need rule in Oregon

2020In light of that uncertainty, “certificate holders have questions and significant concerns regarding how the Council will proceed with pending requests for amendment, and ODOE “(a) A statement of its findings that its failure to act promptly will result in serious prejudice to the public interest or the interest of the parties con- cerned and the specific reasons for its findings of prejudice; “(b) A citation of the statutory or other legal authority relied upon and bearing upon the promulgation of the rule; “(c) A statement of the need for the rule and a statement of how the rule is intended

2020The court therefore held that a statement of need is suffi- cient if it reports “a need that the rule-proposing agency per- ceives.” Id. (emphasis in original).

2025Cite as 342 Or App 391 (2025) 395 notice and hearing that it finds practicable, if the agency prepares: “(a) A statement of its findings that its failure to act promptly will result in serious prejudice to the public inter- est or the interest of the parties concerned and the specific reasons for its findings of prejudice; “(b) A citation of the statutory or other legal authority relied upon and bearing upon the promulgation of the rule; “(c) A statement of the need for the rule and a state- ment of how the rule is intended to meet the need; “(d) A list of the principal documents, reports or s

2025Cite as 342 Or App 391 (2025) 395 “(5) Notwithstanding subsections (1) to (4) of this sec- tion [regarding notice and comment procedures for perma- nent rules], an agency may adopt, amend or suspend a rule without prior notice or hearing or upon any abbreviated notice and hearing that it finds practicable, if the agency prepares: “(a) A statement of its findings that its failure to act promptly will result in serious prejudice to the public inter- est or the interest of the parties concerned and the specific reasons for its findings of prejudice; “(b) A citation of the statutory or other legal

2022See Bradford v. Mahan, 219 Kan 450, 455, 548 P2d 1223, 1228-29 (1976) (refusing to extend absolute privilege to police officers and stating that “[t]he police should never act with malice or ill will against the citizens of this state without being called to account for their actions,” and “[a] qualified privilege will sufficiently insulate police officers and insure the vigorous enforcement of the law”); Stukuls, 42 NY at 278, 366 NE2d at 833 , 397 NYS2d at 744 (conclud- ing that qualified privilege would adequately protect lower- level officials because “to cloak public officers who do not h

2021Cite as 310 Or App 271 (2021) 279 jury was the identity of the undisputedly male shooter, so Pascoe’s testimony identifying defendant as the shooter did not operate to shift blame from her to him, minimizing the need for the instruction to address potential blame shifting.

2018The need factors are interdependent and, aside from his mistaken contention that compliance with either one is per se sufficient, petitioner does not argue that the county or LUBA misapplied the two factors in combination." Id.

2018However, on remand, if DMAP adheres to its determination that "[a]ll of the issues in the case have been resolved without the need to hold a hearing," OAR 137-003-0515(4)(b), DMAP must explain that determination in a manner that permits meaningful judicial review, see Drew , 322 Or. at 500 -01 , 909 P.2d 1211 (listing the "practical reasons" for the substantial-reason requirement, including to "facilitate[ ] meaningful judicial review" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2018However, on remand, if DMAP adheres to its determination that "[a]ll of the issues in the case have been resolved without the need to hold a hearing," OAR 137-003-0515(4)(b), DMAP must explain that determination in a manner that permits meaningful judicial review, see Drew , 322 Or. at 500 -01 , 909 P.2d 1211 (listing the "practical reasons" for the substantial-reason requirement, including to "facilitate[ ] meaningful judicial review" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2017Friends of Marion County v. Marion County, 233 Or App 488, 494-95 , 227 P3d 198 (2010) (quoting Goal 8).

2017Friends of Marion County v. Marion County, 233 Or App 488, 494-95 , 227 P3d 198 (2010) (quoting Goal 8).

2011As the court explained in State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 638 , 136 P3d 22 (2006), “[t]o protect a person’s right against compelled self-incrimination under [Article I, section 12], this court has held that, before questioning, police must give Miranda warnings to a person who is in Tull custody' or in circumstances that 'create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be “compelling.” ’ ” (quoting State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7 , 791 P2d 836 (1990)).

2011As the court explained in State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 638 , 136 P3d 22 (2006), “[t]o protect a person’s right against compelled self-incrimination under [Article I, section 12], this court has held that, before questioning, police must give Miranda warnings to a person who is in Tull custody' or in circumstances that 'create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be “compelling.” ’ ” (quoting State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7 , 791 P2d 836 (1990)).

