hearing claim in Colorado

2026See People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 704 (Colo. 2010) (“The decision not to call a particular witness is typically a question of trial strategy that reviewing courts are ill-suited to second-guess.” (quoting Greiner v. Wells, 417 F. 3d 305, 323 (2d Cir. 2005))). ¶ 26 Because Baca failed to allege facts establishing that counsel’s failure to call V.B. was deficient performance, he was not entitled to a hearing on this claim.

2019See People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 693 (Colo. 2010) (“On issues of trial strategy, defense counsel is ‘captain of the ship.’” (quoting Arko v. People, 183 P.3d 555, 558 (Colo. 2008))). ¶ 36 We agree with the district court that defendant wasn’t entitled to a hearing on this claim, albeit for slightly different reasons.

2020See Chavez-Torres, ¶ 31, 410 P.3d at 696 . 25 ¶ 53 We therefore affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Houser’s request for a hearing on his claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the constitutionality of SOLSA. 3.

2020See Chavez-Torres, ¶ 31, 410 P.3d at 696 . ¶ 59 We therefore affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Houser’s request for a hearing on his claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the constitutionality of SOLSA. 3.

2016As McDonald noted: "In Heller ... we expressly rejected the argument that the scope of the Second Amendment right should be determined by judicial interest balancing." 561 U.S. at 785 , 130 S.Ct. 3020 . 181 Consequently, like the majority, I would also direct the district court to reinstate that portion of the plaintiffs' complaint alleging the unconstitutionality of H.B. 183-1224 and to proceed with a hearing on the claim, but I would advise the district court on remand to address the question of whether and to what extent H.B. 18-1224 impacts the fundamental guarantee represented in article

2016As McDonald noted: "In Heller . . . we expressly rejected the argument that the scope of the Second Amendment right should be determined by judicial interest balancing." 561 U.S. at 785 . ¶81 Consequently, like the majority, I would also direct the district court to reinstate that portion of the plaintiffs’ complaint alleging the unconstitutionality of H.B. 13-1224 and to proceed with a hearing on the claim, but I would advise the district court on remand to address the question of whether and to what extent H.B. 13-1224 impacts the fundamental guarantee represented in article II, section 13.

2026See Wiedemer, 852 P.2d at 440 n.15. ¶ 12 For the purpose of our analysis, we assume that Shockey adequately alleged facts that, if true, would explain his failure to file his Crim.

2016Close v. People, 180 P.3d 1015, 1019 (Colo. 2008); People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 , 440 n.15 (Colo. 1993).

2026Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 62 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). ¶ 57 In People v. Hunt, 2016 COA 93, ¶¶ 8, 31 , a division of this court held that the defendant was entitled to a hearing on his claim that counsel had erroneously advised him that he could be found guilty of murder as a complicitor, resulting in his acceptance of a plea offer.

2026See People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 704 (Colo. 2010) (“The decision not to call a particular witness is typically a question of trial strategy that reviewing courts are ill-suited to second-guess.” (quoting Greiner v. Wells, 417 F. 3d 305, 323 (2d Cir. 2005))). ¶ 26 Because Baca failed to allege facts establishing that counsel’s failure to call V.B. was deficient performance, he was not entitled to a hearing on this claim.

2026Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 62 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). ¶ 57 In People v. Hunt, 2016 COA 93, ¶¶ 8, 31 , a division of this court held that the defendant was entitled to a hearing on his claim that counsel had erroneously advised him that he could be found guilty of murder as a complicitor, resulting in his acceptance of a plea offer.

2025The bare allegation that appellate counsel failed to assert an additional or different claim, without any comparison of that claim to the claims that counsel did assert, “does not overcome the presumption that appellate counsel’s choice was the result of a 21 strategic election.” People v. Trujillo, 169 P.3d 235, 239 (Colo. App. 2007).2 ¶ 57 Thus, we conclude that Countryman was not entitled to a hearing on this claim.

2024See People in Interest of S.N- V. , 300 P.3d 911 , 916 (Colo. App. 2011) (the invited error doctrine applies when a party invites or injects an error in t he proceedings and later claims that the error should be a basis f or reversal on appeal). ¶ 23 Finally , m other contends that she did not waive her right to appeal the APR judgment as a whole because she “ only left and acquiesced to the ruling after the court ruled the [D]epartment ha d made reasonable efforts, which she had already tied t o the best interests of her child.” ¶ 24 But mother did not mention the child’s best interests du ri

2024Cf. People v. Torrez, 2013 COA 37, ¶ 92 (reversing the defendant’s sentence but declining to remand for resentencing where the trial court “clearly and unequivocally stated that it intended to impose the maximum 33 sentence,” and instead correcting the sentence on appeal to achieve the maximum possible lawful sentence); see also Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo. 2003) (denial of a postconviction motion without a hearing is justified if the existing record establishes that the defendant’s factual allegations, even if proved true, would fail to demonstrate prejudice).

