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14 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lesly Cohen v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1987See also United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir.1969) (allegations must be “sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and noncon-jectural, to enable the court to conclude that a substantial claim [was] ... presented") (citing Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 761 (9th Cir.1967), a Fourth Amendment case), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 968 , 90 S.Ct. 449 , 24 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969). .The majority recognizes that the Jackson rule alters, at least to some extent, the usual burden of proof in identification cases. 1987See also United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir.1969) (allegations must be “sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and noncon-jectural, to enable the court to conclude that a substantial claim [was] ... presented") (citing Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 761 (9th Cir.1967), a Fourth Amendment case), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 968 , 90 S.Ct. 449 , 24 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969). .The majority recognizes that the Jackson rule alters, at least to some extent, the usual burden of proof in identification cases. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. A. D. Allisongreen2 sentences1987See also United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir.1969) (allegations must be “sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and noncon-jectural, to enable the court to conclude that a substantial claim [was] ... presented") (citing Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 761 (9th Cir.1967), a Fourth Amendment case), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 968 , 90 S.Ct. 449 , 24 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969). .The majority recognizes that the Jackson rule alters, at least to some extent, the usual burden of proof in identification cases. 1987See also United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir.1969) (allegations must be “sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and noncon-jectural, to enable the court to conclude that a substantial claim [was] ... presented") (citing Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 761 (9th Cir.1967), a Fourth Amendment case), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 968 , 90 S.Ct. 449 , 24 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969). .The majority recognizes that the Jackson rule alters, at least to some extent, the usual burden of proof in identification cases. | 2 | 2 |
Pepitone v. Californiagreen2 sentences1987See also United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir.1969) (allegations must be “sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and noncon-jectural, to enable the court to conclude that a substantial claim [was] ... presented") (citing Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 761 (9th Cir.1967), a Fourth Amendment case), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 968 , 90 S.Ct. 449 , 24 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969). .The majority recognizes that the Jackson rule alters, at least to some extent, the usual burden of proof in identification cases. 1987See also United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir.1969) (allegations must be “sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and noncon-jectural, to enable the court to conclude that a substantial claim [was] ... presented") (citing Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 761 (9th Cir.1967), a Fourth Amendment case), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 968 , 90 S.Ct. 449 , 24 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969). .The majority recognizes that the Jackson rule alters, at least to some extent, the usual burden of proof in identification cases. | 1 | 2 |
Long v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2026A motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing may be granted if “justice demands withdrawal under the circumstances of the case.” Long v. United States, 169 A.3d 369, 374 (D.C. 2017) (quoting Maske v. United States, 785 A.2d 687, 693 (D.C. 2001)). | 1 | 1 |
Maske v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2026A motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing may be granted if “justice demands withdrawal under the circumstances of the case.” Long v. United States, 169 A.3d 369, 374 (D.C. 2017) (quoting Maske v. United States, 785 A.2d 687, 693 (D.C. 2001)). | 1 | 1 |
LAMONT L. BUSKEY and KEITH A. SIMMS v. UNITED STATESgreen1 sentence2024To the contrary, the trial judge instructed: “Although it is mandatory that you consider these legal rules where I have told you to, it is up to you to decide what facts to find, and to decide whether the government has proved guilt of any charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” When we read the supplemental instruction on aiding and abetting as a whole, as we must, Buskey v. United States, 148 A.3d 1193, 1205 (D.C. 2016); (Gregory L.) Jackson v. United States, 653 A.2d 843, 847 (D.C. 1995)), we conclude that the supplemental instruction was not erroneous.27 IV. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2024To the contrary, the trial judge instructed: “Although it is mandatory that you consider these legal rules where I have told you to, it is up to you to decide what facts to find, and to decide whether the government has proved guilt of any charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” When we read the supplemental instruction on aiding and abetting as a whole, as we must, Buskey v. United States, 148 A.3d 1193, 1205 (D.C. 2016); (Gregory L.) Jackson v. United States, 653 A.2d 843, 847 (D.C. 1995)), we conclude that the supplemental instruction was not erroneous.27 IV. | 1 | 1 |
District of Columbia v. Wical Ltd. Partnershipgreen1 sentence2019P’ship, 630 A.2d 174, 182 (D.C. 1993) (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Swann v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2013Although Mr. Jackson's defense theory was primarily one of "imperfect self-defense,” Swann v. United States, 648 A.2d 928, 930-32 (D.C.1994), he also argued full self-defense. | 1 | 1 |
