Frye test in Connecticut

2005Porter changed the applicable evidentiary test from the Frye test to the broader test more recently articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L.

2005Porter changed the applicable evidentiary test from the Frye test to the broader test more recently articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L.

1997Ed. 2d 50 (1989) (use of photographs by forensic entomologist to determine age of fly larvae found on body satisfied Frye); State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 245-48 , 541 A.2d 96 (1988) (testimony on “shaken baby syndrome” admissible under Frye); State v. Sherman, 38 Conn. App. 371, 409 , 662 A.2d 767 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 905 , 665 A.2d 905 (1995) (“Connecticut courts utilize the Frye standard in appraising the admissibility of evidence derived from innovative scientific techniques” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

1997Ed. 2d 50 (1989) (use of photographs by forensic entomologist to determine age of fly larvae found on body satisfied Frye); State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 245-48 , 541 A.2d 96 (1988) (testimony on “shaken baby syndrome” admissible under Frye); State v. Sherman, 38 Conn. App. 371, 409 , 662 A.2d 767 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 905 , 665 A.2d 905 (1995) (“Connecticut courts utilize the Frye standard in appraising the admissibility of evidence derived from innovative scientific techniques” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

1995Connecticut courts utilize “the Frye standard in appraising the admissibility of evidence derived from innovative scientific techniques.” Moore v. McNamara, 201 Conn. 16, 30 , 513 A.2d 660 (1986).

1995Connecticut courts utilize “the Frye standard in appraising the admissibility of evidence derived from innovative scientific techniques.” Moore v. McNamara, 201 Conn. 16, 30 , 513 A.2d 660 (1986).

2002Additionally, although State v. Spigarolo, supra, 210 Conn. 359 , is not conclusive on the issue of what constitutes scientific evidence, we note that where the defendant has sought to impeach the testimony of the minor victim based on inconsistencies, partial disclosures, or recantations relating to the alleged incidents, the state may present expert opinion evidence that such behavior by minor sexual abuse victims is common.

2002Additionally, although State v. Spigarolo, supra, 210 Conn. 359 , is not conclusive on the issue of what constitutes scientific evidence, we note that where the defendant has sought to impeach the testimony of the minor victim based on inconsistencies, partial disclosures, or recantations relating to the alleged incidents, the state may present expert opinion evidence that such behavior by minor sexual abuse victims is common.

2002“In 1997, however, our Supreme Court squarely addressed that issue in State v. Porter, [ 241 Conn. 57, 66-68 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2002“In 1997, however, our Supreme Court squarely addressed that issue in State v. Porter, [ 241 Conn. 57, 66-68 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2002“In 1997, however, our Supreme Court squarely addressed that issue in State v. Porter, [ 241 Conn. 57, 66-68 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2002“In 1997, however, our Supreme Court squarely addressed that issue in State v. Porter, [ 241 Conn. 57, 66-68 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2002“In 1997, however, our Supreme Court squarely addressed that issue in State v. Porter, [ 241 Conn. 57, 66-68 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2002“In 1997, however, our Supreme Court squarely addressed that issue in State v. Porter, [ 241 Conn. 57, 66-68 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2002“In 1997, however, our Supreme Court squarely addressed that issue in State v. Porter, [ 241 Conn. 57, 66-68 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2002“In 1997, however, our Supreme Court squarely addressed that issue in State v. Porter, [ 241 Conn. 57, 66-68 , 698 A.2d 739 (1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2002The Reid Court thus began its discussion of the defendant's Porter challenge by "examin[ing] the expert testimony at issue in the present case to determine whether it is of the type contemplated by Porter ." Reid , supra 254 Conn. at 546 .

2002The Reid Court thus began its discussion of the defendant's Porter challenge by "examin[ing] the expert testimony at issue in the present case to determine whether it is of the type contemplated by Porter ." Reid , supra 254 Conn. at 546 .

2002People v. Brown , 110 Cal.Rptr. 750 , 762 (Cal.Ct.App. 2001); People v. Hill , 107 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 119 (Cal.Ct.App. 2001); People v. Allen , 85 Cal.Rptr. 655 , 660 (Cal.Ct.App. 1999); Lemour v. State , 802 So.2d 402 , 405 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2001).

2000In State v. Esposito, 235 Conn. 802 , 670 A.2d 301 (1996), our Supreme Court noted that it had earlier “acknowledged that the ‘general acceptance’ test set forth in [Frye] . . . constituted the prevailing standard for evaluating the admissibility of scientific evidence”; id., 831 ; but it took care to say, “[w]e did not, however, expressly adopt the Frye test as the sole standard . . . and we decline to do so today.” Id., 832.

