Frye test in Arizona

2005See State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 582 , 858 P.2d 1152, 1185 (1993) (DNA sample matching meets Frye test for admissibility); State v. Garcia, 197 Ariz. 79 , 3 P.3d 999 (App.1999) (statistical formulas utilized to calculate likelihood ratios used to interpret mixed DNA samples meets Frye test for admissibility); United States v. Ewell, 252 F.Supp.2d 104, 111-12 (D.N.J.2003) (noting numerous state appellate court cases have recognized the reliability of certain DNA testing as “virtually beyond reproach.”).

2005See State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 582 , 858 P.2d 1152, 1185 (1993) (DNA sample matching meets Frye test for admissibility); State v. Garcia, 197 Ariz. 79 , 3 P.3d 999 (App.1999) (statistical formulas utilized to calculate likelihood ratios used to interpret mixed DNA samples meets Frye test for admissibility); United States v. Ewell, 252 F.Supp.2d 104, 111-12 (D.N.J.2003) (noting numerous state appellate court cases have recognized the reliability of certain DNA testing as “virtually beyond reproach.”).

2013Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir. 1923); see also Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470 , 489 ¶ 56, 1 P.3d 113, 132 (2000) (retaining the Frye rule in Arizona).

2013Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir. 1923); see also Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470 , 489 ¶ 56, 1 P.3d 113, 132 (2000) (retaining the Frye rule in Arizona).

2014In opposition, the State argued that because the expert testimony was based on the doctors’ individual training and experience as “medical doctors, pediatricians who specialize in children who have been abused,” their testimony was admissible pursuant to Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470 , 1 P.3d 113 (2000), without the need for a Frye hearing. ¶16 At the time of the Frye motion, defense counsel had received copies of the doctors’ reports but had not requested copies of their curricula vitae (“CV”) and had not yet interviewed them.

2014In opposition, the State argued that because the expert testimony was based on the doctors’ individual training and experience as “medical doctors, pediatricians who specialize in children who have been abused,” their testimony was admissible pursuant to Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470 , 1 P.3d 113 (2000), without the need for a Frye hearing. ¶16 At the time of the Frye motion, defense counsel had received copies of the doctors’ reports but had not requested copies of their curricula vitae (“CV”) and had not yet interviewed them.

1990Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180 , 644 P.2d 1266 [ Collins I ], supplemental opinion on rehearing, 132 Ariz. at 193 , 644 P.2d at 1279 (1982) [ Collins II ]. [2] The Frye test inquires whether the scientific principle or method used is sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.

1990Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180 , 644 P.2d 1266 [ Collins I ], supplemental opinion on rehearing, 132 Ariz. at 193 , 644 P.2d at 1279 (1982) [ Collins II ]. [2] The Frye test inquires whether the scientific principle or method used is sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.

2011See State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 277-80 , 371 P.2d 894, 896-98 (1962). ¶ 10 In Daubert , the United States Supreme Court interpreted language in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which at that time was the same as the Arizona rale, and adopted an approach for determining the admissibility of scientific expert testimony that rejected the plain language of the rale and the Frye test as the sole criteria.

2011See State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 277-80 , 371 P.2d 894, 896-98 (1962). ¶ 10 In Daubert , the United States Supreme Court interpreted language in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which at that time was the same as the Arizona rale, and adopted an approach for determining the admissibility of scientific expert testimony that rejected the plain language of the rale and the Frye test as the sole criteria.

2006The pre-trial inquiry into the general acceptance of a scientific principle or discovery underlying an expert witness’s proffered testimony became known as the Frye test, which, until 1993, was “the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence at trial.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

2006The pre-trial inquiry into the general acceptance of a scientific principle or discovery underlying an expert witness’s proffered testimony became known as the Frye test, which, until 1993, was “the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence at trial.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

2004Cf State v. Harris, 152 Ariz. 150, 152 , 730 P.2d 859, 861 (App.1986) (to be entitled to a Frye hearing, a party opposing the scientific method must be “supported by authorities indicating that there may not be general scientific acceptance of the technique employed.”).

2004Cf State v. Harris, 152 Ariz. 150, 152 , 730 P.2d 859, 861 (App.1986) (to be entitled to a Frye hearing, a party opposing the scientific method must be “supported by authorities indicating that there may not be general scientific acceptance of the technique employed.”).

1998State v. Velasco, 165 Ariz. 480, 486 , 799 P.2d 821, 827 (1990).

1998State v. Velasco, 165 Ariz. 480, 486 , 799 P.2d 821, 827 (1990).

