hearing requirement in Connecticut

1994No such revocation shall be ordered, except upon consideration of the whole record and unless such violation is established by reliable and probative evidence.” The defendant also requests that we reconsider our decision in State v. Baxter, 19 Conn. App. 304 , 563 A.2d 721 (1989).

1994No such revocation shall be ordered, except upon consideration of the whole record and unless such violation is established by reliable and probative evidence.” The defendant also requests that we reconsider our decision in State v. Baxter, 19 Conn. App. 304 , 563 A.2d 721 (1989).

2025On appeal, the defen- dant claims that the court (1) violated his right to due process under the federal constitution by failing to engage in a due process balancing analysis under State v. Shakir, 130 Conn. App. 458, 467 , 22 A.3d 1285 , cert. 1 General Statutes § 53a-32 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) At any time during the period of probation . . . the court or any judge thereof may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the conditions of probation . . . . ‘‘(c) Upon . . . an arrest by warrant as herein provided, the court shall cause the defendant to be brou

2025On appeal, the defen- dant claims that the court (1) violated his right to due process under the federal constitution by failing to engage in a due process balancing analysis under State v. Shakir, 130 Conn. App. 458, 467 , 22 A.3d 1285 , cert. 1 General Statutes § 53a-32 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) At any time during the period of probation . . . the court or any judge thereof may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the conditions of probation . . . . ‘‘(c) Upon . . . an arrest by warrant as herein provided, the court shall cause the defendant to be brou

2023See, e.g., Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 156 , 251 A.2d 49 (1968) (explaining that, under separation of powers principles, ‘‘the General Assembly has no power to make rules of administration, practice or procedure [that] are binding on [our appel- late courts or the Superior Court]’’); Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 185 , 169 A.2d 652 (1961) (‘‘[i]rrespective of legislation, the rule-making power is in the courts’’); see also, e.g., State v. McCahill, 261 Conn. 492 , 520B, 811 A.2d 667 (2002) (explaining that, under separation of powers doctrine, ‘‘the General Assembly lacks the power t

2023See, e.g., Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 156 , 251 A.2d 49 (1968) (explaining that, under separation of powers principles, ‘‘the General Assembly has no power to make rules of administration, practice or procedure [that] are binding on [our appel- late courts or the Superior Court]’’); Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 185 , 169 A.2d 652 (1961) (‘‘[i]rrespective of legislation, the rule-making power is in the courts’’); see also, e.g., State v. McCahill, 261 Conn. 492 , 520B, 811 A.2d 667 (2002) (explaining that, under separation of powers doctrine, ‘‘the General Assembly lacks the power t

2010It is, however, well settled that “[a]s the sole finder of fact in the probation revocation proceeding . . . the court was entitled to arrive at its own conclusion regarding the witnesses’ credibility and what weight to afford their testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blake, 108 Conn. App. 336, 343 , 947 A.2d 998 , aff'd, 289 Conn. 586 , 958 A.2d 1236 (2008).

2010It is, however, well settled that “[a]s the sole finder of fact in the probation revocation proceeding . . . the court was entitled to arrive at its own conclusion regarding the witnesses’ credibility and what weight to afford their testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blake, 108 Conn. App. 336, 343 , 947 A.2d 998 , aff'd, 289 Conn. 586 , 958 A.2d 1236 (2008).

2010It is, however, well settled that “[a]s the sole finder of fact in the probation revocation proceeding . . . the court was entitled to arrive at its own conclusion regarding the witnesses’ credibility and what weight to afford their testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blake, 108 Conn. App. 336, 343 , 947 A.2d 998 , aff'd, 289 Conn. 586 , 958 A.2d 1236 (2008).

2010It is, however, well settled that “[a]s the sole finder of fact in the probation revocation proceeding . . . the court was entitled to arrive at its own conclusion regarding the witnesses’ credibility and what weight to afford their testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blake, 108 Conn. App. 336, 343 , 947 A.2d 998 , aff'd, 289 Conn. 586 , 958 A.2d 1236 (2008).

2007Dugger v. Dorman, 480 U.S. 951 , 107 S. Ct. 1616 , 94 L.

2007Dugger v. Dorman, 480 U.S. 951 , 107 S.Ct. 1616 , 94 L.Ed.2d 801 (1987).

