need test in Texas

2022“Under this standard, the trial court need not test the effectiveness of each available lesser sanction by actually imposing the lesser sanction on the party before issuing the death penalty; rather, the trial court must analyze the available sanctions and offer a reasoned explanation as to the appropriateness of the sanction imposed.” Id. at 840 (citing Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Tex. 2003) (noting that the record should 4 “contain some explanation of the appropriateness of the sanctions imposed”)).

2016“Under 8 this standard, the trial court need not test the effectiveness of each available lesser sanction by actually imposing the lesser sanction on the party before issuing the death penalty; rather, the trial court must analyze the available sanctions and offer a reasoned explanation as to the appropriateness of the sanction imposed.” Id. at 840 (citing Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Tex. 2003) (noting that the record should “contain some explanation of the appropriateness of the sanctions imposed”)).

2005“Clearly before trial court error can be found in the failure to set a hearing on a motion to reinstate the movant must request a hearing.” Cabrera v. Cedarapids Inc., 834 S.W.2d 615, 618-19 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (stating that a party may not lead a trial court into error and then complain about it on appeal); see Rainbow Home Health, Inc. v. Schmidt, 76 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial court’s attention the n

2005A Clearly before trial court error can be found in the failure to set a hearing on a motion to reinstate the movant must request a hearing. @ Cabrera v. Cedarapids Inc. , 834 S.W.2d 615 , 618 B 19 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (stating that a party may not lead a trial court into error and then complain about it on appeal); see Rainbow Home Health, Inc. v. Schmidt , 76 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. App. C San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial court = s

2015Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 730 (Tex. 1993)). 37 Imagine Auto.

2010Corp. v. Tanner , 856 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993) (“[T]he record must reflect the trial court considered the availability of lesser sanctions.”); Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer , 104 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Tex. 2003) (noting that the record should “contain some explanation of the appropriateness of the sanctions imposed.”)).

1996Joseph v. State, 864 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).

1996Joseph v. State, 864 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).

2022“Under this standard, the trial court need not test the effectiveness of each available lesser sanction by actually imposing the lesser sanction on the party before issuing the death penalty; rather, the trial court must analyze the available sanctions and offer a reasoned explanation as to the appropriateness of the sanction imposed.” Id. at 840 (citing Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Tex. 2003) (noting that the record should 4 “contain some explanation of the appropriateness of the sanctions imposed”)).

2016“Under 8 this standard, the trial court need not test the effectiveness of each available lesser sanction by actually imposing the lesser sanction on the party before issuing the death penalty; rather, the trial court must analyze the available sanctions and offer a reasoned explanation as to the appropriateness of the sanction imposed.” Id. at 840 (citing Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Tex. 2003) (noting that the record should “contain some explanation of the appropriateness of the sanctions imposed”)).

2022The court reasoned that, “in the area of limitations, bright-lines rules generally represent the better approach, and that the policy reasons underlying the Hughes rule appropriately balance the competing concerns of the need to bar stale claims and avoid prejudice to defendants yet preserve a reasonable opportunity for plaintiffs to pursue legitimate claims.” Id.

2020The court subsequently reaffirmed what has since been called the Hughes rule, explaining that we must “appropriately balance the competing concerns of the need to bar stale claims and avoid prejudice to defendants yet preserve a reasonable opportunity for plaintiffs to pursue legitimate claims.” See Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Tex. 2001).

2015Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim.

2015Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim.

2014P’ship v. Fine Autographs & Memorabilia Retails Stores, Inc., 418 S.W.3d 229, 233 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) (citing Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 840 ).

2014Pp. v. Fine Autographs & Memorabilia Retails Stores, Inc., 418 S.W.3d 229, 233 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) (citing Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex.2004)).

2013See Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).

2013See Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim.

2013See In re Emergency Consultants, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 78, 79 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding) (noting that requiring rule 202 plaintiff to plead viable claim “would eviscerate the investigatory purpose of Rule 202 and essentially require one to file suit before determining whether a claim exists” and would place “counsel in a quandary, considering counsel’s ethical duty of candor to the court and the requirements of [rule 13]”); see also Tex.R.

2013See In re Emergency Consultants, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 78, 79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding) (noting that requiring rule 202 plaintiff to plead viable claim “would eviscerate the investigatory purpose of Rule 202 and essentially require one to file suit before determining whether a claim exists” and would place “counsel in a quandary, considering counsel’s ethical duty of candor to the court and the requirements of [rule 13]”); see also Tex. R.

