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10 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lindemuthgreen2 sentences1994The Frye test was first adopted in New Mexico in 1952 when this Court affirmed a district court’s exclusion of expert opinion testimony regarding truth serum that was not “reliable or generally approved and accepted by members of the medical profession specializing in psychiatry.” State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 271 , 243 P.2d 325, 334 (1952). 1994The Frye test was first adopted in New Mexico in 1952 when this Court affirmed a district court’s exclusion of expert opinion testimony regarding truth serum that was not “reliable or generally approved and accepted by members of the medical profession specializing in psychiatry.” State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 271 , 243 P.2d 325, 334 (1952). | 3 | 4 |
United States v. John W. Downinggreen2 sentences1994STANDARD OF ADMISSIBILITY This Court recently held in Alberico, 116 N.M. at 167 , 861 P.2d at 203 , that “the Frye test ‘should be rejected as an independent controlling standard of admissibility.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir.1985)). 1994STANDARD OF ADMISSIBILITY This Court recently held in Alberico, 116 N.M. at 167 , 861 P.2d at 203 , that “the Frye test ‘should be rejected as an independent controlling standard of admissibility.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir.1985)). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Hamptongreen2 sentences1993See People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 951 (Colo.1987); see also 1 McCormick on Evidence § 203, at 871 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter McCormick]. 1993See People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 951 (Colo.1987); see also 1 McCormick on Evidence § 203, at 871 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter McCormick]. | 2 | 2 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences2016The Frye test was subsequently rejected by the 2 U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 3 589 (1993)(holding that the Frye test was superceded by the adoption of the Federal 4 Rules of Evidence), and our own Supreme Court in Alberico, 1993-NMSC-047 , ¶¶ 2, 5 97. 2016The Frye test was subsequently rejected by the 2 U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 3 589 (1993)(holding that the Frye test was superceded by the adoption of the Federal 4 Rules of Evidence), and our own Supreme Court in Alberico, 1993-NMSC-047 , ¶¶ 2, 5 97. | 1 | 5 |
Fuyat v. Los Alamos National Laboratorygreen2 sentences2002For example, in Fuyat v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab. 112 N.M. 102, 105-06 , 811 P.2d 1313, 1316-17 (Ct.App.1991), this Court affirmed the WCJ’s decision not to apply the Frye standard to workers’ compensation proceedings. 2002For example, in Fuyat v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab. 112 N.M. 102, 105-06 , 811 P.2d 1313, 1316-17 (Ct.App.1991), this Court affirmed the WCJ’s decision not to apply the Frye standard to workers’ compensation proceedings. | 1 | 4 |
Frye v. United Statesred2 sentences1994Duran filed a motion to exclude the scientific testimony regarding the DNA evidence and requested a hearing pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). 1 The trial court conducted the Frye hearing and took judicial notice of the expert testimony presented in Anderson. 1994Duran filed a motion to exclude the scientific testimony regarding the DNA evidence and requested a hearing pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). 1 The trial court conducted the Frye hearing and took judicial notice of the expert testimony presented in Anderson. | 1 | 2 |
Sheridan v. Catering Management, Inc.green2 sentences2002Sheridan v. Catering Management, Inc., 252 Neb. 825 , 566 N.W.2d 110, 114 (1997). {12} Jurisdictions that have adopted the Daubert standard or some variation on it are no more uniform in their treatment of its application to compensation proceedings. 2002Sheridan v. Catering Management, Inc., 252 Neb. 825 , 566 N.W.2d 110, 114 (1997). {12} Jurisdictions that have adopted the Daubert standard or some variation on it are no more uniform in their treatment of its application to compensation proceedings. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lanigangreen2 sentences2002Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 , 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (1994). 2002Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 , 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
US Sugar Corp. v. Hensongreen2 sentences2002U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So.2d 104, 109 (Fla.2002) (emphasizing that the Frye standard applies only when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or novel scientific techniques); City of Aurora v. Vaughn, 824 P.2d 825, 826 (Colo.App.1991) (indicating that the Frye standard is a “special foundation requirement for novel or new scientific devices or processes involving the evaluation of physical evidence” (emphasis in the original)); K-Mart Corporation v. Morrison, 609 N.E.2d 17, 23-26 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that infrared thermography has not gained general accep 2002U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So.2d 104, 109 (Fla.2002) (emphasizing that the Frye standard applies only when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or novel scientific techniques); City of Aurora v. Vaughn, 824 P.2d 825, 826 (Colo.App.1991) (indicating that the Frye standard is a “special foundation requirement for novel or new scientific devices or processes involving the evaluation of physical evidence” (emphasis in the original)); K-Mart Corporation v. Morrison, 609 N.E.2d 17, 23-26 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that infrared thermography has not gained general accep | 1 | 1 |
