Jackson standard in Louisiana

2012Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559, 563 (La.1983) (“It is the role of the fact-finder to weigh the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will not second-guess the credibility determinations of the trier of fact beyond our sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review.”) (citation omitted).

2012Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559, 563 (La.1983) (“It is the role of the fact-finder to weigh the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will not second-guess the credibility determinations of the trier of fact beyond our sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review.”) (citation omitted).

2013He concedes that the case hinges on credibility— his version of the shootings versus Sheron-da’s — but contends that her testimony was “so inconsistent and incredible as to warrant review and acquittal” under the Jackson standard, as the courts stated in dictum in State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983), and State v. Lewis, 577 So.2d 799 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 582 So.2d 1304 (1991).

2013He concedes that the case hinges on credibility— his version of the shootings versus Sheron-da’s — but contends that her testimony was “so inconsistent and incredible as to warrant review and acquittal” under the Jackson standard, as the courts stated in dictum in State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983), and State v. Lewis, 577 So.2d 799 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 582 So.2d 1304 (1991).

1990See my concurring and dissenting opinions in State v. Gatson, 434 So.2d 1315 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983); State v. Anderson, 440 So.2d 205 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983), writ denied, 444 So.2d 1241 (La.1984); and State v. Bryan, 454 So.2d 1297 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984), writ denied, 458 So.2d 128 (La.1984). .

1990See my concurring and dissenting opinions in State v. Gatson, 434 So.2d 1315 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983); State v. Anderson, 440 So.2d 205 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983), writ denied, 444 So.2d 1241 (La.1984); and State v. Bryan, 454 So.2d 1297 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984), writ denied, 458 So.2d 128 (La.1984). .

2022Under the Jackson standard, the appellate court “must determine that the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a mixture of both, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Pigford, 05-0477, pp. 5-6 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517, 520-21 .

2022Under the Jackson standard, the appellate court “must determine that the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a mixture of both, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Pigford, 05-0477, pp. 5-6 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517, 520-21 .

2024“In all cases, the Jackson standard does not provide a reviewing court with a vehicle for substituting its own appreciation of what the evidence has or has not proved for that of the fact finder.” Id.

2024“In all cases, the Jackson standard does not provide a reviewing court with a vehicle for substituting its own appreciation of what the evidence has or has not proved for that of the fact finder.” Id.

2021Nevertheless, the Jackson standard does not permit jurors "` to speculate if the evidence is such that reasonable jurors must have a reasonable doubt."' State v. Mussall, 523 So. 2d 1305, 1311 ( La. 1988) ( quoting 2 C.

2021Nevertheless, the Jackson standard does not permit jurors "` to speculate if the evidence is such that reasonable jurors must have a reasonable doubt."' State v. Mussall, 523 So. 2d 1305, 1311 ( La. 1988) ( quoting 2 C.

2014State v. Benoit, 07-35 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/29/07) , 960 So.2d 279, 284 . “[T]he Jackson standard does not serve as a vehicle for a reviewing court to second-guess the rational credibility determinations of the fact finder at trial.” State v. Juluke, 98-0341 (La.1/8/99), 725 So.2d 1291, 1293 .

2014The court held in pertinent part: Upon review, the supreme court [in State v. Juluke, 98-0341, pp. 4-5 (La.1/8/99), 725 So.2d 1291 ], reversed the Fourth Circuit, noting: The Jackson standard also does not provide a defendant with a means of splitting alternative and inconsistent defenses in different forums, raising one defense before the jury and when that fails, a second defense [presupposing] a different set of facts in an appellate court conducting sufficiency review under Jackson and [La.Code Crim.P.] art. 821(E). [State v. Juluke, 98-341, pp. 4-5 (La.1/8/99), 725 So.2d 1291,1293 ]. [[Im

2017While defendant proposes there might have been smoking paraphernalia elsewhere in the residence but not found, a jury cannot be permitted to base its verdict on speculation; otherwise, they might just as easily speculate that a substantial quantity of cash, drugs, and a scale were present elsewhere but not found, and a jury cannot speculate as to a defendant’s guilt. 1 When applied to a case involving circumstantial evidence, such as this, the Jackson standard requires an appellate court to determine whether viewing the 1 For example, in State v. Lubrano, 563 So.2d 847 (La. 1990), this Court f

