve

2016Frye test, under which scientific testimony is admissible only if the theory or methodology on which it is based has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.” (John) Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 977 (D.C. 2010). “[B]ecause expert or scientific testimony possesses an aura of special reliability and trustworthiness, the proffer of such testimony must be carefully 6 scrutinized.” Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 632 (D.C. 1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2016Frye test, under which scientific testimony is admissible only if the theory or methodology on which it is based has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.” (John) Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 977 (D.C. 2010). “[BJecause expert or scientific testimony possesses an aura of special reliability and trustworthiness, the proffer of such testimony must be carefully scrutinized.” Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 632 (D.C. 1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2012On the basis of the record before the trial judge, we agree that handwriting comparison and identification as practiced by FBI examiners passes the Frye test for admissibility. “[Scientists significant either in number or experience [must] public[ly] oppose a new technique or method as unreliable” before that “technique or method does not pass muster under Frye.” United States v. Jenkins, 887 A.2d 1013, 1022 (D.C.2005) (internal brackets omitted).

2012On the basis of the record before the trial judge, we agree that handwriting comparison and identification as practiced by FBI examiners passes the Frye test for admissibility. “[Scientists significant either in number or experience [must] public[ly] oppose a new technique or method as unreliable” before that “technique or method does not pass muster under Frye.” United States v. Jenkins, 887 A.2d 1013, 1022 (D.C.2005) (internal brackets omitted).

2000The Frye test remains in effect in this jurisdiction, however, see, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 588 (D.C.1999), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct 841 , 145 L.Ed.2d 707 (2000), and a division of this court lacks the authority to supplant Frye with Daubert and Kumho Tire Co. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971).

2000The Frye test remains in effect in this jurisdiction, however, see, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 588 (D.C.1999), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct 841 , 145 L.Ed.2d 707 (2000), and a division of this court lacks the authority to supplant Frye with Daubert and Kumho Tire Co. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971).

1992As Judge McGowan explained for the court in United States v. Addison, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 199, 201 , 498 F.2d 741, 743 (1974), the Frye standard retards somewhat the admission of proof based on new methods of scientific investigation by requiring that they attain sufficient currency and status to gain the general acceptance of the relevant scientific community.

1992As Judge McGowan explained for the court in United States v. Addison, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 199, 201 , 498 F.2d 741, 743 (1974), the Frye standard retards somewhat the admission of proof based on new methods of scientific investigation by requiring that they attain sufficient currency and status to gain the general acceptance of the relevant scientific community.

2007Investors, 754 A.2d 928 , 943 n. 15 (D.C.2000) (affirming that Frye test remains in effect in the District of Columbia). “[U]n-der Frye , the proponent of a new technology must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that this technology has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.” Porter, 618 A.2d at 633 .

2005As this court reiterated in Porter , “the Frye standard retards somewhat *1022 the admission of proof based on new methods of scientific investigation by requiring that they attain sufficient currency and status to gain acceptance of the relevant scientific community.” Porter, supra, 618 A.2d at 633 (quoting United States v. Addison, 162 U.S.App.

2012Thus, the question arises initially whether the Frye inquiry must be conducted as to handwriting comparison, when expert opinion testimony of this kind has been admitted in the courts of the District for over a century. 3 In (Ricardo) Jones, supra, the court upheld the refusal of the trial court to conduct a Frye hearing before admitting an expert opinion based on firearms comparison; we stated that “[pjattern matching is not new, and courts in this jurisdiction have long been admitting firearms identifications based on this method.” (Ricardo) Jones, 27 A.3d at 1137 ; see also Spann v. State,

2012Thus, the question arises initially whether the Frye inquiry must be conducted as to handwriting comparison, when expert opinion testimony of this kind has been admitted in the courts of the District for over a century. 3 In (Ricardo) Jones, supra, the court upheld the refusal of the trial court to conduct a Frye hearing before admitting an expert opinion based on firearms comparison; we stated that “[pjattern matching is not new, and courts in this jurisdiction have long been admitting firearms identifications based on this method.” (Ricardo) Jones, 27 A.3d at 1137 ; see also Spann v. State,

