Jackson standard in Georgia

2025Sufficiency of the evidence Stitts argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his malice murder conviction. 5 Stitts cites Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307 (1979), and argues that the Jackson standard was not met because there were no eyewitnesses to the killing and the State’s case rested on uncorroborated testimony of Morgan, who Stitts claims was an accomplice.

2025Sufficiency of the evidence Stitts argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his malice murder conviction. 5 Stitts cites Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307 (1979), and argues that the Jackson standard was not met because there were no eyewitnesses to the killing and the State’s case rested on uncorroborated testimony of Morgan, who Stitts claims was an accomplice.

2023See Bullard v. State, 307 Ga. 482, 483 ( 837 SE2d 348 ) (2019) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support Bullard’s convictions for murder and other crimes where two witnesses told police that they saw Bullard shoot at the victim, although they recanted at trial); Jackson v. State, 315 Ga. 543 , 551 10 ( 883 SE2d 815 ) (2023) (holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reject Jackson’s claim of self-defense when the victim was “not within close range” of Jackson and was “walking back toward his car”). (b) Priester further argues that the trial court erred by denying his

2023See Bullard v. State, 307 Ga. 482, 483 (837 SE2d 348) (2019) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to 10 support Bullard’s convictions for murder and other crimes where two witnesses told police that they saw Bullard shoot at the victim, although they recanted at trial); Jackson v. State, 315 Ga. 543, 551 (883 SE2d 815) (2023) (holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reject Jackson’s claim of self-defense when the victim was “not within close range” of Jackson and was “walking back toward his car”). (b) Priester further argues that the trial court erred by denying his moti

2020Further, the trial court’s use of the word “[h]owever” following the outline of its role as the thirteenth juror and its immediate reference to the sufficiency standard “denote[ ] that the trial court failed to apply its discretion, as the determination if there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict is a matter of law, not discretion.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Manuel v. State, 289 Ga. 383, 386 (2) ( 711 SE2d 676 ) (2011); Walker, 292 Ga. at 264 (2). “[W]hen the record reflects that the trial court reviewed the 9 motion for new trial only for legal sufficiency of the evidenc

2020Further, the trial court’s use of the word “[h]owever” following the outline of its role as the thirteenth juror and its immediate reference to the sufficiency standard “denote[ ] that the trial court failed to apply its discretion, as the determination if there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict is a matter of law, not discretion.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Manuel v. State, 289 Ga. 383, 386 (2) ( 711 SE2d 676 ) (2011); Walker, 292 Ga. at 264 (2). “[W]hen the record reflects that the trial court reviewed the 9 motion for new trial only for legal sufficiency of the evidenc

2020Further, the trial court’s use of the word “[h]owever” following the outline of its role as the thirteenth juror and its immediate reference to the sufficiency standard “denote[ ] that the trial court failed to apply its discretion, as the determination if there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict is a matter of law, not discretion.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Manuel v. State, 289 Ga. 383, 386 (2) ( 711 SE2d 676 ) (2011); Walker, 292 Ga. at 264 (2). “[W]hen the record reflects that the trial court reviewed the 9 motion for new trial only for legal sufficiency of the evidenc

2020Further, the trial court’s use of the word “[h]owever” following the outline of its role as the thirteenth juror and its immediate reference to the sufficiency standard “denote[ ] that the trial court failed to apply its discretion, as the determination if there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict is a matter of law, not discretion.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Manuel v. State, 289 Ga. 383, 386 (2) ( 711 SE2d 676 ) (2011); Walker, 292 Ga. at 264 (2). “[W]hen the record reflects that the trial court reviewed the 9 motion for new trial only for legal sufficiency of the evidenc

2019See also Walker v. State , 301 Ga. 482 , 489, 801 S.E.2d 804 (2017) ; Kennebrew v. State , 299 Ga. 864 , 873-874, 792 S.E.2d 695 (2016).

