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26 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Lanigangreen2 sentences2022See Ernest E. v. Commonwealth, 486 Mass. 183 , 189 n.9, 190-191 (2020) (appellate court unable to review issue dependent upon scientific reliability where no hearing held pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-595 [1993], and Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 25-26 [1994]). 2013While Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 458 Mass. at 149-150 , speaks of instances in which the defense may seek to invoke the protocol of Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26 (1994), and request a hearing to challenge the manner in which certain field tests were conducted, or the particular test kit used, that issue is not present in this appeal, there having been no Lanigan challenge raised below. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Whynaughtgreen1 sentence2026Here, El-Bayeh argued in his motion that inspection of the LIDAR unit would allow him to verify the existence and condition of the unit; inspection of the storage area would allow him to confirm if the device was properly stored according to the user manual; and inspection of the testing site, which was at the trooper's home, would allow El-Bayeh to examine if the site complied with the unit's pre- operational testing requirements.6 Simply put, El-Bayeh must be provided sufficient discovery to challenge the accuracy of the LIDAR unit.7 Commonwealth v. Whynaught, 377 Mass. 14, 18 (1979) ("most | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fontanezgreen1 sentence2026L. c. 211, § 3, and denied it on the basis that the petition did not present "the type of exceptional matter that requires the court's extraordinary intervention." Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 25 (2019).2 In his appeal, Smith seeks a variety of relief including an order directing the trial court to schedule a hearing on his rule 30 (b) motions or, alternatively, to set aside his pleas and set a trial date. | 1 | 1 |
Adoption of Nategreen1 sentence2025As the children's attorney admitted at the hearing on the rule 60 (b) motion, the children's current status was not properly before the judge in that proceeding.12 See Adoption of Nate, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 371, 375, 377 (2007) (department's lack of progress in securing placement for child was not grounds to vacate termination decree; proper procedure for addressing department's progress in developing plans for children is permanency hearing under G. | 1 | 1 |
Barry v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025See also Barry, 390 Mass. at 294 ("The filing of [a] motion, at least where a hearing promptly follows, tolls the running of the time in which a defendant must be tried"). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Romangreen1 sentence2025We need not consider the defendant's argument concerning rule 36 (b) (2) (F) because, in any event, the ten days from the filing of the motion to the hearing on the motion are excludable under rule 36 (b) (2) (A) (v) as a reasonable "delay resulting from hearings on pretrial motions." See Roman, 470 Mass. at 94 ("The period from [the date the motion was filed] to [the date of the hearing] is a reasonable time in which to schedule a hearing on the rule 36 motion, and is excludable for that reason"). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Perezgreen1 sentence2024In Perez, 477 Mass. at 679, we held "that where a juvenile is sentenced for a nonmurder offense or offenses, and the aggregate time to be served prior to parole eligibility exceeds that applicable to a juvenile convicted of murder, the sentence cannot be reconciled with art. 26 unless, after a hearing on the factors articulated in Miller[, 567 U.S. at 477-478 ], the judge makes a finding that the circumstances warrant treating the juvenile more harshly for parole purposes than a juvenile convicted of murder" (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green1 sentence2022See Ernest E. v. Commonwealth, 486 Mass. 183 , 189 n.9, 190-191 (2020) (appellate court unable to review issue dependent upon scientific reliability where no hearing held pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-595 [1993], and Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 25-26 [1994]). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Martingreen1 sentence2021Thus, a full evidentiary hearing into competency is not required in every instance because "not every instance of abnormal behavior or sign of mental disorder constitutes a sufficient basis to trigger the hearing requirement." Commonwealth v. Martin, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 96, 98 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bonnettgreen1 sentence2019See Bonnett I , supra at 846-850, 37 N.E.3d 1064 . | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen1 sentence2017Instead, we resolve the issue under art. 26, which we have interpreted more broadly than the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment. 5 We conclude that where a juvenile is sentenced for a nonmurder offense or offenses and the aggregate time to be served prior to parole eligibility exceeds that applicable to a juvenile convicted of murder, the sentence cannot be reconciled with art. 26 unless, after a hearing on the factors articulated in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-478 (2012) (Miller hearing), the judge makes a finding that the circumstances warrant treating the juvenile m | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Cavittgreen2 sentences2016See Cavitt, 460 Mass. at 626 . 2016See Cavitt, 460 Mass. at 626 . | 1 | 1 |
Martineau v. Department of Correctiongreen1 sentence2015See Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 329 (2010) (defendant’s prior attorney’s testimony violated attorney-client privilege); Murray v. Karzon, 423 Mass. 1007, 1008 (1996) (extraordinary relief under G. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeurgreen1 sentence2015See Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 329 (2010) (defendant’s prior attorney’s testimony violated attorney-client privilege); Murray v. Karzon, 423 Mass. 1007, 1008 (1996) (extraordinary relief under G. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2013See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 443 Mass. 122, 139-140 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Licatagreen1 sentence2000A “judge may rule on the issue or issues presented by [a postconviction] motion on the basis of the facts alleged in the affidavits without further hearing if no substantial issue is raised by the motion or affidavits.” Commonwealth v. Licata, 412 Mass. 654, 660 (1992), quoting Mass. R. