Frye test in Florida

2019Cir. 1923); see also Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985) (applying Frye standard); Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 195 (Fla. 1989) (adopting Frye standard); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 577-78 (Fla. 1997) (adhering to Frye standard); Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 547 (Fla. 2007) (reaffirming adherence to Frye standard). 2.

2018In Hadden v. State , 690 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1997), we rejected the argument that the Legislature's enactment and this Court's subsequent adoption of the Evidence Code replaced the Frye standard with the balancing test that existed in the code.

2019The Frye standard “only applies when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or novel scientific techniques.” U.S. Sugar v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104, 109 (Fla. 2002). “[T]he Frye test is utilized in Florida to guarantee the reliability of new or novel scientific evidence.” Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1997).

2019The Frye standard “only applies when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or novel scientific techniques.” U.S. Sugar v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104, 109 (Fla. 2002). “[T]he Frye test is utilized in Florida to guarantee the reliability of new or novel scientific evidence.” Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1997).

2019Moreover, “[i]n utilizing the Frye test, the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to prove the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures used to apply that principle to the facts of the case at hand.” Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 1995).

2019Moreover, “[i]n utilizing the Frye test, the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to prove the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures used to apply that principle to the facts of the case at hand.” Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 1995).

2018See, e.g., Kaminski v. State , 63 So.2d 339 , 340 (Fla. 1952) (recognizing Frye 's rejection of systolic blood pressure deception tests as having "not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.") (quoting Frye , 293 F. at 1014 ); Bundy v. State , 471 So.2d 9 , 13 (Fla. 1985) (describing the Frye test as one in which "the results of mechanical or scientific testing are not admissible unless the testing has de

2018See, e.g., Kaminski v. State , 63 So.2d 339 , 340 (Fla. 1952) (recognizing Frye 's rejection of systolic blood pressure deception tests as having "not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.") (quoting Frye , 293 F. at 1014 ); Bundy v. State , 471 So.2d 9 , 13 (Fla. 1985) (describing the Frye test as one in which "the results of mechanical or scientific testing are not admissible unless the testing has de

2018See, e.g. , Ibar v. State , 938 So.2d 451 , 467 (Fla. 2006) ("Florida courts do not follow Daubert , but instead follow the test set out in Frye ."), cert. denied , 549 U.S. 1208 , 127 S.Ct. 1326 , 167 L.Ed.2d 79 (2007) ; Brim v. State , 695 So.2d 268 , 271-72 (Fla. 1997) ("Despite the federal adoption of a more lenient standard in [ Daubert ], we have maintained the higher standard of reliability as dictated by Frye ."); Hadden v. State , 690 So.2d 573 , 578 (Fla. 1997) ("Our specific adoption of that test after the enactment of the evidence code manifests our intent to use the Frye test as t

2018See, e.g. , Ibar v. State , 938 So.2d 451 , 467 (Fla. 2006) ("Florida courts do not follow Daubert , but instead follow the test set out in Frye ."), cert. denied , 549 U.S. 1208 , 127 S.Ct. 1326 , 167 L.Ed.2d 79 (2007) ; Brim v. State , 695 So.2d 268 , 271-72 (Fla. 1997) ("Despite the federal adoption of a more lenient standard in [ Daubert ], we have maintained the higher standard of reliability as dictated by Frye ."); Hadden v. State , 690 So.2d 573 , 578 (Fla. 1997) ("Our specific adoption of that test after the enactment of the evidence code manifests our intent to use the Frye test as t

2013Id.; Hayes v. State, 660 So.2d 257, 262-64 (Fla.1995) (finding a Frye test not properly applied in light of a scientific report issued after the trial); Bundy v. State, 471 So.2d 9, 18 (Fla.1985) (finding that in a case in which the trial court failed to conduct a Frye hearing, hypnotically refreshed testimony was not shown to be reliable at the time of appeal).

2013Id.; Hayes v. State, 660 So.2d 257, 262-64 (Fla.1995) (finding a Frye test not properly applied in light of a scientific report issued after the trial); Bundy v. State, 471 So.2d 9, 18 (Fla.1985) (finding that in a case in which the trial court failed to conduct a Frye hearing, hypnotically refreshed testimony was not shown to be reliable at the time of appeal).

