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18 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1970–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gibson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1993See id.; Gibson v. United States, 388 A.2d 1214, 1215 (D.C.1978). 1978Compare Gibson, supra; Johnson, supra; Session, supra. The trial court stated the applicable legal standard by which to measure Davis’ claim. | 2 | 2 |
Bruce v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023We therefore remand for the motions court to hold a hearing on this claim as well. 15 See Bruce, 617 A.2d at 995 (remanding for a 15 We acknowledge that Mr. Shepherd may face difficulty in showing that, but for this alleged deficiency alone, there was a “reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Cosio, 927 A.2d at 1132 . | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2023See Taylor v. District of Columbia, 606 F. Supp. 2d 93, 96 (D.D.C. 2009) (plaintiff failed to state due-process claim where plaintiff received notice expressly indicating plaintiff’s right to hearing and advising plaintiff how to request hearing). | 1 | 1 |
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE AND RAND SIMBERG v. MICHAEL E. MANN, NATIONAL REVIEW, INC. v. MICHAEL E. MANNgreen2 sentences2021In applying the first criterion, the CRB ruled that the AHD’s order did not “conclusively determine a [disputed] question of law.” 34 It said that the law answering whether WASA had “standing” to request a “Formal Hearing with AHD” was “well-established”; the employer “does have” such standing as an 31 See text accompanying supra note 3. 32 McNair Builders, Inc., 3 A.3d at 1136 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 , 349–50 (2006)). 33 Mann, 150 A.3d at 1228 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 34 Id. 15 “interested party” with the right to “apply for a hearing on a claim.” 35 In 2021In applying the first criterion, the CRB ruled that the AHD’s order did not “conclusively determine a [disputed] question of law.” 34 It said that the law answering whether WASA had “standing” to request a “Formal Hearing with AHD” was “well-established”; the employer “does have” such standing as an 31 See text accompanying supra note 3. 32 McNair Builders, Inc., 3 A.3d at 1136 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 , 349–50 (2006)). 33 Mann, 150 A.3d at 1228 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 34 Id. 15 “interested party” with the right to “apply for a hearing on a claim.” 35 In | 1 | 1 |
Willie M. Folks v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2021Comm., 242 A.3d at 613 (declining to examine “in the first instance” whether plaintiffs could show they were likely to succeed on their claims, and instead remanding for trial court to hold a hearing and rule on that issue); see also, e.g., Folks v. District of Columbia, 93 A.3d 681, 686 (D.C. 2014) (“The trial court did not definitively resolve that issue. | 1 | 1 |
Junior v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2017While acknowledging that there is a presumption in favor of holding a hearing on 2 See Junior v. United States, 634 A.2d 411, 417 (D.C. 1993) (―[A] motion . . . filed before appellant was sentenced [cannot be] characterize[ed] . . . as [a] post-sentence § 23-110 [motion].‖). 3 In that motion, appellate counsel represented that post-trial counsel had ―indicated that he had lost Mr. Bethea‘s file.‖ 4 We do not infer from this sequence of events that Mr. Bethea or his counsel perceived it necessary to supplement the information presented in his first two motions in order to support and obtain a h | 1 | 1 |
Wells v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2007See id. | 1 | 1 |
Becker v. Montgomerygreen2 sentences2001See Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 , ___, 121 S.Ct. 1801, 1804 , 149 L.Ed.2d 983 (2001). 2001See Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 , ___, 121 S.Ct. 1801, 1804 , 149 L.Ed.2d 983 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1999See Wright v. United States, 608 A.2d 763, 766 (D.C.1992) (remanding for a hearing because claim was not palpably incredible). 1999See Wright v. United States, 608 A.2d 763, 766 (D.C.1992) (remanding for a hearing because claim was not palpably incredible). | 1 | 1 |
Sykes v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1998See Sykes v. United States, 585 A.2d 1335, 1338-39 (D.C.1991). | 1 | 1 |
White v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1993See White v. United States, 484 A.2d 553, 558-89 (D.C.1984) (affirming denial of a hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where failure to prepare alibi defense, which was supported by an affidavit of the alibi witness, was too vague to support claim of ineffective assistance and contradicted appellant’s testimony at trial). 6 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed. . 1993See White v. United States, 484 A.2d 553, 558-89 (D.C.1984) (affirming denial of a hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where failure to prepare alibi defense, which was supported by an affidavit of the alibi witness, was too vague to support claim of ineffective assistance and contradicted appellant's testimony at trial). [6] Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
Ellerbe v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1991Ellerbe v. United States, 545 A.2d 1197, 1198-99 (D.C.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 , 109 S.Ct. 174 , 102 L.Ed.2d 144 (1988); Hockman v. United States, 517 A.2d 44 (D.C.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Chevy Chase Citizens Ass'n v. District of Columbia Councilgreen2 sentences1982The award of these exclusive rights is an “administrative proceeding ... concerned basically with weighing particular information and arriving at a decision directed at the rights of specific parties.” Schneider, supra at 326 , quoting Chevy Chase Citizens Association v. District of Columbia Council, D.C.App., 327 A.2d 310, 313 (1974) (en banc). 1982The award of these exclusive rights is an "administrative proceeding . . . concerned basically with weighing particular information and arriving at a decision directed at the rights of specific parties." Schneider, supra at 326 , quoting Chevy Chase Citizens Association v. District of Columbia Council, D.C.App., 327 A.2d 310, 313 (1974) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
