hearing claim in Illinois

2003The trial court must hold a hearing on the claim raised by the defendant and should apply the test for ineffective assistance developed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 80 L.

2003The trial court must hold a hearing on the claim raised by the defendant and should apply the test for ineffective assistance developed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 80 L.

2004He relies on our decision in People v. Hobley, 182 Ill.2d 404 , 231 Ill.Dec. 321 , 696 N.E.2d 313 (1998), to argue the Sinadinos affidavit, which must be taken as true ( Ward, 187 Ill.2d at 255 , 240 Ill.Dec. 636 , 718 N.E.2d 117 ), is sufficient to entitle him to a hearing on his claim that the juror misconduct resulted in the deliberations being subject to an improper extraneous influence and that, as a result, he was denied a fair trial.

2004He relies on our decision in People v. Hobley, 182 Ill.2d 404 , 231 Ill.Dec. 321 , 696 N.E.2d 313 (1998), to argue the Sinadinos affidavit, which must be taken as true ( Ward, 187 Ill.2d at 255 , 240 Ill.Dec. 636 , 718 N.E.2d 117 ), is sufficient to entitle him to a hearing on his claim that the juror misconduct resulted in the deliberations being subject to an improper extraneous influence and that, as a result, he was denied a fair trial.

2022People v. Voss, 2014 IL App (1st) 122014, ¶ 16 .

2020People v. Voss, 2014 IL App (1st) 122014 , ¶ 16.

2018Moreover, the inquiry is not burdensome upon the circuit court, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the claim will be much clearer in the minds of all involved when the inquiry is made just subsequent to trial or plea, as opposed to years later on appeal.” Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶¶ 20-21 . ¶ 31 Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s motion to reconsider and remand with directions for the court to conduct a Krankel-like inquiry into defendant’s pro se claim of unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel to determine if conflict-free counsel needs to be a

2018Moreover, the inquiry is not burdensome upon the circuit court, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the claim will be much clearer in the minds of all involved when the inquiry is made just subsequent to trial or plea, as opposed to years later on appeal." Ayres , 2017 IL 120071 , ¶¶ 20-21, 417 Ill.Dec. 580 , 88 N.E.3d 732 . ¶ 31 Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's denial of defendant's motion to reconsider and remand with directions for the court to conduct a Krankel -like inquiry into defendant's pro se claim of unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel to determine i

2017Id. at 485 . ¶ 36 On direct review, this court affirmed the convictions but remanded, directing the trial court to allow Johnson and his codefendants to file postconviction petitions and conduct a hearing on their claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

2016Id. at 485 . ¶ 36 On direct review, this court affirmed the convictions but remanded, directing the trial court to allow Johnson and his codefendants to file postconviction petitions and conduct a hearing on their claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

2017Schlosser, 2012 IL App (1st) 092523, ¶¶ 22-26 ; see also People v. Kelly, 2012 IL App (1st) 101521, ¶¶ 40-41, 48 (postconviction counsel’s failure to provide a reasonable level of assistance required appointment of new counsel on remand); People v. Nitz, 2011 IL App (2d) 100031, ¶¶ 19, 21 (same); People v. Jones, 2016 IL App (3d) 140094, ¶¶ 33-34, 36 (same); People v. Shortridge, 2012 IL App (4th) 100663, ¶¶ 14-15 (same). ¶ 37 Second, the Rule 651(c) certificate, which the trial court directed him to file, does not indicate whether he has communicated with defendant at any time since 2009, whe

2017Schlosser, 2012 IL App (1st) 092523, ¶¶ 22-26 ; see also People v. Kelly, 2012 IL App (1st) 101521, ¶¶ 40-41, 48 (postconviction counsel’s failure to provide a reasonable level of assistance required appointment of new counsel on remand); People v. Nitz, 2011 IL App (2d) 100031, ¶¶ 19, 21 (same); People v. Jones, 2016 IL App (3d) 140094, ¶¶ 33-34, 36 (same); People v. Shortridge, 2012 IL App (4th) 100663, ¶¶ 14-15 (same). ¶ 37 Second, the Rule 651(c) certificate, which the trial court directed him to file, does not indicate whether he has communicated with defendant at any time since 2009, whe

2017App. 3d 774, 780 , 838 N.E.2d 226, 232 (2005) (reversing the trial court’s order granting a petition to administer involuntary treatment where the hospital failed to provide the patient with written notification of the risks, benefits, side effects, and alternative treatments); In re David M., 2013 IL App (4th) 121004, ¶ 35 , 994 N.E.2d 694 (reversing the trial court’s order for the administration of involuntary treatment where the State failed to provide adequate notice of the hearing and where the hearing was combined with the petition for involuntary admission).

2017App. 3d 774, 780 , 838 N.E.2d 226, 232 (2005) (reversing the trial court’s order granting a petition to administer involuntary treatment where the hospital failed to provide the patient with written notification of the risks, benefits, side effects, and alternative treatments); In re David M., 2013 IL App (4th) 121004, ¶ 35 , 994 N.E.2d 694 (reversing the trial court’s order for the administration of involuntary treatment where the State failed to provide adequate notice of the hearing and where the hearing was combined with the petition for involuntary admission).

2017“We presume *** that licensees convicted of a qualifying offense have received due process in the underlying criminal proceedings, during which they had the opportunity to contest the factual and legal bases for their criminal charges, present evidence, question witnesses, and present grounds for appeal.” Hayashi, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 42 .

2017“We presume *** that licensees convicted of a qualifying offense have received due process in the underlying criminal proceedings, during which they had the opportunity to contest the factual and legal bases for their criminal charges, present evidence, question witnesses, and present grounds for appeal.” Hayashi, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 42 .