2011App.2005) (holding that counsel's action—failing to investigate the victim's medical history because counsel had not been paid for experts—rendered counsel ineffective when "the clear and obvious defense strategy, which [he] recognized, was to focus on [the victim's] medical history"); see also Aldrich v. State, 296 S.W.3d 225, 245 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref'd) (op. on reh'g) (holding that counsel's action—failing to timely designate experts in part because his client was indigent—rendered counsel ineffective when the record "affirmatively reflect[ed]" that he "repeatedly recognized

2011See Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458, 467-68 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (holding that counsel’s action— failing to investigate the victim’s medical history because counsel had not been paid for experts — rendered counsel ineffective when “the clear and obvious defense strategy, which [he] recognized, was to focus on [the victim’s] medical history”); see also Aldrich v. State, 296 S.W.3d 225, 245 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref'd) (op. on reh’g) (holding that counsel’s action — failing to timely designate experts in part because his client was indigent — rendered counsel ineffective when the record

2011See Estrada v. State , 313 S.W.3d 274, 303 (Tex. Crim.

2011See Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 303 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Taylor v. Sunbelt Mgmt., Inc. , 905 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ); Nguyen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank , No. 14-07-00086-CV, 2008 WL 2130430 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 22, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.).

2010See Taylor v. Sunbelt Mgmt., Inc., 905 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ); Nguyen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 14-07-00086-CV, 2008 WL 2130430 , at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 22, 2008, no pet.) (mem.op.).

2006See Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex. Crim.

2006See Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (noting court “might disagree” with court of appeals’s holding that there was no evidence tending to connect defendant to offense, but failure to instruct jury in accordance with corroboration requirement for accomplice witness testimony was nevertheless harmful error).

2005“Clearly before trial court error can be found in the failure to set a hearing on a motion to reinstate the movant must request a hearing.” Cabrera v. Cedarapids Inc., 834 S.W.2d 615, 618-19 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (stating that a party may not lead a trial court into error and then complain about it on appeal); see Rainbow Home Health, Inc. v. Schmidt, 76 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial court’s attention the n

2005A Clearly before trial court error can be found in the failure to set a hearing on a motion to reinstate the movant must request a hearing. @ Cabrera v. Cedarapids Inc. , 834 S.W.2d 615 , 618 B 19 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (stating that a party may not lead a trial court into error and then complain about it on appeal); see Rainbow Home Health, Inc. v. Schmidt , 76 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. App. C San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial court = s

2005“Clearly before trial court error can be found in the failure to set a hearing on a motion to reinstate the movant must request a hearing.” Cabrera v. Cedarapids Inc., 834 S.W.2d 615, 618-19 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (stating that a party may not lead a trial court into error and then complain about it on appeal); see Rainbow Home Health, Inc. v. Schmidt, 76 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial court’s attention the n

2005A Clearly before trial court error can be found in the failure to set a hearing on a motion to reinstate the movant must request a hearing. @ Cabrera v. Cedarapids Inc. , 834 S.W.2d 615 , 618 B 19 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (stating that a party may not lead a trial court into error and then complain about it on appeal); see Rainbow Home Health, Inc. v. Schmidt , 76 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. App. C San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial court = s

2002See Cabrera, 834 S.W.2d at 618-19 ; Kelly v. Cunningham, 848 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (stating that a party may not lead a trial court into error and then complain about it on appeal).

2002See Cabrera , 834 S.W.2d at 618-19 ; Kelly v. Cunningham , 848 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex. App.--Houston [1 st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (stating that a party may not lead a trial court into error and then complain about it on appeal).

2025See In re Sarkissian, 243 S.W.3d 860, 861 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, orig. proceeding) (observing that mandamus record failed to establish that relator requested ruling or called motion to trial court’s attention and that “mere filing of a motion with a trial court clerk does not equate to a request that the trial court rule on the motion”); see also In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228 (noting that information known to trial court clerk “is not imputed to the trial court” and that simply alleging that something was mailed to trial court clerk does not prove that trial court received notice of filing).

2025See In re Sarkissian, 243 S.W.3d 860, 861 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, orig. proceeding) (observing that mandamus record failed to establish that relator requested ruling or called motion to trial court’s attention and that “mere filing of a motion with a trial court clerk does not equate to a request that the trial court rule on the motion”); see also In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228 (noting that information known to trial court clerk “is not imputed to the trial court” and that simply alleging that something was mailed to trial court clerk does not prove that trial court received notice of filing).

2025EVID. 407(a) (evidence of subsequent remedial measure is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product or its design, or a need for a warning or instruction); Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 465 S.W.3d 193, 214 (Tex. 2015).

2024See Aston v. State, 656 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Zarco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 816, 831 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (and cases cited therein).