Simmons v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33 , 542 A.2d 1258, 1259 (1988) (holding, in a state without the diminished capacity defense, that it was error for a trial court to exclude as a matter of law expert testimony from a psychiatrist "that her examination of Simmons revealed that he did in fact have such a subjective belief”); but see Bishop v. United States, 107 F.2d 297 ; 301-03 (D.C.Cir.1939) (rejecting defendant’s argument that intoxication defense could be used to establish the mitigating circumstance of adequate provocation because the "heat of passion” standard assumes an "ordinary man,” meani 2013See Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33 , 542 A.2d 1258, 1259 (1988) (holding, in a state without the diminished capacity defense, that it was error for a trial court to exclude as a matter of law expert testimony from a psychiatrist "that her examination of Simmons revealed that he did in fact have such a subjective belief”); but see Bishop v. United States, 107 F.2d 297 ; 301-03 (D.C.Cir.1939) (rejecting defendant’s argument that intoxication defense could be used to establish the mitigating circumstance of adequate provocation because the "heat of passion” standard assumes an "ordinary man,” meani | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2013Because Mr. Jackson’s defense was at bottom one of diminished capacity, we need not generally decide whether a defendant ever could present expert testimony supporting a claim of mitigation- — or justification, for that matter, see Smith, 686 A.2d at 549 (deciding on other grounds a claim involving a defendant’s argument that he should have been able to present an expert "explaining] to the jury why his perception of a continuing threat was not unreasonable”)— especially on the subjective standard for imperfect self-defense. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2011Jackson, supra, 768 A.2d at 590 (exclusion of testimony was error "because Jackson's defense was that his wrongful arrest stemmed from the officers' neglect ... of their duty to gather available fingerprint evidence"). "[T]he relevance of [fingerprint expert] testimony to that defense [i]s heightened" once the government has presented evidence on the futility of gathering fingerprint evidence. 2011Jackson, supra, 768 A.2d at 590 (exclusion of testimony was error "because Jackson's defense was that his wrongful arrest stemmed from the officers' neglect ... of their duty to gather available fingerprint evidence"). "[T]he relevance of [fingerprint expert] testimony to that defense [i]s heightened" once the government has presented evidence on the futility of gathering fingerprint evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2005See Jackson, 329 A.2d at 788 . [T]rial courts should [not], in all cases, reject an offer of a co-defendant witness to provide exculpatory testimony conditioned on a separate trial prior to that of the movant. 2005See Jackson, 329 A.2d at 788 . [Tjrial courts should [not], in all cases, reject an offer of a co-defendant witness to provide exculpatory testimony conditioned on a separate trial prior to that of the movant. | 1 | 1 |
Carle v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2001Assuming that the proffered testimony had some relevance, the government nevertheless argues that the trial judge enjoys discretion in ruling on a request for expert services at public expense, see Carle v. United States, 705 A.2d 682, 686 (D.C.1998); Berry v. United States, 528 A.2d 1209, 1210 (D.C.1987), and that, as in United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212 (1st Cir.1996), the judge could fairly conclude here that how thoroughly the police *588 conducted the investigation — specifically, not trying to obtain fingerprint corroboration — was only marginally helpful to Jackson’s defense that he | 1 | 1 |
Berry v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2001Assuming that the proffered testimony had some relevance, the government nevertheless argues that the trial judge enjoys discretion in ruling on a request for expert services at public expense, see Carle v. United States, 705 A.2d 682, 686 (D.C.1998); Berry v. United States, 528 A.2d 1209, 1210 (D.C.1987), and that, as in United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212 (1st Cir.1996), the judge could fairly conclude here that how thoroughly the police *588 conducted the investigation — specifically, not trying to obtain fingerprint corroboration — was only marginally helpful to Jackson’s defense that he | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Glenwood M. Fordgreen2 sentences1991See United States v. Ford, 276 U.S.App.D.C. 315, 317 , 870 F.2d 729, 732 (1989) (after threshold showing, trial court must examine "the significance of the testimony in relation to the defendant's theory of the case"). 1991See United States v. Ford, 276 U.S.App.D.C. 315, 317 , 870 F.2d 729, 732 (1989) (after threshold showing, trial court must examine "the significance of the testimony in relation to the defendant's theory of the case"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bishop v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2013See Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33 , 542 A.2d 1258, 1259 (1988) (holding, in a state without the diminished capacity defense, that it was error for a trial court to exclude as a matter of law expert testimony from a psychiatrist "that her examination of Simmons revealed that he did in fact have such a subjective belief”); but see Bishop v. United States, 107 F.2d 297 ; 301-03 (D.C.Cir.1939) (rejecting defendant’s argument that intoxication defense could be used to establish the mitigating circumstance of adequate provocation because the "heat of passion” standard assumes an "ordinary man,” meani | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
King v. United States
green
2 sentences2005Where application of the first and second Jackson factors indicates that a defendant has vigilantly moved for severance in order to secure a co-defendant's genuinely exculpatory testimony, the consequential request to sequence the trials to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege of the witness is likely to be the norm and should not, on its own, automatically lead to denial of the severance motion on the ground that the co-defendant is not reasonably "likely to testify." King, 550 A.2d at 352 . 2005Where application of the first and second Jackson factors indicates that a defendant has vigilantly moved for severance in order to secure a co-defendant’s genuinely exculpatory testimony, the consequential request to sequence the trials to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege of the witness is likely to be the norm and should not, on its own, automatically lead to denial of the severance motion on the ground that the co-defendant is not reasonably “likely to testify.” King, 550 A.2d at 352 . | 2 | 1991–2005 |
Kansas v. Crane
green
