hearing requirement in Indiana

2018That was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. [16] Kelley cites this court’s holding in Metcalf that “when the court orders a hearing and notice of the hearing date is sent to the plaintiff, the hearing requirement of T.R. 41(E) is satisfied, regardless of whether the plaintiff or his counsel attends the hearing.” 726 N.E.2d at 374 .

2016Corp., 12 N.E.3d 955, 961-63 (Ind.Ct.App.2014) (holding that Trial Rule 41(E) hearing requirement was not satisfied where parties appeared by counsel for hearing but trial court did not hear their arguments and that trial court was required to hold hearing prior to dismissing case), trans. denied, and cases cited therein. 4 [15] However, in Metcalf v. Estate of Hastings, 726 N.E.2d 372 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied, the majority stated that “when the court orders a hearing and notice of the hearing date is sent to the plaintiff, the hearing requirement of T.R. 41(E) is satisfied, regardles

2016See Lake County, 674 N.E.2d at 629 .

2016Lake County Trust v. Highland, Plan Com’n, 674 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied [(1997)].

2019Rumfelt v. Himes, 438 N.E.2d 980, 983-84 (Ind. 1982) (determining that Trial Rule 41(E)’s hearing requirement controls over Trial Rule 73). [24] Here, the trial rules do not indicate that a hearing was required on EMC’s motion, and the Francises cite to no authority that entitled them to such a hearing.

2016See Rumfelt [, 438 N.E.2d at 983 ], However, when the court orders a hearing and notice of the hearing date is sent to the plaintiff, the hearing requirement of T.R. 41(E) is satisfied, regardless of whether the plaintiff or his counsel attends the hearing.

2023See Allison v. Pepkowski, 6 N.E.3d 467, 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (noting due process rights implicated when respondent subject to ex parte order for seven months without a hearing and without adequate explanation for the delay by the trial court).

2020However, “[t]here is no specific deadline for the filing of a pre-sentence investigation report except that the factual contents or a copy of the report must be furnished ‘sufficiently in advance of sentencing so that the defendant will be afforded a fair opportunity to controvert the material included.’” Goudy v. State, 689 N.E.2d 686, 698-699 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Ind. Code § 35-38-1-12 (b)), reh’g denied. “[I]t is incumbent 1 Morrow cites to a document signed by him and titled “AFFIDAVIT OF GARRETT MORROW” in which he asserted that his case was called for a hearing within five minutes of him

2020The trial court later denied Ovidiu’s motion to set aside the default judgment. [36] “[T]he proper procedure . . . for setting aside an entry of default or grant of default judgment thereon is to first file a Rule 60(B) motion to have the default or default judgment set aside.” Siebert Oxidermo, Inc. v. Shields, 446 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind. 1983).

2020Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-476 | August 31, 2020 Page 4 of 9 Discussion I. [7] Morrow first argues that he was denied a fair opportunity to controvert the PSI and asserts he was provided with a copy of the PSI only five minutes prior to the hearing in violation of Ind. Code § 35-38-1-12 (b). 1 The State contends that Morrow’s argument is not supported by the record or case law. [8] Ind. Code § 35-38-1-12 (b) provides in part: “The court shall furnish the factual contents of the presentence investigation or a copy of the presentence report sufficiently in advance o

2020Prior to 1994, the preferred language for describing direct contempt was some variant of “in the presence of or so near to the court as to interrupt the proceedings of the court.” Whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 196, 212 (Ind. 1871) (emphasis added); see also Snyder v. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-864 | October 8, 2020 Page 8 of 10 that the judge was personally aware that a comment or threat has been made and that the comment or threat has disrupted the ordinary proceedings of the court.