2019Cir. 1923); see also Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985) (applying Frye standard); Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 195 (Fla. 1989) (adopting Frye standard); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 577-78 (Fla. 1997) (adhering to Frye standard); Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 547 (Fla. 2007) (reaffirming adherence to Frye standard). 2.

2018We acknowledge that the Frye rule has come under some criticism since its inception in 1923 as too harsh and inflexible; however, we believe that the problems associated with the other recognized judicial approaches foreclose their use. *1226 Stokes v. State , 548 So.2d 188 , 195 (Fla. 1989) (citation omitted) (citing Bundy v. State , 471 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1985) ; Bundy v. State , 455 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1984) ).

2019Cir. 1923); see also Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985) (applying Frye standard); Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 195 (Fla. 1989) (adopting Frye standard); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 577-78 (Fla. 1997) (adhering to Frye standard); Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 547 (Fla. 2007) (reaffirming adherence to Frye standard). 2.

2018See, e.g., Kaminski v. State , 63 So.2d 339 , 340 (Fla. 1952) (recognizing Frye 's rejection of systolic blood pressure deception tests as having "not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.") (quoting Frye , 293 F. at 1014 ); Bundy v. State , 471 So.2d 9 , 13 (Fla. 1985) (describing the Frye test as one in which "the results of mechanical or scientific testing are not admissible unless the testing has de

2025The report or testimony of any doctor so designated by the judge of compensation claims shall be made a part of the record of the proceedings and shall be given the same consideration by the judge of compensation claims as is accorded other medical evidence submitted in the proceeding; . .. § 440.25(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added); 2002: The Florida Supreme Court issues Henson, 823 So. 2d 104 , which declared that the Frye standard is the generally acceptable standard for admissibility of novel evidence and applies to medical experts in workers’ compensation proceedings; 12 2003: The

2025The report or testimony of any doctor so designated by the judge of compensation claims shall be made a part of the record of the proceedings and shall be given the same consideration by the judge of compensation claims as is accorded other medical evidence submitted in the proceeding; . .. § 440.25(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added); 2002: The Florida Supreme Court issues Henson, 823 So. 2d 104 , which declared that the Frye standard is the generally acceptable standard for admissibility of novel evidence and applies to medical experts in workers’ compensation proceedings; 12 2003: The

2019When applying the Frye test, “the court may peruse disparate sources— e.g., expert testimony, scientific and legal publications, and judicial opinions—and decide for itself whether the theory in issue has been sufficiently tested and accepted by the relevant scientific community.” Ramirez, 810 So. 2d at 844 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).

2019When applying the Frye test, “the court may peruse disparate sources— e.g., expert testimony, scientific and legal publications, and judicial opinions—and decide for itself whether the theory in issue has been sufficiently tested and accepted by the relevant scientific community.” Ramirez, 810 So. 2d at 844 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).

2003In Berry , we said, "Our de novo review of the Frye issue in these cases includes an examination of three methods of proof: (1) expert testimony, (2) scientific and legal writings, and (3) judicial opinions." 709 So.2d at 557 (citing Flanagan v. State, 586 So.2d 1085, 1112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), approved, 625 So.2d 827 (Fla.1993)).

2001NOTES [1] Because appellant's initial brief provides an excellent explanation of the biology and science involved, upon which only marginal additions are needed, we quote extensively from the facts in the brief. [2] An appellate court's de novo review of a Frye issue "includes an examination of three methods of proof: (1) expert testimony, (2) scientific and legal writings, and (3) judicial opinions." Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So.2d 552, 557 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), rev. denied, 718 So.2d 167 (Fla.1998) (citing Flanagan v. State, 586 So.2d 1085, 1112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)). [3] It was extremel

2007See, e.g., Cordoba v. Rodriguez, 939 So.2d 319, 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("Medical expert testimony concerning the causation of a medical condition will be considered pure opinion testimony and admissible when it is based solely on the expert's training and experience."); Gelsthorpe v. Weinstein, 897 So.2d 504, 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("[M]edical expert testimony concerning the causation of a medical condition will be considered pure opinion testimony — and thus not subject to Frye analysis — when it is based solely on the expert's training and experience."); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Tursi 729

