Jackson standard in Texas

2025Under the Jackson standard, “we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim.

2025Under the Jackson standard, “we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim.

2026Among other bases for its decision, Brooks had reasoned that because the Jackson standard already required courts to analyze the reasonableness of believing certain evidence, Jackson “essentially incorporates a 3 Because Montgomery County was the exclusive venue for civil commitment cases involving sexually violent predators until 2015, most of the case law comes from the Ninth Court. 4 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). 3 factual-sufficiency review.” Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 n.19.

2026Among other bases for its decision, Brooks had reasoned that because the Jackson standard already required courts to analyze the reasonableness of believing certain evidence, Jackson “essentially incorporates a 3 Because Montgomery County was the exclusive venue for civil commitment cases involving sexually violent predators until 2015, most of the case law comes from the Ninth Court. 4 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). 3 factual-sufficiency review.” Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 n.19.

2024App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (concluding the Jackson standard “is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply” when examining the sufficiency of the evidence)); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim.

2024App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (concluding the Jackson standard “is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply” when examining the sufficiency of the evidence)); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim.

2016Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 , 894–913 (Tex.Crim.App.2010). 82 See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 317–19, 99 S.Ct. at 2788–89; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.2009). 27 “modicum” of evidence probative of an element of the offense; (3) the evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt; or (4) the acts alleged do not constitute the criminal offense charged.83 We consider both direct and circumstantial evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence in making our determination.84 The Jackson standard defers to the fact finder to resolve any conflicts

2016Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 , 894–913 (Tex.Crim.App.2010). 82 See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 317–19, 99 S.Ct. at 2788–89; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.2009). 27 “modicum” of evidence probative of an element of the offense; (3) the evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt; or (4) the acts alleged do not constitute the criminal offense charged.83 We consider both direct and circumstantial evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence in making our determination.84 The Jackson standard defers to the fact finder to resolve any conflicts

2015See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129 (" Jackson standard of review does not satisfy a noncapital defendant's right to an appellate review of fact questions" ) and at 129-31 (" When their jurisdiction to review fact questions is properly invoked, the courts of appeals cannot ignore constitutional and statutory mandates." ); Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, pet. ref'd as untimely filed) (stating that it is " duty-bound to exercise the full extent of the constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction when requested by the litigants" ). [30] See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 406-414 ; C

2015See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129 (" Jackson standard of review does not satisfy a noncapital defendant's right to an appellate review of fact questions" ) and at 129-31 (" When their jurisdiction to review fact questions is properly invoked, the courts of appeals cannot ignore constitutional and statutory mandates." ); Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, pet. ref'd as untimely filed) (stating that it is " duty-bound to exercise the full extent of the constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction when requested by the litigants" ). [30] See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 406-414 ; C

2011Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 132, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), overruled by Brooks, 323 S.W.3d 893 . 1 The plurality and concurring opinions in Brooks agree that the Jackson standard of review is the sole standard to be used for challenges concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to support each element of the offense and that a finding of insufficiency results in an order acquitting the appellant.

2011Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 132, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), overruled by Brooks, 323 S.W.3d 893 . 1 The plurality and concurring opinions in Brooks agree that the Jackson standard of review is the sole standard to be used for challenges concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to support each element of the offense and that a finding of insufficiency results in an order acquitting the appellant.

2024“Under the Jackson test, we permit juries to draw multiple reasonable inferences as long as each inference is supported by evidence presented at trial.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim.

2024“Under the Jackson test, we permit juries to draw multiple reasonable inferences as long as each inference is supported by evidence presented at trial.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim.

2020The Jackson standard is deferential and accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the facts. 4 Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 ; Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 732 ; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778 .

2020The Jackson standard is deferential and accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the facts. 4 Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 ; Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 732 ; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778 .

2022Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662 , 668-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (“Under the Jackson standard, the reviewing court is not to position itself as a thirteenth juror in assessing the evidence.

2022Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662 , 668-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (“Under the Jackson standard, the reviewing court is not to position itself as a thirteenth juror in assessing the evidence.

