18 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Montejo v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2011The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Montejo's argument, reasoning that the Jackson rule is not triggered "unless and until the defendant has actually requested a lawyer or has otherwise asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Montejo, 556 U.S. at _ , 129 S. Ct. at 2083 . 2011The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Montejo's argument, reasoning that the Jackson rule is not triggered "unless and until the defendant has actually requested a lawyer or has otherwise asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Montejo, 556 U.S. at _ , 129 S. Ct. at 2083 . | 5 | 5 |
State v. Allengreen2 sentences2024See Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9 .6 ¶21 Therefore, for the reasons stated above, we conclude that the postconviction court properly denied Jackson’s motion without a hearing and we affirm. 2024See Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9 .6 ¶21 Therefore, for the reasons stated above, we conclude that the postconviction court properly denied Jackson’s motion without a hearing and we affirm. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Bentleygreen2 sentences2023See Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶48 (explaining that a postconviction motion is conclusory if it "fail[s] to allege 'any factual assertions which would allow a court to meaningfully assess [the defendant's] claim.'" (quoting State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 316 , 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996))). 2023See Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶48 (explaining that a postconviction motion is conclusory if it "fail[s] to allege 'any factual assertions which would allow a court to meaningfully assess [the defendant's] claim.'" (quoting State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 316 , 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996))). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Theophilous Ruffingreen2 sentences2026Id. 3 Jackson’s motion also contained several references to the ineffectiveness of “appellate counsel.” The circuit court noted that any such claim was not properly before it pursuant to State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 512-13 , 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992). 5 Nos. 2025AP4 2025AP5 DISCUSSION ¶12 Jackson seeks postconviction relief on two grounds. 2024“If the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the defendant to relief, or if it presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 6 No. 2023AP90 entitled to relief, the circuit court has the discretion to grant or deny a hearing.” Ruffin, 401 Wis. 2d 619, ¶28 . ¶10 In this case, we conclude that Jackson’s motion was properly denied without a hearing. ¶11 First, as the postconviction court found, Jackson did not establish that any of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims were “clearly stronger” than the issues raised in | 1 | 3 |
State v. Witkowskigreen2 sentences2026A defendant may not relitigate a matter previously litigated, “no matter how artfully the defendant may rephrase the issue.” Witkowski, 163 Wis. 2d at 990 . 2026Therefore, it concluded that this claim was barred by State v. Witkowski, 163 Wis. 2d 985, 990 , 473 N.W.2d 512 (Ct. 4 Nos. 2025AP4 2025AP5 App. 1991) (“A matter once litigated may not be relitigated in a subsequent postconviction proceeding no matter how artfully the defendant may rephrase the issue.”).3 LEGAL STANDARDS ¶10 We review the circuit court’s decision denying Jackson’s postconviction motion without a hearing under a mixed standard of review. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Ginger M. Breitzmangreen1 sentence2026See Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶64 . 10 No. 2024AP240-CR ¶20 Jackson and the State both discuss whether trial counsel’s performance prejudiced Jackson’s defense and, relatedly, whether the circuit court properly assessed the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lamont L. Travisgreen1 sentence2023Cf. Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶26 (concluding that there was inaccurate information where the circuit court mistakenly believed a mandatory minimum applied to the offense); Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶¶6, 29-30 (concluding that there was inaccurate information where the number of prior convictions was wrong). ¶21 Moreover, the underlying fact—that D.M.B. suffered trauma from the sexual assault—is supported in the record. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Balliettegreen2 sentences2023See Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶48 (explaining that a postconviction motion is conclusory if it "fail[s] to allege 'any factual assertions which would allow a court to meaningfully assess [the defendant's] claim.'" (quoting State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 316 , 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996))). 2023Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶63 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lamont Donnell Sholargreen1 sentence2023See Sholar, 381 Wis. 2d 560, ¶50 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tiepelmangreen1 sentence2023Cf. Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶26 (concluding that there was inaccurate information where the circuit court mistakenly believed a mandatory minimum applied to the offense); Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶¶6, 29-30 (concluding that there was inaccurate information where the number of prior convictions was wrong). ¶21 Moreover, the underlying fact—that D.M.B. suffered trauma from the sexual assault—is supported in the record. | 1 | 1 |