2024Cf. People v. Torrez, 2013 COA 37, ¶ 92 (reversing the defendant’s sentence but declining to remand for resentencing where the trial court “clearly and unequivocally stated that it intended to impose the maximum 33 sentence,” and instead correcting the sentence on appeal to achieve the maximum possible lawful sentence); see also Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo. 2003) (denial of a postconviction motion without a hearing is justified if the existing record establishes that the defendant’s factual allegations, even if proved true, would fail to demonstrate prejudice).

2021See People v. Huggins , 2019 COA 116, ¶ 17 . 11 facts relevant to guilt and punishment.” People v. Davis , 849 P.2d 857, 861 (Colo. App. 1992), aff’d , 871 P.2d 769 (Colo. 199 4); see Davis , 871 P.2d at 773 (“[C]ounsel has a duty to make r easonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”).

2021See People v. Huggins , 2019 COA 116, ¶ 17 . 11 facts relevant to guilt and punishment.” People v. Davis , 849 P.2d 857, 861 (Colo. App. 1992), aff’d , 871 P.2d 769 (Colo. 199 4); see Davis , 871 P.2d at 773 (“[C]ounsel has a duty to make r easonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”).

2021See People v. Huggins , 2019 COA 116, ¶ 17 . 11 facts relevant to guilt and punishment.” People v. Davis , 849 P.2d 857, 861 (Colo. App. 1992), aff’d , 871 P.2d 769 (Colo. 199 4); see Davis , 871 P.2d at 773 (“[C]ounsel has a duty to make r easonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”).

2021See People v. Huggins , 2019 COA 116, ¶ 17 . 11 facts relevant to guilt and punishment.” People v. Davis , 849 P.2d 857, 861 (Colo. App. 1992), aff’d , 871 P.2d 769 (Colo. 199 4); see Davis , 871 P.2d at 773 (“[C]ounsel has a duty to make r easonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”).

2020See Carrera v. People, 2019 CO 83, ¶ 24 (noting that a “statute’s history can ‘inform[] our understanding of legislative intent’”) (citation omitted).4 ¶ 18 We reject the guardian’s contention that section 15-10-503(4) permits the court to act without a hearing because it barred her from making decisions for or otherwise caring for the ward while the 4 We express no opinion on whether the parties may waive notice and hearing when the facts are uncontested.

2019See People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 693 (Colo. 2010) (“On issues of trial strategy, defense counsel is ‘captain of the ship.’” (quoting Arko v. People, 183 P.3d 555, 558 (Colo. 2008))). ¶ 36 We agree with the district court that defendant wasn’t entitled to a hearing on this claim, albeit for slightly different reasons.

2016Close v. People, 180 P.3d 1015, 1019 (Colo. 2008); People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 , 440 n.15 (Colo. 1993).

2015See People v. Herrera, 2014 COA 20 , ¶ 10, 343 P.3d 1012 (declining to "judicially impose a hearing requirement where the legislature did not"). ¶ 42 McCoy's reliance on People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1986), for the proposition that section 18-3-404(1)(g) applies only to acts occurring within a physician-patient relationship is misplaced.

2015See People v. Herrera, 2014 COA 20 , ¶ 10, 343 P.3d 1012 (declining to "judicially impose a hearing requirement where the legislature did not"). ¶ 42 McCoy's reliance on People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1986), for the proposition that section 18-3-404(1)(g) applies only to acts occurring within a physician-patient relationship is misplaced.

2015See People v. Herrera, 2014 COA 20 , ¶ 10, 343 P.3d 1012 (declining to "judicially impose a hearing requirement where the legislature did not"). ¶ 42 McCoy's reliance on People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1986), for the proposition that section 18-3-404(1)(g) applies only to acts occurring within a physician-patient relationship is misplaced.

2014Seq, eg., People v. Dren-non, 860 P.2d 589, 591 (Colo. (if the legislature intended a statute to include a particular requirement, it would have clearly expressed that intent); see also People v. Jaramillo, 188 P.8d 665, 671 (Colo.App.2008) {courts cannot add words to or subtract words from a statute). {11 In any event, construing subsection (1)(d) in pari materia with subsection (1)(e) produces the same result.

2007See People v. Naranjo, supra; People v. Venzor, supra. C.