2022Under the Jackson standard, we defer to the factfinder “to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 ; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778 .

2022Under the Jackson standard, we defer to the factfinder “to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 ; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778 .

2010It is no longer permissible to merely quote the Jackson standard and then to turn around and apply the ... no evidence standard as we have historically done.” Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

2010It is no longer permissible to merely quote the Jackson standard and then to turn around and apply the ... no evidence standard as we have historically done.” Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

2015App. 1997). 12 Smith v. State 340 S.W.3d 41, 46-47 (Tex.App.–Houston [1 Dist.] 2011) citing: Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1071 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 (plurality op.); Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.2009); Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). 32 Evidence is insufficient under the Jackson standard in four circumstances: (1) the record contains no evidence probative of an element of the offense; (2) the record contains a

2015App. 1997). 12 Smith v. State 340 S.W.3d 41, 46-47 (Tex.App.–Houston [1 Dist.] 2011) citing: Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1071 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 (plurality op.); Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.2009); Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). 32 Evidence is insufficient under the Jackson standard in four circumstances: (1) the record contains no evidence probative of an element of the offense; (2) the record contains a

2019Under the Jackson standard, we need not decide “what happened;” but instead must only be satisfied that the evidence allowed a reasonable jury to find Adamick guilty of the crime of continuous 14 Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim.

2019Under the Jackson standard, we need not decide “what happened;” but instead must only be satisfied that the evidence allowed a reasonable jury to find Adamick guilty of the crime of continuous 14 Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim.

2019The Jackson standard “accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778 (quotation omitted); see Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim.

2019The Jackson standard “accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778 (quotation omitted); see Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim.

2019See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 (1979)) (concluding the Jackson standard “is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply” when examining the sufficiency of the evidence); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “[We] must evaluate all of the evidence in the record, both direct and circumstantial, whether admissible or inadmissible.” Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citations omitted).

2019See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 (1979)) (concluding the Jackson standard “is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply” when examining the sufficiency of the evidence); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “[We] must evaluate all of the evidence in the record, both direct and circumstantial, whether admissible or inadmissible.” Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citations omitted).

2026Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim.

2026Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim.

1999See Collins v. State , 800 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.).

1999See Collins v. State , 800 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.).

2017While observing that motive is Crim. App. 2007). [*778] not an element of murder, the court stated that 14 Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. "when identity is called into question, as it is here, proof Crim. App. 2001). of motive might be the glue that holds the entire case 15 Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326 . together." 8 The court pointed to the absence of any evi- 16 Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 . dence connecting Clayton to Playonero and then deter- mined that drug-deal-gone-bad theory was unreliable, After a thorough review of the record and the opin- stating, "Such strained speculation is f

2017While observing that motive is Crim. App. 2007). [*778] not an element of murder, the court stated that 14 Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. "when identity is called into question, as it is here, proof Crim. App. 2001). of motive might be the glue that holds the entire case 15 Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326 . together." 8 The court pointed to the absence of any evi- 16 Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 . dence connecting Clayton to Playonero and then deter- mined that drug-deal-gone-bad theory was unreliable, After a thorough review of the record and the opin- stating, "Such strained speculation is f

2015App. 2007); Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim.

2015App. 2007); Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim.

2013The test evaluates the legal sufficiency of the evidence using a legal standard."); Meraz , 785 S.W.2d at 152-54 (finding that a modified Jackson standard is not appropriate for reviewing the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence to reject an affirmative defense and adopting civil standards of review). 31.

2013See Van Guilder, 709 S.W.2d at 181 ("[W]e hold that in reviewing a case involving an affirmative defense, the court of appeals must review the evidence on the affirmative defense by looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the implicit finding by the jury with respect to such affirmative defense and then determine, by examining all the evidence concerning the affirmative defense, if any rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove his defense by a preponderance of the evidence-The test evaluates the legal sufficiency of the evidence using a legal sta

2015Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 144-145 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (applying Jackson standard to jury’s rejection of self-defense claim).