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. LePoregreen1 sentence1998Cf. Commonwealth v. LePore, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 543, 548 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Goldmangreen1 sentence1993See Commonwealth v. Goldman, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 699, 707-709 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Ramosgreen1 sentence1992Commonwealth v. Ramos, 402 Mass. 209, 215 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Elder Care Services, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appealsgreen1 sentence1989Thus, in Elder Care Services, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Hingham, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 480, 481 (1984), we stated (although by way of dictum, because the point was not crucial to the outcome) that *776 the constructive grant of the special permit at issue in that case occurred on the ninetieth day after the continued hearing date. 2 The decisions under comparable statutory provisions have been the same. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Nine Hundred & Ninety-Two Dollarsgreen1 sentence1988Under Franks , a hearing on such a motion is constitutionally required if the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that: (1) the affiant made a false statement, either knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard for its truth, and (2) at least in the case of reckless falsehood, the misstatement is necessary to the existence of probable cause. 4 Commonwealth v. Nine Hundred & Ninety-two Dollars, 383 Mass. 764, 767-768 (1981), citing Franks v. Delaware, supra. No such showing was made here. | 1 | 1 |
| Jacobs v. District Unemployment Compensation Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Franks v. Delaware
green
2 sentences1992The defendant, citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), claims that he was entitled to a hearing to challenge two false and misleading statements contained in Officer Latta’s affidavit in support of the issuance of the warrant. 3 As proof, the defendant contrasts the affidavit with the police report of another officer involved in the arrest. 4 Under Franks , a hearing is constitutionally required if the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that: (1) the affiant made a false statement, either knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard for its truth, and (2) at le 1988The defendant next claims that his motion for a hearing to challenge the veracity of statements contained in the affidavit *215 was improperly denied, citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). | 2 | 1988–1992 |
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District
green
1 sentence2024The decision in Perez came on the heels of our decision in Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. 655 , and involved juvenile offenders convicted of crimes not punishable by life without the possibility of parole who were faced with sentences that provided for time to be served prior to parole eligibility that exceeded the time applicable to juveniles convicted of murder in the first degree. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Carleton v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2020As noted, one of the 5 The Supreme Judicial Court in Carleton, 447 Mass. at 805 - 807, discussed the bases for the HRD rule that a firefighter applicant could not use a hearing aid while taking a hearing test. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Roviaro v. United States
green
2 sentences2019We accordingly remanded for a hearing under the framework set forth in **839 Roviaro v. United States , 353 U.S. 53 , 59, 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). 2019We accordingly remanded for a hearing under the framework set forth in **839 Roviaro v. United States , 353 U.S. 53 , 59, 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Durling
green
1 sentence2017Although probationers charged with violations certainly have due process rights, see Commonwealth v. Durling , 407 Mass. 108 , 112 (1990), the defendant cites no case from the probation context, or any other, in which a delay between the announcement of a decision and the preparation of findings and rulings in support of that decision has been held to violate due process. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Querubin v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2017After reviewing the statutory procedures and common-law standards for determining whether a defendant should be held without bail because he is likely to flee, we concluded that these procedures are “narrowly tailored to the State’s legitimate and compelling interest in assuring the defendant’s presence at trial,” id. at 116 , and that the hearing requirement afforded the defendant sufficient procedural protection, see id. at 117-119 . 2017After reviewing the statutory procedures and common-law standards for determining whether a defendant should be held without bail because he is likely to flee, we concluded that these procedures are “narrowly tailored to the State’s legitimate and compelling interest in assuring the defendant’s presence at trial,” id. at 116 , and that the hearing requirement afforded the defendant sufficient procedural protection, see id. at 117-119 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Fernandez
green
2 sentences2013Cf. Fernandez, supra (rejecting appellate claim concerning potential Lanigan hearing directed to field testing, where no objection to field test raised until day of trial commencement). 2013While Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 458 Mass. at 149-150 , speaks of instances in which the defense may seek to invoke the protocol of Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26 (1994), and request a hearing to challenge the manner in which certain field tests were conducted, or the particular test kit used, that issue is not present in this appeal, there having been no Lanigan challenge raised below. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Mello v. Mayor of Fall River
green
1 sentence2004In Mello v. Mayor of Fall River, 22 Mass.App.Ct. 974 (1986), relied upon by the defendant Commission, the employee who was discharged without a hearing in violation of G.L.c. 31, §42 for failing to comply with a municipal residency ordinance could not have been reinstated by the appointing authority even if a hearing had been conducted. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Commonwealth v. Stewart
green
1 sentence2002In determining whether a hearing under rule 30 was warranted, we look “not only at the seriousness of the issue asserted, but also to the adequacy of the defendant’s showing on the issue raised.” Id. at 257-258 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Commonwealth v. Wertheimer green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Westbrook v. Arizona green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Hill v. District Unemployment Compensation Board green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.