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144 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2026 34 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences2026“Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “[T]he weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses is strictly within the competence of the fact finder.” People v. Ellis, 74 Ill. 2d 489, 496 (1978) (citing People v. Orlando, 380 Ill. 107, 119 (1942); People v. Novotny, 41 Ill. 2d 401, 412 (1968); People v. Yarbrough, 67 Ill. 2d 222, 227 (1977)). ¶ 20 Addressing defendant’s argument, we find th 2026“Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “[T]he weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses is strictly within the competence of the fact finder.” People v. Ellis, 74 Ill. 2d 489, 496 (1978) (citing People v. Orlando, 380 Ill. 107, 119 (1942); People v. Novotny, 41 Ill. 2d 401, 412 (1968); People v. Yarbrough, 67 Ill. 2d 222, 227 (1977)). ¶ 20 Addressing defendant’s argument, we find th | 34 | 88 |
People v. Pollockgreen2 sentences2021“The Jackson standard applies in all criminal cases, regardless of the nature of the evidence.” Id. at 279. (citing People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 217 (2002)). 2021“The Jackson standard applies in all criminal cases, regardless of the nature of the evidence.” Id. at 279. (citing People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 217 (2002)). | 10 | 10 |
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2026“Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “[T]he weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses is strictly within the competence of the fact finder.” People v. Ellis, 74 Ill. 2d 489, 496 (1978) (citing People v. Orlando, 380 Ill. 107, 119 (1942); People v. Novotny, 41 Ill. 2d 401, 412 (1968); People v. Yarbrough, 67 Ill. 2d 222, 227 (1977)). ¶ 20 Addressing defendant’s argument, we find th 2026“Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “[T]he weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses is strictly within the competence of the fact finder.” People v. Ellis, 74 Ill. 2d 489, 496 (1978) (citing People v. Orlando, 380 Ill. 107, 119 (1942); People v. Novotny, 41 Ill. 2d 401, 412 (1968); People v. Yarbrough, 67 Ill. 2d 222, 227 (1977)). ¶ 20 Addressing defendant’s argument, we find th | 8 | 19 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 545 [, 708 N.E.2d at 371 ] (holding that no reasonable person could find the witness’ testimony credible) ***.” Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280 , 818 N.E.2d at 308 . 2007See, e.g., Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 545 [, 708 N.E.2d at 371 ] (holding that no reasonable person could find the witness’ testimony credible) ***.” Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280 , 818 N.E.2d at 308 . | 6 | 8 |
People v. Jacksonred2 sentences2014People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179, 192 , 514 N.E.2d 983, 988-89 (1987), overruled on other grounds, People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 , 586 N.E.2d 1239 (1992); People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 , 972 N.E.2d 815 (applying the Jackson analysis); Kizer, 365 Ill. 2014People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179, 192 , 514 N.E.2d 983, 988-89 (1987), overruled on other grounds, People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 , 586 N.E.2d 1239 (1992); People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 , 972 N.E.2d 815 (applying the Jackson analysis); Kizer, 365 Ill. | 4 | 4 |
People v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2026“Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “[T]he weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses is strictly within the competence of the fact finder.” People v. Ellis, 74 Ill. 2d 489, 496 (1978) (citing People v. Orlando, 380 Ill. 107, 119 (1942); People v. Novotny, 41 Ill. 2d 401, 412 (1968); People v. Yarbrough, 67 Ill. 2d 222, 227 (1977)). ¶ 20 Addressing defendant’s argument, we find th 2026“Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “[T]he weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses is strictly within the competence of the fact finder.” People v. Ellis, 74 Ill. 2d 489, 496 (1978) (citing People v. Orlando, 380 Ill. 107, 119 (1942); People v. Novotny, 41 Ill. 2d 401, 412 (1968); People v. Yarbrough, 67 Ill. 2d 222, 227 (1977)). ¶ 20 Addressing defendant’s argument, we find th | 2 | 5 |
People v. Kazenkogreen2 sentences2014People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179, 192 , 514 N.E.2d 983, 988-89 (1987), overruled on other grounds, People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 , 586 N.E.2d 1239 (1992); People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 , 972 N.E.2d 815 (applying the Jackson analysis); Kizer, 365 Ill. 2014People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179, 192 , 514 N.E.2d 983, 988-89 (1987), overruled on other grounds, People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 , 586 N.E.2d 1239 (1992); People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 , 972 N.E.2d 815 (applying the Jackson analysis); Kizer, 365 Ill. | 2 | 5 |
