Jackson defense in Delaware

2023In 2018, following a two-day non-jury trial, Mr. Jackson was convicted of two counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”) and two counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PABPP”).7 3 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578-79 (Del. 1998).

2015Aug. 19, 2014). 3 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 3 (7) As to Jackson’s first claim, it appears that the Superior Court mistakenly treated Jackson’s motion as a motion for modification of sentence under Rule 35(b), rather than a motion for correction of sentence under Rule 35(a).

2019See also Willia)ns v. State, 539 A.2d 164, 166-69 (Del. 1988) (discussing development of Delaware’s sufficiency-of-evidence standard and adoption of Jackson standard). 37 Del.

2017See also Williams v. State, 539 A.2d 164, 166-69 (Del. 1988) (discussing development of Delaware‟s sufficiency-of-evidence standard and adoption of Jackson standard); id. at 167 (“Thus, prior to 1972, if the evidence was purely circumstantial and there was an alternate explanation of innocence that was consistent with the evidence, the conviction could not be sustained.”); Henry v. State, 298 A.2d 327, 330 (Del. 1972) (Delaware Supreme Court “reconsider[ed and rejected] the rule as to circumstantial evidence long followed in this State.

2024For the same reason, we also reject Jackson’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the protective sweep of the residence. 14 Owens v. State, 301 A.3d 580 , 588-89 (Del. 2023) (cleaned up). 15 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)). 16 Del.

2024We review the Court of Chancery’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.136 We review questions of law, including the Court of Chancery’s “formulation and application of legal principles,”137 and whether the court “correctly formulated the legal standard for determining if [Nielsen or Britton] owed a fiduciary duty to [Jackson],”138 de novo.139 Before holding that the Covenants were facially overbroad, the Court of Chancery first found that Sunder could not obtain a preliminary injunction because 136 Lawson, 897 A.2d at 743 ; SI Mgmt., 707 A.2d at 40 ; Kais

2024For the same reason, we also reject Jackson’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the protective sweep of the residence. 14 Owens v. State, 301 A.3d 580 , 588-89 (Del. 2023) (cleaned up). 15 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)). 16 Del.

2024We review the Court of Chancery’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.136 We review questions of law, including the Court of Chancery’s “formulation and application of legal principles,”137 and whether the court “correctly formulated the legal standard for determining if [Nielsen or Britton] owed a fiduciary duty to [Jackson],”138 de novo.139 Before holding that the Covenants were facially overbroad, the Court of Chancery first found that Sunder could not obtain a preliminary injunction because 136 Lawson, 897 A.2d at 743 ; SI Mgmt., 707 A.2d at 40 ; Kais

2024The cases that Appellant cites in support of its argument161 all address un-pleaded affirmative defenses raised at the pre-trial stage and not a preliminary injunction stage.162 Additionally, Appellant’s argument presumes that Jackson was required to plead an affirmative defense to challenge the enforceability of the LLC Agreement based on Nielsen and Britton’s conduct.163 But Appellant had the burden of establishing an enforceable contract as an element of its claim in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.164 The Court of Chancery therefore did not abuse its discretion in considering the

2024We are also satisfied that Jackson’s counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly determined that Jackson could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 21 See Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997) (“In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, [a defendant] is bound by his answers on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea From and by his sworn testimony prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea.”). 8 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

2024We review the Court of Chancery’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.136 We review questions of law, including the Court of Chancery’s “formulation and application of legal principles,”137 and whether the court “correctly formulated the legal standard for determining if [Nielsen or Britton] owed a fiduciary duty to [Jackson],”138 de novo.139 Before holding that the Covenants were facially overbroad, the Court of Chancery first found that Sunder could not obtain a preliminary injunction because 136 Lawson, 897 A.2d at 743 ; SI Mgmt., 707 A.2d at 40 ; Kais

2024We review the Court of Chancery’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.136 We review questions of law, including the Court of Chancery’s “formulation and application of legal principles,”137 and whether the court “correctly formulated the legal standard for determining if [Nielsen or Britton] owed a fiduciary duty to [Jackson],”138 de novo.139 Before holding that the Covenants were facially overbroad, the Court of Chancery first found that Sunder could not obtain a preliminary injunction because 136 Lawson, 897 A.2d at 743 ; SI Mgmt., 707 A.2d at 40 ; Kais

2022Ct. Mar. 14, 2005). 63 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). 64 Id. at 659 . 65 Id. 66 Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696 (Del. 2002). - 15 - case to meaningful adversarial testing.67 But before the Court will “presume prejudice under Cronic, there must be a complete failure of counsel.”68 As set out below, there was no “complete failure of counsel.” No, Mr. Jackson’s contentions exhibit more of either his complete disagreement with or complete misunderstanding of the professional decisions Mr. Wilkinson made, and the professional acts Mr. Wilkinson took—acts taken with, at least, so

