hearing claim in Pennsylvania

2023See Commonwealth v. Wright, 14 A.3d 798, 814 (Pa. 2011) (“[A]s a matter of statutory interpretation, although one is admonished to listen attentively to what a 10 The dissent argues “the reason revocation cannot occur ‘at any time’ is not a temporal limitation, but the hearing requirement.” Dissenting Opinion at 8.

2023See Commonwealth v. Wright, 14 A.3d 798, 814 (Pa. 2011) (“[A]s a matter of statutory interpretation, although one is admonished to listen attentively to what a 10 The dissent argues “the reason revocation cannot occur ‘at any time’ is not a temporal limitation, but the hearing requirement.” Dissenting Opinion at 8.

2025Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 899-900 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted and formatting altered).11 An appellate court extends “great deference to the trial judge’s determination as to competency because [the trial court] had the opportunity to observe directly a defendant’s behavior.” Commonwealth v. Flor, 998 A.2d 606, 617 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).

2025To obtain a hearing on this claim, Appellant would have to proffer evidence sufficient to meet this burden.” Smith, 17 A.3d at 900 - 18 - J-S44005-24 (citations omitted).

2023A petitioner asserting an after-discovered evidence claim under the PCRA must plead and prove that: “(1) the evidence has been discovered after trial and it could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 228 (Pa. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 823 (Pa. 2004)).

2022Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 820 (Pa. 2004). -5- J-S36012-21 Here, Glenn asserts that he was entitled to a hearing on his claim of after-discovered evidence2 involving crimes committed by Ronald Dove,3 a former Philadelphia police detective who was “alleged to have been present” during the interviews of two key witnesses in Glenn’s case.

2022First, the PCRA court “must determine whether the [Petitioner’s] PCRA petition raises a material issue of fact concerning whether he was competent at the time of trial such that he would be entitled to a hearing on the claim.” Id. (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2) (pertaining to PCRA hearings), Commonwealth v. Banks, 656 A.2d 467, 473 (Pa. 1995) (noting that where there are no disputed factual issues, a PCRA hearing is not necessary)).

2004See Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2); see also Banks, 656 A.2d at 473 .

2021See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d). - 21 - J-A23046-20 statement which is contrary to his own interests.” Commonwealth v. Colon, 337 A.2d 554, 556 (Pa. 1975); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 (1973) (it is assumed that “a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his own interest at the time it is made.”).

2021See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d). - 21 - J-A23046-20 statement which is contrary to his own interests.” Commonwealth v. Colon, 337 A.2d 554, 556 (Pa. 1975); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 (1973) (it is assumed that “a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his own interest at the time it is made.”).

2021See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d). - 21 - J-A23046-20 statement which is contrary to his own interests.” Commonwealth v. Colon, 337 A.2d 554, 556 (Pa. 1975); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 (1973) (it is assumed that “a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his own interest at the time it is made.”).

2021See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d). - 21 - J-A23046-20 statement which is contrary to his own interests.” Commonwealth v. Colon, 337 A.2d 554, 556 (Pa. 1975); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 (1973) (it is assumed that “a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his own interest at the time it is made.”).

2025Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 900 (Pa. 2011) (internal citations omitted); see also 50 P.S. § 7402(a) (incompetence to proceed on criminal charges); Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 752 (Pa. 2014) (“Competency to stand trial is measured by the relationship between counsel ____________________________________________ Rule 601.

2018However, Appellant argues that notwithstanding this failing, “the trial court took upon itself to address the Rule 600 issue through an [o]rder … and in doing so, failed to comply with the hearing requirement of the rule on which its decision was predicated.” Id.

2021To obtain a new trial based upon after-discovered evidence, a defendant must satisfy a four-prong test, namely that: “(1) the evidence could not have been obtained before the conclusion of the trial by reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence will not be used solely for purposes of impeachment; and (4) the evidence is of such a nature and character that a different outcome is likely.” Commonwealth v. Heaster, 171 A.3d 268, 273 (Pa.Super. 2017).

