hearing challenge in New Jersey

2024Particularly given the ex parte nature and "informality of a [C]hief of [P]olice's initial consideration of an application," Dubov, 410 N.J.

2016Dubov, supra, 410 N.J.

2024Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that his trial counsel was deficient for not presenting an alibi defense and for failing to request a hearing to challenge the reliability of the witnesses' identification of his tattoo pursuant to United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

2023Relying on the Court's decisions in Webster and State v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1 (2002), defendant contends we should remand for a hearing on his claim PCR A-1838-21 17 counsel was ineffective by failing to elaborate on defendant's pro se arguments.

2023In Webster, however, the Court remanded for a hearing on the defendant's claim PCR counsel was ineffective because it was not clear if the PCR court had considered the defendant's pro se arguments where PCR counsel's brief had not referred to defendant's arguments and the PCR judge had not commented on them. 187 N.J. at 258 .

2022More recently, in Susko v. Borough of Belmar, 458 N.J.

2021Appellant requested a hearing to challenge the proposed suspension, and relying on State v. Davis, 95 N.J.

2020It is fundamental that credibility issues are determined only after a full hearing where the petitioner and respondent present their witnesses and testimony. 8 See ibid.

2019Rather, as the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in Howery, "[t]he limitations imposed by Franks are not insignificant." 80 N.J. at 567 .

2014Similarly, in Burch v. Apalachee Cmty. Mental Health Servs., Inc., the plaintiff’s five-month involuntary commitment during which he was “never . . . accorded a hearing at which to challenge his commitment and treatment” was sufficient to “state a procedural due process claim upon which relief could be granted” under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 . 840 F.2d 797, 799, 803 (11th Cir. 1988), aff’d, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 , 110 S. Ct. 975 , 108 L.

2014Similarly, in Burch v. Apalachee Cmty. Mental Health Servs., Inc., the plaintiff’s five-month involuntary commitment during which he was “never . . . accorded a hearing at which to challenge his commitment and treatment” was sufficient to “state a procedural due process claim upon which relief could be granted” under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 . 840 F.2d 797, 799, 803 (11th Cir. 1988), aff’d, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 , 110 S. Ct. 975 , 108 L.

2010He argues that "there is no record of the extent to which defense counsel reviewed discovery or constitutional rights to trial, confrontation, and testimony so as to determine whether Enright's plea was truly knowing and intelligent." He argues further that "[t]he present record ... is silent about either the existence of discovery ... or Enright's knowledge and understanding of the significance of such discovery." These allegations are not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-part test established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 6

2010He argues that "there is no record of the extent to which defense counsel reviewed discovery or constitutional rights to trial, confrontation, and testimony so as to determine whether Enright's plea was truly knowing and intelligent." He argues further that "[t]he present record ... is silent about either the existence of discovery ... or Enright's knowledge and understanding of the significance of such discovery." These allegations are not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-part test established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 6

2004While a defendant is entitled to a hearing to challenge an ADTC recommendation that he be sentenced under the Sex Offender Act (Act), State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 121-128 , 539 A.2d 1203 (1988), the State has no basis for challenging a report that finds a defendant ineligible for sentencing under the Act.

2004While a defendant is entitled to a hearing to challenge an ADTC recommendation that he be sentenced under the Sex Offender Act (Act), State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 121-128 , 539 A.2d 1203 (1988), the State has no basis for challenging a report that finds a defendant ineligible for sentencing under the Act.

2004Co. v. State Dept. of Transp., 120 N.J. 40, 54 , 575 A. 2d 1360 (1990) (noting that agency could refer a case to OAL for a hearing by rule or regulation even though it did not meet APA definition of "contested case").

2004Co. v. State Dept. of Transp., 120 N.J. 40, 54 , 575 A. 2d 1360 (1990) (noting that agency could refer a case to OAL for a hearing by rule or regulation even though it did not meet APA definition of "contested case").

1998A hearing, as envisioned in Sorentino v. The Family and Children’s Soc’y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127 , 367 A.2d 1168 (1976) (Sorentino I), and as further amplified in Sorentino v. The Family & Children’s Soc’y of Elizabeth, 74 N.J. 313 , 378 A.2d 18 (1977) (Sorentino II), was mandatory under the facts of this ease.* 7 We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the Family Part for further accelerated proceedings, as discussed infra. We shall retain jurisdiction and shall consider, on an accelerated basis, any application necessitated by the decision of the Family Part at the conc

1998A hearing, as envisioned in Sorentino v. The Family and Children’s Soc’y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127 , 367 A.2d 1168 (1976) (Sorentino I), and as further amplified in Sorentino v. The Family & Children’s Soc’y of Elizabeth, 74 N.J. 313 , 378 A.2d 18 (1977) (Sorentino II), was mandatory under the facts of this ease.* 7 We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the Family Part for further accelerated proceedings, as discussed infra. We shall retain jurisdiction and shall consider, on an accelerated basis, any application necessitated by the decision of the Family Part at the conc

1998A hearing, as envisioned in Sorentino v. The Family and Children’s Soc’y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127 , 367 A.2d 1168 (1976) (Sorentino I), and as further amplified in Sorentino v. The Family & Children’s Soc’y of Elizabeth, 74 N.J. 313 , 378 A.2d 18 (1977) (Sorentino II), was mandatory under the facts of this ease.* 7 We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the Family Part for further accelerated proceedings, as discussed infra. We shall retain jurisdiction and shall consider, on an accelerated basis, any application necessitated by the decision of the Family Part at the conc

1998A hearing, as envisioned in Sorentino v. The Family and Children’s Soc’y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127 , 367 A.2d 1168 (1976) (Sorentino I), and as further amplified in Sorentino v. The Family & Children’s Soc’y of Elizabeth, 74 N.J. 313 , 378 A.2d 18 (1977) (Sorentino II), was mandatory under the facts of this ease.* 7 We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the Family Part for further accelerated proceedings, as discussed infra. We shall retain jurisdiction and shall consider, on an accelerated basis, any application necessitated by the decision of the Family Part at the conc

1998State v. Jefimowicz, 119 N.J. 152, 155 , 574 A.2d 428 (1990), involved a defendant who was convicted of armed robbery and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.

1998State v. Jefimowicz, 119 N.J. 152, 155 , 574 A.2d 428 (1990), involved a defendant who was convicted of armed robbery and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.

1988And to the extent that the Appellate Division had any doubt on this subject, it provided for the possibility of error by explicitly advising the defendant that if he “actually desires to contest whether he was previously convicted of a ‘Graves’ offense, he should move before the trial court under 7?. 3:22-2 for correction of an illegal sentence.” 209 N.J.Super. at 482 . *15 We recognize the possibility that in the case before us today, the disposition by the Appellate Division may both accomplish substantial justice and conserve judicial energy.

1977Thus, the court is satisfied that if there is a common-law right to abate a nuisance, which unquestionably there is, and if that right is coupled with a guarantee of a hearing at some stage for the alleged victim, then certainly, in the context of this litigation, the concern by the city officials resulting in the abrupt closedown on December 9, 1976 more than satisfies that test, as set down in Gissen and Ajamian, supra .

1958Continuously from the time of the rendition of the decision in Textileather Corp. v. Great American Indemnity Co., 108 N.J.L. 121 ( E. & A. 1931), and at least until the deliverance in Calabria v. Liberty Mutual Ins.