2017While defendant proposes there might have been smoking paraphernalia elsewhere in the residence but not found, a jury cannot be permitted to base its verdict on speculation; otherwise, they might just as easily speculate that a substantial quantity of cash, drugs, and a scale were present elsewhere but not found, and a jury cannot speculate as to a defendant’s guilt. 1 When applied to a case involving circumstantial evidence, such as this, the Jackson standard requires an appellate court to determine whether viewing the 1 For example, in State v. Lubrano, 563 So.2d 847 (La. 1990), this Court f

2025State v. Legrand, 02-1462, p. 5 (La. 12/3/03), 864 So.2d 89, 94 . “[A] reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319, 1324 (La. 1992). “[T]he Jackson standard does not provide a reviewing court with a vehicle for substituting its appreciation of what the evidence has or has not proved for that of the fact finder.” State v. Mack, 13-1311, pp. 9-10 (La. 5/7/14), 144 So.3d 983, 989 .

2020State v. Legrand, 02-1462, p. 5 (La. 12/3/03), 864 So.2d 89, 94 . “[A] reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Smith, 600 So.2d at 1324 . 18 “[T]he Jackson standard does not provide a reviewing court with a vehicle for substituting its appreciation of what the evidence has or has not proved for that of the fact finder.” State v. Mack, 13-1311, p. 9-10 (La. 5/7/14), 144 So.3d 983, 989 .

1990LSA-R.S. 15:438; State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464 (La.1983); State v. Nealy, supra. Ultimately all the evidence must meet the Jackson standard by convincing a rational juror that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

1990LSA-R.S. 15:438; State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464 (La.1983); State v. Nealy, supra. Ultimately all the evidence must meet the Jackson standard by convincing a rational juror that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

2002When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of the offense, La.Rev.Stat. 15:438 requires that "assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable *910 hypothesis of innocence." The circumstantial evidence rule is not a separate test from the Jackson standard but "provides an evidentiary guideline for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence and facilitates appellate review of whether a rational juror could have found defendant guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198, 1201 (

2002When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of the offense, La.Rev.Stat. 15:438 requires that "assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable *910 hypothesis of innocence." The circumstantial evidence rule is not a separate test from the Jackson standard but "provides an evidentiary guideline for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence and facilitates appellate review of whether a rational juror could have found defendant guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198, 1201 (

1990See my concurring and dissenting opinions in State v. Gatson, 434 So.2d 1315 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983); State v. Anderson, 440 So.2d 205 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983), writ denied, 444 So.2d 1241 (La.1984); and State v. Bryan, 454 So.2d 1297 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984), writ denied, 458 So.2d 128 (La.1984). .

1990See my concurring and dissenting opinions in State v. Gatson, 434 So.2d 1315 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983); State v. Anderson, 440 So.2d 205 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983), writ denied, 444 So.2d 1241 (La.1984); and State v. Bryan, 454 So.2d 1297 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984), writ denied, 458 So.2d 128 (La.1984). .

2025Under the Jackson standard, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. at 2789 .

2025Under the Jackson standard, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. at 2789 .

2014Additionally, when circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, the evidence, “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove ... must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” R.S. 15:438; see State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817, 820 (La.1987) (all direct and circumstantial evidence must meet the Jackson test); State v. Porretto, 468 So.2d 1142, 1146 (La.1985) (R.S. 15:438 serves as an evidentiary guide for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence).

2014Additionally, when circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, the evidence, “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove ... must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” R.S. 15:438; see State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817, 820 (La.1987) (all direct and circumstantial evidence must meet the Jackson test); State v. Porretto, 468 So.2d 1142, 1146 (La.1985) (R.S. 15:438 serves as an evidentiary guide for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence).

2019State v. Bordenave , 95-2328 (La. 4/26/96), 678 So.2d 19 , 20.

2019State v. Bordenave , 95-2328 (La. 4/26/96), 678 So.2d 19 , 20.

