10 Delaware opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Frye v. United Statesred2 sentences2018The Frye standard’s sole focus_the general acceptance of the evidence in the particular field in which it belongs$_is analogous to Daubert’s inquiry into the acceptance of 3 Id. at 1227 (quoting Cunningham v. McDonala', 689 A.2d 1190, 1193 (Del.1997)). 4 Sturgz's v. Bayside Health Ass ’n Chartered, 942 A.2d 579, 584 (Del. 2007). 5 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 2018The Frye standard’s sole focus_the general acceptance of the evidence in the particular field in which it belongs$_is analogous to Daubert’s inquiry into the acceptance of 3 Id. at 1227 (quoting Cunningham v. McDonala', 689 A.2d 1190, 1193 (Del.1997)). 4 Sturgz's v. Bayside Health Ass ’n Chartered, 942 A.2d 579, 584 (Del. 2007). 5 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. | 2 | 3 |
Sturgis v. Bayside Health Ass'n Charteredgreen2 sentences2018The Frye standard’s sole focus_the general acceptance of the evidence in the particular field in which it belongs$_is analogous to Daubert’s inquiry into the acceptance of 3 Id. at 1227 (quoting Cunningham v. McDonala', 689 A.2d 1190, 1193 (Del.1997)). 4 Sturgz's v. Bayside Health Ass ’n Chartered, 942 A.2d 579, 584 (Del. 2007). 5 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 2018The Frye standard’s sole focus_the general acceptance of the evidence in the particular field in which it belongs$_is analogous to Daubert’s inquiry into the acceptance of 3 Id. at 1227 (quoting Cunningham v. McDonala', 689 A.2d 1190, 1193 (Del.1997)). 4 Sturgz's v. Bayside Health Ass ’n Chartered, 942 A.2d 579, 584 (Del. 2007). 5 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. | 2 | 2 |
Cunningham v. McDonaldgreen2 sentences2018The Frye standard’s sole focus_the general acceptance of the evidence in the particular field in which it belongs$_is analogous to Daubert’s inquiry into the acceptance of 3 Id. at 1227 (quoting Cunningham v. McDonala', 689 A.2d 1190, 1193 (Del.1997)). 4 Sturgz's v. Bayside Health Ass ’n Chartered, 942 A.2d 579, 584 (Del. 2007). 5 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 2018The Frye standard’s sole focus_the general acceptance of the evidence in the particular field in which it belongs$_is analogous to Daubert’s inquiry into the acceptance of 3 Id. at 1227 (quoting Cunningham v. McDonala', 689 A.2d 1190, 1193 (Del.1997)). 4 Sturgz's v. Bayside Health Ass ’n Chartered, 942 A.2d 579, 584 (Del. 2007). 5 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. | 2 | 2 |
Nelson v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 74 (Del.1993) (rejecting the Frye test and adopting standards for determining the admissibility of expert testimony relying on the Delaware Rules of Evidence, as consistent with the United States Supreme Court holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). 19 . 2006Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 74 (Del.1993) (rejecting the Frye test and adopting standards for determining the admissibility of expert testimony relying on the Delaware Rules of Evidence, as consistent with the United States Supreme Court holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). 19 . | 2 | 2 |
Whalen v. Stategreen2 sentences1986As we noted in our first opinion in this case, we rejected the Frye test as an independent controlling standard of admissibility of scientific evidence in Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 434 A.2d 1346, 1354-55 (1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1258 , 71 L.Ed.2d 449 (1982). 1986As we noted in our first opinion in this case, we rejected the Frye test as an independent controlling standard of admissibility of scientific evidence in Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 434 A.2d 1346, 1354-55 (1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1258 , 71 L.Ed.2d 449 (1982). | 1 | 2 |
Linda Messick v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.green2 sentences2025The Superior Court’s “liberal thrust” standard The Superior Court, before engaging in its Daubert analysis, noted that courts are directed to “conduct their Daubert analyses ‘with a liberal thrust favoring admission.’”81 The phrase “liberal thrust” is taken from Daubert itself, but the Superior Court adopted the phrase in a manner that divorced it from its context.82 In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court explained that the Frye test that previously governed expert testimony had imposed a “rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement” on admissibility that was not consistent with the “liberal t 2025The Superior Court’s “liberal thrust” standard The Superior Court, before engaging in its Daubert analysis, noted that courts are directed to “conduct their Daubert analyses ‘with a liberal thrust favoring admission.’”81 The phrase “liberal thrust” is taken from Daubert itself, but the Superior Court adopted the phrase in a manner that divorced it from its context.82 In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court explained that the Frye test that previously governed expert testimony had imposed a “rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement” on admissibility that was not consistent with the “liberal t | 1 | 1 |
