7 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2016Jackson opposed the motion to compel filed by Rent-A-Center on the ground that “the arbitration agreement in question is clearly unenforceable in that it is unconscionable,” Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 66 , 130 S. Ct. at 2775 ; that “the entire arbitration agreement, including the delegation clause, was unconscionable,” Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 73 , 130 S. Ct. at 2779 (emphasis added); and that “the arbitration agreement as a whole is substantively unconscionable.” Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 73 , 130 S. Ct. at 2779 . ¶58 Because Jackson’s opposition only challenged the arbitration agreement a 2016Jackson opposed the motion to compel filed by Rent-A-Center on the ground that “the arbitration agreement in question is clearly unenforceable in that it is unconscionable,” Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 66 , 130 S. Ct. at 2775 ; that “the entire arbitration agreement, including the delegation clause, was unconscionable,” Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 73 , 130 S. Ct. at 2779 (emphasis added); and that “the arbitration agreement as a whole is substantively unconscionable.” Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 73 , 130 S. Ct. at 2779 . ¶58 Because Jackson’s opposition only challenged the arbitration agreement a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Luke
neutral
2 sentences2018State v. Luke, 2014 MT 22, ¶ 10 , 373 Mont. 398 , 321 P.3d 70 . ¶7 Section 46-13-401(2), MCA, provides: After the entry of a plea upon a misdemeanor charge, the court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, shall order the prosecution to be dismissed, 3 with prejudice, if defendant whose trial has not been postponed upon the defendant’s motion is not brought to trial within 6 months. ¶8 Jackson argues § 46-13-401(2), MCA, requires dismissal. 2018State v. Luke, 2014 MT 22, ¶ 10 , 373 Mont. 398 , 321 P.3d 70 . ¶7 Section 46-13-401(2), MCA, provides: After the entry of a plea upon a misdemeanor charge, the court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, shall order the prosecution to be dismissed, 3 with prejudice, if defendant whose trial has not been postponed upon the defendant’s motion is not brought to trial within 6 months. ¶8 Jackson argues § 46-13-401(2), MCA, requires dismissal. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Jackson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences2010Jackson, 600 S.E.2d at 351 . 2010Jackson, 600 S.E.2d at 351 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2009The District Court reasoned that Jackson failed to show any of the elements required to establish a violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). ¶20 Jackson appeals. 2009The District Court reasoned that Jackson failed to show any of the elements required to establish a violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). ¶20 Jackson appeals. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Kauffman-Harmon v. Kauffman
green
2 sentences2007The State admitted to the sentencing court that Jackson had received an illegal sentence and that the proper “remedy is to re-sentence the defendant.” Judicial estoppel binds the State to its judicial admissions and prevents the State from taking a position “inconsistent with previously made declarations in a subsequent action or proceeding.” Kauffman-Harmon v. Kauffman, 2001 MT 238, ¶ 15 , 307 Mont. 45, ¶ 15 , 36 P.3d 408, ¶ 15 . 2007The State admitted to the sentencing court that Jackson had received an illegal sentence and that the proper “remedy is to re-sentence the defendant.” Judicial estoppel binds the State to its judicial admissions and prevents the State from taking a position “inconsistent with previously made declarations in a subsequent action or proceeding.” Kauffman-Harmon v. Kauffman, 2001 MT 238, ¶ 15 , 307 Mont. 45, ¶ 15 , 36 P.3d 408, ¶ 15 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Plouffe
green
2 sentences1983The Jackson standard is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 646 P.2d at 538 , 198 Mont. at 388 . 1983The Jackson standard is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 646 P.2d at 538 , 198 Mont. at 388 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
State v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences1981State v. Rodriguez (1981), 192 Mont. 411 , 628 P.2d 280 , 38 St.Rep. 578F, 5781. 1981State v. Rodriguez (1981), 192 Mont. 411 , 628 P.2d 280 , 38 St.Rep. 578F, 5781. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.