2019See Tumbleson v. State, 706 N.E.2d 217, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that: “By statute, Tumbleson was entitled to one day credit time for each actual day served barring proof at a hearing of a violation of the rules of the facility in which he was incarcerated”); see also Murphy v. State, 930 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (remanding for a hearing on whether the trial court should have granted educational credit time because “the issue of whether Murphy demonstrated a pattern consistent with rehabilitation was never addressed”), opinion adopted by Murphy v. State, 942 N.E.2d 818 (In

2019See Tumbleson v. State, 706 N.E.2d 217, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that: “By statute, Tumbleson was entitled to one day credit time for each actual day served barring proof at a hearing of a violation of the rules of the facility in which he was incarcerated”); see also Murphy v. State, 930 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (remanding for a hearing on whether the trial court should have granted educational credit time because “the issue of whether Murphy demonstrated a pattern consistent with rehabilitation was never addressed”), opinion adopted by Murphy v. State, 942 N.E.2d 818 (In

2019See Tumbleson v. State, 706 N.E.2d 217, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that: “By statute, Tumbleson was entitled to one day credit time for each actual day served barring proof at a hearing of a violation of the rules of the facility in which he was incarcerated”); see also Murphy v. State, 930 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (remanding for a hearing on whether the trial court should have granted educational credit time because “the issue of whether Murphy demonstrated a pattern consistent with rehabilitation was never addressed”), opinion adopted by Murphy v. State, 942 N.E.2d 818 (In

2016Corp., 12 N.E.3d 955, 961-63 (Ind.Ct.App.2014) (holding that Trial Rule 41(E) hearing requirement was not satisfied where parties appeared by counsel for hearing but trial court did not hear their arguments and that trial court was required to hold hearing prior to dismissing case), trans. denied, and cases cited therein. 4 [15] However, in Metcalf v. Estate of Hastings, 726 N.E.2d 372 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied, the majority stated that “when the court orders a hearing and notice of the hearing date is sent to the plaintiff, the hearing requirement of T.R. 41(E) is satisfied, regardles

2009After a default judgment, the trial court is not required to hold a hearing if a hearing is not necessary "to determine the amount of damages." Ind. Trial Rule 55(B) Instead, "where the action is for a sum certain and liquidated, the final judgment can be entered and no hearing on damages [is] necessary." Stewart v. Hicks, 182 Ind.App. 308 , 395 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1979).

2009After a default judgment, the trial court is not required to hold a hearing if a hearing is not necessary "to determine the amount of damages." Ind. Trial Rule 55(B) Instead, "where the action is for a sum certain and liquidated, the final judgment can be entered and no hearing on damages [is] necessary." Stewart v. Hicks, 182 Ind.App. 308 , 395 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1979).

2008In response, Nichols cites to Mallard’s Pointe Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. L & L Investors Group, LLC, 859 N.E.2d 360, 364 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied, in which this court noted that Reichert was decided under the prior version of Trial *645 Rule 37 11 and held that under the present version, “we no longer require strict compliance with the hearing requirement of Indiana Trial Rule 55,” and instead “evaluate whether the sanction of an entry of default judgment is unjust.” The court went on to hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering default judgment and determinin

2008Id. at 365 .

2006R. 37 (explicitly requiring hearing only before awarding expenses for motion to compel); Davidson, 756 N.E.2d 1007 (upholding trial court's issuing exclusion of evidence as discovery sanction without mentioning a hearing requirement); Pfaffenberger v. Jackson County Reg Sewer Dist., 785 N.E.2d 1180, 1185-86 (Ind.Ct.

2005We addressed the hearing requirement of Ind. Trial Rule 53.3 in Kovacik v. Kovacik, 631 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ind.Ct.App.1994).

2005We addressed the hearing requirement of Ind. Trial Rule 53.3 in Kovacik v. Kovacik, 631 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ind.Ct.App.1994).

2001Finally, citing Henderson v. State, 647 N.E.2d 7, 13 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied; State v. Goble, 717 N.E.2d 1268, 1272 (Ind.Ct.App.1999); and Loyd v. State, 272 Ind. 404, 409 , 398 N.E.2d 1260, 1265 (1980), the State argues that the special judge erred when he found that the 99 days "needed to appoint a special judge" pursuant to T.R. 58.2 "counts against the Criminal Rule 4 period." State's Brief at 8.

2001This Court reversed and directed the trial court to hold a hearing. 250 Ind. at 165-66, 175 , 234 N.E.2d at 270, 276 .

2001This Court reversed and directed the trial court to hold a hearing. 250 Ind. at 165-66, 175 , 234 N.E.2d at 270, 276 .