17 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chatterjee v. Kinggreen1 sentence2022See Chatterjee v. King, 2011-NMCA-012, ¶ 15 , 149 N.M. 625 , 7 253 P.3d 915 (noting “the Legislature knows how to include language in a statute if 8 it so desires”), rev’d on other grounds by 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 52 , 283 P.3d 283 . 9 Nothing in the statutory language in either Section 72-2-16 or 72-12-3 indicates that 10 the hearing requirement set forth by the Legislature is as exacting as Applicant 11 claims. | 1 | 1 |
Chatterjee v. Kinggreen2 sentences2022See Chatterjee v. King, 2011-NMCA-012, ¶ 15 , 149 N.M. 625 , 7 253 P.3d 915 (noting “the Legislature knows how to include language in a statute if 8 it so desires”), rev’d on other grounds by 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 52 , 283 P.3d 283 . 9 Nothing in the statutory language in either Section 72-2-16 or 72-12-3 indicates that 10 the hearing requirement set forth by the Legislature is as exacting as Applicant 11 claims. 2022See Chatterjee v. King, 2011-NMCA-012, ¶ 15 , 149 N.M. 625 , 7 253 P.3d 915 (noting “the Legislature knows how to include language in a statute if 8 it so desires”), rev’d on other grounds by 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 52 , 283 P.3d 283 . 9 Nothing in the statutory language in either Section 72-2-16 or 72-12-3 indicates that 10 the hearing requirement set forth by the Legislature is as exacting as Applicant 11 claims. | 1 | 1 |
Chatterjee v. Kinggreen1 sentence2022See Chatterjee v. King, 2011-NMCA-012, ¶ 15 , 149 N.M. 625 , 7 253 P.3d 915 (noting “the Legislature knows how to include language in a statute if 8 it so desires”), rev’d on other grounds by 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 52 , 283 P.3d 283 . 9 Nothing in the statutory language in either Section 72-2-16 or 72-12-3 indicates that 10 the hearing requirement set forth by the Legislature is as exacting as Applicant 11 claims. | 1 | 1 |
Derringer v. Turneygreen1 sentence2022See Derringer, 2001-NMCA-075, ¶ 10 ; Garcia, 2008-NMCA-139, ¶¶ 4-5 . | 1 | 1 |
Dalton v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc.green1 sentence2017See, e.g., Dalton v. Santander Consumer 5 1 USA, Inc., 2015-NMCA-030, ¶ 26 , 345 P.3d 1086 (observing that the district court 2 was entitled to raise an issue sua sponte at a hearing on a defense motion and to 3 request argument from counsel), rev’d on other grounds, 2016-NMSC-035 , 385 P.3d 4 619; State v. Portillo, 2011-NMCA-079, ¶ 9 , 150 N.M. 187 , 258 P.3d 466 5 (characterizing standing as a threshold issue). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Portillogreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Dalton v. Santander Consumer 5 1 USA, Inc., 2015-NMCA-030, ¶ 26 , 345 P.3d 1086 (observing that the district court 2 was entitled to raise an issue sua sponte at a hearing on a defense motion and to 3 request argument from counsel), rev’d on other grounds, 2016-NMSC-035 , 385 P.3d 4 619; State v. Portillo, 2011-NMCA-079, ¶ 9 , 150 N.M. 187 , 258 P.3d 466 5 (characterizing standing as a threshold issue). 2017See, e.g., Dalton v. Santander Consumer 5 1 USA, Inc., 2015-NMCA-030, ¶ 26 , 345 P.3d 1086 (observing that the district court 2 was entitled to raise an issue sua sponte at a hearing on a defense motion and to 3 request argument from counsel), rev’d on other grounds, 2016-NMSC-035 , 385 P.3d 4 619; State v. Portillo, 2011-NMCA-079, ¶ 9 , 150 N.M. 187 , 258 P.3d 466 5 (characterizing standing as a threshold issue). | 1 | 1 |
Dalton v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc.green1 sentence2017See, e.g., Dalton v. Santander Consumer 5 1 USA, Inc., 2015-NMCA-030, ¶ 26 , 345 P.3d 1086 (observing that the district court 2 was entitled to raise an issue sua sponte at a hearing on a defense motion and to 3 request argument from counsel), rev’d on other grounds, 2016-NMSC-035 , 385 P.3d 4 619; State v. Portillo, 2011-NMCA-079, ¶ 9 , 150 N.M. 187 , 258 P.3d 466 5 (characterizing standing as a threshold issue). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Van Danggreen2 sentences2017See generally State v. Van Dang, 6 2005-NMSC-033, ¶ 7 , 138 N.M. 408 , 120 P.3d 830 (“To establish standing [to 7 challenge the constitutionality of a search, a d]efendant must demonstrate that he had 8 a subjective expectation of privacy that society will recognize as reasonable.”). 9 Although the prosecutor’s comments could reasonably have been understood as a 10 concession, this is not binding. 