Frye standard in Maryland

2022Over time, however, as Judge Adkins observed, the scope of the “general acceptance” standard, in practice although not expressly, has been expanded to include “testimony based on any scientific principle—new or old.” Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138 , 8 Frye-Reed refers to the seminal case of Frye v. State, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923), which articulated a standard for admissibility of novel scientific expert testimony, and Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978), which adopted the Frye standard in Maryland. 16 180 (2017) (Adkins, J., concurring).

2022Over time, however, as Judge Adkins observed, the scope of the “general acceptance” standard, in practice although not expressly, has been expanded to include “testimony based on any scientific principle—new or old.” Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138 , 8 Frye-Reed refers to the seminal case of Frye v. State, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923), which articulated a standard for admissibility of novel scientific expert testimony, and Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978), which adopted the Frye standard in Maryland. 16 180 (2017) (Adkins, J., concurring).

2025Those factors are: 1) whether experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for the purposes of testifying; 2) whether the expert has 11 In federal courts and in a supermajority of the states, these five factors have replaced the Frye standard, originating from the 1923 case Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.

2025Those factors are: 1) whether experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for the purposes of testifying; 2) whether the expert has 11 In federal courts and in a supermajority of the states, these five factors have replaced the Frye standard, originating from the 1923 case Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.

2022With respect to this reliability assessment, the Court 19 See Rochkind, 471 Md. at 14 n.5 (noting that courts have referred to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), as the “Daubert Trilogy”). 27 provided a non-exclusive list of factors for federal trial courts to consider: (1) “whether a theory or technique ... can be (and has been) tested”; (2) “whether [it] has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) “the known or potential rate of error”; (4) “

2022With respect to this reliability assessment, the Court 19 See Rochkind, 471 Md. at 14 n.5 (noting that courts have referred to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), as the “Daubert Trilogy”). 27 provided a non-exclusive list of factors for federal trial courts to consider: (1) “whether a theory or technique ... can be (and has been) tested”; (2) “whether [it] has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) “the known or potential rate of error”; (4) “

2009We recognized in Reed that seminal scientific technologies may be rejected, because the “Frye standard retards somewhat the admission of proof based on new methods of scientific investigation by requiring that they attain sufficient currency and status to gain the general acceptance of the relevant scientific community,” id. at 385, 391 A.2d at 370 , quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C.Cir.1974), in that “[f]airness to a litigant would seem to require that before the results of a scientific process can be used against him, he is entitled to a scientific judgment on the

1978We have acknowledged the existence of a'... misleading aura of certainty which often envelops a new scientific process, obscuring its currently experimental nature.’ (Huntingdon v. Crowley, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 656, 51 Cal.Rptr. at p. 262, 414 P.2d at p. 390;.....) As stated in Addison, supra, in the course of rejecting the admissibility of voiceprint testimony, ‘scientific proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury —’ (United States v. Addison, supra, 498 F. 2d at p. 744 .)” In addition to the advantage of substituting scientific for lay judgm

2008See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 450 , 681 P.2d 291 , 298 & n. 7, 299 (1984) (holding that the trial court erred in admitting "rape trauma syndrome" testimony to prove that a victim had been raped, iterating that the Frye standard is the proper basis for determining the admissibility of "rape trauma syndrome" testimony); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645 , 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982) (holding that expert psychiatric testimony on "rape trauma syndrome" is relevant and admissible where the defense is consent, iterating that the Frye standard is applicable to testimony regarding a p

2008See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 450 , 681 P.2d 291 , 298 & n. 7, 299 (1984) (holding that the trial court erred in admitting "rape trauma syndrome" testimony to prove that a victim had been raped, iterating that the Frye standard is the proper basis for determining the admissibility of "rape trauma syndrome" testimony); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645 , 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982) (holding that expert psychiatric testimony on "rape trauma syndrome" is relevant and admissible where the defense is consent, iterating that the Frye standard is applicable to testimony regarding a p

2017We initially set forth the standards and purposes of applying Frye-Reed to expert evidence: If ... a novel scientific process does achieve general acceptance in the scientific community, there will likely be as little dispute over its reliability as there is now concerning other areas of forensic science which have been deemed admissible under the Frye standard, such as blood tests, ballistics tests, etc. Id. at 586-87, 971 A.2d at 242 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2017We initially set forth the standards and purposes of applying Frye-Reed to expert evidence: If ... a novel scientific process does achieve general acceptance in the scientific community, there will likely be as little dispute over its reliability as there is now concerning other areas of forensic science which have been deemed admissible under the Frye standard, such as blood tests, ballistics tests, etc. Id. at 586-87, 971 A.2d at 242 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2022Over time, however, as Judge Adkins observed, the scope of the “general acceptance” standard, in practice although not expressly, has been expanded to include “testimony based on any scientific principle—new or old.” Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138 , 8 Frye-Reed refers to the seminal case of Frye v. State, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923), which articulated a standard for admissibility of novel scientific expert testimony, and Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978), which adopted the Frye standard in Maryland. 16 180 (2017) (Adkins, J., concurring).

