need inquiry in California

2017Apprendi , we noted, preserved the Almendarez-Torres exception **61 for "the fact of a prior conviction" ( Apprendi , supra , 530 U.S. at p. 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ). ( McGee , supra , 38 Cal.4th at pp. 706-707, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 899 , 133 P.3d 1054 .) And identifying the "fact of a prior conviction," we reasoned, necessarily entails a limited inquiry into the "nature or basis of the crime of which the defendant was convicted." ( Id. at p. 691, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 899 , 133 P.3d 1054 .) We went on to explain: "The need for such an inquiry does not contemplate that the court will make an independent dete

2017Apprendi , we noted, preserved the Almendarez-Torres exception **61 for "the fact of a prior conviction" ( Apprendi , supra , 530 U.S. at p. 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ). ( McGee , supra , 38 Cal.4th at pp. 706-707, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 899 , 133 P.3d 1054 .) And identifying the "fact of a prior conviction," we reasoned, necessarily entails a limited inquiry into the "nature or basis of the crime of which the defendant was convicted." ( Id. at p. 691, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 899 , 133 P.3d 1054 .) We went on to explain: "The need for such an inquiry does not contemplate that the court will make an independent dete

1987Appeals Bd., supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 575 .) The “ ‘volitional’ test,” with which we are here concerned, “postulates the need for an inquiry into the dynamics of the circumstances which have created the unemployment, the criteria for denial or awarding of benefits being the personal responsibility of the claimant for his unemployment in the former case [citation], or the fault of the employer in the latter case. [Citation.]” (Chrysler Corp. v. California Emp. etc. Com. (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 8, 15 [ 253 P.2d 68 ].) The conflict in the instant action arises from the difference in the parties’

1987Appeals Bd., supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 575 .) The “ ‘volitional’ test,” with which we are here concerned, “postulates the need for an inquiry into the dynamics of the circumstances which have created the unemployment, the criteria for denial or awarding of benefits being the personal responsibility of the claimant for his unemployment in the former case [citation], or the fault of the employer in the latter case. [Citation.]” (Chrysler Corp. v. California Emp. etc. Com. (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 8, 15 [ 253 P.2d 68 ].) The conflict in the instant action arises from the difference in the parties’

2022(See Le Francois, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 1108 [party’s motion for reconsideration has no “procedural significance” if it does not satisfy requirements of section 1008: “The court need not rule on any [mere] suggestion that it should reconsider a previous ruling”].) Further, Brookshire misrepresents this court’s decision in Lee v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1187 (Lee), suggesting we held that section 1008 could never apply to a motion for relief under section 473.

2010"The court need not rule on any suggestion that it should reconsider a previous ruling and, without more, another party would not be expected to respond to such a suggestion." ( Le Francois, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1108.) But, "[t]o be fair to the parties, if the court is seriously concerned that one of its prior interim rulings might have been erroneous, and thus that it might want to reconsider that ruling on its own motion—something we think will happen rather rarely— it should inform the parties of this concern, solicit briefing, and hold a hearing. [Citations.] Then, and only then, would

2014(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291, fn. 17 ; U.S. Western Falun Dafa Assn. v. Chinese Chamber of Commerce, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 603, fn. 5 .) Here, the tentative ruling noted, “The court need not rule on Defendants’ objections to Plaintiffs’ evidence.

2014(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291, fn. 17 ; U.S. Western Falun Dafa Assn. v. Chinese Chamber of Commerce, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 603, fn. 5 .) Here, the tentative ruling noted, “The court need not rule on Defendants’ objections to Plaintiffs’ evidence.

2014(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291, fn. 17 ; U.S. Western Falun Dafa Assn. v. Chinese Chamber of Commerce, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 603, fn. 5 .) Here, the tentative ruling noted, “The court need not rule on Defendants’ objections to Plaintiffs’ evidence.

2014(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291, fn. 17 ; U.S. Western Falun Dafa Assn. v. Chinese Chamber of Commerce, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 603, fn. 5 .) Here, the tentative ruling noted, “The court need not rule on Defendants’ objections to Plaintiffs’ evidence.

1970Martin, supra, 1 Cal.3d 524, 531 .) “His defense, we repeat, was that of alibi, not diminished capacity.” (People v. Fain, 70 Cal.2d 588, 597 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 451 P.2d 65 ].) “But appellant’s defense at trial was not diminished capacity; it was an alibi.” (People v. Nichols * (Cal.App.) 84 Cal.Rptr. 405 .) “The defense made no such claim.

1970Martin, supra, 1 Cal.3d 524, 531 .) “His defense, we repeat, was that of alibi, not diminished capacity.” (People v. Fain, 70 Cal.2d 588, 597 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 451 P.2d 65 ].) “But appellant’s defense at trial was not diminished capacity; it was an alibi.” (People v. Nichols * (Cal.App.) 84 Cal.Rptr. 405 .) “The defense made no such claim.