Vonaire T. Washington v. Judy Smith, Warden, Oshkosh Correctional Institutiongreen1 sentence2023See Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶¶23-24 (explaining that a post-conviction motion contains sufficient facts when it alleges "the name of the witness (who), the reason the witness is important (why, how), and acts that can be proven (what, where, when)."); see also Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 630-35 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that counsel's failure to contact or produce possible alibi witnesses at trial was constitutionally deficient performance and prejudicial). ¶16 Rather than focus on the sufficiency of Jackson's allegations, the State argues that the record conclusively establishes that | 1 | 1 |
Rene Rodriguez v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023Although Jackson's motion alleges what counsel said regarding the order of witnesses, it fails to demonstrate that counsel's statement "was incorrect, much less unreasonable." See Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972, 984-85 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting allegations of deficient performance because the advice of counsel that led the defendant to decide not to testify was neither incorrect nor unreasonable); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (in order to show deficient performance, a defendant must allege "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2023Although Jackson's motion alleges what counsel said regarding the order of witnesses, it fails to demonstrate that counsel's statement "was incorrect, much less unreasonable." See Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972, 984-85 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting allegations of deficient performance because the advice of counsel that led the defendant to decide not to testify was neither incorrect nor unreasonable); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (in order to show deficient performance, a defendant must allege "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' | 1 | 1 |
Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Scott F. Andersongreen1 sentence2021Anderson, 394 Wis. 2d 190, ¶¶18, 37, 44 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Leongreen2 sentences2014Ultimately, the court held: In sum, when the marginal benefits of the Jackson rule are weighed against its substantial costs to the truth-seeking process and the criminal justice system, we readily conclude that the rule does not "pay its way," United States v. Leon, [ 468 U.S. 897, 907-08, n.6 (1984).] Michigan v. Jackson should be and now is overruled. 2014Ultimately, the court held: In sum, when the marginal benefits of the Jackson rule are weighed against its substantial costs to the truth-seeking process and the criminal justice system, we readily conclude that the rule does not "pay its way," United States v. Leon, [ 468 U.S. 897, 907-08, n.6 (1984).] Michigan v. Jackson should be and now is overruled. | 1 | 1 |
Coleman v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2012See Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 2060 (2012) (per curiam) (finding the evidence sufficient to support conspiracy guilt under the Jackson standard). 2012See Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 2060 (2012) (per curiam) (finding the evidence sufficient to support conspiracy guilt under the Jackson standard). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stankgreen2 sentences2008"It is the duty of the reviewing *627 court to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that the probable cause existed." Id., ¶ 21 (internal citations omitted); see also Stank, 288 Wis.2d 414, ¶ 30 , 708 N.W.2d 43 . ¶ 6 The trial court held a hearing on Jackson's motion challenging the validity of the warrant. 2008"It is the duty of the reviewing *627 court to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that the probable cause existed." Id., ¶ 21 (internal citations omitted); see also Stank, 288 Wis.2d 414, ¶ 30 , 708 N.W.2d 43 . ¶ 6 The trial court held a hearing on Jackson's motion challenging the validity of the warrant. