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11 Tennessee opinions name it 4 courts 1996–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pleasant View Utility District v. Vradenburggreen2 sentences2003As we have held, a taking occurs when a governmental defendant with the power of eminent domain performs “any action . . . which destroys, interrupts, or interferes with the common and necessary use of real property of another . . . .” Vradenburg, 545 S.W.2d at 735 (emphasis added). 2003As we have held, a taking occurs when a governmental defendant with the power of eminent domain performs “any action . . . which destroys, interrupts, or interferes with the common and necessary use of real property of another . . . .” Vradenburg, 545 S.W.2d at 735 (emphasis added). | 2 | 2 |
Michelle RYE Et Al. v. WOMEN’S CARE CENTER OF MEMPHIS, MPLLC Et Al.green1 sentence2020Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 (2019); see also Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
Montejo v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2011However, in Montejo , the United States Supreme Court revisited the Jackson rule, that is, “whether courts must presume that such a waiver [of an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel] is invalid under certain circumstances.” Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2085 (emphasis in original). 2011However, in Montejo , the United States Supreme Court revisited the Jackson rule, that is, “whether courts must presume that such a waiver [of an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel] is invalid under certain circumstances.” Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2085 (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Bervoets v. Harde Ralls Pontiac-Olds, Inc.green2 sentences1996The Court rejected Adanac’s interpretation of the opinion in McIntyre , stating: [0]ur statements in McIntyre with regard to the effect of our adoption of a scheme of comparative fault on the remedy of contribution make it clear that we did not intend to deprive litigants of the right to pursue a claim for contribution in an appropriate case: Id. at 907. 1996The Court rejected Adanac's interpretation of the opinion in McIntyre , stating: [O]ur statements in McIntyre with regard to the effect of our adoption of a scheme of comparative fault on the remedy of contribution make it clear that we did not intend to deprive litigants of the right to pursue a claim for contribution in an appropriate case: Id. at 907. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Minnick v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences2016In Montejo v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), which prevented law enforcement from initiating an interrogation of a defendant after the defendant had requested counsel at an arraignment or similar hearing and concluded that the purpose of the Jackson rule was met by the protections given by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990): These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. 2016In Montejo v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), which prevented law enforcement from initiating an interrogation of a defendant after the defendant had requested counsel at an arraignment or similar hearing and concluded that the purpose of the Jackson rule was met by the protections given by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990): These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. | 3 | 2009–2016 |
Edwards v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2016In Montejo v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), which prevented law enforcement from initiating an interrogation of a defendant after the defendant had requested counsel at an arraignment or similar hearing and concluded that the purpose of the Jackson rule was met by the protections given by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990): These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. 2016In Montejo v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), which prevented law enforcement from initiating an interrogation of a defendant after the defendant had requested counsel at an arraignment or similar hearing and concluded that the purpose of the Jackson rule was met by the protections given by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990): These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. | 3 | 2009–2016 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2016In Montejo v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), which prevented law enforcement from initiating an interrogation of a defendant after the defendant had requested counsel at an arraignment or similar hearing and concluded that the purpose of the Jackson rule was met by the protections given by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990): These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. 2016In Montejo v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), which prevented law enforcement from initiating an interrogation of a defendant after the defendant had requested counsel at an arraignment or similar hearing and concluded that the purpose of the Jackson rule was met by the protections given by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990): These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. | 2 | 2009–2016 |
Michigan v. Jackson
red
2 sentences2016In Montejo v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), which prevented law enforcement from initiating an interrogation of a defendant after the defendant had requested counsel at an arraignment or similar hearing and concluded that the purpose of the Jackson rule was met by the protections given by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990): These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. 2016In Montejo v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), which prevented law enforcement from initiating an interrogation of a defendant after the defendant had requested counsel at an arraignment or similar hearing and concluded that the purpose of the Jackson rule was met by the protections given by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990): These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. | 2 | 2009–2016 |
State v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2015App. 1996), Id., Sentencing 2 In his brief, the Defendant urges this Court to reconsider the Jackson standard, contending that a closer look at that case requires us to affirm a conviction only if the evidence would convince “the average mind” of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 2015App. 1996), Id., Sentencing 2 In his brief, the Defendant urges this Court to reconsider the Jackson standard, contending that a closer look at that case requires us to affirm a conviction only if the evidence would convince “the average mind” of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Watson's Carpet & Floor Coverings, Inc. v. McCormick
green
1 sentence2010Even if Ms. Jackson was unaware of the full extent of her legal rights in 2004 when the injury occurred, she could have determined her rights within a year had she proceeded with reasonable diligence.3 The only authority Ms. Jackson cites in support of her argument is Watson’s Carpet & Floor Coverings, Inc. v. McCormick, 247 S.W.3d 169 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), which does not mention or discuss the discovery rule or a statute of limitations period. 3 Ms. Jackson was represented by counsel at the time. -5- We therefore conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the basis th | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2003Section 39-13-204(i)(6) provides that the death penalty may be imposed if “[t]he murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another....” Under the Jackson standard, an appellate court must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the [aggravating circumstance] beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 (emphasis in original); see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i) (S 2003Section 39-13-204(i)(6) provides that the death penalty may be imposed if “[t]he murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another....” Under the Jackson standard, an appellate court must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the [aggravating circumstance] beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 (emphasis in original); see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i) (S | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.