2017See generally State v. Van Dang, 6 2005-NMSC-033, ¶ 7 , 138 N.M. 408 , 120 P.3d 830 (“To establish standing [to 7 challenge the constitutionality of a search, a d]efendant must demonstrate that he had 8 a subjective expectation of privacy that society will recognize as reasonable.”). 9 Although the prosecutor’s comments could reasonably have been understood as a 10 concession, this is not binding. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tellesgreen2 sentences2011See State v. Telles, 1999-NMCA-013, ¶ 25 , 126 N.M. 593 , 973 P.2d 2 845 . 2011See State v. Telles, 1999-NMCA-013, ¶ 25 , 126 N.M. 593 , 973 P.2d 2 845 . | 1 | 1 |
Chronis v. State Ex Rel. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2008Rodriguez, 100 N.M. 342, 346-47 , 670 P.2d 953, 957-58 (1983) (holding that a statutory summary license suspension provision without notice or a hearing was a violation of due process). 2008Rodriguez, 100 N.M. 342, 346-47 , 670 P.2d 953, 957-58 (1983) (holding that a statutory summary license suspension provision without notice or a hearing was a violation of due process). | 1 | 1 |
Joab, Inc. v. Espinosagreen2 sentences2003See § 74-4-4.2(H); see also Joab, Inc. v. Espinosa, 116 N.M. 554, 558 , 865 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Ct.App.1993) (recognizing the importance of public input to the Environment Department's decision to issue a permit under the Solid Waste Act). 2003See § 74-4-4.2(H); see also Joab, Inc. v. Espinosa, 116 N.M. 554, 558 , 865 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Ct.App.1993) (recognizing the importance of public input to the Environment Department's decision to issue a permit under the Solid Waste Act). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lackgreen2 sentences1997Cf. Lack, 98 N.M. at 509 , 650 P.2d at 31 (where defendant fails to object to amount proposed in restitution, failure to afford him a hearing is not error). 1997Cf. Lack, 98 N.M. at 509 , 650 P.2d at 31 (where defendant fails to object to amount proposed in restitution, failure to afford him a hearing is not error). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.green2 sentences1993See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 , 76 S.Ct. 763, 771 , 100 L.Ed. 1081 (1956) (stating that the Federal Communications Commission should have the flexibility to refuse applications without a hearing when a hearing is not warranted). 1993See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 , 76 S.Ct. 763, 771 , 100 L.Ed. 1081 (1956) (stating that the Federal Communications Commission should have the flexibility to refuse applications without a hearing when a hearing is not warranted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Moralesgreen2 sentences1973The state has the burden of proving “ * * * by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification.” United States v. Wade, supra; see State v. Morales, 81 N.M. 333 , 466 P.2d 899 (Ct.App.1970). 1973The state has the burden of proving “ * * * by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification.” United States v. Wade, supra; see State v. Morales, 81 N.M. 333 , 466 P.2d 899 (Ct.App.1970). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lobbgreen2 sentences1969See State v. Lobb, 78 N.M. 735 , 437 P.2d 1004 (1968). 1969See State v. Lobb, 78 N.M. 735 , 437 P.2d 1004 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque
green
2 sentences2022High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050 , 12 ¶ 5, 126 N.M. 413 , 970 P.2d 599 (noting we “will not read into a statute or ordinance 13 language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written” (internal 14 quotation marks and citation omitted)). 3 To the extent Applicant argues the history of Section 72-2-16 and Section 72-12-3 can be read to express legislative intent to require an evidentiary hearing, we disagree. 2022High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050 , 12 ¶ 5, 126 N.M. 413 , 970 P.2d 599 (noting we “will not read into a statute or ordinance 13 language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written” (internal 14 quotation marks and citation omitted)). 3 To the extent Applicant argues the history of Section 72-2-16 and Section 72-12-3 can be read to express legislative intent to require an evidentiary hearing, we disagree. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v. Blackmer
green
