hearing rule in Texas

2024However, neither Cordova-Diana nor her current counsel have filed a motion for extension of time, or motion for leave, or other pleading regarding this matter, and a new attorney has not filed an appearance in this original proceeding. 4 has refused to set a hearing or rule on a proper motion.” In re G.P., 495 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, orig. proceeding); see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 829 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661 .

2023In re M.B., No. 02-17-00237-CV, 2017 WL 3996430 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 8, 2017, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.); In re Harris, No. 02-17-00142-CV, 2017 WL 2375775 , at *1 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth June 1, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Shredder Co., 225 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, orig. proceeding); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 829 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct a hearing and rule on a motion).

2010See Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (to establish that the trial court refused to rule on a pending motion, the relator must provide a record that shows that, after he filed his motion, relator asked the trial court for a hearing and a ruling on his motion and the trial court refused to hold a hearing and to rule; see also In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 662 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding) merely “[s]howing that a motion was filed with the court clerk does not constitute proof that the motion was brought to the trial court’

2010See Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (to establish that the trial court refused to rule on a pending motion, the relator must provide a record that shows that, after he filed his motion, relator asked the trial court for a hearing and a ruling on his motion and the trial court refused to hold a hearing and to rule; see also In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 662 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding) merely “[s]howing that a motion was filed with the court clerk does not constitute proof that the motion was brought to the trial

2024However, neither Cordova-Diana nor her current counsel have filed a motion for extension of time, or motion for leave, or other pleading regarding this matter, and a new attorney has not filed an appearance in this original proceeding. 4 has refused to set a hearing or rule on a proper motion.” In re G.P., 495 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, orig. proceeding); see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 829 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661 .

2010See Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (to establish that the trial court refused to rule on a pending motion, the relator must provide a record that shows that, after he filed his motion, relator asked the trial court for a hearing and a ruling on his motion and the trial court refused to hold a hearing and to rule; see also In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 662 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding) merely “[s]howing that a motion was filed with the court clerk does not constitute proof that the motion was brought to the trial court’

2024App. 1980) (“We have consistently held that the failure to object waives any error in the admission of evidence tending to show an extraneous offense.”); Carmichael v. State, 505 S.W.3d 95, 103 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. refused) (“This court concludes that the article 38.37, section 2-a hearing requirement . . . is subject to the 9 general requirement of preservation, and is therefore subject to forfeiture.”).

2019This hearing requirement, however, is “subject to the general requirement of preservation, and therefore subject to forfeiture.” Carmichael v. State, 505 S.W.3d 95, 103 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. ref’d); see also, Murphy v. State, No. 01-17- 00599-CR, 2018 WL 6378004 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

2018Thordson v. City of Houston, 815 S.W.2d 550, 550 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam); see Welborn v. American Medical Response of Texas, Inc., 313 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. —Dallas 2010, no pet.).

2010Thordson v. City of Houston, 815 S.W.2d 550, 550 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).

2015Ford v. State, 1 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex. Crim.

2001A hearing on a challenge to a party's peremptory strikes requires the trial court to determine whether the challenging party has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the race-neutral explanation given by the strike's proponent was a sham or pretext for discrimination Ford v. State , 1 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex. Crim.

2012See Safety-Kleen Corp., 945 S.W.2d at 269 (holding that trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set motion for a hearing after relator requested that court coordinator set hearing); In re MHI P’ship, Ltd., 7 S.W.3d at 921–22 (holding that trial court abused its discretion by deferring ruling on arbitration motion until after discovery was complete); In re Reeves Cnty., No. 08-09-00227-CV, 2009 WL 2623355 , at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding that trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on arbitration motion despite three letters requesting

2012See Safety-Kleen Corp., 945 S.W.2d at 269 (holding that trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set motion for a hearing after relator requested that court coordinator set hearing); In re MHI P’ship, Ltd., 7 S.W.3d at 921-22 (holding that trial court abused its discretion by deferring ruling on arbitration motion until after discovery was complete); In re Reeves Cnty., No. 08-09-00227-CV, 2009 WL 2623355 , at *2 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding that trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on arbitration motion despite three letters requesting

2010Long v. Tanner, 170 S.W.3d 752, 754 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied) (citing Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim.

2008Long v. Tanner, 170 S.W.3d 752, 754 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. denied) (citing Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim.

2009See Hollifield v. Hollifield , 925 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ); Clancy v. Zale Corp ., 705 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2009See Hollifield v. Hollifield, 925 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ); Clancy v. Zale Corp., 705 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2009See Hollifield v. Hollifield , 925 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ); Clancy v. Zale Corp ., 705 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2009See Hollifield v. Hollifield, 925 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ); Clancy v. Zale Corp., 705 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2004See Leyva v. Pacheco , 163 Tex. 638 , 358 S.W.2d 547, 549 (1962).

2004See Leyva v. Pacheco , 163 Tex. 638 , 358 S.W.2d 547, 549 (1962).

2008The Hearing The motion to suppress sought the exclusion of the statement under Article 38.22 of the code of criminal procedure based on the denial of due process, the denial of the defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights, and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 380 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).