People v. Stefangreen2 sentences2014People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179, 192 , 514 N.E.2d 983, 988-89 (1987), overruled on other grounds, People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 , 586 N.E.2d 1239 (1992); People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 , 972 N.E.2d 815 (applying the Jackson analysis); Kizer, 365 Ill. 2014People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179, 192 , 514 N.E.2d 983, 988-89 (1987), overruled on other grounds, People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 , 586 N.E.2d 1239 (1992); People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 , 972 N.E.2d 815 (applying the Jackson analysis); Kizer, 365 Ill. | 2 | 4 |
People v. Rossgreen2 sentences2019Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; People v. Ross , 229 Ill. 2d 255 , 272, 322 Ill.Dec. 574 , 891 N.E.2d 865 (2008). ¶ 30 Defendant claims that his guilt is purely a question of law, and thus we should review his conviction de novo , instead of applying the deferential Jackson standard to the jury's verdict. 2019Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; People v. Ross , 229 Ill. 2d 255 , 272, 322 Ill.Dec. 574 , 891 N.E.2d 865 (2008). ¶ 30 Defendant claims that his guilt is purely a question of law, and thus we should review his conviction de novo , instead of applying the deferential Jackson standard to the jury's verdict. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Schottgreen2 sentences1993While courts have continued to say a criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt (People v. Campbell (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 363, 375 , 586 N.E.2d 1261, 1266 ; Schott, 145 Ill. 2d at 203 , 582 N.E.2d at 697 ; Pintos, 133 Ill. 2d at 291 , 549 N.E.2d at 346 ; Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261 , 478 N.E.2d at 276 ), this principle must be read in the context of the Jackson standard embraced in Collins, i.e., in reviewing the determination of the trier of fact, a court cannot substitute it 1993While courts have continued to say a criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt (People v. Campbell (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 363, 375 , 586 N.E.2d 1261, 1266 ; Schott, 145 Ill. 2d at 203 , 582 N.E.2d at 697 ; Pintos, 133 Ill. 2d at 291 , 549 N.E.2d at 346 ; Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261 , 478 N.E.2d at 276 ), this principle must be read in the context of the Jackson standard embraced in Collins, i.e., in reviewing the determination of the trier of fact, a court cannot substitute it | 2 | 3 |
People v. Nicholasgreen2 sentences2019See People v. Nicholas, 2013 IL App (1st) 103202, ¶ 40 (concluding that a defendant established prejudice where his claim that officers beat him into making a false confession was “strikingly similar *** as to the time period, location, manner, method, participants and the role of the participants” to prior acts of torture a special prosecutor found had taken place in other cases). 2018See People v. Nicholas, 2013 IL App (1st) 103202, ¶ 40 (concluding that a defendant established prejudice where his claim that officers beat him into making a false confession was “strikingly similar *** as to the time period, location, manner, method, participants and the role of the participants” to prior acts of torture a special prosecutor found had taken place in other cases). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Greengreen2 sentences2017People v. Green, 322 Ill. 2017People v. Green, 322 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Murneigh v. Gainergreen2 sentences2017Murneigh v. Gainer, 177 Ill. 2d 287, 299 (1997). 2017Murneigh v. Gainer, 177 Ill. 2d 287, 299 (1997). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2004App. 3d 741 (2003), and People v. Gonzalez, 326 Ill. 2004App. 3d 741 (2003) and People v. Gonzalez , 326 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Oliveragreen2 sentences2004People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 393 (1995). 2004People v. Olivera , 164 Ill. 2d 382, 393 (1995). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Kizergreen2 sentences2014People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179, 192 , 514 N.E.2d 983, 988-89 (1987), overruled on other grounds, People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 , 586 N.E.2d 1239 (1992); People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 , 972 N.E.2d 815 (applying the Jackson analysis); Kizer, 365 Ill. 2014People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179, 192 , 514 N.E.2d 983, 988-89 (1987), overruled on other grounds, People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 , 586 N.E.2d 1239 (1992); People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 , 972 N.E.2d 815 (applying the Jackson analysis); Kizer, 365 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Siguenza-Britogreen2 sentences2025People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213 , 2 Defendant’s opening brief contains a section titled “Manifest Weight of the Evidence,” which asserts that the “trial court’s guilty finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence” given the “serious doubts raised by the evidence as a whole.” Defendant essentially asserts that the State failed to satisfy the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), as he contends that “even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, no rational factfinder could have found the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonab 2025People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213 , 2 Defendant’s opening brief contains a section titled “Manifest Weight of the Evidence,” which asserts that the “trial court’s guilty finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence” given the “serious doubts raised by the evidence as a whole.” Defendant essentially asserts that the State failed to satisfy the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), as he contends that “even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, no rational factfinder could have found the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonab | 1 | 2 |