2014Lehr, 201 Ariz. 509, ¶ 26 , 38 P.3d at 1180 . 17 It concluded that the trial court’s preclusion of the evidence presented at the Frye hearing “infringed upon the role of the jury and improperly insulated the state’s evidence from critique.” Lehr, 201 Ariz. 509, ¶ 29 , 38 P.3d at 1180 . ¶ 68 Although the supreme court has adopted new rules for the pretrial determination of the admissibility of expert testimony since Lehr, see Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, ¶ 1 , 325 P.3d at 997 , those rules similarly recognize that the threshold Daubert screening is not intended to diminish the jury’s role in

2014Lehr, 201 Ariz. 509, ¶ 26 , 38 P.3d at 1180 . 17 It concluded that the trial court’s preclusion of the evidence presented at the Frye hearing “infringed upon the role of the jury and improperly insulated the state’s evidence from critique.” Lehr, 201 Ariz. 509, ¶ 29 , 38 P.3d at 1180 . ¶ 68 Although the supreme court has adopted new rules for the pretrial determination of the admissibility of expert testimony since Lehr, see Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, ¶ 1 , 325 P.3d at 997 , those rules similarly recognize that the threshold Daubert screening is not intended to diminish the jury’s role in

1995See, e.g., State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 578 , 804 P.2d 109, 111 (App. 1990) ( Frye hearing not required where presentation is of comparative evidence by an expert).

1995See, e.g., State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 578 , 804 P.2d 109, 111 (App. 1990) ( Frye hearing not required where presentation is of comparative evidence by an expert).

1987Appellant argues that the Frye test was not applicable, citing State v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212 , 700 P.2d 1312 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 , 105 S.Ct. 2169 , 471 U.S. 1094 (1985), which held that the Frye rule is not applicable to all expert testimony.

1987Appellant argues that the Frye test was not applicable, citing State v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212 , 700 P.2d 1312 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 , 105 S.Ct. 2169 , 471 U.S. 1094 (1985), which held that the Frye rule is not applicable to all expert testimony.

1985The Frye test, as adopted in Arizona, is as follows: “To be accepted by a court as fact, a scientific principle must have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Scales v. City Court, 122 Ariz. 231 , 594 P.2d 97 (1979).

1985The Frye test, as adopted in Arizona, is as follows: “To be accepted by a court as fact, a scientific principle must have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Scales v. City Court, 122 Ariz. 231 , 594 P.2d 97 (1979).

2016See State v. Miller, 234 Ariz. 31 , 41 ¶ 29, 316 P.3d 1219, 1229 (2013) (holding that the Frye, not Daubert, standard applied to defendant’s trial, which ended before Arizona’s amended Evidence Rule 702 took effect in January 2012); Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 616 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting the absence of “authority in which the Daubert standard has been imposed on states as a requirement of due process in any context, including criminal trials”). ¶ 146 Nor did the trial court err by declining to hold a Frye hearing before ruling on the admissibility of Hamilton’s testimony.

2016See State v. Miller, 234 Ariz. 31 , 41 ¶ 29, 316 P.3d 1219, 1229 (2013) (holding that the Frye, not Daubert, standard applied to defendant’s trial, which ended before Arizona’s amended Evidence Rule 702 took effect in January 2012); Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 616 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting the absence of “authority in which the Daubert standard has been imposed on states as a requirement of due process in any context, including criminal trials”). ¶ 146 Nor did the trial court err by declining to hold a Frye hearing before ruling on the admissibility of Hamilton’s testimony.

2007See Maule, 142 Ariz. at 515 , 690 P.2d at 816 ; see also Twin City Fire Ins.

2007See Maule, 142 Ariz. at 515 , 690 P.2d at 816 ; see also Twin City Fire Ins.

2001We review de novo, however, “whether a scientific principle used as a basis for expert testimony is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.” State v. Johnson, 186 Ariz. 329, 334 , 922 P.2d 294, 299 (1996) (citing Bible, 175 Ariz. at 578 , 858 P.2d at 1181 ). ¶ 9 Wozniak relies solely on Frye to support his contention that the drug screen results are not generally accepted as providing scientific evidence of the presence of a drug or its metabolite, and therefore the drug screen should not have been admitted as evidence against him. 1 The Frye test is designed to ensure that an

2001We review de novo, however, “whether a scientific principle used as a basis for expert testimony is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.” State v. Johnson, 186 Ariz. 329, 334 , 922 P.2d 294, 299 (1996) (citing Bible, 175 Ariz. at 578 , 858 P.2d at 1181 ). ¶ 9 Wozniak relies solely on Frye to support his contention that the drug screen results are not generally accepted as providing scientific evidence of the presence of a drug or its metabolite, and therefore the drug screen should not have been admitted as evidence against him. 1 The Frye test is designed to ensure that an

2011“Thus,” the court concluded, “we retain the Frye rule but continue to apply it as described in [State v.] Hummert [, 188 Ariz. 119 , 933 P.2d 1187 (1997) ].