Zimmerman v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Zimmerman v. State, 693 A.2d 311, 314 (Del.1997). 20 . 2006Zimmerman v. State, 693 A.2d 311, 314 (Del.1997). 20 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John Ray Bonds (91-3610) Mark Verdi (91-3609) and Steven Wayne Yee (91-3608)green2 sentences2000See U.S. v. Bonds, 6th Cir., 12 F.3d 540 (1993). 2000See U.S. v. Bonds, 6th Cir., 12 F.3d 540 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Steven Elmer Luschen, United States of America v. Wayne Bernard Kinggreen2 sentences2000See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 5th Cir., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115 (1991) (holding that the Frye test and the Federal Rules can co-exist); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 3d Cir., 911 F.2d 941 , 953 (1990) (illustrating a more “liberal criteria” to be used under the Federal Rules than the “general acceptance” test enunciated in Frye)-, United States v. Luschen, 8th Cir., 614 F.2d 1164, 1169 (1980) (the Court should use a broader test than the “general acceptance” test in determining the admissibility of an expert). 2000See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 5th Cir., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115 (1991) (holding that the Frye test and the Federal Rules can co-exist); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 3d Cir., 911 F.2d 941 , 953 (1990) (illustrating a more “liberal criteria” to be used under the Federal Rules than the “general acceptance” test enunciated in Frye)-, United States v. Luschen, 8th Cir., 614 F.2d 1164, 1169 (1980) (the Court should use a broader test than the “general acceptance” test in determining the admissibility of an expert). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John A. Shorter, Jr.green2 sentences2000U.S. v. Shorter, D.C.Cir., 809 F.2d 54, 59-60 (1987) (using the Frye test to determine the admissibility of expert evidence after the adoption of the Federal Rules); Novak v. U.S., 6th Cir., 865 F.2d 718, 722 (1989) (testing the. admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 with the “generally accepted” test); U.S. v. Smith, 7th Cir., 869 F.2d 348, 352-53 (1989) (using the Frye test to evaluate an expert witness after the adoption of the Federal Rules). 2000U.S. v. Shorter, D.C.Cir., 809 F.2d 54, 59-60 (1987) (using the Frye test to determine the admissibility of expert evidence after the adoption of the Federal Rules); Novak v. U.S., 6th Cir., 865 F.2d 718, 722 (1989) (testing the. admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 with the “generally accepted” test); U.S. v. Smith, 7th Cir., 869 F.2d 348, 352-53 (1989) (using the Frye test to evaluate an expert witness after the adoption of the Federal Rules). | 1 | 1 |
Barbara Novak, Cross-Appellant v. United States of America, Cross-Appelleegreen2 sentences2000U.S. v. Shorter, D.C.Cir., 809 F.2d 54, 59-60 (1987) (using the Frye test to determine the admissibility of expert evidence after the adoption of the Federal Rules); Novak v. U.S., 6th Cir., 865 F.2d 718, 722 (1989) (testing the. admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 with the “generally accepted” test); U.S. v. Smith, 7th Cir., 869 F.2d 348, 352-53 (1989) (using the Frye test to evaluate an expert witness after the adoption of the Federal Rules). 2000U.S. v. Shorter, D.C.Cir., 809 F.2d 54, 59-60 (1987) (using the Frye test to determine the admissibility of expert evidence after the adoption of the Federal Rules); Novak v. U.S., 6th Cir., 865 F.2d 718, 722 (1989) (testing the. admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 with the “generally accepted” test); U.S. v. Smith, 7th Cir., 869 F.2d 348, 352-53 (1989) (using the Frye test to evaluate an expert witness after the adoption of the Federal Rules). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Tamara Jo Smithgreen2 sentences2000U.S. v. Shorter, D.C.Cir., 809 F.2d 54, 59-60 (1987) (using the Frye test to determine the admissibility of expert evidence after the adoption of the Federal Rules); Novak v. U.S., 6th Cir., 865 F.2d 718, 722 (1989) (testing the. admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 with the “generally accepted” test); U.S. v. Smith, 7th Cir., 869 F.2d 348, 352-53 (1989) (using the Frye test to evaluate an expert witness after the adoption of the Federal Rules). 2000U.S. v. Shorter, D.C.Cir., 809 F.2d 54, 59-60 (1987) (using the Frye test to determine the admissibility of expert evidence after the adoption of the Federal Rules); Novak v. U.S., 6th Cir., 865 F.2d 718, 722 (1989) (testing the. admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 with the “generally accepted” test); U.S. v. Smith, 7th Cir., 869 F.2d 348, 352-53 (1989) (using the Frye test to evaluate an expert witness after the adoption of the Federal Rules). | 1 | 1 |
