need immunity in Michigan

2017Id. at 615- 616.

2017Id. at 615- 616.

2017Yet, this need not be error. “[D]eclining to raise objections,” including to the admission of evidence “can often be consistent with sound trial strategy.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 253 ; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).

2017Yet, this need not be error. “[D]eclining to raise objections,” including to the admission of evidence “can often be consistent with sound trial strategy.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 253 ; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).

1985See, e.g., Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409 ; 96 S Ct 984 ; 47 L Ed 2d 128 (1976), Wood v Strickland, 420 US 308 ; 95 S Ct 992 ; 43 L Ed 2d 214 (1975), Scheuer v Rhodes, 416 US 232 ; 94 S Ct 1683 ; 40 L Ed 2d 90 (1974).

1985See, e.g., Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409 ; 96 S Ct 984 ; 47 L Ed 2d 128 (1976), Wood v Strickland, 420 US 308 ; 95 S Ct 992 ; 43 L Ed 2d 214 (1975), Scheuer v Rhodes, 416 US 232 ; 94 S Ct 1683 ; 40 L Ed 2d 90 (1974).

1985See, e.g., Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409 ; 96 S Ct 984 ; 47 L Ed 2d 128 (1976), Wood v Strickland, 420 US 308 ; 95 S Ct 992 ; 43 L Ed 2d 214 (1975), Scheuer v Rhodes, 416 US 232 ; 94 S Ct 1683 ; 40 L Ed 2d 90 (1974).

1985See, e.g., Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409 ; 96 S Ct 984 ; 47 L Ed 2d 128 (1976), Wood v Strickland, 420 US 308 ; 95 S Ct 992 ; 43 L Ed 2d 214 (1975), Scheuer v Rhodes, 416 US 232 ; 94 S Ct 1683 ; 40 L Ed 2d 90 (1974).

2025See MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a); see also People v Lucas, 393 Mich 522, 529 ; 227 NW2d 763 (1975); People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 368-369 ; 770 NW2d 68 (2009).

2025See MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a); see also People v Lucas, 393 Mich 522, 529 ; 227 NW2d 763 (1975); People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 368-369 ; 770 NW2d 68 (2009).

2025“While jurors are not presumed to know the law applicable to a case, Michigan law presumes that a trial judge sitting as finder of fact is ‘aware of lesser-included offenses without the need for instruction.’ ” People v Jones, 497 Mich 155, 171 ; 860 NW2d 112 (2014), quoting People v Cazal, 412 Mich 680, 686-687 ; 316 NW2d 705 (1982).

2025“While jurors are not presumed to know the law applicable to a case, Michigan law presumes that a trial judge sitting as finder of fact is ‘aware of lesser-included offenses without the need for instruction.’ ” People v Jones, 497 Mich 155, 171 ; 860 NW2d 112 (2014), quoting People v Cazal, 412 Mich 680, 686-687 ; 316 NW2d 705 (1982).

1998The possibility of future increased costs has been found to be too speculative to merit a contested case hearing. 1 Attorney General v Public Service Comm, 206 Mich App 290, 295 ; 520 NW2d 636 (1994).

1998The possibility of future increased costs has been found to be too speculative to merit a contested case hearing. 1 Attorney General v Public Service Comm, 206 Mich App 290, 295 ; 520 NW2d 636 (1994).

1997Hvh contends that this Court’s opinion in Huron Valley Hosp, Inc v State Health Facilities Comm, 110 Mich App 236 ; 312 NW2d 422 (1981), implicitly com pelled the department to ignore the 350 beds previously granted to PGH in the present need analysis.

1997Hvh contends that this Court’s opinion in Huron Valley Hosp, Inc v State Health Facilities Comm, 110 Mich App 236 ; 312 NW2d 422 (1981), implicitly com pelled the department to ignore the 350 beds previously granted to PGH in the present need analysis.

1995Id.

1995Likewise, a defendant who does not timely challenge the amount of costs waives the right on appeal to challenge an order for costs that appears on its face to be a reasonable approximation of the costs permitted by MCL 771.3(4); MSA 28.1133(4). [ 428 Mich 361 -363.] *471 Unlike People v Avignone, 198 Mich App 419 ; 499 NW2d 376 (1993), cited by defendant, defense counsel’s comments did not implicate the need for a hearing.

1995Likewise, a defendant who does not timely challenge the amount of costs waives the right on appeal to challenge an order for costs that appears on its face to be a reasonable approximation of the costs permitted by MCL 771.3(4); MSA 28.1133(4). [ 428 Mich 361 -363.] *471 Unlike People v Avignone, 198 Mich App 419 ; 499 NW2d 376 (1993), cited by defendant, defense counsel’s comments did not implicate the need for a hearing.

1993The need for a rule, 39 Hastings L J 283 (1988). 12 See also People v Dugan, 102 Mich App 497 ; 302 NW2d 209 (1980); People v Harris, 95 Mich App 507 ; 291 NW2d 97 (1980). 13 In People v Houze, 425 Mich 82, 90 ; 387 NW2d 807 (1986), this Court directly quoted People v Dugan, n 12 supra, with apparent approval and noted the exigent circumstances recognized by the Court of Appeals in that case.

1993The need for a rule, 39 Hastings L J 283 (1988). 12 See also People v Dugan, 102 Mich App 497 ; 302 NW2d 209 (1980); People v Harris, 95 Mich App 507 ; 291 NW2d 97 (1980). 13 In People v Houze, 425 Mich 82, 90 ; 387 NW2d 807 (1986), this Court directly quoted People v Dugan, n 12 supra, with apparent approval and noted the exigent circumstances recognized by the Court of Appeals in that case.