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Keithgreen2 sentences2007By letting pass the opportunity for the trial court to fully assess whether Natisha Watkins's assertion of her right against self-incrimination was justified, Jackson waived a contention that the trial court erred, although Jackson's motion for postconviction relief did assert in an undeveloped argument that "[t]he trial court should have made further inquiry concerning why [Natisha Watkins] claimed a right not to testify, and if necessary ordered her to testify." See Wis. Stat. Rule 901.03(1)(b) (offer of proof); State v. Keith, 216 Wis. 2d 61, 77-78 , 573 N.W.2d 888, 896 (Ct. App. 1997) (all 2007By letting pass the opportunity for the trial court to fully assess whether Natisha Watkins's assertion of her right against self-incrimination was justified, Jackson waived a contention that the trial court erred, although Jackson's motion for postconviction relief did assert in an undeveloped argument that "[t]he trial court should have made further inquiry concerning why [Natisha Watkins] claimed a right not to testify, and if necessary ordered her to testify." See Wis. Stat. Rule 901.03(1)(b) (offer of proof); State v. Keith, 216 Wis. 2d 61, 77-78 , 573 N.W.2d 888, 896 (Ct. App. 1997) (all | 1 | 1 |
| Kimmelman v. Morrisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miranda v. Arizonagreen | 1 | 1 |
| UFE Inc. v. Labor & Industry Review Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Andres Romero-Georgana
green
2 sentences2026The circuit court properly rejected Jackson’s claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel because the claims are based on nothing more than conclusory allegations.4 See id. ¶15 Jackson’s claim that he was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence related to the victim’s identification of him as the shooter is procedurally barred. 2024The court observed that due to “the numerous allegations raised, [Jackson] spends more space describing what his many issues are than he devotes to arguing the substance of the issues, to the detriment of his request for relief.” The court found that Jackson had failed to apply the clearly stronger standard pursuant to State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, ¶46 , 360 Wis. 2d 522 , 849 N.W.2d 668 , several of Jackson’s claims were “inappropriate attempts to repackage claims already litigated on appeal,” and Jackson failed to establish prejudice with respect to his complaints about counsel. | 2 | 2024–2026 |
State v. Knight
green
2 sentences2026Id. 3 Jackson’s motion also contained several references to the ineffectiveness of “appellate counsel.” The circuit court noted that any such claim was not properly before it pursuant to State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 512-13 , 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992). 5 Nos. 2025AP4 2025AP5 DISCUSSION ¶12 Jackson seeks postconviction relief on two grounds. 2026Id. 3 Jackson’s motion also contained several references to the ineffectiveness of “appellate counsel.” The circuit court noted that any such claim was not properly before it pursuant to State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 512-13 , 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992). 5 Nos. 2025AP4 2025AP5 DISCUSSION ¶12 Jackson seeks postconviction relief on two grounds. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Conner
green
2 sentences2024This appeal follows.1 1 “Ordinarily, a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses.” State v. Conner, 2012 WI App 105, ¶15 , 344 Wis. 2d 233 , 821 N.W.2d 267 (citation omitted). 2024This appeal follows.1 1 “Ordinarily, a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses.” State v. Conner, 2012 WI App 105, ¶15 , 344 Wis. 2d 233 , 821 N.W.2d 267 (citation omitted). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Lomax
green
2 sentences2021Alternatively, Jackson argued the circuit court had erred in denying his request to replace trial counsel prior to the trial date and that 9 No. 2019AP2383-CR he was entitled to a hearing pursuant to State v. Lomax, 146 Wis. 2d 356 , 432 N.W.2d 89 (1988). ¶17 The postconviction court held a hearing on Jackson’s motion on September 13, 2019. 2021Alternatively, Jackson argued the circuit court had erred in denying his request to replace trial counsel prior to the trial date and that 9 No. 2019AP2383-CR he was entitled to a hearing pursuant to State v. Lomax, 146 Wis. 2d 356 , 432 N.W.2d 89 (1988). ¶17 The postconviction court held a hearing on Jackson’s motion on September 13, 2019. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Bangert
green
2 sentences2021First, he claimed he received ineffective assistance because trial counsel: (1) “only met with Mr. Jackson three times outside of court”; (2) failed to timely request discovery; (3) waited until the day before trial to ask for plea agreements his codefendants had with the State; (4) “never reviewed the discovery with” him; (5) failed to “develop a defense strategy that would allow [him] to make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision” about proceeding to trial or accepting a plea offer; (6) let Jackson “plead guilty as a principal” despite evidence that others “were directly involved in 2021“An understanding of the nature of the charge must include an awareness of the essential elements of the crime.” Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 267 . ¶79 The defects in Jackson’s plea hearing are palpable. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Ninham