2021Id. at 755 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) and Rule 702(a)). 12 Id. (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 ). 17 adversary system,” in which “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” 13 Both the preliminary reliability determination and the manner in which it is made are committed to the trial judge’s discretion, reviewable for abuse. 14 At appellant’s first trial, which was held before our decision in Motorol

2021Id. at 755 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) and Rule 702(a)). 12 Id. (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 ). 17 adversary system,” in which “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” 13 Both the preliminary reliability determination and the manner in which it is made are committed to the trial judge’s discretion, reviewable for abuse. 14 At appellant’s first trial, which was held before our decision in Motorol

2016See Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1100 (D.C. 1996) (en banc) (noting “the advantage that uniformity with the federal rule and the vast majority 8 Our decision to adopt Rule 702 means, among other things, that we will no longer ask whether the subject matter is “beyond the ken of the average layman.” Dyas, 376 A.2d at 832 .

2016See Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1100 (D.C. 1996) (en banc) (noting “the advantage that uniformity with the federal rule and the vast majority 8 Our decision to adopt Rule 702 means, among other things, that we will no longer ask whether the subject matter is “beyond the ken of the average layman.” Dyas, 376 A.2d at 832 .

2016However, under Dyas/Frye, this inquiry “begins—and ends—with a determination of whether there is general acceptance of a particular scientific methodology, not an acceptance, beyond that, of particular study results based on that methodology.” Id. at 638 ; see also President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Wheeler, 75 A.3d 280, 291 (D.C. 2013) (“The third Dyas requirement focuses not on the acceptance of a particular conclusion derived from the methodology, but rather on the acceptance of the methodology itself.” (ellipsis, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2016However, under Dyas/Frye, this inquiry “begins—and ends—-with a determination of whether there is general acceptance of a particular scientific methodology, not an acceptance, beyond that, of particular study results based on that methodology.” Id. at 638 ; see also President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Wheeler, 75 A.3d 280, 291 (D.C. 2013) (“The third Dyas requirement focuses not on the acceptance of a particular conclusion derived from the methodology, but rather on the acceptance of the methodology itself.” (ellipsis, .brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2012Thus, the question arises initially whether the Frye inquiry must be conducted as to handwriting comparison, when expert opinion testimony of this kind has been admitted in the courts of the District for over a century. 3 In (Ricardo) Jones, supra, the court upheld the refusal of the trial court to conduct a Frye hearing before admitting an expert opinion based on firearms comparison; we stated that “[pjattern matching is not new, and courts in this jurisdiction have long been admitting firearms identifications based on this method.” (Ricardo) Jones, 27 A.3d at 1137 ; see also Spann v. State,

2012Thus, the question arises initially whether the Frye inquiry must be conducted as to handwriting comparison, when expert opinion testimony of this kind has been admitted in the courts of the District for over a century. 3 In (Ricardo) Jones, supra, the court upheld the refusal of the trial court to conduct a Frye hearing before admitting an expert opinion based on firearms comparison; we stated that “[pjattern matching is not new, and courts in this jurisdiction have long been admitting firearms identifications based on this method.” (Ricardo) Jones, 27 A.3d at 1137 ; see also Spann v. State,

2012Cf. Pettus v. United States, 37 A.3d 213, 217 (D.C.2012) (concluding that it was proper for this court to determine whether “handwriting identification meets Frye’s general acceptance standard” where expert testimony on the topic arguably was not novel but where such a determination had not previously been announced in our cases).

2012Cf. Pettus v. United States, 37 A.3d 213, 217 (D.C.2012) (concluding that it was proper for this court to determine whether “handwriting identification meets Frye’s general acceptance standard” where expert testimony on the topic arguably was not novel but where such a determination had not previously been announced in our cases).

2011Frye only applies to "a novel scientific test or a unique controversial methodology or technique." Drevenak v. Abendschein, 773 A.2d 396, 418 (D.C.2001); see Cook v. Edgewood Mgmt.

2011Frye only applies to "a novel scientific test or a unique controversial methodology or technique." Drevenak v. Abendschein, 773 A.2d 396, 418 (D.C.2001); see Cook v. Edgewood Mgmt.