2017See also State v. Macon, 06-481, p. 8 (La. 6/1/07), 957 So.2d 1280, 1285 (“A reviewing court may impinge on the factfinding function of the jury only to the extent necessary to assure the Jackson standard of review.”).

2017See also State v. Macon, 06-481, p. 8 (La. 6/1/07), 957 So.2d 1280, 1285 (“A reviewing court may impinge on the factfinding function of the jury only to the extent necessary to assure the Jackson standard of review.”).

1998The determination of whether the requisite intent is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact, and a review of the correctness of this determination is to be guided by the Jackson standard, supra. State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741 (La.1982); State v. Augustus, 93-406 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/23/94) , 633 So.2d 783 , writ denied, 642 So.2d 1284 (La.1994).

1998The determination of whether the requisite intent is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact, and a review of the correctness of this determination is to be guided by the Jackson standard, supra. State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741 (La.1982); State v. Augustus, 93-406 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/23/94) , 633 So.2d 783 , writ denied, 642 So.2d 1284 (La.1994).

2020“Under the Jackson standard, the rational credibility determinations of the trier of fact are not to be second guessed by a reviewing court.” State v. Williams, 11-0414, p. 18 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/29/12), 85 So.3d 759, 771 .

2020“Under the Jackson standard, the rational credibility determinations of the trier of fact are not to be second guessed by a reviewing court.” State v. Williams, 11-0414, p. 18 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/29/12), 85 So.3d 759, 771 .

1989State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198 (La.1984); State v, Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Morris, supra. LSA-R.S. 15:438, which as to circumstantial evidence requires exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence in order to convict, provides an evidentiary guideline, emphasizes the need for careful observation of the Jackson standard, and provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases Which hinge on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence.

1989State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198 (La.1984); State v, Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Morris, supra. LSA-R.S. 15:438, which as to circumstantial evidence requires exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence in order to convict, provides an evidentiary guideline, emphasizes the need for careful observation of the Jackson standard, and provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases Which hinge on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence.

2014The Jackson standard of review, now legislatively embodied by La.Code Crim.P. art. 821, does not allow the appellate court “to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact-finder.” State v. Pigford, 05-477, p. 6 (La.2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517, 521 (citing State v. Robertson, 96-1048 (La.10/4/96), 680 So.2d 1165 ; State v. Lubrano, 563 So.2d 847 (La.1990)).

2014The Jackson standard of review, now legislatively embodied by La.Code Crim.P. art. 821, does not allow the appellate court “to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact-finder.” State v. Pigford, 05-477, p. 6 (La.2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517, 521 (citing State v. Robertson, 96-1048 (La.10/4/96), 680 So.2d 1165 ; State v. Lubrano, 563 So.2d 847 (La.1990)).

1982(Emphasis in original.) [9] In State v. Austin, 399 So.2d 158 at 160 (La. 1981), we considered the Jackson standard of review when the state's case is founded upon circumstantial evidence and said in that regard: Regarding circumstantial evidence, R.S. 15:438 sets forth the rule that, in order to convict, the evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

1982(Emphasis in original.) [9] In State v. Austin, 399 So.2d 158 at 160 (La. 1981), we considered the Jackson standard of review when the state's case is founded upon circumstantial evidence and said in that regard: Regarding circumstantial evidence, R.S. 15:438 sets forth the rule that, in order to convict, the evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

1991This court has explained in State v. Fluitt, 482 So.2d 906 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986) citing State v. Eason, 460 So.2d 1139 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984), writ denied 463 So.2d 1317 (1985), the interaction of the Jackson standard of review with this state’s statutory circumstantial evidence rule as follows: This statutory rule is not a purely separate test from the Jackson standard to be applied instead of a sufficiency of the evidence test whenever the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of the crime.

1991This court has explained in State v. Fluitt, 482 So.2d 906 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986) citing State v. Eason, 460 So.2d 1139 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984), writ denied 463 So.2d 1317 (1985), the interaction of the Jackson standard of review with this state’s statutory circumstantial evidence rule as follows: This statutory rule is not a purely separate test from the Jackson standard to be applied instead of a sufficiency of the evidence test whenever the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of the crime.