2000In State v. Esposito, 235 Conn. 802 , 670 A.2d 301 (1996), our Supreme Court noted that it had earlier “acknowledged that the ‘general acceptance’ test set forth in [Frye] . . . constituted the prevailing standard for evaluating the admissibility of scientific evidence”; id., 831 ; but it took care to say, “[w]e did not, however, expressly adopt the Frye test as the sole standard . . . and we decline to do so today.” Id., 832.

1998State v. Zollo, 36 Conn. App. 718, 726 , 654 A.2d 359 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 906 , 660 A.2d 859 (1995).

1998State v. Zollo, 36 Conn. App. 718, 726 , 654 A.2d 359 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 906 , 660 A.2d 859 (1995).

1998State v. Zollo, 36 Conn. App. 718, 726 , 654 A.2d 359 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 906 , 660 A.2d 859 (1995).

1998State v. Zollo, 36 Conn. App. 718, 726 , 654 A.2d 359 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 906 , 660 A.2d 859 (1995).

1998State v. Zollo, 36 Conn. App. 718, 726 , 654 A.2d 359 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 906 , 660 A.2d 859 (1995).

1998State v. Zollo, 36 Conn. App. 718, 726 , 654 A.2d 359 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 906 , 660 A.2d 859 (1995).

1997See State v. Hasan, supra, 205 Conn. 489 ; State v. Miller, 202 Conn. 463, 484 , 522 A.2d 463 (1987).

1997See State v. Hasan, supra, 205 Conn. 489 ; State v. Miller, 202 Conn. 463, 484 , 522 A.2d 463 (1987).

1997We begin by noting that, at present, Connecticut nominally follows the Frye rule. 10 See, e.g., State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 153-54 , 646 A.2d 169 (1994) (restriction fragment length polymorphism procedure as part of DNA analysis “generally accepted in the scientific community”); State v. John, 210 Conn. 652, 678 , 557 A.2d 93 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824 , 110 S. Ct. 84 , 107 L.

1997We begin by noting that, at present, Connecticut nominally follows the Frye rule. 10 See, e.g., State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 153-54 , 646 A.2d 169 (1994) (restriction fragment length polymorphism procedure as part of DNA analysis “generally accepted in the scientific community”); State v. John, 210 Conn. 652, 678 , 557 A.2d 93 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824 , 110 S. Ct. 84 , 107 L.

1997Ed. 2d 50 (1989) (use of photographs by forensic entomologist to determine age of fly larvae found on body satisfied Frye); State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 245-48 , 541 A.2d 96 (1988) (testimony on “shaken baby syndrome” admissible under Frye); State v. Sherman, 38 Conn. App. 371, 409 , 662 A.2d 767 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 905 , 665 A.2d 905 (1995) (“Connecticut courts utilize the Frye standard in appraising the admissibility of evidence derived from innovative scientific techniques” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

1997Ed. 2d 50 (1989) (use of photographs by forensic entomologist to determine age of fly larvae found on body satisfied Frye); State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 245-48 , 541 A.2d 96 (1988) (testimony on “shaken baby syndrome” admissible under Frye); State v. Sherman, 38 Conn. App. 371, 409 , 662 A.2d 767 , cert. denied, 235 Conn. 905 , 665 A.2d 905 (1995) (“Connecticut courts utilize the Frye standard in appraising the admissibility of evidence derived from innovative scientific techniques” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

1997Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. . . . [N]othing in Daubert . . . disturb [s] the settled precedent that polygraph evidence is . . . [not] admissible . . . .” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]). a The most significant, and fundamental, problem with allowing polygraph evidence in court is that it would invade the fact-finding province of the jury. 58 The jury has traditionally been the sole arbiter of witness credibility. 59 State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 438 , 678 A.2d 1338 (1996); State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342, 347 , 673 A.2d 463 (1996); see

1997Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. . . . [N]othing in Daubert . . . disturb [s] the settled precedent that polygraph evidence is . . . [not] admissible . . . .” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]). a The most significant, and fundamental, problem with allowing polygraph evidence in court is that it would invade the fact-finding province of the jury. 58 The jury has traditionally been the sole arbiter of witness credibility. 59 State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 438 , 678 A.2d 1338 (1996); State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342, 347 , 673 A.2d 463 (1996); see

