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33 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences2015See Lanigan, supra at 25-26 (adopting standard in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 [1993], while maintaining Frye standard as alternative means to establish reliability of expert testimony). 2006Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (Daubert), thus superseded the older Frye test, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. | 5 | 9 |
Frye v. United Statesred2 sentences2006Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (Daubert), thus superseded the older Frye test, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1999On the basis of Rosenberg’s testimony as just summarized, the plaintiff now argues that the Deftos test is neither “generally accepted” in the scientific community under the Frye test (applicable at the time of trial, see Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266 [1963], adopting Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 [Ct. App. D.C. 1923]), nor valid or reliable under Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 (1994). | 4 | 9 |
Commonwealth v. Devlingreen2 sentences2000See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gordon, 422 Mass. 816, 838 (1996) (declining to determine retroactive application of the Lanigan standard because disputed scientific testimony was admissible under the “somewhat more stringent” Frye standard); Commonwealth v. Ghee, 414 Mass. 313, 320 (1993); Commonwealth v. Cifizzari, 397 Mass. 560, 569 (1986); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 365 Mass. 149, 154-155 (1974). 1986In Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 366 Mass. 18, 24-25 (1974), we affirmed our holding in Devlin, supra. Recently we cited the Devlin case in stating that this court has not “utilized the Frye test to preclude the admissibility of novel scientific techniques or information developed by a particular expert witness utilizing accepted scientific instruments or theories.” Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, supra at 215 n.11. *571 See also Commonwealth v. Weichell, 390 Mass. 62, 83 (1982) (Liacos, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 1038 (1984) (“composite” drawings should not be subject to the restrictions | 4 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Lykusgreen2 sentences1989In Massachusetts, “the requirement of the Frye rule of general acceptability is satisfied ... if the principle is generally accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar with its use.” Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 203 (1975), S.C., ante 135 (1989). 1989In Massachusetts, “the requirement of the Frye rule of general acceptability is satisfied ... if the principle is generally accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar with its use.” Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 203 (1975), S.C., ante 135 (1989). | 4 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Lanigangreen2 sentences2015See Lanigan, supra at 25-26 (adopting standard in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 [1993], while maintaining Frye standard as alternative means to establish reliability of expert testimony). 1999On the basis of Rosenberg’s testimony as just summarized, the plaintiff now argues that the Deftos test is neither “generally accepted” in the scientific community under the Frye test (applicable at the time of trial, see Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266 [1963], adopting Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 [Ct. App. D.C. 1923]), nor valid or reliable under Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 (1994). | 3 | 8 |
Commonwealth v. Curningreen2 sentences1999Those decisions have focused on the Frye test: “whether the community of scientists involved generally accepts the theory or process.” Id. at 24, quoting from Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 222 (1991). 1999Those decisions have focused on the Frye test: “whether the community of scientists involved generally accepts the theory or process.” Id. at 24, quoting from Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 222 (1991). | 3 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Cifizzarigreen2 sentences2000See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gordon, 422 Mass. 816, 838 (1996) (declining to determine retroactive application of the Lanigan standard because disputed scientific testimony was admissible under the “somewhat more stringent” Frye standard); Commonwealth v. Ghee, 414 Mass. 313, 320 (1993); Commonwealth v. Cifizzari, 397 Mass. 560, 569 (1986); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 365 Mass. 149, 154-155 (1974). 1999See also Commonwealth v. Cifizzari, 397 Mass. 560, 570 (1986) (in Massachusetts, “the history of the admission of medical experts’ opinions undermine[s] the . . . assertion that ‘general acceptance’ is a prerequisite to the admissibility of those opinions”). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Fatalogreen2 sentences1999On the basis of Rosenberg’s testimony as just summarized, the plaintiff now argues that the Deftos test is neither “generally accepted” in the scientific community under the Frye test (applicable at the time of trial, see Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266 [1963], adopting Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 [Ct. App. D.C. 1923]), nor valid or reliable under Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 (1994). 1999On the basis of Rosenberg’s testimony as just summarized, the plaintiff now argues that the Deftos test is neither “generally accepted” in the scientific community under the Frye test (applicable at the time of trial, see Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266 [1963], adopting Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 [Ct. App. D.C. 1923]), nor valid or reliable under Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 (1994). | 2 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Vitellogreen2 sentences1989In Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426 (1978), while declining to overrule the Frye standard, this court identified a number of evidentiary and policy considerations which animated our decision to allow polygraph evidence to be admitted for limited purposes in limited circumstances. 1989In Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426 (1978), while declining to overrule the Frye standard, this court identified a number of evidentiary and policy considerations which animated our decision to allow polygraph evidence to be admitted for limited purposes in limited circumstances. | 2 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Powellgreen2 sentences2024The Commonwealth does not rely on the Frye test to establish reliability in this case, however. 23 unacceptably high known or potential rate of error; and (5) is governed by recognized standards." Commonwealth v. Powell, 450 Mass. 229, 238 (2007). 2024The Commonwealth does not rely on the Frye test to establish reliability in this case, however. 23 unacceptably high known or potential rate of error; and (5) is governed by recognized standards." Commonwealth v. Powell, 450 Mass. 229, 238 (2007). | 2 | 2 |
