Jackson standard in Illinois

2026“Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis removed.) Id. at 319 ; see People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004) (noting that Illinois has adopted the Jackson test).

2026“Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis removed.) Id. at 319 ; see People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004) (noting that Illinois has adopted the Jackson test).

2021“The Jackson standard applies in all criminal cases, regardless of the nature of the evidence.” Id. at 279. (citing People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 217 (2002)).

2021“The Jackson standard applies in all criminal cases, regardless of the nature of the evidence.” Id. at 279. (citing People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 217 (2002)).

2026“Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis removed.) Id. at 319 ; see People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004) (noting that Illinois has adopted the Jackson test).

2026“Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis removed.) Id. at 319 ; see People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004) (noting that Illinois has adopted the Jackson test).

2007See, e.g., Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 545 [, 708 N.E.2d at 371 ] (holding that no reasonable person could find the witness’ testimony credible) ***.” Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280 , 818 N.E.2d at 308 .

2007See, e.g., Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 545 [, 708 N.E.2d at 371 ] (holding that no reasonable person could find the witness’ testimony credible) ***.” Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280 , 818 N.E.2d at 308 .

2014See People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179 (1987), overruled on other grounds by People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 (1992); see also People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 (applying the Jackson analysis). ¶ 17 We first note that, as defendant points out, he was not charged with DUI by a uniform traffic citation and complaint.

2014See People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179 (1987), overruled on other grounds by People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 (1992); see also People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 (applying the Jackson analysis). ¶ 17 We first note that, as defendant points out, he was not charged with DUI by a uniform traffic citation and complaint.

2026“Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “[T]he weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses is strictly within the competence of the fact finder.” People v. Ellis, 74 Ill. 2d 489, 496 (1978) (citing People v. Orlando, 380 Ill. 107, 119 (1942); People v. Novotny, 41 Ill. 2d 401, 412 (1968); People v. Yarbrough, 67 Ill. 2d 222, 227 (1977)). ¶ 20 Addressing defendant’s argument, we find th

2026The Brooks court answered his argument with an isolated comment: “these arguments are better directed toward the admissibility of the statements” because “[o]nce the statements are deemed to be admissible, our standard of review is limited to the [Jackson standard, as applied in People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237 (1985)].” Id. at 134.

2014See People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179 (1987), overruled on other grounds by People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 (1992); see also People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 (applying the Jackson analysis). ¶ 17 We first note that, as defendant points out, he was not charged with DUI by a uniform traffic citation and complaint.

2014See People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179 (1987), overruled on other grounds by People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 (1992); see also People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 (applying the Jackson analysis). ¶ 17 We first note that, as defendant points out, he was not charged with DUI by a uniform traffic citation and complaint.

2014See People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179 (1987), overruled on other grounds by People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 (1992); see also People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 (applying the Jackson analysis). ¶ 17 We first note that, as defendant points out, he was not charged with DUI by a uniform traffic citation and complaint.

2014See People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179 (1987), overruled on other grounds by People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 (1992); see also People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 (applying the Jackson analysis). ¶ 17 We first note that, as defendant points out, he was not charged with DUI by a uniform traffic citation and complaint.

2019Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; People v. Ross , 229 Ill. 2d 255 , 272, 322 Ill.Dec. 574 , 891 N.E.2d 865 (2008). ¶ 30 Defendant claims that his guilt is purely a question of law, and thus we should review his conviction de novo , instead of applying the deferential Jackson standard to the jury's verdict.

2019Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; People v. Ross , 229 Ill. 2d 255 , 272, 322 Ill.Dec. 574 , 891 N.E.2d 865 (2008). ¶ 30 Defendant claims that his guilt is purely a question of law, and thus we should review his conviction de novo , instead of applying the deferential Jackson standard to the jury's verdict.

1993While courts have continued to say a criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt (People v. Campbell (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 363, 375 , 586 N.E.2d 1261, 1266 ; Schott, 145 Ill. 2d at 203 , 582 N.E.2d at 697 ; Pintos, 133 Ill. 2d at 291 , 549 N.E.2d at 346 ; Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261 , 478 N.E.2d at 276 ), this principle must be read in the context of the Jackson standard embraced in Collins, i.e., in reviewing the determination of the trier of fact, a court cannot substitute it

1993While courts have continued to say a criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt (People v. Campbell (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 363, 375 , 586 N.E.2d 1261, 1266 ; Schott, 145 Ill. 2d at 203 , 582 N.E.2d at 697 ; Pintos, 133 Ill. 2d at 291 , 549 N.E.2d at 346 ; Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261 , 478 N.E.2d at 276 ), this principle must be read in the context of the Jackson standard embraced in Collins, i.e., in reviewing the determination of the trier of fact, a court cannot substitute it

2021The court further wrote that “[t]he Jackson standard applies in all criminal cases, regardless of the nature of the evidence.” (Emphasis added.) Id.; see also People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 64 (“This standard of review applies in all criminal cases, whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial.”).