2008The Hearing The motion to suppress sought the exclusion of the statement under Article 38.22 of the code of criminal procedure based on the denial of due process, the denial of the defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights, and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 380 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).

2022See Cantu v. Longoria, 878 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex. 1994).

2003See id.

2017Torres v. State, 4 S.W.3d 295, 297 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

2017On appeal, appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion by not conducting a hearing because a hearing was necessary to develop facts supporting the grounds asserted by appellant in his motion for new trial. 1 Torres v. State, 4 S.W.3d 295, 297 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

2015See Perez, 352 S.W.3d at 756 (A trial court is not required to hold a hearing unless the court knows or should reasonably know of an actual, not a potential, conflict.).

2015See Perez, 352 S.W.3d at 756 (A trial court is not required to hold a hearing unless the court knows or should reasonably know of an actual, not a potential, conflict.).

2015Long, 800 S.W.2d at 547 ; see Sanchez, 354 S.W.3d at 484 .

2015Long, 800 S.W.2d at 547 ; see Sanchez, 354 S.W.3d at 484 .

2014See id. art. 64.04. 2 After the hearing, the statute requires the trial court to make a finding as to whether the results are favorable or unfavorable to the convicted person.

2014See id. art. 64.04.2 After the hearing, the statute requires the trial court to make a finding as to whether the results are favorable or unfavorable to the convicted person.

2004See Doran, 439 U.S. at 290 , 99 S.Ct. 530 .

2004See Doran, 439 U.S. at 290 , 99 S.Ct. 530 .

2015A “proffer of evidence” in the context of a selective prosecution claim that allows a trial court in its discretion to order a hearing on the claim should be no different than the procedure to obtain a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), where a defendant contests the truthfulness of an affidavit supporting a search warrant.

2015And 10 a “‘proffer of evidence’ in the context of a selective prosecution claim that allows a trial court in its discretion to order a hearing on the claim,” Hill asserts, “should be no different than the procedure to obtain a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), where a defendant con- tests the truthfulness of an affidavit supporting a search warrant.” PDR at 55.

2009For example, in Smith v. State,28 we recently held that the defendant was not entitled to a hearing on his claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance–in failing both to inform the defendant of his right to testify at his adjudication hearing and to introduce medical records into evidence–because he failed to establish reasonable grounds to demonstrate that he could meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland 23 Id. at 338-39 . 24 Id. at 339 .

2009For example, in Smith v. State,28 we recently held that the defendant was not entitled to a hearing on his claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance–in failing both to inform the defendant of his right to testify at his adjudication hearing and to introduce medical records into evidence–because he failed to establish reasonable grounds to demonstrate that he could meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland 23 Id. at 338-39 . 24 Id. at 339 .

2015Long, 800 S.W.2d at 547 ; see Sanchez, 354 S.W.3d at 484 .

2015Long, 800 S.W.2d at 547 ; see Sanchez, 354 S.W.3d at 484 .

2024See id. at 228 (stating that one complaining of the trial court’s failure to convene a hearing and rule upon a motion necessarily requires the petitioner to illustrate that the trial court was aware of the motion and observing the absence of any rule mandating that notice of a matter held by the district clerk is imputed to the trial judge).

2015See Eli Lilly & Co v. Marshall, 829 S.W.2d 157 , 158 {Tex.l992)(per curiam); In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659 ,661 {Tex.App.-Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding). 9 A trial judge is required to perform the ministerial duty of considering and ruling on a properly filed and pending motion within a "reasonable time." In re Chavez, 62 S.W. 3d 225 , 228 {Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding); In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding).

2023Gonzalez, 855 S.W.2d at 695 (commenting on the purpose of former Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 31(d)) (“The hearing requirement provides either party an opportunity to develop a record for appellate review, should either party elect to appeal the decision on the motion for new trial.”).

1993Gonzalez, 855 S.W.2d at 695 .

2020Jarrell, 580 S.W.3d at 468 (citing In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d at 685 ; In re Jamea, 2010 WL 2968044 , at *5–6).

2019See In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d at 685 ; In re Jamea, 2010 WL 2968044 , at *5-6.

2012See Safety-Kleen Corp., 945 S.W.2d at 269 (holding that trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set motion for a hearing after relator requested that court coordinator set hearing); In re MHI P’ship, Ltd., 7 S.W.3d at 921–22 (holding that trial court abused its discretion by deferring ruling on arbitration motion until after discovery was complete); In re Reeves Cnty., No. 08-09-00227-CV, 2009 WL 2623355 , at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding that trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on arbitration motion despite three letters requesting

2012See Safety-Kleen Corp., 945 S.W.2d at 269 (holding that trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set motion for a hearing after relator requested that court coordinator set hearing); In re MHI P’ship, Ltd., 7 S.W.3d at 921-22 (holding that trial court abused its discretion by deferring ruling on arbitration motion until after discovery was complete); In re Reeves Cnty., No. 08-09-00227-CV, 2009 WL 2623355 , at *2 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding that trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on arbitration motion despite three letters requesting

2026Ctr., 754 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).