13 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Swangreen2 sentences2008The State argues, and we agree, that the “without unnecessary delay” language plainly refers to the first court appearance after an offender is arrested pursuant to a revocation petition. ¶19 Triplett cites our holding in State v. Swan and offers that the language therein stating a “revocation hearing should be ‘held promptly’ and defendant should be “brought before the court without unnecessary delay for a hearing on the violation charged,”’ demonstrates the applicability of the statutory language to a revocation hearing. 220 Mont. 162, 166 , 713 P.2d 1003, 1006 (1986). 2008The State argues, and we agree, that the “without unnecessary delay” language plainly refers to the first court appearance after an offender is arrested pursuant to a revocation petition. ¶19 Triplett cites our holding in State v. Swan and offers that the language therein stating a “revocation hearing should be ‘held promptly’ and defendant should be “brought before the court without unnecessary delay for a hearing on the violation charged,”’ demonstrates the applicability of the statutory language to a revocation hearing. 220 Mont. 162, 166 , 713 P.2d 1003, 1006 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. City of Livingstongreen2 sentences1999See Phillips, 268 Mont. at 159-60 , 885 P.2d at 530-31 . ¶ 17 The Defendants contend, however, that Phillips is distinguishable because, unlike the City here, Livingston does not have self-government powers; thus, according to the Defendants, Phillips applies only to local governments with general government powers. 1999See Phillips, 268 Mont. at 159-60 , 885 P.2d at 530-31 . ¶ 17 The Defendants contend, however, that Phillips is distinguishable because, unlike the City here, Livingston does not have self-government powers; thus, according to the Defendants, Phillips applies only to local governments with general government powers. | 1 | 1 |
Johansen v. State, Dept. of Natural Resourcesgreen2 sentences1999See Johansen v. State, Dept. of Natural Resources, 1998 MT 51, ¶ 24 , 288 Mont. 39, ¶ 24 , 955 P.2d 653, ¶ 24 (this Court is not obligated to conduct legal research on a party's behalf, guess at the party's precise position, or develop a legal analysis which may lend support to that position). 1999See Johansen v. State, Dept. of Natural Resources, 1998 MT 51, ¶ 24 , 288 Mont. 39, ¶ 24 , 955 P.2d 653, ¶ 24 (this Court is not obligated to conduct legal research on a party's behalf, guess at the party's precise position, or develop a legal analysis which may lend support to that position). | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Myllymakigreen2 sentences1990In Shackelton, 207 Mont. at 102 , 672 P.2d at 1115 , we adopted the following factors from State Steamship Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, 426 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1970), to be used in considering whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing a suit for failure to prosecute: “(1) [T]he appellant’s right to a hearing on its claim, (2) the impairment of the appellees’ defenses presumed from the unreasonable delay, (3) the wholesome policy of the law in favor of the prompt disposition of law suits, and (4) the duty of the appellant to proceed with due diligence.” In Cox v. Myllym 1990In Shackelton, 207 Mont. at 102 , 672 P.2d at 1115 , we adopted the following factors from State Steamship Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, 426 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1970), to be used in considering whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing a suit for failure to prosecute: “(1) [T]he appellant’s right to a hearing on its claim, (2) the impairment of the appellees’ defenses presumed from the unreasonable delay, (3) the wholesome policy of the law in favor of the prompt disposition of law suits, and (4) the duty of the appellant to proceed with due diligence.” In Cox v. Myllym | 1 | 1 |
No. 85-2149green1 sentence1990Quoting Hamilton v. Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 811 F.2d 498, 499 (9th Cir. 1987), we enumerated the following considerations: “[T]he plaintiff’s diligence, the trial court’s need to manage its docket, the danger of prejudice to the party suffering the delay, the availability of alternate sanctions, and the existence of warning to the party occasioning the delay.” Taking the Shackelton and Cox factors together, the elements this Court will consider when determining whether a district court has abused its discretion by dismissing an action for failure to prosecute are: 1) the plaintiff’s dilige | 1 | 1 |
States Steamship Company, a Corporation v. Philippine Air Lines, a Corporation, and Qantas Airways, a Corporationgreen2 sentences1990In Shackelton, 207 Mont. at 102 , 672 P.2d at 1115 , we adopted the following factors from State Steamship Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, 426 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1970), to be used in considering whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing a suit for failure to prosecute: “(1) [T]he appellant’s right to a hearing on its claim, (2) the impairment of the appellees’ defenses presumed from the unreasonable delay, (3) the wholesome policy of the law in favor of the prompt disposition of law suits, and (4) the duty of the appellant to proceed with due diligence.” In Cox v. Myllym 1990In Shackelton, 207 Mont. at 102 , 672 P.2d at 1115 , we adopted the following factors from State Steamship Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, 426 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir.1970), to be used in considering whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing a suit for failure to prosecute: (1) [T]he appellant's right to a hearing on its claim, (2) the impairment of the appellees' defenses presumed from the unreasonable delay, (3) the wholesome policy of the law in favor of the prompt disposition of law suits, and (4) the duty of the appellant to proceed with due diligence. | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Krutzfeldt v. District Court of Thirteenth Judicial District ex rel. County of Yellowstonegreen2 sentences1977Court, 163 Mont. 164, 170 , 515 P.2d 1312, 1315 (1973), we said: “That comment makes it clear that if, in the judge’s opinion and after a hearing if requested by either attorney, a defendant was clearly suffering from mental disease at the time of the crime then the judge can acquit the defendant and have him committed to a state institution forthwith. 1977Court, 163 Mont. 164, 170 , 515 P.2d 1312, 1315 (1973), we said: “That comment makes it clear that if, in the judge’s opinion and after a hearing if requested by either attorney, a defendant was clearly suffering from mental disease at the time of the crime then the judge can acquit the defendant and have him committed to a state institution forthwith. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Applications for the Commitment of Sl