2020The court further wrote that “[t]he Jackson standard applies in all criminal cases, regardless of the nature of the evidence.” (Emphasis added.) Id.; see also People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 64 (“This standard of review applies in all criminal cases, whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial.”).

2020See People v. Loggins, 2019 IL App (1st) 160482 , ¶¶ 29, 32. ¶ 14 In a bench trial, the judge is the trier of fact, and is entrusted “to determine the credibility of witnesses, to weigh evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom, and to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.” People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009).

2019See People v. Loggins, 2019 IL App (1st) 160482, ¶¶ 30-32 (when parties dispute on appeal whether defendant was armed at certain time, review is under Jackson standard).

2019See People v. Nicholas, 2013 IL App (1st) 103202, ¶ 40 (concluding that a defendant established prejudice where his claim that officers beat him into making a false confession was “strikingly similar *** as to the time period, location, manner, method, participants and the role of the participants” to prior acts of torture a special prosecutor found had taken place in other cases).

2018See People v. Nicholas, 2013 IL App (1st) 103202, ¶ 40 (concluding that a defendant established prejudice where his claim that officers beat him into making a false confession was “strikingly similar *** as to the time period, location, manner, method, participants and the role of the participants” to prior acts of torture a special prosecutor found had taken place in other cases).

2019To support a claim of actual innocence, evidence “must be newly discovered; material and not merely cumulative; and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 333.

2018To support a claim of actual innocence, evidence “must be newly discovered; material and not merely cumulative; and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 333.

2017People v. Green. 322 Ill.

2017People v. Green. 322 Ill.

2017Murneigh v. Gainer, 177 Ill. 2d 287, 299 (1997).

2017Murneigh v. Gainer, 177 Ill. 2d 287, 299 (1997).

2004People v. Olivera , 164 Ill. 2d 382, 393 (1995).

2004People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 393 (1995).

2014People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179, 192 , 514 N.E.2d 983, 988-89 (1987), overruled on other grounds, People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 , 586 N.E.2d 1239 (1992); People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 , 972 N.E.2d 815 (applying the Jackson analysis); Kizer, 365 Ill.

2014People v. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d 179, 192 , 514 N.E.2d 983, 988-89 (1987), overruled on other grounds, People v. Stefan, 146 Ill. 2d 324 , 586 N.E.2d 1239 (1992); People v. Kazenko, 2012 IL App (3d) 110529 , 972 N.E.2d 815 (applying the Jackson analysis); Kizer, 365 Ill.

2025People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213 , 2 Defendant’s opening brief contains a section titled “Manifest Weight of the Evidence,” which asserts that the “trial court’s guilty finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence” given the “serious doubts raised by the evidence as a whole.” Defendant essentially asserts that the State failed to satisfy the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), as he contends that “even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, no rational factfinder could have found the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonab

2025People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213 , 2 Defendant’s opening brief contains a section titled “Manifest Weight of the Evidence,” which asserts that the “trial court’s guilty finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence” given the “serious doubts raised by the evidence as a whole.” Defendant essentially asserts that the State failed to satisfy the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), as he contends that “even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, no rational factfinder could have found the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonab

2011In applying this standard, we "must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution." Cunningham, 212 Ill.2d at 280 , 288 Ill.Dec. 616 , 818 N.E.2d 304 . "[O]ur function is not to retry the defendant." People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d 187, 242 , 307 Ill.Dec. 524 , 860 N.E.2d 178 (2006).

2011In applying this standard, we "must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution." Cunningham, 212 Ill.2d at 280 , 288 Ill.Dec. 616 , 818 N.E.2d 304 . "[O]ur function is not to retry the defendant." People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d 187, 242 , 307 Ill.Dec. 524 , 860 N.E.2d 178 (2006).

2011"Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Everhart, 405 Ill.App.3d 687, 704 , 345 Ill.

2011"Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Everhart, 405 Ill.App.3d 687, 704 , 345 Ill.