K-Mart Corp. v. Morrisongreen2 sentences2002U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So.2d 104, 109 (Fla.2002) (emphasizing that the Frye standard applies only when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or novel scientific techniques); City of Aurora v. Vaughn, 824 P.2d 825, 826 (Colo.App.1991) (indicating that the Frye standard is a “special foundation requirement for novel or new scientific devices or processes involving the evaluation of physical evidence” (emphasis in the original)); K-Mart Corporation v. Morrison, 609 N.E.2d 17, 23-26 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that infrared thermography has not gained general accep 2002U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So.2d 104, 109 (Fla.2002) (emphasizing that the Frye standard applies only when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or novel scientific techniques); City of Aurora v. Vaughn, 824 P.2d 825, 826 (Colo.App.1991) (indicating that the Frye standard is a “special foundation requirement for novel or new scientific devices or processes involving the evaluation of physical evidence” (emphasis in the original)); K-Mart Corporation v. Morrison, 609 N.E.2d 17, 23-26 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that infrared thermography has not gained general accep | 1 | 1 |
City of Aurora v. Vaughngreen2 sentences2002U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So.2d 104, 109 (Fla.2002) (emphasizing that the Frye standard applies only when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or novel scientific techniques); City of Aurora v. Vaughn, 824 P.2d 825, 826 (Colo.App.1991) (indicating that the Frye standard is a “special foundation requirement for novel or new scientific devices or processes involving the evaluation of physical evidence” (emphasis in the original)); K-Mart Corporation v. Morrison, 609 N.E.2d 17, 23-26 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that infrared thermography has not gained general accep 2002U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So.2d 104, 109 (Fla.2002) (emphasizing that the Frye standard applies only when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or novel scientific techniques); City of Aurora v. Vaughn, 824 P.2d 825, 826 (Colo.App.1991) (indicating that the Frye standard is a “special foundation requirement for novel or new scientific devices or processes involving the evaluation of physical evidence” (emphasis in the original)); K-Mart Corporation v. Morrison, 609 N.E.2d 17, 23-26 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that infrared thermography has not gained general accep | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vandebogartgreen2 sentences1994Unless otherwise stated, we derive our scientific explanation of DNA and DNA profiling from testimony given at the Frye hearing, from a report entitled “DNA Technology in Forensic Science,” which the National Research Council published in April 1992, and from Government of Virgin Islands v. Penn, 838 F.Supp. 1054, 1057-73 (D.V.I.1993) and State v. Vandebogart, 136 N.H. 365 , 616 A.2d 483, 486 (1992). 1994Unless otherwise stated, we derive our scientific explanation of DNA and DNA profiling from testimony given at the Frye hearing, from a report entitled “DNA Technology in Forensic Science,” which the National Research Council published in April 1992, and from Government of Virgin Islands v. Penn, 838 F.Supp. 1054, 1057-73 (D.V.I.1993) and State v. Vandebogart, 136 N.H. 365 , 616 A.2d 483, 486 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Government of Virgin Islands v. Penngreen2 sentences1994Unless otherwise stated, we derive our scientific explanation of DNA and DNA profiling from testimony given at the Frye hearing, from a report entitled “DNA Technology in Forensic Science,” which the National Research Council published in April 1992, and from Government of Virgin Islands v. Penn, 838 F.Supp. 1054, 1057-73 (D.V.I.1993) and State v. Vandebogart, 136 N.H. 365 , 616 A.2d 483, 486 (1992). 1994Unless otherwise stated, we derive our scientific explanation of DNA and DNA profiling from testimony given at the Frye hearing, from a report entitled “DNA Technology in Forensic Science,” which the National Research Council published in April 1992, and from Government of Virgin Islands v. Penn, 838 F.Supp. 1054, 1057-73 (D.V.I.1993) and State v. Vandebogart, 136 N.H. 365 , 616 A.2d 483, 486 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Castrogreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., Caldwell, 393 S.E.2d at 441 ; Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 425-26 ; Polk, 612 So.2d at 391 ; People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956 , 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 (Sup.Ct.1989); Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 783; Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 797. 1994See, e.g., Caldwell, 393 S.E.2d at 441 ; Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 425-26 ; Polk, 612 So.2d at 391 ; People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956 , 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 (Sup.Ct.1989); Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 783; Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 797. | 1 | 1 |
