9 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Trustees for Alaska, Alaska Center for the Environment v. Gorsuchgreen2 sentences1996Compare Gorsuch, 835 P.2d at 1245-46 (separate permitting permissible so long as DNR determines that cumulative impacts will not be problematic) with Gorsuch, 835 P.2d at 1250-51 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) (unified permitting process necessary to ensure adequate consideration of cumulative effects). 1996Compare Gorsuch, 835 P.2d at 1245-46 (separate permitting permissible so long as DNR determines that cumulative impacts will not be problematic) with Gorsuch, 835 P.2d at 1250-51 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) (unified permitting process necessary to ensure adequate consideration of cumulative effects). | 2 | 2 |
PH v. Stategreen2 sentences1982See P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d at 840 . 1982See P. H. v. State, 504 P.2d at 840 . | 2 | 2 |
Greenpeace, Inc. v. State, Office of Management & Budget, Division of Governmental Coordination & Alaska Coastal Policy Councilgreen2 sentences2025Id. at 636-37 (quoting Greenpeace, 79 P.3d at 593-94, 596 ); see also Greenpeace, 79 P.3d at 597 (noting “a cursory argument that a NEPA-like cumulative impacts requirement can be inferred from various sections of article VIII . . . and from the ‘public trust’ responsibility implicit in those provisions” but concluding that “none of these sources directly or indirectly suggests the need for such analysis”). 2025Id. at 636-37 (quoting Greenpeace, 79 P.3d at 593-94, 596 ); see also Greenpeace, 79 P.3d at 597 (noting “a cursory argument that a NEPA-like cumulative impacts requirement can be inferred from various sections of article VIII . . . and from the ‘public trust’ responsibility implicit in those provisions” but concluding that “none of these sources directly or indirectly suggests the need for such analysis”). | 1 | 1 |
Tna v. Cbjgreen1 sentence2013Third, conditions and stipulations may be used to address unforeseen occurrences or unforeseen situations that may arise during exploration or development, but permit conditions may not serve as a substitute for an initial pre-permitting analysis that can be conducted with reasonably obtainable information.[21] We determined in Kachemak Bay that the first and third Thane principles “did not survive the 1994 amendment.”22 Addressing the first principle, we stated that, because the amended statute expressly allowed DNR to review projects in phases, “it cannot be said that phasing is ‘disfavored’ | 1 | 1 |
Bidwell v. Stategreen1 sentence1987See Bidwell v. State, 656 P.2d 592, 594 (Alaska App.1983). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1985In Keller , we stated: The purpose of the warrant requirement is to prevent the police from hasty, ill-advised, or unreasonable actions in "the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Id. at 1219 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 , 68 S.Ct. 367, 369 , 92 L.Ed. 436, 440 (1948)). " Because nonlawyers are so often involved in the initial probable cause determination, there is a need for a test that provides more guidance than a totality of circumstances approach." [4] As Justice White states in his concurring opinion, it will often be a difficult question whether a 1985In Keller , we stated: The purpose of the warrant requirement is to prevent the police from hasty, ill-advised, or unreasonable actions in "the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Id. at 1219 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 , 68 S.Ct. 367, 369 , 92 L.Ed. 436, 440 (1948)). " Because nonlawyers are so often involved in the initial probable cause determination, there is a need for a test that provides more guidance than a totality of circumstances approach." [4] As Justice White states in his concurring opinion, it will often be a difficult question whether a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kachemak Bay Conservation Society v. State, Department of Natural Resources
green
2 sentences2013Third, conditions and stipulations may be used to address unforeseen occurrences or unforeseen situations that may arise during exploration or development, but permit conditions may not serve as a substitute for an initial pre-permitting analysis that can be conducted with reasonably obtainable information.[21] We determined in Kachemak Bay that the first and third Thane principles “did not survive the 1994 amendment.”22 Addressing the first principle, we stated that, because the amended statute expressly allowed DNR to review projects in phases, “it cannot be said that phasing is ‘disfavored’ 2013Third, conditions and stipulations may be used to address unforeseen occurrences or unforeseen situations that may arise during exploration or development, but permit conditions may not serve as a substitute for an initial pre-permitting analysis that can be conducted with reasonably obtainable information.[21] We determined in Kachemak Bay that the first and third Thane principles “did not survive the 1994 amendment.”22 Addressing the first principle, we stated that, because the amended statute expressly allowed DNR to review projects in phases, “it cannot be said that phasing is ‘disfavored’ | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Dimmick v. State
green
2 sentences1983The facts of Dimmick v. State, 473 P.2d 616 (Alaska 1970), which discusses the standing rule in the context of fifth amendment violations, illustrate the need for this exception to a standing requirement. 1983The facts of Dimmick v. State, 473 P.2d 616 (Alaska 1970), which discusses the standing rule in the context of fifth amendment violations, illustrate the need for this exception to a standing requirement. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.