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corporationgreen2 sentences2000See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 5th Cir., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115 (1991) (holding that the Frye test and the Federal Rules can co-exist); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 3d Cir., 911 F.2d 941 , 953 (1990) (illustrating a more “liberal criteria” to be used under the Federal Rules than the “general acceptance” test enunciated in Frye)-, United States v. Luschen, 8th Cir., 614 F.2d 1164, 1169 (1980) (the Court should use a broader test than the “general acceptance” test in determining the admissibility of an expert). 2000See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 5th Cir., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115 (1991) (holding that the Frye test and the Federal Rules can co-exist); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 3d Cir., 911 F.2d 941 , 953 (1990) (illustrating a more “liberal criteria” to be used under the Federal Rules than the “general acceptance” test enunciated in Frye)-, United States v. Luschen, 8th Cir., 614 F.2d 1164, 1169 (1980) (the Court should use a broader test than the “general acceptance” test in determining the admissibility of an expert). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garrettgreen2 sentences1996See, e.g., Schultz, 664 A.2d at 66 (finding HGN test scientific and required to satisfy Frye test); State of Oregon v. O'Key, 321 Or. 285 , 899 P.2d 663, 674 (1995); People v. Leahy, 8 Cal.4th 587 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663, 675-76 , 882 P.2d 321, 333-34 (1994); State v. Klawitter, Minn.Supr., 518 N.W.2d 577, 584-86 (1994) (finding HGN test not "emerging scientific technique[],” but is " 'scientific' in the sense that we use the term”); State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878 , 811 P.2d 488, 490 (1991); Malone v. City of Silverhill, Ala.Cr. 1996See, e.g., Schultz, 664 A.2d at 66 (finding HGN test scientific and required to satisfy Frye test); State of Oregon v. O'Key, 321 Or. 285 , 899 P.2d 663, 674 (1995); People v. Leahy, 8 Cal.4th 587 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663, 675-76 , 882 P.2d 321, 333-34 (1994); State v. Klawitter, Minn.Supr., 518 N.W.2d 577, 584-86 (1994) (finding HGN test not "emerging scientific technique[],” but is " 'scientific' in the sense that we use the term”); State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878 , 811 P.2d 488, 490 (1991); Malone v. City of Silverhill, Ala.Cr. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bueninggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. O'Keygreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1996App., 575 So.2d 101, 105 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 575 So.2d 106 (1990); State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194 , 366 S.E.2d 642 (1988); State v. Clark, 234 Mont. 222 , 762 P.2d 853 (1988); Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa.Super. 359 , 532 A.2d 1186, 1189 (1987) (“Results of the HGN test are ... scientific evidence based on the scientific principle that consumption of alcohol causes the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test”); State v. Borchardt, 224 Neb. 47 , 395 N.W.2d 551 (1986); Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 181 ; People v. Buening, 229 Ill.App.3d 538 , 170 Ill.Dec. 542 , 547_48, 592 N.E.2d 1996See, e.g., Schultz, 664 A.2d at 65 (holding HGN evidence must satisfy Frye “general acceptance test”); Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 177 (finding HGN test admissible under Frye "general acceptance test”). 13 . | 1 | 1 |
| Schultz v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Millergreen2 sentences1996App., 575 So.2d 101, 105 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 575 So.2d 106 (1990); State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194 , 366 S.E.2d 642 (1988); State v. Clark, 234 Mont. 222 , 762 P.2d 853 (1988); Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa.Super. 359 , 532 A.2d 1186, 1189 (1987) (“Results of the HGN test are ... scientific evidence based on the scientific principle that consumption of alcohol causes the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test”); State v. Borchardt, 224 Neb. 47 , 395 N.W.2d 551 (1986); Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 181 ; People v. Buening, 229 Ill.App.3d 538 , 170 Ill.Dec. 542 , 547_48, 592 N.E.2d 1996App., 575 So.2d 101, 105 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 575 So.2d 106 (1990); State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194 , 366 S.E.2d 642 (1988); State v. Clark, 234 Mont. 222 , 762 P.2d 853 (1988); Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa.Super. 