Caldwell v. Stategreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., Caldwell, 393 S.E.2d at 441 ; Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 425-26 ; Polk, 612 So.2d at 391 ; People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956 , 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 (Sup.Ct.1989); Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 783; Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 797. 1994See, e.g., Caldwell, 393 S.E.2d at 441 ; Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 425-26 ; Polk, 612 So.2d at 391 ; People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956 , 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 (Sup.Ct.1989); Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 783; Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 797. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences1994Anderson, 115 N.M. at 437, 444 , 853 P.2d at 139, 146 . 1994Anderson, 115 N.M. at 437, 444 , 853 P.2d at 139, 146 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jakobetzgreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F.Supp. 250 (D.Vt.1990), aff'd 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 104 , 121 L.Ed.2d 63 (1992); Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d 841 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988), cert. denied, 542 So.2d 1332 (Fla.1989); Pierce, 597 N.E.2d at 112 . 1993See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F.Supp. 250 (D.Vt.1990), aff'd 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 104 , 121 L.Ed.2d 63 (1992); Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d 841 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988), cert. denied, 542 So.2d 1332 (Fla.1989); Pierce, 597 N.E.2d at 112 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pizarrogreen2 sentences1993See People v. Pizarro, 10 Cal.App.4th 57 , 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 436 (1992) (remanding for Frye hearing because it was unacceptable to appellate court that only one expert, an FBI scientist, testified below). 1993See People v. Pizarro, 10 Cal.App.4th 57 , 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 436 (1992) (remanding for Frye hearing because it was unacceptable to appellate court that only one expert, an FBI scientist, testified below). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Montalbogreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Randolph Jakobetzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bowden v. Clinton Correctional Facilitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Alberico
green
2 sentences1994Because this Court recently abandoned the use of the Frye test in New Mexico to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence, State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156 , 861 P.2d 192 (1998), we address only one issue: Whether the procedures and calculations used in determining the probability of a coincidental DNA match meet the standard provided by our rules of evidence in SCRA 1986, 11-702 (Repl.Pamp.1994) (testimony by experts), SCRA 1986, 11-703 (Repl.Pamp.1994) (bases of expert opinion testimony), SCRA 1986,11-403 (Repl.Pamp.1994) (exclusion of relevant prejudicial evidence) and explained in 1994Because this Court recently abandoned the use of the Frye test in New Mexico to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence, State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156 , 861 P.2d 192 (1998), we address only one issue: Whether the procedures and calculations used in determining the probability of a coincidental DNA match meet the standard provided by our rules of evidence in SCRA 1986, 11-702 (Repl.Pamp.1994) (testimony by experts), SCRA 1986, 11-703 (Repl.Pamp.1994) (bases of expert opinion testimony), SCRA 1986,11-403 (Repl.Pamp.1994) (exclusion of relevant prejudicial evidence) and explained in | 2 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Alberico
green
2 sentences1994Because this Court recently abandoned the use of the Frye test in New Mexico to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence, State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156 , 861 P.2d 192 (1998), we address only one issue: Whether the procedures and calculations used in determining the probability of a coincidental DNA match meet the standard provided by our rules of evidence in SCRA 1986, 11-702 (Repl.Pamp.1994) (testimony by experts), SCRA 1986, 11-703 (Repl.Pamp.1994) (bases of expert opinion testimony), SCRA 1986,11-403 (Repl.Pamp.1994) (exclusion of relevant prejudicial evidence) and explained in 1994Because this Court recently abandoned the use of the Frye test in New Mexico to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence, State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156 , 861 P.2d 192 (1998), we address only one issue: Whether the procedures and calculations used in determining the probability of a coincidental DNA match meet the standard provided by our rules of evidence in SCRA 1986, 11-702 (Repl.Pamp.1994) (testimony by experts), SCRA 1986, 11-703 (Repl.Pamp.1994) (bases of expert opinion testimony), SCRA 1986,11-403 (Repl.Pamp.1994) (exclusion of relevant prejudicial evidence) and explained in | 2 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1999On the contrary, the Alberico-Daubert standard explicitly incorporates “general acceptance” as a factor for courts to consider in determining the admissibility of scientific testimony, see Anderson, 118 N.M. at 299-300 , 881 P.2d at 44-45 , and we believe that the novel status of a particular scientific principle or procedure may be addressed in considering this factor. 1999On the contrary, the Alberico-Daubert standard explicitly incorporates “general acceptance” as a factor for courts to consider in determining the admissibility of scientific testimony, see Anderson, 118 N.M. at 299-300 , 881 P.2d at 44-45 , and we believe that the novel status of a particular scientific principle or procedure may be addressed in considering this factor. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Schwartz
green