2011In any event, we have read Leaks's motion, and nothing in it undermines the conclusions we explain below. [4] See State v. Lucero, 207 Ariz. 301 , 85 P.3d 1059, 1062 (App.2004) ("To earn the right to a Frye hearing on previously accepted scientific evidence, the party opposing its admissibility must preliminarily demonstrate that the method is no longer accorded general scientific acceptance.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [5] See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557, 566 (D.C.2005); Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65 , 66-67 n. 7 (D.C. 1996); Frendak v. United

2011In any event, we have read Leaks's motion, and nothing in it undermines the conclusions we explain below. [4] See State v. Lucero, 207 Ariz. 301 , 85 P.3d 1059, 1062 (App.2004) ("To earn the right to a Frye hearing on previously accepted scientific evidence, the party opposing its admissibility must preliminarily demonstrate that the method is no longer accorded general scientific acceptance.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [5] See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557, 566 (D.C.2005); Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65 , 66-67 n. 7 (D.C. 1996); Frendak v. United

2011In any event, we have read Leaks's motion, and nothing in it undermines the conclusions we explain below. [4] See State v. Lucero, 207 Ariz. 301 , 85 P.3d 1059, 1062 (App.2004) ("To earn the right to a Frye hearing on previously accepted scientific evidence, the party opposing its admissibility must preliminarily demonstrate that the method is no longer accorded general scientific acceptance.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [5] See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557, 566 (D.C.2005); Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65 , 66-67 n. 7 (D.C. 1996); Frendak v. United

2011In any event, we have read Leaks's motion, and nothing in it undermines the conclusions we explain below. [4] See State v. Lucero, 207 Ariz. 301 , 85 P.3d 1059, 1062 (App.2004) ("To earn the right to a Frye hearing on previously accepted scientific evidence, the party opposing its admissibility must preliminarily demonstrate that the method is no longer accorded general scientific acceptance.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [5] See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557, 566 (D.C.2005); Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65 , 66-67 n. 7 (D.C. 1996); Frendak v. United

2011In any event, we have read Leaks's motion, and nothing in it undermines the conclusions we explain below. [4] See State v. Lucero, 207 Ariz. 301 , 85 P.3d 1059, 1062 (App.2004) ("To earn the right to a Frye hearing on previously accepted scientific evidence, the party opposing its admissibility must preliminarily demonstrate that the method is no longer accorded general scientific acceptance.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [5] See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557, 566 (D.C.2005); Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65 , 66-67 n. 7 (D.C. 1996); Frendak v. United

2011In any event, we have read Leaks's motion, and nothing in it undermines the conclusions we explain below. [4] See State v. Lucero, 207 Ariz. 301 , 85 P.3d 1059, 1062 (App.2004) ("To earn the right to a Frye hearing on previously accepted scientific evidence, the party opposing its admissibility must preliminarily demonstrate that the method is no longer accorded general scientific acceptance.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [5] See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557, 566 (D.C.2005); Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65 , 66-67 n. 7 (D.C. 1996); Frendak v. United

2011In any event, we have read Leaks's motion, and nothing in it undermines the conclusions we explain below. [4] See State v. Lucero, 207 Ariz. 301 , 85 P.3d 1059, 1062 (App.2004) ("To earn the right to a Frye hearing on previously accepted scientific evidence, the party opposing its admissibility must preliminarily demonstrate that the method is no longer accorded general scientific acceptance.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [5] See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557, 566 (D.C.2005); Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65 , 66-67 n. 7 (D.C. 1996); Frendak v. United

2011In any event, we have read Leaks's motion, and nothing in it undermines the conclusions we explain below. [4] See State v. Lucero, 207 Ariz. 301 , 85 P.3d 1059, 1062 (App.2004) ("To earn the right to a Frye hearing on previously accepted scientific evidence, the party opposing its admissibility must preliminarily demonstrate that the method is no longer accorded general scientific acceptance.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [5] See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557, 566 (D.C.2005); Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65 , 66-67 n. 7 (D.C. 1996); Frendak v. United

2011In any event, we have read Leaks's motion, and nothing in it undermines the conclusions we explain below. [4] See State v. Lucero, 207 Ariz. 301 , 85 P.3d 1059, 1062 (App.2004) ("To earn the right to a Frye hearing on previously accepted scientific evidence, the party opposing its admissibility must preliminarily demonstrate that the method is no longer accorded general scientific acceptance.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [5] See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557, 566 (D.C.2005); Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65 , 66-67 n. 7 (D.C. 1996); Frendak v. United