2007See Gelsthorpe, 897 So.2d at 511 (recognizing that "a typical opinion on medical causation" should not be treated as a "new principle, subject to Frye analysis, simply because some other experts disagree with it and because the challenged expert does not rely on any specific authority to support his particular opinion"); Tursi 729 So.2d at 997 (recognizing that an ophthalmologist's opinion on causation was not based on "novel scientific evidence," as "[i]t was no more novel than an orthopedist testifying that a neck injury, which did not manifest itself with symptoms until four years after a r

2007See Gelsthorpe, 897 So.2d at 511 (recognizing that "a typical opinion on medical causation" should not be treated as a "new principle, subject to Frye analysis, simply because some other experts disagree with it and because the challenged expert does not rely on any specific authority to support his particular opinion"); Tursi 729 So.2d at 997 (recognizing that an ophthalmologist's opinion on causation was not based on "novel scientific evidence," as "[i]t was no more novel than an orthopedist testifying that a neck injury, which did not manifest itself with symptoms until four years after a r

2003In Berry , we said, "Our de novo review of the Frye issue in these cases includes an examination of three methods of proof: (1) expert testimony, (2) scientific and legal writings, and (3) judicial opinions." 709 So.2d at 557 (citing Flanagan v. State, 586 So.2d 1085, 1112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), approved, 625 So.2d 827 (Fla.1993)).

2013But the supreme court in Marsh specifically stated that an expert’s opinion is based on the expert’s training and experience, 977 So.2d at 548 , and that “ ‘[m]edical expert testimony concerning the causation of a medical condition will be considered pure opinion testimony — and thus not subject to Frye analysis — when it is based solely on the expert’s training and experience.’ ” Id. (quoting Gelsthorpe v. Weinstein, 897 So.2d 504, 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)).

2010Thus, “medical expert testimony concerning the causation of a medical condition will be considered pure opinion testimony — and thus not subject to Frye analysis — when it is based solely on the expert’s training and experience.” Gelsthorpe v. Weinstein, 897 So.2d 504, 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

2019Whereas the Frye standard only applied to expert testimony based on new or novel scientific techniques and general acceptance, Daubert provides that “the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye).

2019Whereas the Frye standard only applied to expert testimony based on new or novel scientific techniques and general acceptance, Daubert provides that “the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye).

2021One of the stated purposes for amending section 90.702 is as follows: “the Florida Legislature intends to prohibit in the courts of this state pure opinion testimony as provided in Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007) . . . .” Ch. 2013–107, Laws of Fla. In Marsh, the Florida Supreme Court held that the Frye standard for admissibility did not apply to “pure opinion” 9 testimony; that is, testimony based on experience or training. 977 So. 2d at 548 .

2021One of the stated purposes for amending section 90.702 is as follows: “the Florida Legislature intends to prohibit in the courts of this state pure opinion testimony as provided in Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007) . . . .” Ch. 2013–107, Laws of Fla. In Marsh, the Florida Supreme Court held that the Frye standard for admissibility did not apply to “pure opinion” 9 testimony; that is, testimony based on experience or training. 977 So. 2d at 548 .

2010This court has explained that “pure opinion” testimony “refers to expert opinion developed from inductive reasoning based on the experts’ own experience, observation, or research, whereas the Frye test applies when an expert witness reaches a conclusion by deduction, from applying new and novel scientific principle, formula, or procedure developed by others.” See Holy Cross Hosp., Inc. v. Marrone, 816 So.2d 1113, 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

2010This court has explained that “pure opinion” testimony “refers to expert opinion developed from inductive reasoning based on the experts’ own experience, observation, or research, whereas the Frye test applies when an expert witness reaches a conclusion by deduction, from applying new and novel scientific principle, formula, or procedure developed by others.” See Holy Cross Hosp., Inc. v. Marrone, 816 So.2d 1113, 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

2026See Murray v. State, 692 So. 2d 157, 161 (Fla. 1997) (noting that in Brim, “we reaffirmed our adherence to the Frye test for the admissibility of DNA evidence, and clarified that each stage of the DNA process, i.e., the methodology for determining DNA profiles, as well as the statistical calculations used to report the test results— both of which are at issue in the instant case—are subject to the Frye test”).

2026See Murray v. State, 692 So. 2d 157, 161 (Fla. 1997) (noting that in Brim, “we reaffirmed our adherence to the Frye test for the admissibility of DNA evidence, and clarified that each stage of the DNA process, i.e., the methodology for determining DNA profiles, as well as the statistical calculations used to report the test results— both of which are at issue in the instant case—are subject to the Frye test”).