359 , 532 A.2d 1186, 1189 (1987) (“Results of the HGN test are ... scientific evidence based on the scientific principle that consumption of alcohol causes the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test”); State v. Borchardt, 224 Neb. 47 , 395 N.W.2d 551 (1986); Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 181 ; People v. Buening, 229 Ill.App.3d 538 , 170 Ill.Dec. 542 , 547_48, 592 N.E.2d | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pennellgreen2 sentences1996In State v. Pennell, Del.Super., 584 A.2d 513, 515 (1989), Judge Gebelein astutely identified the following factors governing the admission of new and novel scientific evidence under the Delaware Rules of Evidence: (1) the expert being offered is qualified; (2) the evidence offered is otherwise admissible, relevant and reliable; (3) the specialized knowledge being offered will assist the trier-of-fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a factual issue; (4) the scientific technique and its underlying principles are reasonably relied upon by the experts in the field; and (5) such ev 1996In State v. Pennell, Del.Super., 584 A.2d 513, 515 (1989), Judge Gebelein astutely identified the following factors governing the admission of new and novel scientific evidence under the Delaware Rules of Evidence: (1) the expert being offered is qualified; (2) the evidence offered is otherwise admissible, relevant and reliable; (3) the specialized knowledge being offered will assist the trier-of-fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a factual issue; (4) the scientific technique and its underlying principles are reasonably relied upon by the experts in the field; and (5) such ev | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Klawittergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Malone v. City of Silverhillgreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Leahygreen2 sentences1996See, e.g., Schultz, 664 A.2d at 66 (finding HGN test scientific and required to satisfy Frye test); State of Oregon v. O'Key, 321 Or. 285 , 899 P.2d 663, 674 (1995); People v. Leahy, 8 Cal.4th 587 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663, 675-76 , 882 P.2d 321, 333-34 (1994); State v. Klawitter, Minn.Supr., 518 N.W.2d 577, 584-86 (1994) (finding HGN test not "emerging scientific technique[],” but is " 'scientific' in the sense that we use the term”); State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878 , 811 P.2d 488, 490 (1991); Malone v. City of Silverhill, Ala.Cr. 1996See, e.g., Schultz, 664 A.2d at 66 (finding HGN test scientific and required to satisfy Frye test); State of Oregon v. O'Key, 321 Or. 285 , 899 P.2d 663, 674 (1995); People v. Leahy, 8 Cal.4th 587 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663, 675-76 , 882 P.2d 321, 333-34 (1994); State v. Klawitter, Minn.Supr., 518 N.W.2d 577, 584-86 (1994) (finding HGN test not "emerging scientific technique[],” but is " 'scientific' in the sense that we use the term”); State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878 , 811 P.2d 488, 490 (1991); Malone v. City of Silverhill, Ala.Cr. | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Randolph Jakobetzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fensterer v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025The Superior Court’s “liberal thrust” standard The Superior Court, before engaging in its Daubert analysis, noted that courts are directed to “conduct their Daubert analyses ‘with a liberal thrust favoring admission.’”81 The phrase “liberal thrust” is taken from Daubert itself, but the Superior Court adopted the phrase in a manner that divorced it from its context.82 In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court explained that the Frye test that previously governed expert testimony had imposed a “rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement” on admissibility that was not consistent with the “liberal t 2025The Superior Court’s “liberal thrust” standard The Superior Court, before engaging in its Daubert analysis, noted that courts are directed to “conduct their Daubert analyses ‘with a liberal thrust favoring admission.’”81 The phrase “liberal thrust” is taken from Daubert itself, but the Superior Court adopted the phrase in a manner that divorced it from its context.82 In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court explained that the Frye test that previously governed expert testimony had imposed a “rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement” on admissibility that was not consistent with the “liberal t | 3 | 2000–2025 |
Ribotsky v. United States
green
2 sentences1986As we noted in our first opinion in this case, we rejected the Frye test as an independent controlling standard of admissibility of scientific evidence in Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 434 A.2d 1346, 1354-55 (1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1258 , 71 L.Ed.2d 449 (1982). 1986As we noted in our first opinion in this case, we rejected the Frye test as an independent controlling standard of admissibility of scientific evidence in Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 434 A.2d 1346, 1354-55 (1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1258 , 71 L.Ed.2d 449 (1982). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Piatt v. Lovett
green