green
2 sentences2018Instead, the State contended that the governing cases are State v. Ninham , 2011 WI 33 , 333 Wis. 2d 335 , 797 N.W.2d 451 , and State v. Barbeau , 2016 WI App 51 , 370 Wis. 2d 736 , 883 N.W.2d 520 , both of which concluded that sentences of life imprisonment for juveniles are constitutionally permissible. ¶22 The trial court agreed with the State and denied Jackson's motion in its entirety. 2018Instead, the State contended that the governing cases are State v. Ninham , 2011 WI 33 , 333 Wis. 2d 335 , 797 N.W.2d 451 , and State v. Barbeau , 2016 WI App 51 , 370 Wis. 2d 736 , 883 N.W.2d 520 , both of which concluded that sentences of life imprisonment for juveniles are constitutionally permissible. ¶22 The trial court agreed with the State and denied Jackson's motion in its entirety. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Barbeau
green
2 sentences2018Instead, the State contended that the governing cases are State v. Ninham , 2011 WI 33 , 333 Wis. 2d 335 , 797 N.W.2d 451 , and State v. Barbeau , 2016 WI App 51 , 370 Wis. 2d 736 , 883 N.W.2d 520 , both of which concluded that sentences of life imprisonment for juveniles are constitutionally permissible. ¶22 The trial court agreed with the State and denied Jackson's motion in its entirety. 2018Instead, the State contended that the governing cases are State v. Ninham , 2011 WI 33 , 333 Wis. 2d 335 , 797 N.W.2d 451 , and State v. Barbeau , 2016 WI App 51 , 370 Wis. 2d 736 , 883 N.W.2d 520 , both of which concluded that sentences of life imprisonment for juveniles are constitutionally permissible. ¶22 The trial court agreed with the State and denied Jackson's motion in its entirety. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Patterson v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2011The court then noted that the "only question raised by this case, and the only one addressed by the Jackson rule, is whether courts must presume that such a waiver is invalid under certain circumstances." Id. 2011The court then noted that the "only question raised by this case, and the only one addressed by the Jackson rule, is whether courts must presume that such a waiver is invalid under certain circumstances." Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
McNeil v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2011The Court proceeded to vitiate the Jackson rule and explained that it had "never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than 'custodial interrogation.'" Id. at 2091 (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n.3). 2011The Court proceeded to vitiate the Jackson rule and explained that it had "never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than 'custodial interrogation.'" Id. at 2091 (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n.3). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Wade
green
1 sentence2011First, the Court noted that "once the adversary judicial process has been initiated, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all 'critical' stages of the criminal proceedings." Id. at 2085 (citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 227-28 ). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Forbush
green
2 sentences2011State v. Forbush, 2010 WI App 11, ¶ 13 , 323 Wis. 2d 258 , 779 N.W.2d 476 . 2011State v. Forbush, 2010 WI App 11, ¶ 13 , 323 Wis. 2d 258 , 779 N.W.2d 476 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
In Re Estate of Balkus v. Security First National Bank of Sheboygan Trust Department
green
2 sentences2007By letting pass the opportunity for the trial court to fully assess whether Natisha Watkins's assertion of her right against self-incrimination was justified, Jackson waived a contention that the trial court erred, although Jackson's motion for postconviction relief did assert in an undeveloped argument that "[t]he trial court should have made further inquiry concerning why [Natisha Watkins] claimed a right not to testify, and if necessary ordered her to testify." See Wis. Stat. Rule 901.03(1)(b) (offer of proof); State v. Keith, 216 Wis. 2d 61, 77-78 , 573 N.W.2d 888, 896 (Ct. App. 1997) (all 2007By letting pass the opportunity for the trial court to fully assess whether Natisha Watkins's assertion of her right against self-incrimination was justified, Jackson waived a contention that the trial court erred, although Jackson's motion for postconviction relief did assert in an undeveloped argument that "[t]he trial court should have made further inquiry concerning why [Natisha Watkins] claimed a right not to testify, and if necessary ordered her to testify." See Wis. Stat. Rule 901.03(1)(b) (offer of proof); State v. Keith, 216 Wis. 2d 61, 77-78 , 573 N.W.2d 888, 896 (Ct. App. 1997) (all | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| County of Riverside v. McLaughlin green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Washington green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.