2007Dugger v. Dorman, 480 U.S. 951 , 107 S. Ct. 1616 , 94 L.

2007Dugger v. Dorman, 480 U.S. 951 , 107 S.Ct. 1616 , 94 L.Ed.2d 801 (1987).

2007“If the parties to an action fail to object seasonably to a late judgment, waiver may be implied.” Lawton v. Weiner, 91 Conn. App. 698, 710 , 882 A.2d 151 (2005).

2007“If the parties to an action fail to object seasonably to a late judgment, waiver may be implied.” Lawton v. Weiner, 91 Conn. App. 698, 710 , 882 A.2d 151 (2005).

2007Anderson v. School Board of Seminole County, supra, 830 So. 2d 953 ; Rutz v. Essex Junction Prudential Committee, supra, 142 Vt. 410 .

2005Section 53a-32(a) provides, in relevant part, that upon a defendant's arrest for a violation of probation, "the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before *553 it without unnecessary delay for a hearing on the violation charges...." In State v. Toler, 192 Conn. 321 , 471 A.2d 643 (1984), our Supreme Court set forth enumerated factors to be considered in determining whether a delay between arraignment for a violation of probation and hearing constituted an unnecessary delay.

2005Section 53a-32(a) provides, in relevant part, that upon a defendant's arrest for a violation of probation, "the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before *553 it without unnecessary delay for a hearing on the violation charges...." In State v. Toler, 192 Conn. 321 , 471 A.2d 643 (1984), our Supreme Court set forth enumerated factors to be considered in determining whether a delay between arraignment for a violation of probation and hearing constituted an unnecessary delay.

2004In Hart Twin Volvo Corp. v. Commissioner of *809 Motor Vehicles, supra, 165 Conn. 42 , the commissioner of motor vehicles (commissioner) temporarily suspended the license of the plaintiff, Hart Twin Volvo Corporation (Hart Twin), to operate a car dealership after giving Hart Twin notice that it had violated a state statute pertaining to the operation of car dealerships.

2003Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 , 94 S. Ct. 1633 , 40 L.

2003Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 , 94 S. Ct. 1633 , 40 L.

2002On August 15, 1995, the Supreme Court ruled in PARCC, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals Heath Care , supra, 235 Conn. 128 that the trial court had erred in looking for a hearing requirement only among the statutes administered by the commission.

2002On August 15, 1995, the Supreme Court ruled in PARCC, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals Heath Care , supra, 235 Conn. 128 that the trial court had erred in looking for a hearing requirement only among the statutes administered by the commission.

2001The court next reviews Ralto Developers Inc. v. Environmental Impact Commission , 220 Conn. 54 (1991) and Trost v. Conservation Commission , 242 Conn. 335 (1997).

2001The court next reviews Ralto Developers Inc. v. Environmental Impact Commission , 220 Conn. 54 (1991) and Trost v. Conservation Commission , 242 Conn. 335 (1997).

2001Willimantic Car Wash, Inc. v. Zoning Board , 247 Conn. 732 (1999) focused on the hearing requirement for the approval of a settlement agreement and the court finds is not dispositive of the issue before this court.

2000Section 19a-87 (c) provides that "If the Commissioner of Public Health holds a hearing on a violation of § 19a-87 , the Commissioner may, in his discretion order that a civil penalty be imposed not greater than the penalty stated in the notice." Thus, the statute specifically gives the commissioner the power to impose a civil penalty and the exercise of that discretion "cannot be successfully challenged unless the discretion has been abused." Gibson v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board , 141 Conn. 218 , 230 (1954).

1999“Evidentiary support of counsel’s representations may be found necessary by the court . . . under certain contested circumstances-, see State v. Aillon, 202 Conn. 385 , 521 A.2d 555 (1987) . . . .” (Emphasis added.) State v. Haye, supra, 214 Conn. 483 .

1999“Evidentiary support of counsel’s representations may be found necessary by the court . . . under certain contested circumstances-, see State v. Aillon, 202 Conn. 385 , 521 A.2d 555 (1987) . . . .” (Emphasis added.) State v. Haye, supra, 214 Conn. 483 .

1997On May 22, 1996, a hearing on the violation of probation was held in accordance with Payne v. Robinson, 10 Conn. App. 395 (1987).