need inquiry in New Jersey

2018RPC 1.8(a)(3). "[I]t is the substance of the relationship, involving as it does a heightened aspect of reliance, that triggers the need for the rule's prescriptions of full disclosure and informed consent." Silverman, 113 N.J. at 214 .

2001It is also clear that it is the substance of the relationship, involving as it does a heightened aspect of reliance, that triggers the need for the rule's prescriptions of full disclosure and informed consent." In re Silverman, 113 N.J. 193, 214 , 549 A. 2d 1225 (1988).

2021And the trial court recognized defendant's invocation of his right to counsel that ended the interview, concluding "defendant's rights were not violated and [his] statement was made with a valid waiver of those rights." law, [3] that he has the right to the presence of an attorney[] and [4] that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. [Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 .] A-2932-18 8 The administration of Miranda warnings does not obviate the need for our analysis of the statement's voluntariness, a legal issue requiring our independent r

2021And the trial court recognized defendant's invocation of his right to counsel that ended the interview, concluding "defendant's rights were not violated and [his] statement was made with a valid waiver of those rights." law, [3] that he has the right to the presence of an attorney[] and [4] that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. [Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 .] A-2932-18 8 The administration of Miranda warnings does not obviate the need for our analysis of the statement's voluntariness, a legal issue requiring our independent r

2014As was noted in Benoit, supra, the public needs to know that “judges are being held to a defined and definable level of conduct,” and judges must know the “particular level of scrutiny that will be applied to their behavior, should it ever be challenged.” 487 A.2d at 1163 .

2014As was noted in Benoit, supra, the public needs to know that “judges are being held to a defined and definable level of conduct,” and judges must know the “particular level of scrutiny that will be applied to their behavior, should it ever be challenged.” 487 A.2d at 1163 .

2013The Court reasoned that the home is the place “where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute” and that the District’s laws made “it impossible for citizens to use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.” Id. at 628-30 , 128 S.Ct. at 2817-18 , 171 L.Ed.2d at 679-80 (emphasis added) (quoted in part in McDonald, supra, — U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 3036 , 177 L.Ed.2d at 914-15 ). 2.

2013The Court reasoned that the home is the place “where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute” and that the District’s laws made “it impossible for citizens to use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.” Id. at 628-30 , 128 S.Ct. at 2817-18 , 171 L.Ed.2d at 679-80 (emphasis added) (quoted in part in McDonald, supra, — U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 3036 , 177 L.Ed.2d at 914-15 ). 2.

1990We stated that: Once [the danger of the hammer chipping] was established, it was within the competence of the jury, unaided by expert testimony, to determine the need for warnings and the adequacy of the warnings placed on the hammer by the manufacturer. [ 211 N.J.Super. at 643-644 , 512 A.2d 548 ].

1990We stated that: Once [the danger of the hammer chipping] was established, it was within the competence of the jury, unaided by expert testimony, to determine the need for warnings and the adequacy of the warnings placed on the hammer by the manufacturer. [ 211 N.J.Super. at 643-644 , 512 A.2d 548 ].

1990In Black v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 56 N.J. 63 , 265 A.2d 129 (1970), the Court held that a jury could decide without expert assistance whether due care required an electric utility to post signs on or near poles or wires to warn members of the public and workers in the area of the danger posed by highly charged electric wires.

1986On the other hand, while it was dealing with a negligence rather than a strict liability case, the Court in Black v. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., supra, squarely held that the need for warnings of a recognized danger may be determined by a jury without expert testimony. 56 N.J. at 78-79 .

2026Rule 703 "mandates that expert opinion be grounded in 'facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts.'" A-2484-24 23 Townsend, 221 N.J. at 54 (quoting Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 , (2008)) (internal quotations omitted).

2026Rule 703 "mandates that expert opinion be grounded in 'facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts.'" A-2484-24 23 Townsend, 221 N.J. at 54 (quoting Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 , (2008)) (internal quotations omitted).

2024Id. at 106 .

2021"Of course, any future agreement of the parties may obviate the need for such hearing." Edgerton, 203 N.J.

2017For example, although “[traditionally self-defense claims require that a person who can safely retreat from the confrontation avail themselves of that means of escape,” that requirement is suspended under the “castle doctrine ... if the confrontation takes place in one’s home or ‘castle.’ ” State v. Gartland, 149 N.J. 456, 466 , 694 A.2d 564 (1997) (quoting Beth Bjerregaard & Anita N. Blowers, Chartering a New Frontier for Self-Defense Claims: The Applicability of the Battered Person Syndrome as a Defense for Parricide Offenders, 33 U. Louisville J.

2017For example, although “[traditionally self-defense claims require that a person who can safely retreat from the confrontation avail themselves of that means of escape,” that requirement is suspended under the “castle doctrine ... if the confrontation takes place in one’s home or ‘castle.’ ” State v. Gartland, 149 N.J. 456, 466 , 694 A.2d 564 (1997) (quoting Beth Bjerregaard & Anita N. Blowers, Chartering a New Frontier for Self-Defense Claims: The Applicability of the Battered Person Syndrome as a Defense for Parricide Offenders, 33 U. Louisville J.

2013Judge DeStefano concluded, "Since the challenged statute only regulates the carrying of a handgun outside the home, it does not infringe upon any conduct protected by the Second Amendment^]” On appeal, in urging us to find a constitutional violation, Pantano relies on Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F.Supp.2d 462 (D.Md.2012), and its interpretation of Heller, supra. The Woollard court held that Heller “left unanswered” whether the Second Amendment’s protections extend beyond the home, “ ‘where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.’ ” Woollard, supra, 863 F.Supp.2d at 467

2013Judge DeStefano concluded, "Since the challenged statute only regulates the carrying of a handgun outside the home, it does not infringe upon any conduct protected by the Second Amendment^]” On appeal, in urging us to find a constitutional violation, Pantano relies on Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F.Supp.2d 462 (D.Md.2012), and its interpretation of Heller, supra. The Woollard court held that Heller “left unanswered” whether the Second Amendment’s protections extend beyond the home, “ ‘where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.’ ” Woollard, supra, 863 F.Supp.2d at 467

2012As noted in State v. Leonardis (Leonardis I), 71 N.J. 85 , 363 A.2d 321 (1976), PTI is a significant beneficial alternative for defendants.

2012As noted in State v. Leonardis (Leonardis I), 71 N.J. 85 , 363 A.2d 321 (1976), PTI is a significant beneficial alternative for defendants.

2008Those cases, we determined, simply did not present the overriding concern of divided loyalties triggering the need for a presumption of prejudice. 9 This case is unlike State v. Pych, 213 N.J.Super. 446 , 517 A.2d 871 (App.Div.1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 90 , 526 A.2d 167 (1987), in which counsel was under indictment in a different county from the one where his client was charged.

2008Those cases, we determined, simply did not present the overriding concern of divided loyalties triggering the need for a presumption of prejudice. 9 This case is unlike State v. Pych, 213 N.J.Super. 446 , 517 A.2d 871 (App.Div.1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 90 , 526 A.2d 167 (1987), in which counsel was under indictment in a different county from the one where his client was charged.

2008Those cases, we determined, simply did not present the overriding concern of divided loyalties triggering the need for a presumption of prejudice. 9 This case is unlike State v. Pych, 213 N.J.Super. 446 , 517 A.2d 871 (App.Div.1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 90 , 526 A.2d 167 (1987), in which counsel was under indictment in a different county from the one where his client was charged.