People v. Sutherlandgreen2 sentences2011In applying this standard, we “must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution.” Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280 . “[O]ur function is not to retry the defendant.” People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242 (2006). 2011In applying this standard, we “must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution.” Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280 . “[O]ur function is not to retry the defendant.” People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242 (2006). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Everhartgreen2 sentences2011"Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Everhart, 405 Ill.App.3d 687, 704 , 345 Ill. 2011"Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Everhart, 405 Ill.App.3d 687, 704 , 345 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
The People v. Novotnygreen2 sentences2026“Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “[T]he weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses is strictly within the competence of the fact finder.” People v. Ellis, 74 Ill. 2d 489, 496 (1978) (citing People v. Orlando, 380 Ill. 107, 119 (1942); People v. Novotny, 41 Ill. 2d 401, 412 (1968); People v. Yarbrough, 67 Ill. 2d 222, 227 (1977)). ¶ 20 Addressing defendant’s argument, we find th 2026“Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “[T]he weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses is strictly within the competence of the fact finder.” People v. Ellis, 74 Ill. 2d 489, 496 (1978) (citing People v. Orlando, 380 Ill. 107, 119 (1942); People v. Novotny, 41 Ill. 2d 401, 412 (1968); People v. Yarbrough, 67 Ill. 2d 222, 227 (1977)). ¶ 20 Addressing defendant’s argument, we find th | 1 | 1 |
| The People v. Orlandogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ellisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Yarbroughgreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2026Admissibility Standard ¶ 62 The appellate majority cited the familiar Jackson standard yet determined that “no rational trier of fact could have convicted [defendant] under the test set out in the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).” 2024 IL App (1st) 220494, ¶ 3 (majority opinion). 2026Admissibility Standard ¶ 62 The appellate majority cited the familiar Jackson standard yet determined that “no rational trier of fact could have convicted [defendant] under the test set out in the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).” 2024 IL App (1st) 220494, ¶ 3 (majority opinion). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Clinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Colonegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wellsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Saxongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lattimoregreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ortizgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re MTgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. ONE 1998 GMCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mauriciogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Smith
green
2 sentences2019He notes that in Smith , 191 Ill. 2d at 411 , 247 Ill.Dec. 458 , 732 N.E.2d 513 , the supreme court reviewed a conviction for armed violence de novo , because, as the court found in that case, "the facts [were] not in dispute," and Smith's guilt was therefore "a question of law." ¶ 31 Defendant misreads Smith . 2019He notes that in Smith , 191 Ill. 2d at 411 , 247 Ill.Dec. 458 , 732 N.E.2d 513 , the supreme court reviewed a conviction for armed violence de novo , because, as the court found in that case, "the facts [were] not in dispute," and Smith's guilt was therefore "a question of law." ¶ 31 Defendant misreads Smith . | 3 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Conway
green
2 sentences2025It is not the function of a reviewing court to retry the defendant, nor may we “substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.” People v. Conway, 2023 IL 127670, ¶ 16 . ¶ 34 The trial court, in its role as the trier of fact, has the responsibility to resolve any -7- conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. 2025It is not the function of a reviewing court to retry the defendant, nor may we “substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.” People v. Conway, 2023 IL 127670, ¶ 16 . ¶ 34 The trial court, in its role as the trier of fact, has the responsibility to resolve any -7- conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. | 2 | 2024–2025 |
People v. Dye
green