2 sentences1986As we noted in our first opinion in this case, we rejected the Frye test as an independent controlling standard of admissibility of scientific evidence in Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 434 A.2d 1346, 1354-55 (1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1258 , 71 L.Ed.2d 449 (1982). 1986As we noted in our first opinion in this case, we rejected the Frye test as an independent controlling standard of admissibility of scientific evidence in Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 434 A.2d 1346, 1354-55 (1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1258 , 71 L.Ed.2d 449 (1982). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Kretchmar v. United States
green
2 sentences1986As we noted in our first opinion in this case, we rejected the Frye test as an independent controlling standard of admissibility of scientific evidence in Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 434 A.2d 1346, 1354-55 (1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1258 , 71 L.Ed.2d 449 (1982). 1986As we noted in our first opinion in this case, we rejected the Frye test as an independent controlling standard of admissibility of scientific evidence in Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 434 A.2d 1346, 1354-55 (1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1258 , 71 L.Ed.2d 449 (1982). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Eskin v. Carden
green
2 sentences2018The Frye standard’s sole focus_the general acceptance of the evidence in the particular field in which it belongs$_is analogous to Daubert’s inquiry into the acceptance of 3 Id. at 1227 (quoting Cunningham v. McDonala', 689 A.2d 1190, 1193 (Del.1997)). 4 Sturgz's v. Bayside Health Ass ’n Chartered, 942 A.2d 579, 584 (Del. 2007). 5 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 2018The Frye standard’s sole focus_the general acceptance of the evidence in the particular field in which it belongs$_is analogous to Daubert’s inquiry into the acceptance of 3 Id. at 1227 (quoting Cunningham v. McDonala', 689 A.2d 1190, 1193 (Del.1997)). 4 Sturgz's v. Bayside Health Ass ’n Chartered, 942 A.2d 579, 584 (Del. 2007). 5 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Safka
green
2 sentences2018No Daubert jurisdiction has yet to reject EDR evidence. 17 Id 18 101 19 Ia'. (citing Com. v. Sajka, 95 A.3d 304 (Pa. Super. 2018No Daubert jurisdiction has yet to reject EDR evidence. 17 Id 18 101 19 Ia'. (citing Com. v. Sajka, 95 A.3d 304 (Pa. Super. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Amy Deluca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 5th Cir., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115 (1991) (holding that the Frye test and the Federal Rules can co-exist); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 3d Cir., 911 F.2d 941 , 953 (1990) (illustrating a more “liberal criteria” to be used under the Federal Rules than the “general acceptance” test enunciated in Frye)-, United States v. Luschen, 8th Cir., 614 F.2d 1164, 1169 (1980) (the Court should use a broader test than the “general acceptance” test in determining the admissibility of an expert). 2000See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 5th Cir., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115 (1991) (holding that the Frye test and the Federal Rules can co-exist); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 3d Cir., 911 F.2d 941 , 953 (1990) (illustrating a more “liberal criteria” to be used under the Federal Rules than the “general acceptance” test enunciated in Frye)-, United States v. Luschen, 8th Cir., 614 F.2d 1164, 1169 (1980) (the Court should use a broader test than the “general acceptance” test in determining the admissibility of an expert). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences1996App., 575 So.2d 101, 105 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 575 So.2d 106 (1990); State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194 , 366 S.E.2d 642 (1988); State v. Clark, 234 Mont. 222 , 762 P.2d 853 (1988); Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa.Super. 359 , 532 A.2d 1186, 1189 (1987) (“Results of the HGN test are ... scientific evidence based on the scientific principle that consumption of alcohol causes the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test”); State v. Borchardt, 224 Neb. 47 , 395 N.W.2d 551 (1986); Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 181 ; People v. Buening, 229 Ill.App.3d 538 , 170 Ill.Dec. 542 , 547_48, 592 N.E.2d 1996App., 575 So.2d 101, 105 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 575 So.2d 106 (1990); State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194 , 366 S.E.2d 642 (1988); State v. Clark, 234 Mont. 222 , 762 P.2d 853 (1988); Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa.Super. 359 , 532 A.2d 1186, 1189 (1987) (“Results of the HGN test are ... scientific evidence based on the scientific principle that consumption of alcohol causes the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test”); State v. Borchardt, 224 Neb. 47 , 395 N.W.2d 551 (1986); Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 181 ; People v. Buening, 229 Ill.App.3d 538 , 170 Ill.Dec. 542 , 547_48, 592 N.E.2d | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Borchardt
green