2015App. 3d at 323-24 , 822 N.E.2d at 925-26 . ¶ 10 Young concluded the defendant was entitled to a hearing on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective and his plea was not voluntary and, therefore, reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.

2015App. 3d at 323-24 , 822 N.E.2d at 925-26 . ¶ 10 Young concluded the defendant was entitled to a hearing on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective and his plea was not voluntary and, therefore, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.

2014Rocca, 408 Ill.

2014Rocca, 408 Ill.

2011Handy, 278 Ill.App.3d at 835 , 216 Ill.Dec. 114 , 664 N.E.2d at 1046 .

2011Handy, 278 Ill.

2010Champ, 329 Ill.App.3d at 133 , 263 Ill.Dec. 477 , 768 N.E.2d at 242 .

2010Champ, 329 Ill.App.3d at 133 , 263 Ill.Dec. 477 , 768 N.E.2d at 242 .

2008As noted in In re Luker, "The purpose of the petition is to advise [the] respondent of the proceedings which have been commenced against him in order that he may prepare evidence and argument for the hearing." In re Luker, 255 Ill.

2008As noted in In re Luker, “The purpose of the petition is to advise [the] respondent of the proceedings which have been commenced against him in order that he may prepare evidence and argument for the hearing.” In re Luker, 255 Ill.

2004Bartee, 208 Ill.

2004Bartee , 208 Ill.

2004He relies on our decision in People v. Hobley, 182 Ill.2d 404 , 231 Ill.Dec. 321 , 696 N.E.2d 313 (1998), to argue the Sinadinos affidavit, which must be taken as true ( Ward, 187 Ill.2d at 255 , 240 Ill.Dec. 636 , 718 N.E.2d 117 ), is sufficient to entitle him to a hearing on his claim that the juror misconduct resulted in the deliberations being subject to an improper extraneous influence and that, as a result, he was denied a fair trial.

2004He relies on our decision in People v. Hobley, 182 Ill.2d 404 , 231 Ill.Dec. 321 , 696 N.E.2d 313 (1998), to argue the Sinadinos affidavit, which must be taken as true ( Ward, 187 Ill.2d at 255 , 240 Ill.Dec. 636 , 718 N.E.2d 117 ), is sufficient to entitle him to a hearing on his claim that the juror misconduct resulted in the deliberations being subject to an improper extraneous influence and that, as a result, he was denied a fair trial.

1983Anderson v. Department of Finance (1938), 370 Ill. 225 ; Copilevitz v. Department of Revenue (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 154 ; Du Page Liquor Store, Inc. v. McKibbin (1943), 383 Ill. 276 ; Novicki v. Department of Finance (1940), 373 Ill. 342 .” (Grand Liquor Co. v. Department of Revenue (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 195, 198 , 367 N.E.2d 1238, 1240 .) It is significant, in our opinion, that exactly this method was employed in the case at bar.

1977Anderson v. Department of Finance (1938), 370 Ill. 225 ; Copilevitz v. Department of Revenue (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 154 ; Du Page Liquor Store, Inc. v. McKibbin (1943), 383 Ill. 276 ; Novicki v. Department of Finance (1940), 373 Ill. 342 .

1983Anderson v. Department of Finance (1938), 370 Ill. 225 ; Copilevitz v. Department of Revenue (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 154 ; Du Page Liquor Store, Inc. v. McKibbin (1943), 383 Ill. 276 ; Novicki v. Department of Finance (1940), 373 Ill. 342 .” (Grand Liquor Co. v. Department of Revenue (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 195, 198 , 367 N.E.2d 1238, 1240 .) It is significant, in our opinion, that exactly this method was employed in the case at bar.

1977Anderson v. Department of Finance (1938), 370 Ill. 225 ; Copilevitz v. Department of Revenue (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 154 ; Du Page Liquor Store, Inc. v. McKibbin (1943), 383 Ill. 276 ; Novicki v. Department of Finance (1940), 373 Ill. 342 .

1983Anderson v. Department of Finance (1938), 370 Ill. 225 ; Copilevitz v. Department of Revenue (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 154 ; Du Page Liquor Store, Inc. v. McKibbin (1943), 383 Ill. 276 ; Novicki v. Department of Finance (1940), 373 Ill. 342 .” (Grand Liquor Co. v. Department of Revenue (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 195, 198 , 367 N.E.2d 1238, 1240 .) It is significant, in our opinion, that exactly this method was employed in the case at bar.

1977Anderson v. Department of Finance (1938), 370 Ill. 225 ; Copilevitz v. Department of Revenue (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 154 ; Du Page Liquor Store, Inc. v. McKibbin (1943), 383 Ill. 276 ; Novicki v. Department of Finance (1940), 373 Ill. 342 .

1983Anderson v. Department of Finance (1938), 370 Ill. 225 ; Copilevitz v. Department of Revenue (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 154 ; Du Page Liquor Store, Inc. v. McKibbin (1943), 383 Ill. 276 ; Novicki v. Department of Finance (1940), 373 Ill. 342 .” (Grand Liquor Co. v. Department of Revenue (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 195, 198 , 367 N.E.2d 1238, 1240 .) It is significant, in our opinion, that exactly this method was employed in the case at bar.

1977Anderson v. Department of Finance (1938), 370 Ill. 225 ; Copilevitz v. Department of Revenue (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 154 ; Du Page Liquor Store, Inc. v. McKibbin (1943), 383 Ill. 276 ; Novicki v. Department of Finance (1940), 373 Ill. 342 .

2026Id. § 20(a).