Canavan's Casegreen2 sentences2005See Commonwealth v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 185-186 (1997) (“party seeking to introduce scientific evidence may lay a foundation either by showing that the underlying scientific theory is generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, or by showing that the theory is reliable or valid through other means” [emphasis added]); Canavan’s Case, supra at 310 (Lanigan’s partial adoption of Daubert was merely “to account for [the] circumstance” where “strict adherence to the Frye test” caused otherwise reliable evidence to be excluded because it had not yet become generally accepted). 2005See Commonwealth v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 185-186 (1997) (“party seeking to introduce scientific evidence may lay a foundation either by showing that the underlying scientific theory is generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, or by showing that the theory is reliable or valid through other means” [emphasis added]); Canavan’s Case, supra at 310 (Lanigan’s partial adoption of Daubert was merely “to account for [the] circumstance” where “strict adherence to the Frye test” caused otherwise reliable evidence to be excluded because it had not yet become generally accepted). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Mendesgreen2 sentences1993See Commonwealth v. Mendes, 406 Mass. 201, 205 (1989); Commonwealth v. Daggett, 416 Mass. 347, 350 (1993). 1993See Commonwealth v. Mendes, 406 Mass. 201, 205 (1989); Commonwealth v. Daggett, 416 Mass. 347, 350 (1993). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Beausoleilgreen2 sentences1996See also Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, 397 Mass. 206 , 215 n.11 (1986) (stating this court has not “utilized the Frye test to preclude the admissibility of novel scientific techniques or information developed by a particular expert witness utilizing accepted scientific instruments or theories”). 1996See also Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, 397 Mass. 206 , 215 n.11 (1986) (stating this court has not “utilized the Frye test to preclude the admissibility of novel scientific techniques or information developed by a particular expert witness utilizing accepted scientific instruments or theories”). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Pattersongreen1 sentence2021See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 640 (2005), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87 (2013) (Frye standard requires "theory and methodology in question to be generally accepted by a relevant scientific community"). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Brittgreen1 sentence2021See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 640 (2005), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87 (2013) (Frye standard requires "theory and methodology in question to be generally accepted by a relevant scientific community"). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sandsgreen2 sentences2005See Commonwealth v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 185-186 (1997) (“party seeking to introduce scientific evidence may lay a foundation either by showing that the underlying scientific theory is generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, or by showing that the theory is reliable or valid through other means” [emphasis added]); Canavan’s Case, supra at 310 (Lanigan’s partial adoption of Daubert was merely “to account for [the] circumstance” where “strict adherence to the Frye test” caused otherwise reliable evidence to be excluded because it had not yet become generally accepted). 2005See Commonwealth v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 185-186 (1997) (“party seeking to introduce scientific evidence may lay a foundation either by showing that the underlying scientific theory is generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, or by showing that the theory is reliable or valid through other means” [emphasis added]); Canavan’s Case, supra at 310 (Lanigan’s partial adoption of Daubert was merely “to account for [the] circumstance” where “strict adherence to the Frye test” caused otherwise reliable evidence to be excluded because it had not yet become generally accepted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Seniorgreen2 sentences2005See also Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 453, 458-459 (2001) (same). 2005See also Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 453, 458-459 (2001) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Gheegreen1 sentence2000See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gordon, 422 Mass. 816, 838 (1996) (declining to determine retroactive application of the Lanigan standard because disputed scientific testimony was admissible under the “somewhat more stringent” Frye standard); Commonwealth v. Ghee, 414 Mass. 313, 320 (1993); Commonwealth v. Cifizzari, 397 Mass. 560, 569 (1986); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 365 Mass. 149, 154-155 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Gordongreen1 sentence2000See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gordon, 422 Mass. 816, 838 (1996) (declining to determine retroactive application of the Lanigan standard because disputed scientific testimony was admissible under the “somewhat more stringent” Frye standard); Commonwealth v. Ghee, 414 Mass. 313, 320 (1993); Commonwealth v. Cifizzari, 397 Mass. 560, 569 (1986); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 365 Mass. 149, 154-155 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Dayegreen1 sentence1999Cf. Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 741 (1992) (less favorable standard of review where defendants neither sought voir dire nor objected to expert’s testimony on basis of Frye test). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Daggettgreen2 sentences1993See Commonwealth v. Mendes, 406 Mass. 201, 205 (1989); Commonwealth v. Daggett, 416 Mass. 347, 350 (1993). 1993See Commonwealth v. Mendes, 406 Mass. 201, 205 (1989); Commonwealth v. Daggett, 416 Mass. 347, 350 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Castrogreen1 sentence1991Ct. Nov. 13, 1989) (admitting Cellmark’s DNA test results showing match of blood of victim and blood found in carpet stain in defendant’s van, but rejecting Cellmark’s probability evidence as not shown to be reliable or resting on sound scientific base); State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 100 (1990) (defendant presented expert who did not give significant opposing view). 6 See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989) (accepting use of forensic DNA typing but declaring test results inadmissible because laboratory did not follow appropriate standards and controls or make its testing da | 1 | 1 |