2 sentences2022Invoking Section 72-2-16, Applicant filed a timely pending case.”); Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 20 , 138 N.M. 398 , 120 P.3d 820 (recognizing that a case becomes “pending” at the time of filing). 6 1 motion for a post-decision hearing, arguing it was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, 2 which the State Engineer denied. 3 {10} On appeal, Applicant argues that the hearing it received—the hearing on the 4 motions for summary judgment—did not satisfy the hearing requirement of Section 5 72-2-16, when read in conjunction with Section 72-2-17, which describes hearing 2022Invoking Section 72-2-16, Applicant filed a timely pending case.”); Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 20 , 138 N.M. 398 , 120 P.3d 820 (recognizing that a case becomes “pending” at the time of filing). 6 1 motion for a post-decision hearing, arguing it was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, 2 which the State Engineer denied. 3 {10} On appeal, Applicant argues that the hearing it received—the hearing on the 4 motions for summary judgment—did not satisfy the hearing requirement of Section 5 72-2-16, when read in conjunction with Section 72-2-17, which describes hearing | 2 | 2022–2022 |
D'ANTONIO v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2022Garcia interpreted the water code and Derringer to determine that the right to a post-decision hearing is not absolute and could be waived, and noted that the hearing requirement was “intended to ensure that the state engineer affords an appropriate degree of process to the parties before a final decision is entered.” Garcia, 2008-NMCA-139, ¶ 9 . {21} Both cases establish that an aggrieved party is entitled to a post-decision hearing only when the party was given no in-person, predecision hearing at all. 2022See Derringer, 2001-NMCA-075, ¶ 10 ; Garcia, 2008-NMCA-139, ¶¶ 4-5 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Rawlings v. Rawlings
green
2 sentences2022On May 5, 2022, this Court entered an order of limited remand for the district court to hold a hearing on Mother’s objections as required by Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2022-NMCA-013 , 505 P.3d 875 , cert. granted (S-1- SC-39107 Jan. 13, 2022). 2022On May 5, 2022, this Court entered an order of limited remand for the district court to hold a hearing on Mother’s objections as required by Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2022-NMCA-013 , 505 P.3d 875 , cert. granted (S-1- SC-39107 Jan. 13, 2022). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison
green
2 sentences2008Id. at 241 , 824 P.2d at 1043 . {24} In the case at bar, because the State filed its motion to reopen the hearing to bar reproseeution in district court fifteen days after filing its notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals, the district court no longer had any ability to act on the motion. 2008Id. at 241 , 824 P.2d at 1043 . {24} In the case at bar, because the State filed its motion to reopen the hearing to bar reproseeution in district court fifteen days after filing its notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals, the district court no longer had any ability to act on the motion. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Brooks v. Shanks
green
2 sentences2003Moreover, as the facts indicate, it was only after the hearing that the hearing officer decided to elevate the offense based upon his finding under Factor C that “[t]he specific behavior is repeated or has previously been the subject of disciplinary action.” Thus, we reject the State’s argument that Petitioner should have treated and defended against the Category B offense as if it were a major level offense, when he was expressly told by prison officials that the offense was only going to be reviewed at a minor level hearing. {21} Since the petition alleged that Petitioner had been wrongfully 2003Moreover, as the facts indicate, it was only after the hearing that the hearing officer decided to elevate the offense based upon his finding under Factor C that “[t]he specific behavior is repeated or has previously been the subject of disciplinary action.” Thus, we reject the State’s argument that Petitioner should have treated and defended against the Category B offense as if it were a major level offense, when he was expressly told by prison officials that the offense was only going to be reviewed at a minor level hearing. {21} Since the petition alleged that Petitioner had been wrongfully | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Southwest Research & Information Center v. State