2018As we have explained, mere conclusory accusations relating to after-discovered evidence are insufficient to warrant a hearing and such a hearing is for the presentation, “not the potential discovery of evidence.” See Heaster, 171 A.3d 268 , 273- 74.

2018Petition of Tax Claim Bureau of Westmoreland Cty., supra. The party who has received the rule has the burden of proof at the hearing on the rule to show why the court should not grant the requested relief.

1995In In re Petition of Tax Claim Bureau of Westmoreland County, 149 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 532 , 613 A.2d 634 , appeal denied, 533 Pa. 615 , 618 A.2d 404 (1992), we held that because a hearing on the rule to show cause is required to afford an opportunity to object to the judicial sale, a mortgage was not divested by the judicial sale of property where the trial court continued the hearing on the rule to show cause without notifying the mortgagee of the new hearing date.

2025Compare id. (“It was not a hearing, at which each side could present evidence . . . .”) (bold emphasis added), with Calor, 340 F.3d at 431 (“The opportunity to participate requirement is satisfied because [the defendant] could have presented reasons why the court should not enter a[] [protective] order . . . at the . . . court proceeding.”) (emphasis added), and Young, 458 F.3d at 1009 (“[Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires] a proceeding during which the defendant could have objected to the entry of the order or otherwise engaged with the court as to the merits of the restraining order.”) (emphasis

2025United States v. Boyd, 999 F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 2021). “[T]he statute 4 The decisions of inferior federal courts are of persuasive value.

2025As stated above, “[§] 922(g)(8) does not require . . . a particular hearing scope or duration,” Boyd, 999 F.3d at 181 , and “the statute does not require that evidence actually have been offered or witnesses called,” Lippman, 369 F.3d at 1042 .

2025Compare id. (“It was not a hearing, at which each side could present evidence . . . .”) (bold emphasis added), with Calor, 340 F.3d at 431 (“The opportunity to participate requirement is satisfied because [the defendant] could have presented reasons why the court should not enter a[] [protective] order . . . at the . . . court proceeding.”) (emphasis added), and Young, 458 F.3d at 1009 (“[Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires] a proceeding during which the defendant could have objected to the entry of the order or otherwise engaged with the court as to the merits of the restraining order.”) (emphasis

2025Compare id. (“It was not a hearing, at which each side could present evidence . . . .”) (bold emphasis added), with Calor, 340 F.3d at 431 (“The opportunity to participate requirement is satisfied because [the defendant] could have presented reasons why the court should not enter a[] [protective] order . . . at the . . . court proceeding.”) (emphasis added), and Young, 458 F.3d at 1009 (“[Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires] a proceeding during which the defendant could have objected to the entry of the order or otherwise engaged with the court as to the merits of the restraining order.”) (emphasis

2025Appellant’s Supplemental Appellate Brief at 3. -8- J-S31025-23 “On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review requires us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 819 (Pa. Super. 2011).

2025Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 899-900 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted and formatting altered).11 An appellate court extends “great deference to the trial judge’s determination as to competency because [the trial court] had the opportunity to observe directly a defendant’s behavior.” Commonwealth v. Flor, 998 A.2d 606, 617 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).

2025As noted, we extend “great deference to the trial judge’s determination as to competency because [the trial court] had the opportunity to observe directly a defendant’s behavior.” Flor, 998 A.2d at 617 (citation omitted).

2025Concise Statement, 12/2/24, at 1; see also In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 350 (Pa. Super. 2013) (noting that “[t]his Court may find waiver where a concise statement is too vague”) (internal citation omitted).

2025In United States v. Bramer, for instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that a proceeding at which the court did not engage “in any type of exchange” with the pro se defendant before issuing a protective order did not satisfy the hearing requirement of § 922(g)(8)(A) because the defendant did not have an opportunity to participate in the proceeding. 956 F.3d 91, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2020).

2025Although it agreed with its sister circuits that the opportunity to participate requirement is “a minimal one,” the Second Circuit explained the requirement is met for unrepresented defendants when “a reasonable person in [the defendant’s] position would have understood that he was permitted to interpose objections or make an argument as to why an order of protection should not be imposed.” Id. at 98 .