2022Over time, however, as Judge Adkins observed, the scope of the “general acceptance” standard, in practice although not expressly, has been expanded to include “testimony based on any scientific principle—new or old.” Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138 , 8 Frye-Reed refers to the seminal case of Frye v. State, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923), which articulated a standard for admissibility of novel scientific expert testimony, and Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978), which adopted the Frye standard in Maryland. 16 180 (2017) (Adkins, J., concurring).

2006Only seven months ago, in Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339 , 896 A.2d 1059 (2006), this Court unanimously maintained its allegiance to the Frye test, as it had done four years earlier in Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191 , 803 A.2d 1034 (2002).

2006Only seven months ago, in Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339 , 896 A.2d 1059 (2006), this Court unanimously maintained its allegiance to the Frye test, as it had done four years earlier in Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191 , 803 A.2d 1034 (2002).

2007See e.g., Roche v. Lincoln Property Co., 278 F.Supp.2d 744 (E.D.Va.2003) (applying the Daubert test to determine the admissibility of a physician’s testimony that mold exposure caused various ailments); Flores v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s Company, 229 F.Supp.2d 697 (S.D.Tex.2002) (applying the Daubert test to a medical expert’s testimony regarding mold exposure and illness); Mondelli v. Kendel Homes Corp., 262 Neb. 263 , 631 N.W.2d 846 (2001) (applying the Frye test to determine the admissibility of medical expert testimony regarding mold exposure and respiratory illness); Geffcken v. D Andrea, 1

2007See e.g., Roche v. Lincoln Property Co., 278 F.Supp.2d 744 (E.D.Va.2003) (applying the Daubert test to determine the admissibility of a physician’s testimony that mold exposure caused various ailments); Flores v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s Company, 229 F.Supp.2d 697 (S.D.Tex.2002) (applying the Daubert test to a medical expert’s testimony regarding mold exposure and illness); Mondelli v. Kendel Homes Corp., 262 Neb. 263 , 631 N.W.2d 846 (2001) (applying the Frye test to determine the admissibility of medical expert testimony regarding mold exposure and respiratory illness); Geffcken v. D Andrea, 1

2008See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 450 , 681 P.2d 291 , 298 & n. 7, 299 (1984) (holding that the trial court erred in admitting "rape trauma syndrome" testimony to prove that a victim had been raped, iterating that the Frye standard is the proper basis for determining the admissibility of "rape trauma syndrome" testimony); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645 , 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982) (holding that expert psychiatric testimony on "rape trauma syndrome" is relevant and admissible where the defense is consent, iterating that the Frye standard is applicable to testimony regarding a p

2008See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 450 , 681 P.2d 291 , 298 & n. 7, 299 (1984) (holding that the trial court erred in admitting "rape trauma syndrome" testimony to prove that a victim had been raped, iterating that the Frye standard is the proper basis for determining the admissibility of "rape trauma syndrome" testimony); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645 , 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982) (holding that expert psychiatric testimony on "rape trauma syndrome" is relevant and admissible where the defense is consent, iterating that the Frye standard is applicable to testimony regarding a p

2022With respect to this reliability assessment, the Court 19 See Rochkind, 471 Md. at 14 n.5 (noting that courts have referred to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), as the “Daubert Trilogy”). 27 provided a non-exclusive list of factors for federal trial courts to consider: (1) “whether a theory or technique ... can be (and has been) tested”; (2) “whether [it] has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) “the known or potential rate of error”; (4) “

2022With respect to this reliability assessment, the Court 19 See Rochkind, 471 Md. at 14 n.5 (noting that courts have referred to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), as the “Daubert Trilogy”). 27 provided a non-exclusive list of factors for federal trial courts to consider: (1) “whether a theory or technique ... can be (and has been) tested”; (2) “whether [it] has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) “the known or potential rate of error”; (4) “

1986This Court agreed with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn.1980), where it was said: “Under the Frye rule, the results of mechanical or scientific testing are not admissible unless the testing has developed or improved to the point where experts in the field widely share the view that the results are scientifically reliable as accurate.