2 sentences2019In response, the State points out that the court in People v. Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 11 , a case upon which defendant heavily relies for its substance, applied the Jackson standard, and contends that defendant’s argument regarding Duncan is misplaced because that case examined whether a statement was constitutionally protected as religious opinion and this case is not about whether a specific statement was protected. 2019In response, the State points out that the court in People v. Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 11 , a case upon which defendant heavily relies for its substance, applied the Jackson standard, and contends that defendant’s argument regarding Duncan is misplaced because that case examined whether a statement was constitutionally protected as religious opinion and this case is not about whether a specific statement was protected. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Duncan v. Peterson
green
2 sentences2018App. 3d 911 , 349 Ill.Dec. 668 , 947 N.E.2d 305 (2010), defendant asserts that the Jackson standard does not apply to this matter. 2018App. 3d 911 , 349 Ill.Dec. 668 , 947 N.E.2d 305 (2010), defendant asserts that the Jackson standard does not apply to this matter. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
People v. Hogan
green
2 sentences2014App. 3d at 955-56 , 851 N.E.2d at 270-71 ; People v. Hogan, 186 Ill. 2014App. 3d at 955-56 , 851 N.E.2d at 270-71 ; People v. Hogan, 186 Ill. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2008The majority applies a portion of the standard this court announced in People v. Jackson, 181 Ill. 2008The majority applies a portion of the standard this court announced in People v. Jackson, 181 Ill. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Tisley
green
2 sentences2004Finally, although we need not address Jackson’s claim that the jury was improperly instructed regarding identification evidence, we think that in light of the disagreement in this district regarding this issue (compare People v. Tisley, 341 Ill. 2004Finally, although we need not address Jackson's claim that the jury was improperly instructed regarding identification evidence, we think that in light of the disagreement in this district regarding this issue (compare People v. Tisley , 341 Ill. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Washington v. Board of Review
green
2 sentences2003This indicated that the legislature intended that persons discharged for incapacity, inadvertence, negligence or inability to perform assigned tasks should receive unemployment benefits."); Washington v. Board of Review, 211 Ill.App.3d 663, 669 , 156 Ill.Dec. 90 , 570 N.E.2d 566 (1991) ( Jackson standard rejected in light of 1988 amendment). 2003This indicated that the legislature intended that persons discharged for incapacity, inadvertence, negligence or inability to perform assigned tasks should receive unemployment benefits."); Washington v. Board of Review, 211 Ill.App.3d 663, 669 , 156 Ill.Dec. 90 , 570 N.E.2d 566 (1991) ( Jackson standard rejected in light of 1988 amendment). | 2 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Aljohani green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Neil v. Biggers
green
2 sentences2026Admissibility Standard ¶ 62 The appellate majority cited the familiar Jackson standard yet determined that “no rational trier of fact could have convicted [defendant] under the test set out in the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).” 2024 IL App (1st) 220494, ¶ 3 (majority opinion). 2026Admissibility Standard ¶ 62 The appellate majority cited the familiar Jackson standard yet determined that “no rational trier of fact could have convicted [defendant] under the test set out in the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).” 2024 IL App (1st) 220494, ¶ 3 (majority opinion). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Jackson green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Johnson yellow | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. McLaurin green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Apprendi v. New Jersey green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Franzen green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Gray green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Jackson green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Hobley green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Davis green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Dismuke neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| People v. Godfrey green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| JACKSON BY JACKSON v. Michael Reese Hosp. and Medical Center green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Jackson green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Morgan v. 253 East Delaware Condominium Ass'n green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Pintos green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Campbell green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Dorsey green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| The People v. Stoval green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People Ex Rel. Walker v. Pate green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Robinson v. California green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| The PEOPLE v. Davis green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.