1 sentence2020Cf. Crane, 534 U.S. at 411–12 (agreeing that Hendricks set forth no requirement of total or complete lack of control; it is enough if the commitment statute requires a “‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it ‘difficult, if not impossible, for the dangerous person to (continued…) 45 finding and the parties’ advocacy, to determine whether the court should proceed to the long-delayed Jackson hearing. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Griffin v. Wisconsin
green
1 sentence2019Even if CSOSA’s decision was influenced by that information and request, Griffin deemed it “reasonable to permit information provided by a police officer . . . to support a probationer search,” 50 and it is well-settled that probation officers are permitted to collaborate with the police “as long as the probation officers are pursuing legitimate probation-related objectives” in doing 50 483 U.S. at 879-80 . 34 so.51 Here, while the police request was evidently what led CSOSA to consider placing Mr. Jackson on GPS monitoring, the record shows that CSOSA did so only after determining that he met | 1 | 2019–2019 |
McDonald v. City of Chicago
green
2 sentences2013After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 3020 , 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010), it is clear that the right to keep and bear arms extends to a person who possesses and carries a handgun in his or her home for self-defense. 2013After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 3020 , 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010), it is clear that the right to keep and bear arms extends to a person who possesses and carries a handgun in his or her home for self-defense. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Michigan v. Long
green
2 sentences2012Thus, as Mr. Jackson was not under arrest when he was in the back of the cruiser, and as there was “a very distinct possibility that [he] would return to the car after the investigatory stop and regain access to the weapon,” police had the right under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 , 103 S.Ct. 3469 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), to conduct what amounted to a “pat down of the passenger compartment or those places where a suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.” The court also found that removing the horn was not outside the scope of such a search for weapons as “it’s about as reachable proxi 2012Thus, as Mr. Jackson was not under arrest when he was in the back of the cruiser, and as there was “a very distinct possibility that [he] would return to the car after the investigatory stop and regain access to the weapon,” police had the right under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 , 103 S.Ct. 3469 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), to conduct what amounted to a “pat down of the passenger compartment or those places where a suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.” The court also found that removing the horn was not outside the scope of such a search for weapons as “it’s about as reachable proxi | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Martin v. United States
green
2 sentences2005Martin, 606 A.2d at 127 . 2005Martin, 606 A.2d at 127 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Lumpkin v. United States
green
2 sentences2005Although this court has not specifically addressed the issue, our case law signals a general assent to the notion that a trial court may take into account the conditional nature of the offer to testify against granting a motion for severance. 14 In Lumpkin , the court determined that a trial judge is not obligated to assume a movant’s burden to establish the “nature and effect” of a co-defendant’s purported exculpatory testimony by conducting a Jackson inquiry sua sponte. 586 A.2d at 707-708 . 2005Although this court has not specifically addressed the issue, our case law signals a general assent to the notion that a trial court may take into account the conditional nature of the offer to testify against granting a motion for severance. 14 In Lumpkin , the court determined that a trial judge is not obligated to assume a movant’s burden to establish the “nature and effect” of a co-defendant’s purported exculpatory testimony by conducting a Jackson inquiry sua sponte. 586 A.2d at 707-708 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Manning
green
2 sentences2001Assuming that the proffered testimony had some relevance, the government nevertheless argues that the trial judge enjoys discretion in ruling on a request for expert services at public expense, see Carle v. United States, 705 A.2d 682, 686 (D.C.1998); Berry v. United States, 528 A.2d 1209, 1210 (D.C.1987), and that, as in United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212 (1st Cir.1996), the judge could fairly conclude here that how thoroughly the police *588 conducted the investigation — specifically, not trying to obtain fingerprint corroboration — was only marginally helpful to Jackson’s defense that he 2001Assuming that the proffered testimony had some relevance, the government nevertheless argues that the trial judge enjoys discretion in ruling on a request for expert services at public expense, see Carle v. United States, 705 A.2d 682, 686 (D.C.1998); Berry v. United States, 528 A.2d 1209, 1210 (D.C.1987), and that, as in United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212 (1st Cir.1996), the judge could fairly conclude here that how thoroughly the police *588 conducted the investigation — specifically, not trying to obtain fingerprint corroboration — was only marginally helpful to Jackson’s defense that he | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States v. David Durant
green
1 sentence2001Admissibility of Lockhart’s testimony should not have turned on whether the government itself introduced fingerprint evidence, see Durant, supra, because Jackson’s defense was that his wrongful arrest stemmed from the officers’ neglect, at least, of their duty to gather available fingerprint evidence. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Ake v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2001Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. at 83 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 . 2001Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. at 83 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Glenwood Cemetery v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission
green
1 sentence1988The Superior Court Agency Review rule, iike our own rule in Glen-wood, “makes it clear that it is notice to the parties that triggers the time period for filing a petition for review_” Id. at 242 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.