2011In any event, we have read Leaks's motion, and nothing in it undermines the conclusions we explain below. [4] See State v. Lucero, 207 Ariz. 301 , 85 P.3d 1059, 1062 (App.2004) ("To earn the right to a Frye hearing on previously accepted scientific evidence, the party opposing its admissibility must preliminarily demonstrate that the method is no longer accorded general scientific acceptance.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [5] See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557, 566 (D.C.2005); Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65 , 66-67 n. 7 (D.C. 1996); Frendak v. United

2011In any event, we have read Leaks's motion, and nothing in it undermines the conclusions we explain below. [4] See State v. Lucero, 207 Ariz. 301 , 85 P.3d 1059, 1062 (App.2004) ("To earn the right to a Frye hearing on previously accepted scientific evidence, the party opposing its admissibility must preliminarily demonstrate that the method is no longer accorded general scientific acceptance.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [5] See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557, 566 (D.C.2005); Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65 , 66-67 n. 7 (D.C. 1996); Frendak v. United

2011In any event, we have read Leaks's motion, and nothing in it undermines the conclusions we explain below. [4] See State v. Lucero, 207 Ariz. 301 , 85 P.3d 1059, 1062 (App.2004) ("To earn the right to a Frye hearing on previously accepted scientific evidence, the party opposing its admissibility must preliminarily demonstrate that the method is no longer accorded general scientific acceptance.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [5] See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557, 566 (D.C.2005); Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65 , 66-67 n. 7 (D.C. 1996); Frendak v. United

2011The Frye Standard In the District of Columbia, "before expert testimony about a new scientific principle [may] be admitted, the testing methodology must have become `sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.'" Williams v. District of Columbia, 558 A.2d 344, 346 (D.C.1989) (quoting Frye, 54 App.D.C. at 47, 293 F. at 1014).

2011The Frye Standard In the District of Columbia, “before expert testimony about a new scientific principle [may] be admitted, the testing methodology must have become ‘sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’ ” Williams v. District of Columbia, 558 A.2d 344, 346 (D.C.1989) (quoting Frye, 54 App.D.C. at 47, 293 F. at 1014).

2011"The third criterion incorporates the so-called Frye test, under which scientific testimony is admissible only if the theory or methodology on which it is based has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community." Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 977 (D.C.2010) (citing Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 47 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923)). [11] 978 A.2d 1257 (D.C.2009).

2011"The third criterion incorporates the so-called Frye test, under which scientific testimony is admissible only if the theory or methodology on which it is based has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community." Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 977 (D.C.2010) (citing Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 47 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923)). [11] 978 A.2d 1257 (D.C.2009).

2009In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the Supreme Court rejected Fiye's requirement of "general acceptance” as a precondition to admissibility and required instead that the trial judge, acting as "gatekeeper," determine whether the proffered expert testimony is "scientific knowledge," so that "evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.” Id. at 590 & n. 9, 113 S.Ct. 2786 ; cf. People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417 , 611 N.Y.S.2d 97 , 633 N.E.2d 451, 464 (1994) (Kaye, C.J., concurring) (noting that the "general acceptance”

2009In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the Supreme Court rejected Fiye's requirement of "general acceptance” as a precondition to admissibility and required instead that the trial judge, acting as "gatekeeper," determine whether the proffered expert testimony is "scientific knowledge," so that "evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.” Id. at 590 & n. 9, 113 S.Ct. 2786 ; cf. People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417 , 611 N.Y.S.2d 97 , 633 N.E.2d 451, 464 (1994) (Kaye, C.J., concurring) (noting that the "general acceptance”

2000The Frye test remains in effect in this jurisdiction, however, see, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 588 (D.C.1999), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct 841 , 145 L.Ed.2d 707 (2000), and a division of this court lacks the authority to supplant Frye with Daubert and Kumho Tire Co. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971).

2000The Frye test remains in effect in this jurisdiction, however, see, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 588 (D.C.1999), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct 841 , 145 L.Ed.2d 707 (2000), and a division of this court lacks the authority to supplant Frye with Daubert and Kumho Tire Co. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971).