1986This Court agreed with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn.1980), where it was said: “Under the Frye rule, the results of mechanical or scientific testing are not admissible unless the testing has developed or improved to the point where experts in the field widely share the view that the results are scientifically reliable as accurate.

2006Only seven months ago, in Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339 , 896 A.2d 1059 (2006), this Court unanimously maintained its allegiance to the Frye test, as it had done four years earlier in Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191 , 803 A.2d 1034 (2002).

2006Only seven months ago, in Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339 , 896 A.2d 1059 (2006), this Court unanimously maintained its allegiance to the Frye test, as it had done four years earlier in Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191 , 803 A.2d 1034 (2002).

1986In McDonald , 37 Cal.3d 351 , 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 , the California court rejected the Frye test as to such evidence, stating: “[Cjourts have invoked the Kelly-Frye rule primarily in cases involving novel devices or processes such as lie detectors, ‘truth serum/ Nalline testing, experimental systems of blood typing, ‘voiceprints,’ identification by human bite marks, microscopic analysis of gunshot residue, and hypnosis (People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18, 51-54 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 ], and cases cited), and, most recently, proof of guilt by ‘rape trauma syndrome’ (P

1986In McDonald , 37 Cal.3d 351 , 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 , the California court rejected the Frye test as to such evidence, stating: “[Cjourts have invoked the Kelly-Frye rule primarily in cases involving novel devices or processes such as lie detectors, ‘truth serum/ Nalline testing, experimental systems of blood typing, ‘voiceprints,’ identification by human bite marks, microscopic analysis of gunshot residue, and hypnosis (People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18, 51-54 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 ], and cases cited), and, most recently, proof of guilt by ‘rape trauma syndrome’ (P

1986In State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 679-681 , 464 A.2d 1028 (1983) , we applied the Frye test to expert testimony based on a witness having been hypnotized.

1986In State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 679-681 , 464 A.2d 1028 (1983) , we applied the Frye test to expert testimony based on a witness having been hypnotized.

2008See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 450 , 681 P.2d 291 , 298 & n. 7, 299 (1984) (holding that the trial court erred in admitting "rape trauma syndrome" testimony to prove that a victim had been raped, iterating that the Frye standard is the proper basis for determining the admissibility of "rape trauma syndrome" testimony); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645 , 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982) (holding that expert psychiatric testimony on "rape trauma syndrome" is relevant and admissible where the defense is consent, iterating that the Frye standard is applicable to testimony regarding a p

2008See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 450 , 681 P.2d 291 , 298 & n. 7, 299 (1984) (holding that the trial court erred in admitting "rape trauma syndrome" testimony to prove that a victim had been raped, iterating that the Frye standard is the proper basis for determining the admissibility of "rape trauma syndrome" testimony); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645 , 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982) (holding that expert psychiatric testimony on "rape trauma syndrome" is relevant and admissible where the defense is consent, iterating that the Frye standard is applicable to testimony regarding a p

2002In Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 270 Kan. 443 , 14 P.3d 1170 (2000), while reversing a summary judgment entered on the ground that the opinions expressed by appellant’s “causation” experts were not generally accepted by other experts in the relevant scientific community, the Supreme Court of Kansas noted: It is well-established that the Frye test is exclusively concerned with the methodologies underlying expert testimony, rather than the conclusions of that testimony.

2002In Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 270 Kan. 443 , 14 P.3d 1170 (2000), while reversing a summary judgment entered on the ground that the opinions expressed by appellant’s “causation” experts were not generally accepted by other experts in the relevant scientific community, the Supreme Court of Kansas noted: It is well-established that the Frye test is exclusively concerned with the methodologies underlying expert testimony, rather than the conclusions of that testimony.

1999It may not be used to establish the accused’s level of blood alcohol in the absence of a chemical analysis showing the proscribed level in the accused’s blood, breath or urine. 718 P.2d at 182 (emphasis added).

1999It may not be used to establish the accused’s level of blood alcohol in the absence of a chemical analysis showing the proscribed level in the accused’s blood, breath or urine. 718 P.2d at 182 (emphasis added).

1999See Polk v. State, 48 Md.App. 382 , 427 A.2d 1041 (1981).

1999See Polk v. State, 48 Md.App. 382 , 427 A.2d 1041 (1981).

1996Id. at 212 (citing United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.1977)).

1996Id. at 212 (citing United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.1977)).