2019See also Walker v. State , 301 Ga. 482 , 489, 801 S.E.2d 804 (2017) ; Kennebrew v. State , 299 Ga. 864 , 873-874, 792 S.E.2d 695 (2016).

2019See Woodard v. State , 296 Ga. 803 , 810 n.5, 771 S.E.2d 362 (2015) (explaining that if the Jackson standard applied to the analysis of harmless error or ineffective assistance prejudice, "then there would be harmful error or Strickland prejudice only in cases where the evidence was insufficient and the convictions [were] already reversible on due process grounds").

2019See Woodard v. State , 296 Ga. 803 , 810 n.5, 771 S.E.2d 362 (2015) (explaining that if the Jackson standard applied to the analysis of harmless error or ineffective assistance prejudice, "then there would be harmful error or Strickland prejudice only in cases where the evidence was insufficient and the convictions [were] already reversible on due process grounds").

2013“Since we are a court of law for the correction of legal errors committed by the trial court, [Jackson’s] factual assertion[s] present[] nothing for review.” Johnson v. Aurora Loan Svcs., 256 Ga. App. 174, 175 ( 568 SE2d 84 ) (2002).

2013“Since we are a court of law for the correction of legal errors committed by the trial court, [Jackson’s] factual assertion[s] present[] nothing for review.” Johnson v. Aurora Loan Svcs., 256 Ga. App. 174, 175 ( 568 SE2d 84 ) (2002).

2012At the hearing on Jackson’s motion for new trial, his trial counsel testified that he advised Jackson not to testify because he believed that “putting him on the witness stand could be the worst thing that [he could] do,” given that the State would likely impeach Jackson with his five prior felony convictions, including a prior conviction for aggravated assault, which would have caused Jackson to “crash and burn.” Thus, trial counsel made a tactical decision to advise Jackson not to testify, “[a]nd trial tactics and strategy, no matter how mistaken in hindsight, are almost never adequate groun

2012At the hearing on Jackson’s motion for new trial, his trial counsel testified that he advised Jackson not to testify because he believed that “putting him on the witness stand could be the worst thing that [he could] do,” 20 given that the State would likely impeach Jackson with his five prior felony convictions, including a prior conviction for aggravated assault, which would have caused Jackson to “crash and burn.” Thus, trial counsel made a tactical decision to advise Jackson not to testify, “[a]nd trial tactics and strategy, no matter how mistaken in hindsight, are almost never adequate gr

2012See Warner v. State, 287 Ga. App. 892, 895 (3) (a) ( 652 SE2d 898 ) (2007) (“Counsel’s advice against putting [the defendant] on the stand was tactical and does not reach the level of deficient performance.”).

2012See Warner v. State, 287 Ga. App. 892, 895 (3) (a) ( 652 SE2d 898 ) (2007) (“Counsel’s advice against putting [the defendant] on the stand was tactical and does not reach the level of deficient performance.”).

2012Kelley v. State, 308 Ga. App. 418, 421 (1) ( 707 SE2d 619 ) (2011).

2012Kelley v. State, 308 Ga. App. 418, 421 (1) ( 707 SE2d 619 ) (2011).

2019See also Walker v. State , 301 Ga. 482 , 489, 801 S.E.2d 804 (2017) ; Kennebrew v. State , 299 Ga. 864 , 873-874, 792 S.E.2d 695 (2016).

2019See also Walker v. State , 301 Ga. 482 , 489, 801 S.E.2d 804 (2017) ; Kennebrew v. State , 299 Ga. 864 , 873-874, 792 S.E.2d 695 (2016).

2019Trial counsel's decision amounted to trial strategy, see Holmes v. State , 273 Ga. 644 , 648, 543 S.E.2d 688 (2001), and we cannot say that "no reasonable attorney, listening to the inflection of the speaker's *110 voice and judging the jurors' reactions, would choose to remain silent instead of objecting and calling attention to the improper argument." Braithwaite v. State , 275 Ga. 884 , 886, 572 S.E.2d 612 (2002).