State v. Penningtongreen1 sentence1991Ct. Nov. 13, 1989) (admitting Cellmark’s DNA test results showing match of blood of victim and blood found in carpet stain in defendant’s van, but rejecting Cellmark’s probability evidence as not shown to be reliable or resting on sound scientific base); State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 100 (1990) (defendant presented expert who did not give significant opposing view). 6 See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989) (accepting use of forensic DNA typing but declaring test results inadmissible because laboratory did not follow appropriate standards and controls or make its testing da | 1 | 1 |
Caldwell v. Stategreen1 sentence1991Cf. Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 290 (1990) (DNA test results admissible, but evidence of probabilities derived from data base of testing laboratory inadmissible, but more conservative estimate of probabilities admissible). 7 Future challenges should focus on the soundness and general acceptance of the particular testing process for forensic use, and, if raised, on the proper implementation of that process in the given case. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Schwartzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. a Juvenilegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Gilbertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Weichellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carlyon v. Weeksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| PHILLIPS BY & THROUGH UTAH, ETC. v. Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Katergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Stappengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bundy v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. MacKgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. La Mountaingreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Temoneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hurdgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Lykusgreen2 sentences1989In Massachusetts, “the requirement of the Frye rule of general acceptability is satisfied ... if the principle is generally accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar with its use.” Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 203 (1975), S.C., ante 135 (1989). 1989In Massachusetts, “the requirement of the Frye rule of general acceptability is satisfied ... if the principle is generally accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar with its use.” Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 203 (1975), S.C., ante 135 (1989). | 1 | 5 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gentry
green
2 sentences1996State of Washington v. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d 570 , 888 P.2d 1105 (1995) (it is now settled law in Washington that the PCR technique of DNA analysis passes Frye test; criticisms of the test in the particular case went to weight, not admissibility). 4. 1996State of Washington v. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d 570 , 888 P.2d 1105 (1995) (it is now settled law in Washington that the PCR technique of DNA analysis passes Frye test; criticisms of the test in the particular case went to weight, not admissibility). 4. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Moore
green
1 sentence1996State of Montana v. Moore, 885 P.2d 457 (Mont. 1994) (PCR test met Daubert standard of reliability; alleged errors in particular test went to weight; defendant failed to demonstrate whether tissue was contaminated in the instant case). 5. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Hill
green
2 sentences1996State of Kansas v. Hill, 257 Kan. 774 , 895 P.2d 1238 (1995) (citing to several appellate decisions in other jurisdictions, court held PCR testing admissible). 8. 1996State of Kansas v. Hill, 257 Kan. 774 , 895 P.2d 1238 (1995) (citing to several appellate decisions in other jurisdictions, court held PCR testing admissible). 8. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Harrison v. State
green
1 sentence1996Harrison v. State of Indiana, 644 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. 1995) (although trial judge should have held Frye hearing on PCR test results, the defendant not entitled to new trial because he consented to admissibility of results at a pretrial hearing before results were obtained, and results were not of primary importance to the murders of which he was convicted). 7. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Russell
green
2 sentences1996State of Washington v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24 , 882 P.2d 747 (1994) (trial judge correct in finding that the underlying principle and techniques of PCR had been generally accepted by the scientific community; Supreme Court rejected defense argument that problems with use of PCR in forensic setting, including differential amplification, misincorporation and contamination, are so serious that testing fails to meet Frye standard). 3. 1996State of Washington v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24 , 882 P.2d 747 (1994) (trial judge correct in finding that the underlying principle and techniques of PCR had been generally accepted by the scientific community; Supreme Court rejected defense argument that problems with use of PCR in forensic setting, including differential amplification, misincorporation and contamination, are so serious that testing fails to meet Frye standard). 3. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Commonwealth v. Lanigan
green
2 sentences1993At the time of the Frye hearing, and at the time of trial, this court had not yet issued its opinions in Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 413 Mass. 154 (1992), and Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218 (1991). 1993At the time of the Frye hearing, and at the time of trial, this court had not yet issued its opinions in Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 413 Mass. 154 (1992), and Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218 (1991). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Commonwealth v. a Juvenile green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| United States v. Sample green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| People v. Law green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.