2 sentences1994See, e.g., Caldwell, 393 S.E.2d at 441 ; Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 425-26 ; Polk, 612 So.2d at 391 ; People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956 , 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 (Sup.Ct.1989); Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 783; Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 797. 1994See, e.g., Caldwell, 393 S.E.2d at 441 ; Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 425-26 ; Polk, 612 So.2d at 391 ; People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956 , 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 (Sup.Ct.1989); Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 783; Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 797. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Polk v. State
green
2 sentences1994See, e.g., Caldwell, 393 S.E.2d at 441 ; Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 425-26 ; Polk, 612 So.2d at 391 ; People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956 , 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 (Sup.Ct.1989); Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 783; Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 797. 1994See, e.g., Caldwell, 393 S.E.2d at 441 ; Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 425-26 ; Polk, 612 So.2d at 391 ; People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956 , 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 (Sup.Ct.1989); Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 783; Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 797. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Lipscomb
green
2 sentences1993See, e.g., State v. Montalbo, 73 Haw. 130 , 828 P.2d 1274 (1992); People v. Lipscomb, 215 Ill.App.3d 413 , 158 Ill.Dec. 952 , 574 N.E.2d 1345 , cert. denied, 141 Ill.2d 553 , 162 Ill.Dec. 501 , 580 N.E.2d 127 (1991); Kelly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.Ct.App.1990) (applying relevancy standard, not Frye standard), aff'd, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim. 1993See, e.g., State v. Montalbo, 73 Haw. 130 , 828 P.2d 1274 (1992); People v. Lipscomb, 215 Ill.App.3d 413 , 158 Ill.Dec. 952 , 574 N.E.2d 1345 , cert. denied, 141 Ill.2d 553 , 162 Ill.Dec. 501 , 580 N.E.2d 127 (1991); Kelly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.Ct.App.1990) (applying relevancy standard, not Frye standard), aff'd, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Mohit
green
2 sentences1993Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 995 . 1993Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 995 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Andrews v. State
green
2 sentences1993See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F.Supp. 250 (D.Vt.1990), aff'd 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 104 , 121 L.Ed.2d 63 (1992); Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d 841 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988), cert. denied, 542 So.2d 1332 (Fla.1989); Pierce, 597 N.E.2d at 112 . 1993See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F.Supp. 250 (D.Vt.1990), aff'd 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 104 , 121 L.Ed.2d 63 (1992); Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d 841 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988), cert. denied, 542 So.2d 1332 (Fla.1989); Pierce, 597 N.E.2d at 112 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United States v. Matthew Sylvester Two Bulls, A/K/A Matthew Sylvester Two Bulls, Jr.
green
2 sentences1993A federal court of appeals held that admission of the DNA evidence produced by the FBI was reversible error in United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir.1990), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 925 F.2d 1127 , appeal dismissed, 925 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir.1991) (after death of appellant). 1993A federal court of appeals held that admission of the DNA evidence produced by the FBI was reversible error in United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir.1990), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 925 F.2d 1127 , appeal dismissed, 925 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir.1991) (after death of appellant). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Maria L. CURRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary, Defendant-Appellee
green
2 sentences1993A federal court of appeals held that admission of the DNA evidence produced by the FBI was reversible error in United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir.1990), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 925 F.2d 1127 , appeal dismissed, 925 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir.1991) (after death of appellant). 1993A federal court of appeals held that admission of the DNA evidence produced by the FBI was reversible error in United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir.1990), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 925 F.2d 1127 , appeal dismissed, 925 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir.1991) (after death of appellant). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Kelly v. State
green
1 sentence1993See, e.g., State v. Montalbo, 73 Haw. 130 , 828 P.2d 1274 (1992); People v. Lipscomb, 215 Ill.App.3d 413 , 158 Ill.Dec. 952 , 574 N.E.2d 1345 , cert. denied, 141 Ill.2d 553 , 162 Ill.Dec. 501 , 580 N.E.2d 127 (1991); Kelly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.Ct.App.1990) (applying relevancy standard, not Frye standard), aff'd, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Kelly v. State
green
1 sentence1993See, e.g., State v. Montalbo, 73 Haw. 130 , 828 P.2d 1274 (1992); People v. Lipscomb, 215 Ill.App.3d 413 , 158 Ill.Dec. 952 , 574 N.E.2d 1345 , cert. denied, 141 Ill.2d 553 , 162 Ill.Dec. 501 , 580 N.E.2d 127 (1991); Kelly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.Ct.App.1990) (applying relevancy standard, not Frye standard), aff'd, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Pierce green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.