2022Ct. Mar. 14, 2005). 63 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). 64 Id. at 659 . 65 Id. 66 Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696 (Del. 2002). - 15 - case to meaningful adversarial testing.67 But before the Court will “presume prejudice under Cronic, there must be a complete failure of counsel.”68 As set out below, there was no “complete failure of counsel.” No, Mr. Jackson’s contentions exhibit more of either his complete disagreement with or complete misunderstanding of the professional decisions Mr. Wilkinson made, and the professional acts Mr. Wilkinson took—acts taken with, at least, so

2022DISCUSSION A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS. (25) A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the familiar two-part Strickland test.54 A claimant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that: (i) his defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of his proceedings would have been different.55 (26) For the first prong, deficient performance, the burden is on the claimant to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an object

2022DISCUSSION A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS. (25) A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the familiar two-part Strickland test.54 A claimant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that: (i) his defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of his proceedings would have been different.55 (26) For the first prong, deficient performance, the burden is on the claimant to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an object

2022Ct. Mar. 14, 2005). 63 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). 64 Id. at 659 . 65 Id. 66 Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696 (Del. 2002). - 15 - case to meaningful adversarial testing.67 But before the Court will “presume prejudice under Cronic, there must be a complete failure of counsel.”68 As set out below, there was no “complete failure of counsel.” No, Mr. Jackson’s contentions exhibit more of either his complete disagreement with or complete misunderstanding of the professional decisions Mr. Wilkinson made, and the professional acts Mr. Wilkinson took—acts taken with, at least, so

2022DISCUSSION A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS. (25) A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the familiar two-part Strickland test.54 A claimant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that: (i) his defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of his proceedings would have been different.55 (26) For the first prong, deficient performance, the burden is on the claimant to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an object

2022As to the decisions reserved for the defendant, the record is clear that Mr. Jackson’s plea offer rejection,108 jury trial waiver,109 and decision not to testify were of his own volition.110 With respect to cross- examination—a function well-within trial counsel’s province—the record evidences trial counsel’s efforts to include Mr. Jackson’s input for each witness questioned.111 And once the State rested, Mr. Wilkinson asked for the Court’s indulgence several times—including a request to recess—to confer with Mr. Jackson before delivering 107 Id. at 1509 (quoting Gonzalez v. United States, 553

2022DISCUSSION A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS. (25) A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the familiar two-part Strickland test.54 A claimant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that: (i) his defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of his proceedings would have been different.55 (26) For the first prong, deficient performance, the burden is on the claimant to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an object

2022DISCUSSION A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS. (25) A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the familiar two-part Strickland test.54 A claimant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that: (i) his defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of his proceedings would have been different.55 (26) For the first prong, deficient performance, the burden is on the claimant to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an object

2021More stringent still, under the Jackson test, “the applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (emphasis added). 79 lack of the new evidence caused more than mere prejudice, meaning more than simply “a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”210 Lloyd’s burden of persuasiveness is that the new evidence “would have probably changed

2021More stringent still, under the Jackson test, “the applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (emphasis added). 79 lack of the new evidence caused more than mere prejudice, meaning more than simply “a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”210 Lloyd’s burden of persuasiveness is that the new evidence “would have probably changed

2017See also Williams v. State, 539 A.2d 164, 166-69 (Del. 1988) (discussing development of Delaware‟s sufficiency-of-evidence standard and adoption of Jackson standard); id. at 167 (“Thus, prior to 1972, if the evidence was purely circumstantial and there was an alternate explanation of innocence that was consistent with the evidence, the conviction could not be sustained.”); Henry v. State, 298 A.2d 327, 330 (Del. 1972) (Delaware Supreme Court “reconsider[ed and rejected] the rule as to circumstantial evidence long followed in this State.

2017See also Young v. State, 407 A.2d 517, 524 (Del. 1979) (adopting Jackson standard). 8 Del.

2016Juiy 12, 2016). 34 Brown v. State, 967 A.2d 1250, 1252 (Del. 2009) (emphasis in original) (quoting Priest v. State, 879 A.2d 575, 577 (Del. 2005)).

2016Juiy 12, 2016). 34 Brown v. State, 967 A.2d 1250, 1252 (Del. 2009) (emphasis in original) (quoting Priest v. State, 879 A.2d 575, 577 (Del. 2005)).

2016As the Superior Court recognized, 4 Chavous v. State, 953 A.2d 282, 285 (Del. 2008). 5 Super.