14 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2023See supra at ¶ 11 (citing 925 N.E.2d at 373 ). 2023See supra at ¶ 11 (citing 925 N.E.2d at 373 ). | 1 | 1 |
State of Indiana v. Nicolas Lindauergreen1 sentence2020Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-616 | December 10, 2020 Page 9 of 10 See State v. Lindauer, 105 N.E.3d 211, 215-6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (court properly denied defendant’s motion for dismissal because continuances attributable to defendant did not count toward Criminal Rule 4(C) deadline), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Tharpgreen1 sentence2020Indiana Trial Rule 59(F) provides that the order granting the motion to correct error is final and appealable: “Any modification or setting aside of a final judgment or an appealable final order following the filing of a Motion to Correct Error shall be an appealable final judgment or order.” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CT-36 | November 10, 2020 Page 4 of 15 [8] In addition to the standard of review applied to motions to correct error, we must also consider the well-established standard of review applied to summary judgment proceedings: We review summary judgment de n | 1 | 1 |
Myers v. Oak Hill Coal Co.green1 sentence2018The doctrine exists “to promote finality and judicial economy[,]” id., and applies to issues which were decided by an interlocutory appeal when the same claims are repeated on appeal from a completed trial, Harper v. State, 963 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-825 | October 18, 2018 Page 4 of 5 N.E.2d 653, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d on reh’g, 968 N.E.2d 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. [9] We considered and decided the issues presented here in Jackson’s prior interlocutory appeal, holding Officer Zotz possessed reasonable suspicion when he conducted a traff | 1 | 1 |
Carter v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Carter v. State, 754 N.E.2d 877, 880 (Ind. 2001) (uncorroborated testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction), reh’g denied, cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
Bret Lee Sisson v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2015See also Sisson v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 2015See also Sisson v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1,19 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Stewart, 768 N.E.2d at 435 . | 1 | 1 |
Hardley v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Jackson argues that Bennett’s initial response to his petition was a return, that it was insufficient, that Bennett was not entitled to file an amended return, and that he was entitled to judgment on the pleadings.1 Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-25.5-1-1, “Every person whose liberty is restrained, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered from the restraint if the restraint is illegal.” “The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to determine the lawfulness of custody or detention of the defendant | 1 | 1 |
Land v. Stategreen1 sentence2010"By permitting the State to file the habitual offender count, the trial court impliedly found good cause." Land v. State, 802 N.E.2d 45, 53 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Myers v. Stategreen1 sentence2010See id. at 410 (noting that "it has long been the law of this state that acquittal of charges from one joined offense makes the migjoin-der unavailable for reversal of the judgment") (citing Myers v. State, 92 Ind. 390, 395 (1883)). | 1 | 1 |
Harvey v. Stategreen1 sentence2010See id. at 410 (noting that "it has long been the law of this state that acquittal of charges from one joined offense makes the migjoin-der unavailable for reversal of the judgment") (citing Myers v. State, 92 Ind. 390, 395 (1883)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Quirkgreen1 sentence2008See State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind.2006) (recognizing that police officers may stop a vehicle when they observe even minor traffic violations). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harper v. State
green
1 sentence2018The doctrine exists “to promote finality and judicial economy[,]” id., and applies to issues which were decided by an interlocutory appeal when the same claims are repeated on appeal from a completed trial, Harper v. State, 963 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-825 | October 18, 2018 Page 4 of 5 N.E.2d 653, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d on reh’g, 968 N.E.2d 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. [9] We considered and decided the issues presented here in Jackson’s prior interlocutory appeal, holding Officer Zotz possessed reasonable suspicion when he conducted a traff | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Cutter v. State
green
1 sentence2018The doctrine exists “to promote finality and judicial economy[,]” id., and applies to issues which were decided by an interlocutory appeal when the same claims are repeated on appeal from a completed trial, Harper v. State, 963 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-825 | October 18, 2018 Page 4 of 5 N.E.2d 653, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d on reh’g, 968 N.E.2d 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. [9] We considered and decided the issues presented here in Jackson’s prior interlocutory appeal, holding Officer Zotz possessed reasonable suspicion when he conducted a traff | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Wilson v. State
green
1 sentence2015Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 800-01 . [14] At trial, the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Jackson’s claim that he had a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rogers v. State
green
2 sentences2015Id. [36] Considering Jackson’s criminal history and his admitted “past gang membership,” Appellant’s App. at 95, we are not persuaded that Jackson’s claim that he lived as a law-abiding citizen for an eight-year period leading up to the instant offenses is significant and clearly supported by the record. 2015Id. [36] Considering Jackson’s criminal history and his admitted “past gang membership,” Appellant’s App. at 95, we are not persuaded that Jackson’s claim that he lived as a law-abiding citizen for an eight-year period leading up to the instant offenses is significant and clearly supported by the record. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Jackson v. State
green
1 sentence2013Instead, we concluded that “the record supported] the trial court’s specific finding that Jackson’s absence from trial was a ‘willful, knowing and voluntary act.’ ” Id. at 499 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Jackson v. State
green
1 sentence2012Id. at 770 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Jackson v. Indiana
green
2 sentences2008When the determination is made that there is no substantial probability that the defendant will be restored to competency, “the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant.” Id. (emphasis added). 4 *287 Having determined Jackson’s indefinite commitment amounted to a violation of both equal protection and due process, the Court turned its attention to Jackson’s claim that the charges against him must be dismissed. 2008Although it labeled Jackson’s claim “substantial,” the Court concluded the claim was “not sufficiently ripe for ultimate decision.” Id. at 739 , 92 S.Ct. 1845 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.