2012"By definition, the Frye standard only applies when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or novel scientific techniques." Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So.2d 104, 109 (Fla.2002)).

2012"By definition, the Frye standard only applies when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or novel scientific techniques." Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So.2d 104, 109 (Fla.2002)).

2023Zack II, 911 So. 2d at 1197 . 8.

2023Zack II, 911 So. 2d at 1197 . 8.

2010See Brim v. State, 695 So.2d 268, 274 (Fla.1997).” Murray v. State, 838 So.2d 1073, 1077-78 (Fla.2002).

2010See Brim v. State, 695 So.2d 268, 274 (Fla.1997)." Murray v. State, 838 So.2d 1073, 1077-78 (Fla.2002).

2007In a separate opinion, however, Judge Ervin provided an extensive and scholarly analysis concluding that the Frye test did not survive the adoption of Florida's Evidence Code. 470 So.2d at 774 (Ervin, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2007In a separate opinion, however, Judge Ervin provided an extensive and scholarly analysis concluding that the Frye test did not survive the adoption of Florida's Evidence Code. 470 So.2d at 774 (Ervin, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2004In the context of a workers' compensation proceeding, any Frye issue should be set forth in the pretrial stipulation, see U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 787 So.2d 3, 12-13 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)( Henson I) , approved 823 So.2d 104 (Fla.2002), and Frye objections should be raised at the deposition of an expert witness.

2004If new or novel scientific principles are at issue, the JCC should perform a Frye analysis following the four-step process set forth in Ramirez v. State, 651 So.2d 1164, 1167 (Fla.1995); see also Henson I, 787 So.2d at 14 ; see generally, Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 702.3 at 630-33, and David W.

2003"This Court, as most other courts, will accept new scientific methods of establishing evidentiary facts only after a proper predicate has first established the reliability of the new scientific method." Ramirez v. State, 542 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla.1989); see also Brim v. State, 779 So.2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (stating the Frye test is utilized in Florida to guarantee the reliability of new or novel scientific evidence).

2003"This Court, as most other courts, will accept new scientific methods of establishing evidentiary facts only after a proper predicate has first established the reliability of the new scientific method." Ramirez v. State, 542 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla.1989); see also Brim v. State, 779 So.2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (stating the Frye test is utilized in Florida to guarantee the reliability of new or novel scientific evidence).

2003In Brim's 1995 appeal, this court found *526 that the DNA evidence was properly admitted because the Frye standard does not limit the "admissible deductions that can be made from reliable scientific evidence to a single `generally accepted' deduction or theory." Brim v. State, 654 So.2d 184, 186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

2003In Brim's 1995 appeal, this court found *526 that the DNA evidence was properly admitted because the Frye standard does not limit the "admissible deductions that can be made from reliable scientific evidence to a single `generally accepted' deduction or theory." Brim v. State, 654 So.2d 184, 186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

2019However, after the Florida Supreme Court declined to adopt the “Daubert Amendment” to the evidence code, see In re Amendments To Florida Evidence Code, 210 So. 3d 1231 , 1235–39 (Fla. 2017), appellant filed a supplemental brief arguing that Dooley’s testimony did not satisfy 7 the Frye standard.

2019However, after the Florida Supreme Court declined to adopt the “Daubert Amendment” to the evidence code, see In re Amendments To Florida Evidence Code, 210 So. 3d 1231 , 1235–39 (Fla. 2017), appellant filed a supplemental brief arguing that Dooley’s testimony did not satisfy 7 the Frye standard.

2025Sch., 301 So. 3d 1005 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019); 12 2006: The Florida Supreme Court issues Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2006), announcing that the Frye standard, rather than Daubert, applied in Florida; 2010: Section 440.29(3), provides that, “The practice and procedure before the judge of compensation claims shall be governed by the rules adopted by the Supreme Court. . . .” * Contrary to In Re Amend. to the Rules of Workers’ Comp.

2025Sch., 301 So. 3d 1005 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019); 12 2006: The Florida Supreme Court issues Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2006), announcing that the Frye standard, rather than Daubert, applied in Florida; 2010: Section 440.29(3), provides that, “The practice and procedure before the judge of compensation claims shall be governed by the rules adopted by the Supreme Court. . . .” * Contrary to In Re Amend. to the Rules of Workers’ Comp.