2011As the court explained in State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 638 , 136 P3d 22 (2006), “[t]o protect a person’s right against compelled self-incrimination under [Article I, section 12], this court has held that, before questioning, police must give Miranda warnings to a person who is in Tull custody' or in circumstances that 'create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be “compelling.” ’ ” (quoting State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7 , 791 P2d 836 (1990)).

2011As the court explained in State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 638 , 136 P3d 22 (2006), “[t]o protect a person’s right against compelled self-incrimination under [Article I, section 12], this court has held that, before questioning, police must give Miranda warnings to a person who is in Tull custody' or in circumstances that 'create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be “compelling.” ’ ” (quoting State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7 , 791 P2d 836 (1990)).

2007Nor does the complaint contain any allegations that would suggest that plaintiffs were aware of any facts sufficient to excite their attention to the need for an inquiry before that time. 2 *360 Defendants next contend that the discovery rule in ORS 12.110(1) did not extend the time for plaintiffs to file their complaint because the legal status of the mobile homes and camp was “apparent and inherently discoverable at the time of the property sale.” Quoting Gehrke v. CrafCo, Inc., 143 Or App 517, 523 , 923 P2d 1333 (1996), rev den, 324 Or 560 (1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitt

2007Nor does the complaint contain any allegations that would suggest that plaintiffs were aware of any facts sufficient to excite their attention to the need for an inquiry before that time. 2 *360 Defendants next contend that the discovery rule in ORS 12.110(1) did not extend the time for plaintiffs to file their complaint because the legal status of the mobile homes and camp was “apparent and inherently discoverable at the time of the property sale.” Quoting Gehrke v. CrafCo, Inc., 143 Or App 517, 523 , 923 P2d 1333 (1996), rev den, 324 Or 560 (1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitt

2005For those reasons and for convenience, we refer to LCDC throughout this opinion. 5 In Residents ofRosemont, we also stated that, “[i]n order to satisfy the need factors of Goal 14, a subregional need must be identified and evaluated in the context of the regional needs.” 173 Or App at 330 .

2004In 1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC (Curry Co.), 301 Or 447, 457 , 724 P2d 268 (1986), the Supreme Court explained that, “[i]n order to allow land use which any goal would prohibit, a local government must take an ‘exception’ to that goal.” Unlike an “exception,” the “unneeded but committed” doctrine allows a local government to demonstrate compliance with Goal 14 without demonstrating that the need factors of the goal have been satisfied.

2004In 1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC (Curry Co.), 301 Or 447, 457 , 724 P2d 268 (1986), the Supreme Court explained that, “[i]n order to allow land use which any goal would prohibit, a local government must take an ‘exception’ to that goal.” Unlike an “exception,” the “unneeded but committed” doctrine allows a local government to demonstrate compliance with Goal 14 without demonstrating that the need factors of the goal have been satisfied.

2004Roy v. McCormack Pacific Co., 171 Or App 526, 531-32 , 17 P3d 550 (2000), adh’d to on recons, 172 Or App 663, 667 , 19 P3d 999 (2001).

2004Roy v. McCormack Pacific Co., 171 Or App 526, 531-32 , 17 P3d 550 (2000), adh’d to on recons, 172 Or App 663, 667 , 19 P3d 999 (2001).

2004Roy v. McCormack Pacific Co., 171 Or App 526, 531-32 , 17 P3d 550 (2000), adh’d to on recons, 172 Or App 663, 667 , 19 P3d 999 (2001).

2004Roy v. McCormack Pacific Co., 171 Or App 526, 531-32 , 17 P3d 550 (2000), adh’d to on recons, 172 Or App 663, 667 , 19 P3d 999 (2001).

1993The Board’s second reason — that claimant was not required to stay overnight — was rejected in PP&L v. Jacobson, supra, 121 Or App at 262 .

1991Kilpatrick v. Snow Mountain Pine Co., 105 Or App 240 , 805 P2d 137 , rev den 311 Or 426 (1991).

1991Kilpatrick v. Snow Mountain Pine Co., 105 Or App 240 , 805 P2d 137 , rev den 311 Or 426 (1991).

1985The Supreme Court said in 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court, supra, that, “[u]nder Goal 14, it is the establishment of the UGB, and not the city’s creation, that makes land available for urbanization. * * * [B]efore establishment of the UGB, the land within the new city’s corporate boundaries retains its previous classifications [as urban, urbanizable or rural].” 299 Or at 365 .