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6 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1991–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co.green2 sentences2005Power Co. (1983), 202 Mont. 185, 193 , 657 P.2d 594, 598 , we rejected the Frye test as not being ‘in conformity with the spirit of the new rules of evidence.” We adopted the reasoning of United States v. Bailer (4th Cir. 1975), 519 F.2d 463, 466 , wherein the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that ‘It is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation.” Barmeyer, 202 Mont. at 193-94 , 657 P.2d at 598 . 2005Power Co. (1983), 202 Mont. 185, 193 , 657 P.2d 594, 598 , we rejected the Frye test as not being ‘in conformity with the spirit of the new rules of evidence.” We adopted the reasoning of United States v. Bailer (4th Cir. 1975), 519 F.2d 463, 466 , wherein the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that ‘It is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation.” Barmeyer, 202 Mont. at 193-94 , 657 P.2d at 598 . | 2 | 3 |
Williams v. Hedicangreen2 sentences1999See also Williams v. Hedican (Iowa 1997), 561 N.W.2d 817, 825-27 (concluding, in dicta, that the approach taken in Thornton and other federal courts restricting Daubert in favor of a conventional Rule 702 analysis was reasonable); Collins v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1997), 951 S.W.2d 569, 574-75 (concluding that although the court previously adopted the Daubert analysis, Daubert was not triggered because the doctor’s expert testimony concerned basic female anatomical findings that “did not involve any novel scientific techniques or theories”); and State v. Hodgson (Minn. 1994), 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (ack 1999See also Williams v. Hedican (Iowa 1997), 561 N.W.2d 817, 825-27 (concluding, in dicta, that the approach taken in Thornton and other federal courts restricting Daubert in favor of a conventional Rule 702 analysis was reasonable); Collins v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1997), 951 S.W.2d 569, 574-75 (concluding that although the court previously adopted the Daubert analysis, Daubert was not triggered because the doctor’s expert testimony concerned basic female anatomical findings that “did not involve any novel scientific techniques or theories”); and State v. Hodgson (Minn. 1994), 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (ack | 2 | 2 |
Collins v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1999See also Williams v. Hedican (Iowa 1997), 561 N.W.2d 817, 825-27 (concluding, in dicta, that the approach taken in Thornton and other federal courts restricting Daubert in favor of a conventional Rule 702 analysis was reasonable); Collins v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1997), 951 S.W.2d 569, 574-75 (concluding that although the court previously adopted the Daubert analysis, Daubert was not triggered because the doctor’s expert testimony concerned basic female anatomical findings that “did not involve any novel scientific techniques or theories”); and State v. Hodgson (Minn. 1994), 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (ack 1999See also Williams v. Hedican (Iowa 1997), 561 N.W.2d 817, 825-27 (concluding, in dicta, that the approach taken in Thornton and other federal courts restricting Daubert in favor of a conventional Rule 702 analysis was reasonable); Collins v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1997), 951 S.W.2d 569, 574-75 (concluding that although the court previously adopted the Daubert analysis, Daubert was not triggered because the doctor’s expert testimony concerned basic female anatomical findings that “did not involve any novel scientific techniques or theories”); and State v. Hodgson (Minn. 1994), 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (ack | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hodgsongreen2 sentences1999See also Williams v. Hedican (Iowa 1997), 561 N.W.2d 817, 825-27 (concluding, in dicta, that the approach taken in Thornton and other federal courts restricting Daubert in favor of a conventional Rule 702 analysis was reasonable); Collins v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1997), 951 S.W.2d 569, 574-75 (concluding that although the court previously adopted the Daubert analysis, Daubert was not triggered because the doctor’s expert testimony concerned basic female anatomical findings that “did not involve any novel scientific techniques or theories”); and State v. Hodgson (Minn. 1994), 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (ack 1999See also Williams v. Hedican (Iowa 1997), 561 N.W.2d 817, 825-27 (concluding, in dicta, that the approach taken in Thornton and other federal courts restricting Daubert in favor of a conventional Rule 702 analysis was reasonable); Collins v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1997), 951 S.W.2d 569, 574-75 (concluding that although the court previously adopted the Daubert analysis, Daubert was not triggered because the doctor’s expert testimony concerned basic female anatomical findings that “did not involve any novel scientific techniques or theories”); and State v. Hodgson (Minn. 1994), 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (ack | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences1991Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co. (1983), 202 Mont. 185, 193 , 657 P.2d 594, 598 ; State v. Clark (1988), 234 Mont. 222, 227 , 762 P.2d 853, 856 . 1991Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co. (1983), 202 Mont. 185, 193 , 657 P.2d 594, 598 ; State v. Clark (1988), 234 Mont. 222, 227 , 762 P.2d 853, 856 . | 2 | 1991–1991 |
United States v. John W. Downing
green
2 sentences1991Appellant further argues that besides the “general acceptance” prong, the remaining prong of the Frye test requires a threshold determination of reliability of expert testimony to novel areas of scientific expertise, citing United States v. Downing (3d Cir. 1985), 753 F.2d 1224, 1237-39 . 1991Appellant further argues that besides the “general acceptance” prong, the remaining prong of the Frye test requires a threshold determination of reliability of expert testimony to novel areas of scientific expertise, citing United States v. Downing (3d Cir. 1985), 753 F.2d 1224, 1237-39 . | 2 | 1991–1991 |
Missouri v. Frye
green
1 sentence2013Frye, _ U.S. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 1405 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Moore
green
2 sentences2005Nearly twelve years later, we adopted Daubert , concluding that ‘before a trial court admits scientific expert testimony, there must be a preliminary showing that the expert’s opinion is premised on a reliable methodology.” State v. Moore (1994), 268 Mont. 20, 42 , 885 P.2d 457, 471 . ¶66 Unfortunately, we also stated that the Daubert guidelines were consistent with Barmeyer concerning the admission of‘hovel scientific evidence.” Moore, 268 Mont, at 42 , 885 P.2d at 471 . 2005Nearly twelve years later, we adopted Daubert , concluding that ‘before a trial court admits scientific expert testimony, there must be a preliminary showing that the expert’s opinion is premised on a reliable methodology.” State v. Moore (1994), 268 Mont. 20, 42 , 885 P.2d 457, 471 . ¶66 Unfortunately, we also stated that the Daubert guidelines were consistent with Barmeyer concerning the admission of‘hovel scientific evidence.” Moore, 268 Mont, at 42 , 885 P.2d at 471 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 , 113 S.Ct. at 2794 . 2005Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 , 113 S.Ct. at 2794 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Carl Joseph Baller, Jr.
green
2 sentences2005Power Co. (1983), 202 Mont. 185, 193 , 657 P.2d 594, 598 , we rejected the Frye test as not being ‘in conformity with the spirit of the new rules of evidence.” We adopted the reasoning of United States v. Bailer (4th Cir. 1975), 519 F.2d 463, 466 , wherein the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that ‘It is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation.” Barmeyer, 202 Mont. at 193-94 , 657 P.2d at 598 . 2005Power Co. (1983), 202 Mont. 185, 193 , 657 P.2d 594, 598 , we rejected the Frye test as not being ‘in conformity with the spirit of the new rules of evidence.” We adopted the reasoning of United States v. Bailer (4th Cir. 1975), 519 F.2d 463, 466 , wherein the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that ‘It is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation.” Barmeyer, 202 Mont. at 193-94 , 657 P.2d at 598 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Frye v. United States
red
2 sentences1991Frye v. United States (D.C.Cir.1923), 293 F. 1013, 1014 . 1991Frye v. United States (D.C.Cir.1923), 293 F. 1013, 1014 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.