2019Trial counsel's decision amounted to trial strategy, see Holmes v. State , 273 Ga. 644 , 648, 543 S.E.2d 688 (2001), and we cannot say that "no reasonable attorney, listening to the inflection of the speaker's *110 voice and judging the jurors' reactions, would choose to remain silent instead of objecting and calling attention to the improper argument." Braithwaite v. State , 275 Ga. 884 , 886, 572 S.E.2d 612 (2002).

2019Trial counsel's decision amounted to trial strategy, see Holmes v. State , 273 Ga. 644 , 648, 543 S.E.2d 688 (2001), and we cannot say that "no reasonable attorney, listening to the inflection of the speaker's *110 voice and judging the jurors' reactions, would choose to remain silent instead of objecting and calling attention to the improper argument." Braithwaite v. State , 275 Ga. 884 , 886, 572 S.E.2d 612 (2002).

2019Trial counsel's decision amounted to trial strategy, see Holmes v. State , 273 Ga. 644 , 648, 543 S.E.2d 688 (2001), and we cannot say that "no reasonable attorney, listening to the inflection of the speaker's *110 voice and judging the jurors' reactions, would choose to remain silent instead of objecting and calling attention to the improper argument." Braithwaite v. State , 275 Ga. 884 , 886, 572 S.E.2d 612 (2002).

2019See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; Cotton v. State , 297 Ga. 257 , 258 (1), 773 S.E.2d 242 (2015) (despite defendant's claim of self-defense, jury is "free to accept the evidence that [a] stabbing was not done in self-defense and to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense") (citation and punctuation omitted). 2.

2019See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; Cotton v. State , 297 Ga. 257 , 258 (1), 773 S.E.2d 242 (2015) (despite defendant's claim of self-defense, jury is "free to accept the evidence that [a] stabbing was not done in self-defense and to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense") (citation and punctuation omitted). 2.

2018The Jackson standard also applies to a challenge arising from the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, see Humphrey v. State , 252 Ga. 525 , 527, 314 S.E.2d 436 (1984), and we therefore also conclude that the trial court did not err in denying that motion. 3.

2018The Jackson standard also applies to a challenge arising from the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, see Humphrey v. State , 252 Ga. 525 , 527, 314 S.E.2d 436 (1984), and we therefore also conclude that the trial court did not err in denying that motion. 3.

1996Starks, supra, 262 Ga. 244 . 4 Michigan v. Harvey, supra, held that the prosecution may use a statement obtained in violation of the Jackson rule to impeach a defendant’s false or inconsistent testimony. 5 As the court recognized in Chapman v. California, infra, 386 U. S. at 23 , “there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.” We do not find the error herein so inherently offensive to due process so as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. 6 See Starks, supra, 262 Ga. at 244 .

1996Starks, supra, 262 Ga. 244 . 4 Michigan v. Harvey, supra, held that the prosecution may use a statement obtained in violation of the Jackson rule to impeach a defendant’s false or inconsistent testimony. 5 As the court recognized in Chapman v. California, infra, 386 U. S. at 23 , “there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.” We do not find the error herein so inherently offensive to due process so as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. 6 See Starks, supra, 262 Ga. at 244 .

2026Though, on appeal, Appellant attacks the witnesses’ credibility and contends that there were conflicts in the evidence, questions of credibility and the resolution of such conflicts are left to the jury under the Jackson standard and the resolution of such issues “adversely to the defendant does not render the evidence insufficient.” Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 400, 406 (2022) (quotation marks omitted)). 3.

2025See Atkins, 304 Ga. at 246-249 (3) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting the defendant from questioning the victim about the identity of the father of the 15 victim’s child because it was apparent that defendant merely sought to question the victim about all of her prior sexual partners).9 We reject Jackson’s claim that the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Villafranco v. State, 252 Ga. 188 ( 313 SE2d 469 ) (1984), requires a different result in this case.

