Jackson rule in Michigan

2021People v Petrella, 424 Mich 221, 269-270 ; 380 NW2d 11 (1985). -2- . . . .” MCL 750.79(1) (emphasis added).

2021People v Petrella, 424 Mich 221, 269-270 ; 380 NW2d 11 (1985). -2- . . . .” MCL 750.79(1) (emphasis added).

2017People v Woolfolk, 304 Mich App 450, 457-458 ; 848 NW2d 169 (2014), aff’d 497 Mich 23 (2014). -3- Defendant Jackson’s claim of error fails for much of the same reasons.

2017People v Woolfolk, 304 Mich App 450, 457-458 ; 848 NW2d 169 (2014), aff’d 497 Mich 23 (2014). -3- Defendant Jackson’s claim of error fails for much of the same reasons.

2017People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579 ; 640 NW2d 246 (2002); People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 68 ; 862 NW2d 446 (2014).

2017People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579 ; 640 NW2d 246 (2002); People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 68 ; 862 NW2d 446 (2014).

2017People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579 ; 640 NW2d 246 (2002); People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 68 ; 862 NW2d 446 (2014).

2017People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579 ; 640 NW2d 246 (2002); People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 68 ; 862 NW2d 446 (2014).

2017People v Woolfolk, 304 Mich App 450, 457-458 ; 848 NW2d 169 (2014), aff’d 497 Mich 23 (2014). -3- Defendant Jackson’s claim of error fails for much of the same reasons.

2016United States v Lovasco, 431 US 783, 790 ; 97 S Ct 2044 ; 52 L Ed 2d 752 (1977).

2016United States v Lovasco, 431 US 783, 790 ; 97 S Ct 2044 ; 52 L Ed 2d 752 (1977).

1994Cf. Montoya v Collins, 955 F2d 279, 282-283 (CA 5, 1992). 25 Accordingly, any communications made before the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached and been invoked — whether initiated by defendant or not — are irrelevant for purposes of the Jackson exception regarding whether he initiated further communications with respect to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel inquiry. 26 While the record appears to be unclear whether Detective Gaul-tier knew of defendant’s appointed counsel, Jackson makes clear that "[o]ne set of state actors (the police) may not claim ignorance of defendants’ uneq

1994Cf. Montoya v Collins, 955 F2d 279, 282-283 (CA 5, 1992). 25 Accordingly, any communications made before the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached and been invoked — whether initiated by defendant or not — are irrelevant for purposes of the Jackson exception regarding whether he initiated further communications with respect to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel inquiry. 26 While the record appears to be unclear whether Detective Gaul-tier knew of defendant’s appointed counsel, Jackson makes clear that "[o]ne set of state actors (the police) may not claim ignorance of defendants’ uneq

1983A defendant who did not receive a sentence within the range of the sentence recommendation, who was not thereby entitled to withdraw his plea under the rule stated in Killebrew, supra, and who was not informed of the sentence consequences at issue in Jones or Rogers, would still be entitled to reversal of his conviction.

1983A defendant who did not receive a sentence within the range of the sentence recommendation, who was not thereby entitled to withdraw his plea under the rule stated in Killebrew, supra, and who was not informed of the sentence consequences at issue in Jones or Rogers, would still be entitled to reversal of his conviction.

1980In People v Cherry, 393 Mich 261 ; 224 NW2d 286 (1974), the Supreme Court held that, in order to comply with the Jackson rule, the trial court must positively indicate and identify its exercise of discretion.

1980In People v Cherry, 393 Mich 261 ; 224 NW2d 286 (1974), the Supreme Court held that, in order to comply with the Jackson rule, the trial court must positively indicate and identify its exercise of discretion.

1980In People v Crawford, 83 Mich App 35, 38-39 ; 268 NW2d 275 (1978), this Court held that the Jackson rule envisioned a true exercise of discretion by balancing the competing factors involved.

1980In People v Crawford, 83 Mich App 35, 38-39 ; 268 NW2d 275 (1978), this Court held that the Jackson rule envisioned a true exercise of discretion by balancing the competing factors involved.

1980The Court set out the following criteria which were to be considered: "The factors which the judge must weigh in making his determination include: (1) the nature of the prior offense (did it involve an offense which directly bears on credibility, such as perjury?), (2) whether it is for substantially the same conduct for which the defendant is on trial (are the offenses so closely related that the danger that the jury will consider the defendant a 'bad man’ or infer that because he was previously convicted he likely committed this crime, and therefore create prejudice which outweighs the proba

1980The Court set out the following criteria which were to be considered: "The factors which the judge must weigh in making his determination include: (1) the nature of the prior offense (did it involve an offense which directly bears on credibility, such as perjury?), (2) whether it is for substantially the same conduct for which the defendant is on trial (are the offenses so closely related that the danger that the jury will consider the defendant a 'bad man’ or infer that because he was previously convicted he likely committed this crime, and therefore create prejudice which outweighs the proba

1977So did the trial judges.” The argument for prospectivity ignores the opinion of the Court of Appeals in People v Farrar, 36 Mich App 294, 306 ; 193 NW2d 363 (1971), where a panel of that Court adopted the Luck construction, and held it was error for a trial judge to fail to recognize that he may, in the exercise of discretion, refuse to allow reference to a defendant’s prior conviction record.

1977So did the trial judges.” The argument for prospectivity ignores the opinion of the Court of Appeals in People v Farrar, 36 Mich App 294, 306 ; 193 NW2d 363 (1971), where a panel of that Court adopted the Luck construction, and held it was error for a trial judge to fail to recognize that he may, in the exercise of discretion, refuse to allow reference to a defendant’s prior conviction record.

1976This Court held that defendant’s plea of guilty to the offense of attempted unlawful possession of a credit card 14 did not bar prosecution for assault with intent to rob being armed. 15 While the credit card charge was related to the attempted robbery charge in the sense that the credit card was stolen during that attempt, these were separate transactions: "The Double Jeopardy Clause does not license subsequent offenses growing out of a theft or excuse the theft upon trial for one or another offense.” The Jackson analysis was adopted in People v Charles Johnson, 62 Mich App 240, 249 ; 233 NW2

1976This Court held that defendant’s plea of guilty to the offense of attempted unlawful possession of a credit card 14 did not bar prosecution for assault with intent to rob being armed. 15 While the credit card charge was related to the attempted robbery charge in the sense that the credit card was stolen during that attempt, these were separate transactions: "The Double Jeopardy Clause does not license subsequent offenses growing out of a theft or excuse the theft upon trial for one or another offense.” The Jackson analysis was adopted in People v Charles Johnson, 62 Mich App 240, 249 ; 233 NW2