neutral
2 sentences2002Ctr. v. State, 2003-NMCA-012 , ¶ 37, 133 N.M. 179 , 62 P.3d 270 (recognizing that the hearing requirement and public input obtained during the hearing is central to the Solid Waste Act), cert. granted, 132 N.M. 551 , 52 P.3d 411 (2002); 20 NMAC 1.4.1.109 (2002) ("This part 4 governing Permit Procedure for the Environment Department] shall also be liberally construed to facilitate participation by members of the public[.]"). {29} In opposition to the main issue on which the majority opinion reverses, the Secretary argued that Landfill was attempting to publish notice "calculated to give the gen 2002Ctr. v. State, 2003-NMCA-012 , ¶ 37, 133 N.M. 179 , 62 P.3d 270 (recognizing that the hearing requirement and public input obtained during the hearing is central to the Solid Waste Act), cert. granted, 132 N.M. 551 , 52 P.3d 411 (2002); 20 NMAC 1.4.1.109 (2002) ("This part 4 governing Permit Procedure for the Environment Department] shall also be liberally construed to facilitate participation by members of the public[.]"). {29} In opposition to the main issue on which the majority opinion reverses, the Secretary argued that Landfill was attempting to publish notice "calculated to give the gen | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Coll v. Hyland
green
2 sentences2001Behavioral experts in courtrooms and hearings are of little help to patients.”); Coll, 411 F.Supp. at 911 . {21} As can be seen, the Legislature’s decision to establish a seven-day hearing requirement implicates a number of different factors. 2001Behavioral experts in courtrooms and hearings are of little help to patients."); Coll, 411 F.Supp. at 911 . {21} As can be seen, the Legislature's decision to establish a seven-day hearing requirement implicates a number of different factors. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Parham v. J. R.
green
2 sentences2001Any time limitation placed on the hearing requirement must also take into account the administrative burdens of a judicial hearing, including scheduling, availability of judicial staff, and the impact on treatment resources. [4] See Parham, 442 U.S. at 605-06 , 99 S.Ct. 2493 ("One factor that must be considered is the utilization of the time of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other behavioral specialists in preparing for and participating in hearings rather than performing the task for which their special training has fitted them. 2001Any time limitation placed on the hearing requirement must also take into account the administrative burdens of a judicial hearing, including scheduling, availability of judicial staff, and the impact on treatment resources. [4] See Parham, 442 U.S. at 605-06 , 99 S.Ct. 2493 ("One factor that must be considered is the utilization of the time of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other behavioral specialists in preparing for and participating in hearings rather than performing the task for which their special training has fitted them. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States Ex Rel. Smith v. Baldi
green
2 sentences1968Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 , 73 S.Ct. 391 , 97 L.Ed. 549 .” It follows from what has been said that the order denying defendant’s motion must be reversed and he must be given a hearing only on his claim that he was coerced by the sheriff into entering a plea of guilty. 1968Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 , 73 S.Ct. 391 , 97 L.Ed. 549 .” It follows from what has been said that the order denying defendant’s motion must be reversed and he must be given a hearing only on his claim that he was coerced by the sheriff into entering a plea of guilty. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
State v. Moser
green
2 sentences1967State v. Moser, 1967, 78 N.M. 212 , 430 P.2d 106 ; and State v. Franklin, 1967, 78 N.M. 127 , 428 P.2d 982 . 1967State v. Moser, 1967, 78 N.M. 212 , 430 P.2d 106 ; and State v. Franklin, 1967, 78 N.M. 127 , 428 P.2d 982 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
State v. Franklin
green
2 sentences1967State v. Moser, 1967, 78 N.M. 212 , 430 P.2d 106 ; and State v. Franklin, 1967, 78 N.M. 127 , 428 P.2d 982 . 1967State v. Moser, 1967, 78 N.M. 212 , 430 P.2d 106 ; and State v. Franklin, 1967, 78 N.M. 127 , 428 P.2d 982 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.