2025See, e.g., Morrell v. State, 318 Ga. 244 , 246 n.3 (2024). 7 required accomplice corroboration, the evidence was sufficient here.

2025See, e.g., Morrell v. State, 318 Ga. 244 , 246 n.3 (2024). 7 required accomplice corroboration, the evidence was sufficient here.

2025See Atkins, 304 Ga. at 246-249 (3) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting the defendant from questioning the victim about the identity of the father of the 15 victim’s child because it was apparent that defendant merely sought to question the victim about all of her prior sexual partners).9 We reject Jackson’s claim that the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Villafranco v. State, 252 Ga. 188 ( 313 SE2d 469 ) (1984), requires a different result in this case.

2025See Atkins, 304 Ga. at 246-249 (3) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting the defendant from questioning the victim about the identity of the father of the 15 victim’s child because it was apparent that defendant merely sought to question the victim about all of her prior sexual partners).9 We reject Jackson’s claim that the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Villafranco v. State, 252 Ga. 188 ( 313 SE2d 469 ) (1984), requires a different result in this case.

2024(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Holmes, 306 Ga. at 528 (2) (affirming judgment in part, vacating judgment in part, and remanding case with direction based on this Court’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions but the trial court failed to exercise its discretion under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21); see also White, 293 Ga. at 525-526 (2) (vacating the denial of a motion for new trial and remanding for the trial court to apply the proper standard to the general 11 grounds and to exercise its discretion to sit as a “thirteenth juror” pursuant to OCGA

2024See Smith v. State, 308 Ga. 81, 89 (3) n.6 (839 SE2d 630) (2020).

2024See Smith v. State, 308 Ga. 81, 89 (3) n.6 (839 SE2d 630) (2020).

2024(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Holmes, 306 Ga. at 528 (2) (affirming judgment in part, vacating judgment in part, and remanding case with direction based on this Court’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions but the trial court failed to exercise its discretion under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21); see also White, 293 Ga. at 525-526 (2) (vacating the denial of a motion for new trial and remanding for the trial court to apply the proper standard to the general 11 grounds and to exercise its discretion to sit as a “thirteenth juror” pursuant to OCGA

2024First, it recog- nizes that although Mussachio referenced the familiar Jackson test 47 relying on the elements of the crime, it also went further and ex- plained what minimum due process requires in this context—“that a defendant receives . . . a meaningful opportunity to defend against the charge against him.” Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 243 (II).

2024First, it recog- nizes that although Mussachio referenced the familiar Jackson test 47 relying on the elements of the crime, it also went further and ex- plained what minimum due process requires in this context—“that a defendant receives . . . a meaningful opportunity to defend against the charge against him.” Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 243 (II).

2024See id. (“[M]any of us question whether it is proper for this Court to import Jackson into an appellate review of the general grounds (or to otherwise rely on Jackson as part of that analysis).”); see also Madera v. State, 318 Ga. 593 , 595 n.2 ( 899 SE2d 132 ) (2024) (noting our unease with the practice of importing a Jackson analysis into an appellate review of the general grounds); Priester v. State, 317 Ga. 477 , 484 n.13 ( 893 SE2d 751 ) (2023) (same); Johnson v. State, 316 Ga. 672 , 682 n.4 ( 889 SE2d 914 ) (2023) (same).

2024See id. (“[M]any of us question whether it is proper for this Court to import Jackson into an appellate review of the general grounds (or to otherwise rely on Jackson as part of that analysis).”); see also Madera v. State, 318 Ga. 593 , 595 n.2 ( 899 SE2d 132 ) (2024) (noting our unease with the practice of importing a Jackson analysis into an appellate review of the general grounds); Priester v. State, 317 Ga. 477 , 484 n.13 ( 893 SE2d 751 ) (2023) (same); Johnson v. State, 316 Ga. 672 , 682 n.4 ( 889 SE2d 914 ) (2023) (same).