2022(See generally People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 [“Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015; Senate Bill 1437) eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and limited the scope of the felony murder rule”] (Lewis).) The trial court appointed counsel for defendant,2 received written submissions from counsel and from the People, and 2 In its order appointing counsel, the trial court found defendant was not entitled to section 1170.95 relief as to the 3 “summarily den[ied] the petition without the need for a hearing,” i.e., wi

2022(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 963 .) The court explained: “[S]ubdivision (d)(2) provides in part that ‘[t]he parties may waive a resentencing hearing and stipulate that the petitioner is eligible to have his or her murder conviction vacated and for resentencing.’ [Citation.] If entitlement is something more than eligibility, ‘why would a stipulation that the petitioner is merely eligible for relief obviate the need for a hearing on entitlement?’ [Citation.] ‘[S]ection 1170.95’s interchangeable references to eligibility and entitlement repudiate the notion that the concepts have different mea

2016(See, e.g., People v. Woodell [(1998)] 17 Cal.4th 448, 452-461 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 241 , 950 P.2d 85 ].) The need for such an inquiry does not contemplate that the court will make an independent determination regarding a disputed issue of fact relating to the defendant’s prior conduct (see id. at p. 460), but instead that the court simply will examine the record of the prior proceeding to determine whether that record is sufficient to demonstrate that the conviction is of the type that subjects the defendant to increased punishment under California law.

2016(See, e.g., People v. Woodell [(1998)] 17 Cal.4th 448, 452-461 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 241 , 950 P.2d 85 ].) The need for such an inquiry does not contemplate that the court will make an independent determination regarding a disputed issue of fact relating to the defendant’s prior conduct (see id. at p. 460), but instead that the court simply will examine the record of the prior proceeding to determine whether that record is sufficient to demonstrate that the conviction is of the type that subjects the defendant to increased punishment under California law.

2025(In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144 [An as-applied challenge seeks relief “ ‘from a specific application of a facially valid statute or ordinance to an individual or class of individuals who are under [an] allegedly impermissible present restraint or disability as a result of the manner or circumstances in which the statute or ordinance has been applied.’ ”].) “Because an as-applied challenge asserts a ‘constitutional defect [that] may be correctable only by examining factual findings in the record or remanding to the trial court for further findings’ ([citation]), it is not appropriately ra

2023(In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144 [“[A]n ‘as applied’ challenge may seek ‘relief from a specific application of a facially valid statute or ordinance to an individual or class of individuals who are under allegedly impermissible present restraint or disability as a result of the manner or circumstances in which the statute or ordinance has been applied”].) Because an as-applied challenge asserts a “constitutional defense [that] may be correctable only by examining factual findings in the record or remanding to the trial court for further findings” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 88

2018The argument is forfeited. ( Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574 , 589, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 151 ["An appellant who fails to cite accurately to the record forfeits the issue or argument on appeal that is presented without the record reference."].) In any event, he has failed to establish that a two-plus-two between the MEC and Board would have obviated the need for a hearing or resulted in a favorable outcome for him.

2018The argument is forfeited. ( Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574 , 589, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 151 ["An appellant who fails to cite accurately to the record forfeits the issue or argument on appeal that is presented without the record reference."].) In any event, he has failed to establish that a two-plus-two between the MEC and Board would have obviated the need for a hearing or resulted in a favorable outcome for him.

2016(See Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 65 .) Although in most cases a warning to the intermediary will be necessary, warnings are not required if the intermediary was so sophisticated that it actually knew or reasonably should have known about the potential harm.

2016(See Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 65.) Although in most cases a warning to the intermediary will be necessary, warnings are not required if the intermediary was so sophisticated that it actually knew or reasonably should have known about the potential harm.

2025(See People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1200 [the trial court’s determination of whether an instruction should be given must be made without reference to the credibility of the evidence]; People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 203 [“ ‘[t]he jury should not be constrained by the fact that the prosecution and defense have chosen to focus on certain theories’ ”]; People v. Madrigal (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 219 , 243 [“ ‘The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient—even if there is significant countervailing evidence, and the testimony is subject to justifiable suspicion.’ ”].) To that e

2025(See People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1200 [the trial court’s determination of whether an instruction should be given must be made without reference to the credibility of the evidence]; People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 203 [“ ‘[t]he jury should not be constrained by the fact that the prosecution and defense have chosen to focus on certain theories’ ”]; People v. Madrigal (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 219 , 243 [“ ‘The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient—even if there is significant countervailing evidence, and the testimony is subject to justifiable suspicion.’ ”].) To that e

2023The facts probative of the Harrises’ liability for Anderson’s Instagram posts “emerged through the evidence the parties submitted for the hearing on the strike motion.” (Nguyen- Lam, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 868 ; see Slauson Partnership v. Ochoa (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1021 [“nothing in the [anti-SLAPP] statute or case law suggests that the factual analysis for ruling on the motion must be frozen in time on the date the complaint is filed”].)8 After Peterson initiated this action, Anderson admitted she had been “enlisted” by the Harrises and directed by Tameka to make the accusations

2022DISCUSSION A. Claim and Issue Preclusion Do Not Apply “Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of entire causes of action. [Citations.] Claim preclusion applies only when ‘a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties [or their privies] (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit.’” (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322 , 326- 327; accord, Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center (2022) 13 Cal.5th 313 , 323.) “Issue preclusion, by contrast, prevents ‘relitigation of previously decided issues,’ rather than causes of action as a whole. [Citation.] It a