Jackson motion in Florida

2012Jackson’s claims of error are as follows: (1) the trial court erred in admitting Jackson's recorded custodial interrogation into evidence in the State’s case-in-chief; (2) the trial court erred in denying Jackson’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of sexual battery; (3) the trial court erred by finding, as an aggravator given great weight, that Jackson was under a sentence of imprisonment, placed on community control, or on felony probation at the time of the murder; (4) the trial court erred in denying Jackson’s request to instruct the jury that Jackson faced a life sentence i

2012Jackson’s claims of error are as follows: (1) the trial court erred in admitting Jackson's recorded custodial interrogation into evidence in the State’s case-in-chief; (2) the trial court erred in denying Jackson’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of sexual battery; (3) the trial court erred by finding, as an aggravator given great weight, that Jackson was under a sentence of imprisonment, placed on community control, or on felony probation at the time of the murder; (4) the trial court erred in denying Jackson’s request to instruct the jury that Jackson faced a life sentence i

2025There, the respondent brought a “class of one” claim against the Village, and the Supreme Court held that her allegations were “sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis.” Id. at 564-65 .

2025There, the respondent brought a “class of one” claim against the Village, and the Supreme Court held that her allegations were “sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis.” Id. at 564-65 .

2025Arlington Heights stands for the proposition that “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” 429 U.S. at 265 .

2025Arlington Heights stands for the proposition that “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” 429 U.S. at 265 .

2004Jackson argues that the testimony had no valid probative value and only tended to show bad character or propensity, and therefore is inadmissible. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979); Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217 (Fla.1981); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 , 80 S.Ct. 102 , 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959).

1984Jackson's defense counsel interrupted the testimony to object to the line of questioning on relevancy grounds, and was overruled. [1] Jackson argues that the testimony had no valid probative value and only tended to show bad character or propensity, and therefore is inadmissible. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979); Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 1981); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 , 80 S.Ct. 102 , 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [2] *461 Before addressing the merits of this point, we must deal with the state's contention that defense counsel failed to raise a c

2004Jackson argues that the testimony had no valid probative value and only tended to show bad character or propensity, and therefore is inadmissible. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979); Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217 (Fla.1981); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 , 80 S.Ct. 102 , 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959).

1984Jackson's defense counsel interrupted the testimony to object to the line of questioning on relevancy grounds, and was overruled. [1] Jackson argues that the testimony had no valid probative value and only tended to show bad character or propensity, and therefore is inadmissible. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979); Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 1981); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 , 80 S.Ct. 102 , 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [2] *461 Before addressing the merits of this point, we must deal with the state's contention that defense counsel failed to raise a c

2004Jackson argues that the testimony had no valid probative value and only tended to show bad character or propensity, and therefore is inadmissible. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979); Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217 (Fla.1981); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 , 80 S.Ct. 102 , 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959).

1984Jackson's defense counsel interrupted the testimony to object to the line of questioning on relevancy grounds, and was overruled. [1] Jackson argues that the testimony had no valid probative value and only tended to show bad character or propensity, and therefore is inadmissible. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979); Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 1981); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 , 80 S.Ct. 102 , 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [2] *461 Before addressing the merits of this point, we must deal with the state's contention that defense counsel failed to raise a c

2004Jackson argues that the testimony had no valid probative value and only tended to show bad character or propensity, and therefore is inadmissible. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979); Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217 (Fla.1981); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 , 80 S.Ct. 102 , 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959).

1984Jackson's defense counsel interrupted the testimony to object to the line of questioning on relevancy grounds, and was overruled. [1] Jackson argues that the testimony had no valid probative value and only tended to show bad character or propensity, and therefore is inadmissible. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979); Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 1981); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 , 80 S.Ct. 102 , 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). [2] *461 Before addressing the merits of this point, we must deal with the state's contention that defense counsel failed to raise a c

2025In Brown v. State, 994 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), the First District Court of Appeal considered whether the trial court’s reliance on acquittals by reason of insanity in crafting an appropriate sentence constituted a sentencing error.

2018This Court stayed Jackson's appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017).

2018This Court stayed Jackson's appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017).

2018This Court stayed Jackson's appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017).

2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Jackson's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017).

2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Jackson's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017).

2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Jackson's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017).

2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Jackson's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017).

2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Jackson's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017).

2017In light of the State’s concession and this court’s decision in Blocker v. State, 968 So.2d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), we *349 reverse and remand for consideration of Jackson’s motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.

2017As we explained in Blocker, although the evidence that the postconviction court cited in its order denying Jackson’s rule 3.800(a) motion provided a reasonable basis to conclude that a factual question existed with regard to the trial court’s oral pronouncement, “such postconviction disputes can be resolved only after an evidentiary hearing.” Blocker, 968 So.2d at 693-94 ; see also Brantley, 32 So.3d at 90 (stating that “[a] careful examination of the record reveals a reasonable basis to question the accuracy of the transcript of the sentencing hearing, thus creating a disputed issue of fact”

2016In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must prove both deficient performance of counsel and prejudice to the defendant.

2016In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must prove both deficient performance of counsel and prejudice to the defendant.

2015Jackson v. State, 514 So.2d 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

2014Specifically, Jackson’s motion for postcon-viction relief alleged: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Curtis Lewis during the guilt phase because Lewis would have testified that he saw the victim after the State alleged that she disappeared and had been killed; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to question prospective jurors during voir dire in order to uncover those prospective jurors who were unable to give meaningful consideration to mitigating evidence; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and request a Richardson inquiry, see Richardson v.

2014Pound Laboratory and Dr. Jan Westberty; (9) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object or limit the opinion testimony of the medical examiner that the victim’s death was a homicide; (10) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with an expert, such as a forensic scientist, to assess the evidence and *478 the crime scene investigation in Jackson’s case; (11) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate the victim’s background as to being an informant for the Metropolitan Bureau of Investigation (MBI) through publically available resources; (12) trial

2014Pound Laboratory and Dr. Jan Westberty; (9) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object or limit the opinion testimony of the medical examiner that the victim’s death was a homicide; (10) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with an expert, such as a forensic scientist, to assess the evidence and *478 the crime scene investigation in Jackson’s case; (11) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate the victim’s background as to being an informant for the Metropolitan Bureau of Investigation (MBI) through publically available resources; (12) trial

2014Id. at 526 n. 9. 4 .

2013Jackson, 18 So.3d at 1029 .