1997Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. . . . [N]othing in Daubert . . . disturb [s] the settled precedent that polygraph evidence is . . . [not] admissible . . . .” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]). a The most significant, and fundamental, problem with allowing polygraph evidence in court is that it would invade the fact-finding province of the jury. 58 The jury has traditionally been the sole arbiter of witness credibility. 59 State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 438 , 678 A.2d 1338 (1996); State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342, 347 , 673 A.2d 463 (1996); see

1997Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. . . . [N]othing in Daubert . . . disturb [s] the settled precedent that polygraph evidence is . . . [not] admissible . . . .” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]). a The most significant, and fundamental, problem with allowing polygraph evidence in court is that it would invade the fact-finding province of the jury. 58 The jury has traditionally been the sole arbiter of witness credibility. 59 State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 438 , 678 A.2d 1338 (1996); State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342, 347 , 673 A.2d 463 (1996); see

1997In doing so, we follow in the footsteps of the many jurisdictions that, both before 20 and after 21 the Daubert decision, have chosen to reject the Frye standard as an absolute prerequisite to the admissibility of scientific evidence. 22 See, e.g., State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 98 , 393 S.E.2d 847 (1990) (admissibility of scientific evidence should be based on “the reliability of the scientific method rather than its popularity within a scientific community”). 3 We now turn to our reasons for concluding that the Daubert approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence is the proper app

1997In doing so, we follow in the footsteps of the many jurisdictions that, both before 20 and after 21 the Daubert decision, have chosen to reject the Frye standard as an absolute prerequisite to the admissibility of scientific evidence. 22 See, e.g., State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 98 , 393 S.E.2d 847 (1990) (admissibility of scientific evidence should be based on “the reliability of the scientific method rather than its popularity within a scientific community”). 3 We now turn to our reasons for concluding that the Daubert approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence is the proper app

1997See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 169 Conn. 161, 170 , 362 A.2d 808 (1975) (polygraph evidence inadmissible because unreliable, and because “[c]redibility as an issue is committed to the sole determination of the trier of fact”); see also State v. Esposito, supra, 235 Conn. 831 (polygraph evidence inadmissible because of “[t]he questionable accuracy of polygraph tests”); State v. Duntz, 223 Conn. 207, 238 , 613 A.2d 224 (1992) (polygraph evidence inadmissible “[d]ue to the questionable accuracy of the results of polygraph examinations”); State v. Plourde, 208 Conn. 455, 471 , 545 A.2d 1071 (1988),

1997See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 169 Conn. 161, 170 , 362 A.2d 808 (1975) (polygraph evidence inadmissible because unreliable, and because “[c]redibility as an issue is committed to the sole determination of the trier of fact”); see also State v. Esposito, supra, 235 Conn. 831 (polygraph evidence inadmissible because of “[t]he questionable accuracy of polygraph tests”); State v. Duntz, 223 Conn. 207, 238 , 613 A.2d 224 (1992) (polygraph evidence inadmissible “[d]ue to the questionable accuracy of the results of polygraph examinations”); State v. Plourde, 208 Conn. 455, 471 , 545 A.2d 1071 (1988),

1997We begin by noting that, at present, Connecticut nominally follows the Frye rule. 10 See, e.g., State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 153-54 , 646 A.2d 169 (1994) (restriction fragment length polymorphism procedure as part of DNA analysis “generally accepted in the scientific community”); State v. John, 210 Conn. 652, 678 , 557 A.2d 93 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824 , 110 S. Ct. 84 , 107 L.

1997We begin by noting that, at present, Connecticut nominally follows the Frye rule. 10 See, e.g., State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 153-54 , 646 A.2d 169 (1994) (restriction fragment length polymorphism procedure as part of DNA analysis “generally accepted in the scientific community”); State v. John, 210 Conn. 652, 678 , 557 A.2d 93 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824 , 110 S. Ct. 84 , 107 L.

1997We begin by noting that, at present, Connecticut nominally follows the Frye rule. 10 See, e.g., State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 153-54 , 646 A.2d 169 (1994) (restriction fragment length polymorphism procedure as part of DNA analysis “generally accepted in the scientific community”); State v. John, 210 Conn. 652, 678 , 557 A.2d 93 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824 , 110 S. Ct. 84 , 107 L.

1997We begin by noting that, at present, Connecticut nominally follows the Frye rule. 10 See, e.g., State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 153-54 , 646 A.2d 169 (1994) (restriction fragment length polymorphism procedure as part of DNA analysis “generally accepted in the scientific community”); State v. John, 210 Conn. 652, 678 , 557 A.2d 93 , cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824 , 110 S. Ct. 84 , 107 L.