2015Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138 (Tex.App-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet.ref’d) holds that the State carries the burden of persuasion to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt and the review of challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury’s rejection of a claim of self-defense should only be under the Jackson standard.

2020The Jackson standard “requires the reviewing court to consider all the evidence in the ‘light most favorable to the verdict,’ and then it requires the reviewing court to decide whether the jury’s finding is ‘rational.’” Id. (emphasis in original).5 5 “[A]ll of the evidence is to be considered.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original); McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 131 (2010) (“a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence admitted at trial when considering a Jackson claim”).

2020The Jackson standard “requires the reviewing court to consider all the evidence in the ‘light most favorable to the verdict,’ and then it requires the reviewing court to decide whether the jury’s finding is ‘rational.’” Id. (emphasis in original).5 5 “[A]ll of the evidence is to be considered.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original); McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 131 (2010) (“a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence admitted at trial when considering a Jackson claim”).

2015Accordingly, we will review Valentin’s arguments under this standard and not the standard outlined in her brief. 3 show an appellant’s intent, and faced with a record that supports conflicting inferences, we “must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflict in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Crim.

2015Accordingly, we will review Valentin’s arguments under this standard and not the standard outlined in her brief. 3 show an appellant’s intent, and faced with a record that supports conflicting inferences, we “must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflict in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Crim.

2013In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the Jackson standard of review "gives full play to the jury's responsibility fairly to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence." Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 663 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004).

2013In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the Jackson standard of review "gives full play to the jury's responsibility fairly to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence." Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 663 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004).

2015See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129 (" Jackson standard of review does not satisfy a noncapital defendant's right to an appellate review of fact questions" ) and at 129-31 (" When their jurisdiction to review fact questions is properly invoked, the courts of appeals cannot ignore constitutional and statutory mandates." ); Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, pet. ref'd as untimely filed) (stating that it is " duty-bound to exercise the full extent of the constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction when requested by the litigants" ). [30] See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 406-414 ; C

2015See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129 (“ Jackson standard of review does not satisfy a noncapital defendant's right to an appellate review of fact questions”) and at 129-31 (“When their jurisdiction to review fact questions is properly invoked, the courts of appeals cannot ignore constitutional and statutory mandates.”); Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, pet. ref'd as untimely filed) (stating that it is “duty- bound to exercise the full extent of the constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction when requested by the litigants”). 30 See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 406-414 ; Clewis,

1997To determine whether the State proved each element of the alleged crime, we examine the verdict, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,” to determine whether “any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979) (emphasis in original); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205-06 (Tex.Crim.App.,1996); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 158-59 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). 1 “If a reviewing court determines that the evidence is insufficie

1997To determine whether the State proved each element of the alleged crime, we examine the verdict, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,” to determine whether “any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979) (emphasis in original); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205-06 (Tex.Crim.App.,1996); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 158-59 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). 1 “If a reviewing court determines that the evidence is insufficie

2010It is no longer permissible to merely quote the Jackson standard and then to turn around and apply the ... no evidence standard as we have historically done.” Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

2010It is no longer permissible to merely quote the Jackson standard and then to turn around and apply the ... no evidence standard as we have historically done.” Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

2006In doing so, we test the evidence to ascertain if it is at least conclusive enough for a reasonable fact finder to believe the questioned element is established beyond a reasonable doubt’’) (citations omitted); House v. State, 880 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex.App.Eastland 1994, no pet.) (collecting cases and stating that ”[a]ll of these courts agree that 'factual sufficiency’ challenges in criminal cases are limited to affirmative defenses and other issues where the defendant has the burden of proof; consequently, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of the conviction

2006In doing so, we test the evidence to ascertain if it is at least conclusive enough for a reasonable fact finder to believe the questioned element is established beyond a reasonable doubt") (citations omitted); House v. State, 880 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex.App.Eastland 1994, no pet.) (collecting cases and stating that "[a]ll of these courts agree that `factual sufficiency' challenges in criminal cases are limited to affirmative defenses and other issues where the defendant has the burden of proof; consequently, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of the conviction