2 sentences1996App., 575 So.2d 101, 105 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 575 So.2d 106 (1990); State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194 , 366 S.E.2d 642 (1988); State v. Clark, 234 Mont. 222 , 762 P.2d 853 (1988); Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa.Super. 359 , 532 A.2d 1186, 1189 (1987) (“Results of the HGN test are ... scientific evidence based on the scientific principle that consumption of alcohol causes the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test”); State v. Borchardt, 224 Neb. 47 , 395 N.W.2d 551 (1986); Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 181 ; People v. Buening, 229 Ill.App.3d 538 , 170 Ill.Dec. 542 , 547_48, 592 N.E.2d 1996App., 575 So.2d 101, 105 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 575 So.2d 106 (1990); State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194 , 366 S.E.2d 642 (1988); State v. Clark, 234 Mont. 222 , 762 P.2d 853 (1988); Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa.Super. 359 , 532 A.2d 1186, 1189 (1987) (“Results of the HGN test are ... scientific evidence based on the scientific principle that consumption of alcohol causes the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test”); State v. Borchardt, 224 Neb. 47 , 395 N.W.2d 551 (1986); Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 181 ; People v. Buening, 229 Ill.App.3d 538 , 170 Ill.Dec. 542 , 547_48, 592 N.E.2d | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Barker
green
2 sentences1996App., 575 So.2d 101, 105 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 575 So.2d 106 (1990); State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194 , 366 S.E.2d 642 (1988); State v. Clark, 234 Mont. 222 , 762 P.2d 853 (1988); Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa.Super. 359 , 532 A.2d 1186, 1189 (1987) (“Results of the HGN test are ... scientific evidence based on the scientific principle that consumption of alcohol causes the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test”); State v. Borchardt, 224 Neb. 47 , 395 N.W.2d 551 (1986); Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 181 ; People v. Buening, 229 Ill.App.3d 538 , 170 Ill.Dec. 542 , 547_48, 592 N.E.2d 1996App., 575 So.2d 101, 105 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 575 So.2d 106 (1990); State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194 , 366 S.E.2d 642 (1988); State v. Clark, 234 Mont. 222 , 762 P.2d 853 (1988); Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa.Super. 359 , 532 A.2d 1186, 1189 (1987) (“Results of the HGN test are ... scientific evidence based on the scientific principle that consumption of alcohol causes the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test”); State v. Borchardt, 224 Neb. 47 , 395 N.W.2d 551 (1986); Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 181 ; People v. Buening, 229 Ill.App.3d 538 , 170 Ill.Dec. 542 , 547_48, 592 N.E.2d | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Malone v. City of Silverhill
green
1 sentence1996App., 575 So.2d 101, 105 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 575 So.2d 106 (1990); State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194 , 366 S.E.2d 642 (1988); State v. Clark, 234 Mont. 222 , 762 P.2d 853 (1988); Commonwealth v. Miller, 367 Pa.Super. 359 , 532 A.2d 1186, 1189 (1987) (“Results of the HGN test are ... scientific evidence based on the scientific principle that consumption of alcohol causes the type of nystagmus measured by the HGN test”); State v. Borchardt, 224 Neb. 47 , 395 N.W.2d 551 (1986); Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 181 ; People v. Buening, 229 Ill.App.3d 538 , 170 Ill.Dec. 542 , 547_48, 592 N.E.2d | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Delaware v. Fensterer
green
2 sentences1996Delaware Rules of Evidence and HGN In contrast to many states, the admission of new or novel scientific evidence in Delaware is governed by the pertinent Delaware Rules of Evidence, and is not limited solely to the “general acceptance” requirements of the Frye test. 12 Nelson v. State, DeL.Supr., 628 A.2d 69, 73-4 (1993) (finding that basic principles in Frye protected under current [Delaware] standard that opinions may be based on information, tests or techniques that are reasonably relied upon by experts in the field); Santiago, 510 A.2d at 489 (Frye not “sole test” for judging admissibility 1996Delaware Rules of Evidence and HGN In contrast to many states, the admission of new or novel scientific evidence in Delaware is governed by the pertinent Delaware Rules of Evidence, and is not limited solely to the “general acceptance” requirements of the Frye test. 12 Nelson v. State, DeL.Supr., 628 A.2d 69, 73-4 (1993) (finding that basic principles in Frye protected under current [Delaware] standard that opinions may be based on information, tests or techniques that are reasonably relied upon by experts in the field); Santiago, 510 A.2d at 489 (Frye not “sole test” for judging admissibility | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| cluster 573993 green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.