green
2 sentences2005If the patient is still residing in the institution after six months, and the State continues to argue that “placement is not possible” then “the court must determine whether the State has undertaken all good faith efforts necessary to place the individual in an appropriate setting outside the mental institution and whether in the interim the State has placed the individual in the least restrictive setting in the institution.” S.L., 462 A.2d at 1258-59 . ¶46 It is agreed that, “T.W. was dangerous when she entered MDC and her condition substantially improved while she was in the State’s care.” 2005If the patient is still residing in the institution after six months, and the State continues to argue that "placement is not possible" then "the court must determine whether the State has undertaken all good faith efforts necessary to place the individual in an appropriate setting outside the mental institution and whether in the interim the State has placed the individual in the least restrictive setting in the institution." S.L., 462 A.2d at 1258-59 . ¶ 46 It is agreed that, "T.W. was dangerous when she entered MDC and her condition substantially improved while she was in the State's care." | 2 | 2005–2005 |
In Re the Marriage of Wendt
neutral
2 sentences2026In re Marriage of Wendt, 2014 MT 174, ¶ 11 , 375 Mont. 388 , 329 P.3d 567 . 2026In re Marriage of Wendt, 2014 MT 174, ¶ 11 , 375 Mont. 388 , 329 P.3d 567 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Lacey v. State
green
2 sentences2022Lacey v. State, 2017 MT 18, ¶ 13 , 386 Mont. 204 , 389 P.3d 233 . ¶27 This Court has acknowledged the cumulative error doctrine, which is the accumulation of errors that prejudice a defendant’s right to a fair trial, but noted that mere allegations of error without proof of prejudice are insufficient to satisfy the doctrine. 2022Lacey v. State, 2017 MT 18, ¶ 13 , 386 Mont. 204 , 389 P.3d 233 . ¶27 This Court has acknowledged the cumulative error doctrine, which is the accumulation of errors that prejudice a defendant’s right to a fair trial, but noted that mere allegations of error without proof of prejudice are insufficient to satisfy the doctrine. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Oppelt
green
2 sentences2002The hearing may be informal or summary. 5 Section 46-23-1013(1), MCA. ¶17 As we noted in State v. Oppelt (1979), 184 Mont. 48 , 601 P.2d 394 , proceedings for revocation of a suspended sentence are not criminal prosecutions and a probationer has no constitutional right to a “speedy trial.” There is no untimely delay if the lapse between the defendant’s arrest for probation violations and the first revocation hearing is not unreasonable. 2002The hearing may be informal or summary. 5 Section 46-23-1013(1), MCA. ¶17 As we noted in State v. Oppelt (1979), 184 Mont. 48 , 601 P.2d 394 , proceedings for revocation of a suspended sentence are not criminal prosecutions and a probationer has no constitutional right to a “speedy trial.” There is no untimely delay if the lapse between the defendant’s arrest for probation violations and the first revocation hearing is not unreasonable. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Cole v. Flathead County
green
2 sentences2002Cole v. Flathead Co., 236 Mont. 412 , 771 P.2d 97 , 46 St. 2002Cole v. Flathead Co., 236 Mont. 412 , 771 P.2d 97 , 46 St. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State ex rel. Smith v. District Court of Eighth Judicial District
green
2 sentences1997In remanding for a hearing under the standard set forth, we concluded: “Only if the trial court finds that there is a ’clear and present danger’ and that less restrictive alternatives, including a protective order, cannot protect defendant’s right to a fair trial, should closure be ordered.” Smith, 654 P.2d at 988 . 1997In remanding for a hearing under the standard set forth, we concluded: "Only if the trial court finds that there is a `clear and present danger' and that less restrictive alternatives, including a protective order, cannot protect defendant's right to a fair trial, should closure be ordered." Smith, 654 P.2d at 988 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Shackleton v. Neil
green
2 sentences1990In Shackelton, 207 Mont. at 102 , 672 P.2d at 1115 , we adopted the following factors from State Steamship Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, 426 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1970), to be used in considering whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing a suit for failure to prosecute: “(1) [T]he appellant’s right to a hearing on its claim, (2) the impairment of the appellees’ defenses presumed from the unreasonable delay, (3) the wholesome policy of the law in favor of the prompt disposition of law suits, and (4) the duty of the appellant to proceed with due diligence.” In Cox v. Myllym 1990In Shackelton, 207 Mont. at 102 , 672 P.2d at 1115 , we adopted the following factors from State Steamship Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, 426 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1970), to be used in considering whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing a suit for failure to prosecute: “(1) [T]he appellant’s right to a hearing on its claim, (2) the impairment of the appellees’ defenses presumed from the unreasonable delay, (3) the wholesome policy of the law in favor of the prompt disposition of law suits, and (4) the duty of the appellant to proceed with due diligence.” In Cox v. Myllym | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Montana Citizens Freight Rate Ass'n v. Board of Railroad Com'rs
neutral
2 sentences1986Montana Citizens Freight Rate Association v. Board of Railroad Commissioners (1954), 128 Mont. 127, 134 , 271 P.2d 1024, 1027 . 1986Montana Citizens Freight Rate Association v. Board of Railroad Commissioners (1954), 128 Mont. 127, 134 , 271 P.2d 1024, 1027 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.