2011“Thus,” the court concluded, “we retain the Frye rule but continue to apply it as described in [State v.] Hummert [, 188 Ariz. 119 , 933 P.2d 1187 (1997) ].

2001In State v. Varela, we cited Stoll as support for our conclusion that Frye was inapplicable to testimony concerning general characteristics of child sexual abuse victims. 178 Ariz. at 325-26 , 873 P.2d at 663-64 . ¶ 22 We believe the trial court misapplied Logerquist when it granted respondents’ request for a Frye hearing.

2001In State v. Varela, we cited Stoll as support for our conclusion that Frye was inapplicable to testimony concerning general characteristics of child sexual abuse victims. 178 Ariz. at 325-26 , 873 P.2d at 663-64 . ¶ 22 We believe the trial court misapplied Logerquist when it granted respondents’ request for a Frye hearing.

1984The threshold task in applying the Frye rule is to ascertain the particular scientific field to which spectrographic analysis belongs. “[T]he court must be able to find that the procedure is generally accepted as reliable by the larger scientific community in which it originated.” People v. Shirley, [ 31 Cal.3d 18 , 54 n. 32, 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 264 n. 32, 641 P.2d 775 , 796 n. 32 (1982)].

1984The threshold task in applying the Frye rule is to ascertain the particular scientific field to which spectrographic analysis belongs. “[T]he court must be able to find that the procedure is generally accepted as reliable by the larger scientific community in which it originated.” People v. Shirley, [ 31 Cal.3d 18 , 54 n. 32, 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 264 n. 32, 641 P.2d 775 , 796 n. 32 (1982)].

2014See Lujan, 192 Ariz. at 451 -52 ¶¶ 9-12, 967 P.2d at 126-27 ; Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 473-74 , 720 P.2d at 74-75 ; Moran, 151 Ariz. at 381 , 728 P.2d at 251 ; see also State v. Curry, 187 Ariz. 623, 628-29 , 931 P.2d 1133, 1138-39 (App.1996) (holding, under Frye standard, that Dutton’s CSAAS *595 testimony was helpful to the jury and admissible).

2014See Lujan, 192 Ariz. at 451 -52 ¶¶ 9-12, 967 P.2d at 126-27 ; Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 473-74 , 720 P.2d at 74-75 ; Moran, 151 Ariz. at 381 , 728 P.2d at 251 ; see also State v. Curry, 187 Ariz. 623, 628-29 , 931 P.2d 1133, 1138-39 (App.1996) (holding, under Frye standard, that Dutton’s CSAAS *595 testimony was helpful to the jury and admissible).

2005See State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 582 , 858 P.2d 1152, 1185 (1993) (DNA sample matching meets Frye test for admissibility); State v. Garcia, 197 Ariz. 79 , 3 P.3d 999 (App.1999) (statistical formulas utilized to calculate likelihood ratios used to interpret mixed DNA samples meets Frye test for admissibility); United States v. Ewell, 252 F.Supp.2d 104, 111-12 (D.N.J.2003) (noting numerous state appellate court cases have recognized the reliability of certain DNA testing as “virtually beyond reproach.”).

2005See State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 582 , 858 P.2d 1152, 1185 (1993) (DNA sample matching meets Frye test for admissibility); State v. Garcia, 197 Ariz. 79 , 3 P.3d 999 (App.1999) (statistical formulas utilized to calculate likelihood ratios used to interpret mixed DNA samples meets Frye test for admissibility); United States v. Ewell, 252 F.Supp.2d 104, 111-12 (D.N.J.2003) (noting numerous state appellate court cases have recognized the reliability of certain DNA testing as “virtually beyond reproach.”).

2001See id. at 147-51 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 . 5 ¶ 15 In Logerquist v. McVey, our supreme court responded to these cases by reaffirming the continuing vitality of the Frye rule in Arizona. 196 Ariz. at 489, ¶ 57, 1 P.3d at 132 .

2001See id. at 147-51 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 . 5 ¶ 15 In Logerquist v. McVey, our supreme court responded to these cases by reaffirming the continuing vitality of the Frye rule in Arizona. 196 Ariz. at 489, ¶ 57, 1 P.3d at 132 .

2001As did Logerquist, Wilson held that a Frye hearing was not necessary before an expert could testify on the phenomenon of repressed childhood memory. 86 Cal.Rptr.2d at 206-08 . ¶ 20 California v. Ward — the original source of the above quote — is directly on point with this case and, as Logerquist commented regarding Wilson , “puts the matter quite well.” 196 Ariz. at 479, ¶ 29 , 1 P.3d at 122 .

2001As did Logerquist, Wilson held that a Frye hearing was not necessary before an expert could testify on the phenomenon of repressed childhood memory. 86 Cal.Rptr.2d at 206-08 . ¶ 20 California v. Ward — the original source of the above quote — is directly on point with this case and, as Logerquist commented regarding Wilson , “puts the matter quite well.” 196 Ariz. at 479, ¶ 29 , 1 P.3d at 122 .