Isaac Williams v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1970Williams v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 206, 209 , 328 F.2d 178, 181 (1963). 1970Williams v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 206, 209 , 328 F.2d 178, 181 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. United States
green
2 sentences2009We also “reserve[d] for another case the issue of what rights, if any, a defendant may have with respect to appellate counsel’s conduct of the hearing on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel made in accordance with Shepard.” Id. at 600 n. 1 (emphasis in original). 2009We also "reserve[d] for another case the issue of what rights, if any, a defendant may have with respect to appellate counsel's conduct of the hearing on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel made in accordance with Shepard." Id. at 600 n. 1 (emphasis in original). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Cosio v. United States
green
1 sentence2023We therefore remand for the motions court to hold a hearing on this claim as well. 15 See Bruce, 617 A.2d at 995 (remanding for a 15 We acknowledge that Mr. Shepherd may face difficulty in showing that, but for this alleged deficiency alone, there was a “reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Cosio, 927 A.2d at 1132 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Will v. Hallock
green
1 sentence2021In applying the first criterion, the CRB ruled that the AHD’s order did not “conclusively determine a [disputed] question of law.” 34 It said that the law answering whether WASA had “standing” to request a “Formal Hearing with AHD” was “well-established”; the employer “does have” such standing as an 31 See text accompanying supra note 3. 32 McNair Builders, Inc., 3 A.3d at 1136 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 , 349–50 (2006)). 33 Mann, 150 A.3d at 1228 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 34 Id. 15 “interested party” with the right to “apply for a hearing on a claim.” 35 In | 1 | 2021–2021 |
McNair Builders, Inc. v. Taylor
green
1 sentence2021In applying the first criterion, the CRB ruled that the AHD’s order did not “conclusively determine a [disputed] question of law.” 34 It said that the law answering whether WASA had “standing” to request a “Formal Hearing with AHD” was “well-established”; the employer “does have” such standing as an 31 See text accompanying supra note 3. 32 McNair Builders, Inc., 3 A.3d at 1136 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 , 349–50 (2006)). 33 Mann, 150 A.3d at 1228 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 34 Id. 15 “interested party” with the right to “apply for a hearing on a claim.” 35 In | 1 | 2021–2021 |
McClurkin v. United States
green
1 sentence1993McClurkin, supra, 472 A.2d at 1352 . *832 Although that standard applies under both Rule 32(e) and section 23-110, the fact that this collateral attack arises under the statute rather than the rule means that the disposition of this case is additionally subject to the hearing requirement of the statute. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Hockman v. United States
green
1 sentence1991Ellerbe v. United States, 545 A.2d 1197, 1198-99 (D.C.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 , 109 S.Ct. 174 , 102 L.Ed.2d 144 (1988); Hockman v. United States, 517 A.2d 44 (D.C.1986). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Illinois v. Marinez
green
1 sentence1991Ellerbe v. United States, 545 A.2d 1197, 1198-99 (D.C.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 , 109 S.Ct. 174 , 102 L.Ed.2d 144 (1988); Hockman v. United States, 517 A.2d 44 (D.C.1986). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Tarantino v. United States
green
1 sentence1991Ellerbe v. United States, 545 A.2d 1197, 1198-99 (D.C.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 , 109 S.Ct. 174 , 102 L.Ed.2d 144 (1988); Hockman v. United States, 517 A.2d 44 (D.C.1986). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Illinois v. Marinez
green
1 sentence1991Ellerbe v. United States, 545 A.2d 1197, 1198-99 (D.C.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 , 109 S.Ct. 174 , 102 L.Ed.2d 144 (1988); Hockman v. United States, 517 A.2d 44 (D.C.1986). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Schneider v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission
green
2 sentences1982The award of these exclusive rights is an “administrative proceeding ... concerned basically with weighing particular information and arriving at a decision directed at the rights of specific parties.” Schneider, supra at 326 , quoting Chevy Chase Citizens Association v. District of Columbia Council, D.C.App., 327 A.2d 310, 313 (1974) (en banc). 1982The award of these exclusive rights is an "administrative proceeding . . . concerned basically with weighing particular information and arriving at a decision directed at the rights of specific parties." Schneider, supra at 326 , quoting Chevy Chase Citizens Association v. District of Columbia Council, D.C.App., 327 A.2d 310, 313 (1974) (en banc). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences1978Compare Gibson, supra ; Johnson, supra ; Session, supra . 1978Compare Gibson, supra; Johnson, supra; Session, supra. The trial court stated the applicable legal standard by which to measure Davis’ claim. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Session v. United States
green
2 sentences1978Compare Gibson, supra ; Johnson, supra ; Session, supra . 1978Compare Gibson, supra; Johnson, supra; Session, supra. The trial court stated the applicable legal standard by which to measure Davis’ claim. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Bell v. Burson
green
2 sentences1976This hearing requirement was set down by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 , 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589 , 29 L. 1976This hearing requirement was set down by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 , 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589 , 29 L. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.