1998See Seritt v. State, 647 So.2d 1, 4 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); Harmon v. State, 908 P.2d 434, 442 (Alaska Ct.App.1995); People v. Morganti, 43 Cal.App.4th 643 , 50 Cal. Rptr.2d 837, 853 (1996); Pope, 220 Ill.Dec. at 315 , 672 N.E.2d at 1327 ; State v. Hill, 257 Kan. 774 , 895 P.2d 1238, 1247 (1995); Lee, 537 N.W.2d at 257 ; State v. Williams, 252 N.J.Super. 369 , 599 A.2d 960, 968 (Law Div. 1991); State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24 , 882 P.2d 747, 768 (1994).

1998See Seritt v. State, 647 So.2d 1, 4 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); Harmon v. State, 908 P.2d 434, 442 (Alaska Ct.App.1995); People v. Morganti, 43 Cal.App.4th 643 , 50 Cal. Rptr.2d 837, 853 (1996); Pope, 220 Ill.Dec. at 315 , 672 N.E.2d at 1327 ; State v. Hill, 257 Kan. 774 , 895 P.2d 1238, 1247 (1995); Lee, 537 N.W.2d at 257 ; State v. Williams, 252 N.J.Super. 369 , 599 A.2d 960, 968 (Law Div. 1991); State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24 , 882 P.2d 747, 768 (1994).

1984See United States v. McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408 (D.C.Cir.1976); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C.Cir.1974); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24 , 130 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 549 P.2d 1240 (1976); Brown v. United States, 384 A.2d 647 (D.C.1978); Cornett v. State, 450 N.E.2d 498 (Ind.1983); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 , 391 A.2d 364 (1978); People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141 , 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977); Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223 , 369 A.2d 1277 (1977).

1984See United States v. McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408 (D.C.Cir.1976); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C.Cir.1974); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24 , 130 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 549 P.2d 1240 (1976); Brown v. United States, 384 A.2d 647 (D.C.1978); Cornett v. State, 450 N.E.2d 498 (Ind.1983); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 , 391 A.2d 364 (1978); People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141 , 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977); Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223 , 369 A.2d 1277 (1977).

1982The court concluded that the Frye principle, adopted in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 , 391 A.2d 364 (1978) (a spectrograph case), was inapplicable because the hypnosis issue did not involve expert testimony based upon a scientific procedure, but only the credibility of a witness' refreshed memory. 45 Md.

1982The court concluded that the Frye principle, adopted in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 , 391 A.2d 364 (1978) (a spectrograph case), was inapplicable because the hypnosis issue did not involve expert testimony based upon a scientific procedure, but only the credibility of a witness' refreshed memory. 45 Md.

2016See State v. Miller, 234 Ariz. 31 , 41 ¶ 29, 316 P.3d 1219, 1229 (2013) (holding that the Frye, not Daubert, standard applied to defendant’s trial, which ended before Arizona’s amended Evidence Rule 702 took effect in January 2012); Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 616 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting the absence of “authority in which the Daubert standard has been imposed on states as a requirement of due process in any context, including criminal trials”). ¶ 146 Nor did the trial court err by declining to hold a Frye hearing before ruling on the admissibility of Hamilton’s testimony.

2016See State v. Miller, 234 Ariz. 31 , 41 ¶ 29, 316 P.3d 1219, 1229 (2013) (holding that the Frye, not Daubert, standard applied to defendant’s trial, which ended before Arizona’s amended Evidence Rule 702 took effect in January 2012); Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 616 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting the absence of “authority in which the Daubert standard has been imposed on states as a requirement of due process in any context, including criminal trials”). ¶ 146 Nor did the trial court err by declining to hold a Frye hearing before ruling on the admissibility of Hamilton’s testimony.

2016Romley v. Fields, 201 Ariz. 321 , 325 ¶ 11, 35 P.3d 82, 86 (App. 2001) (noting that a Frye hearing is only required before admitting expert testimony that relies on new scientific tests or techniques).

2016Romley v. Fields, 201 Ariz. 321 , 325 ¶ 11, 35 P.3d 82, 86 (App. 2001) (noting that a Frye hearing is only required before admitting expert testimony that relies on new scientific tests or techniques).

2014State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 49, ¶ 29 , 97 P.3d 865, 874 (2004). ¶18 Not all expert testimony is necessarily subject to a Frye analysis and a Frye hearing is not automatically required each time scientific evidence is offered.

2014State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 49, ¶ 29 , 97 P.3d 865, 874 (2004). ¶18 Not all expert testimony is necessarily subject to a Frye analysis and a Frye hearing is not automatically required each time scientific evidence is offered.