1993The need for a rule, 39 Hastings L J 283 (1988). 12 See also People v Dugan, 102 Mich App 497 ; 302 NW2d 209 (1980); People v Harris, 95 Mich App 507 ; 291 NW2d 97 (1980). 13 In People v Houze, 425 Mich 82, 90 ; 387 NW2d 807 (1986), this Court directly quoted People v Dugan, n 12 supra, with apparent approval and noted the exigent circumstances recognized by the Court of Appeals in that case.

1993The need for a rule, 39 Hastings L J 283 (1988). 12 See also People v Dugan, 102 Mich App 497 ; 302 NW2d 209 (1980); People v Harris, 95 Mich App 507 ; 291 NW2d 97 (1980). 13 In People v Houze, 425 Mich 82, 90 ; 387 NW2d 807 (1986), this Court directly quoted People v Dugan, n 12 supra, with apparent approval and noted the exigent circumstances recognized by the Court of Appeals in that case.

1993The need for a rule, 39 Hastings L J 283 (1988). 12 See also People v Dugan, 102 Mich App 497 ; 302 NW2d 209 (1980); People v Harris, 95 Mich App 507 ; 291 NW2d 97 (1980). 13 In People v Houze, 425 Mich 82, 90 ; 387 NW2d 807 (1986), this Court directly quoted People v Dugan, n 12 supra, with apparent approval and noted the exigent circumstances recognized by the Court of Appeals in that case.

1993The need for a rule, 39 Hastings L J 283 (1988). 12 See also People v Dugan, 102 Mich App 497 ; 302 NW2d 209 (1980); People v Harris, 95 Mich App 507 ; 291 NW2d 97 (1980). 13 In People v Houze, 425 Mich 82, 90 ; 387 NW2d 807 (1986), this Court directly quoted People v Dugan, n 12 supra, with apparent approval and noted the exigent circumstances recognized by the Court of Appeals in that case.

1990Plaintiff further contends that the trial court misplaced its reliance on the following cases which hold contrary to Voorhies: Glover v Kalamazoo, 98 Mich App 465 ; 296 NW2d 280 (1980), lv den 411 Mich 951 (1981), Valentine v Redford Twp Supervisor, 371 Mich 138 ; 123 NW2d 227 (1963), and Egan v Detroit, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided October 4, 1983 (Docket No. 65010).

1990Plaintiff further contends that the trial court misplaced its reliance on the following cases which hold contrary to Voorhies: Glover v Kalamazoo, 98 Mich App 465 ; 296 NW2d 280 (1980), lv den 411 Mich 951 (1981), Valentine v Redford Twp Supervisor, 371 Mich 138 ; 123 NW2d 227 (1963), and Egan v Detroit, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided October 4, 1983 (Docket No. 65010).

1990Plaintiff further contends that the trial court misplaced its reliance on the following cases which hold contrary to Voorhies: Glover v Kalamazoo, 98 Mich App 465 ; 296 NW2d 280 (1980), lv den 411 Mich 951 (1981), Valentine v Redford Twp Supervisor, 371 Mich 138 ; 123 NW2d 227 (1963), and Egan v Detroit, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided October 4, 1983 (Docket No. 65010).

1990Plaintiff further contends that the trial court misplaced its reliance on the following cases which hold contrary to Voorhies: Glover v Kalamazoo, 98 Mich App 465 ; 296 NW2d 280 (1980), lv den 411 Mich 951 (1981), Valentine v Redford Twp Supervisor, 371 Mich 138 ; 123 NW2d 227 (1963), and Egan v Detroit, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided October 4, 1983 (Docket No. 65010).

1987Plaintiff also cites Riff v Morgan Pharmacy, 353 Pa Super 21; 508 A2d 1247 (1986), in which the court held that the pharmacy had a duty to warn the patient and the prescribing physician "of the obvious inadequacies appearing on the face of the prescription which created a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” It appears that the prescription in Riff substantially exceeded the accepted maximum dose and that the pharmacy may *218 have refilled the prescription without authorization.

1985In Armstrong v Ross Twp, 82 Mich App 77, 85 ; 266 NW2d 674 (1978), this Court adopted the doctrines set forth by the United States Supreme Court for determining the bounds of governmental immunity under 42 USC 1983: "Immunity from suit under 42 USC 1983 turns upon the existence of an analogous immunity provision at common law coupled with a weighing of the need for immunity as against the need to compensate plaintiffs for violation of civil rights.

1985In Armstrong v Ross Twp, 82 Mich App 77, 85 ; 266 NW2d 674 (1978), this Court adopted the doctrines set forth by the United States Supreme Court for determining the bounds of governmental immunity under 42 USC 1983: "Immunity from suit under 42 USC 1983 turns upon the existence of an analogous immunity provision at common law coupled with a weighing of the need for immunity as against the need to compensate plaintiffs for violation of civil rights.

1985As our Court of Appeals aptly stated in McKissic v Bodine, 42 Mich App 203, 208 ; 201 NW2d 333 (1972), `the problem with economic reality is that it is a conclusion, and it is not a test in the sense that there are any well-defined criteria upon which an objective determination can be based.'" Justice TALBOT SMITH, in his influential dissent in Powell, supra, pp 471-474 , emphasized the need for a standard with a "definite meaning." SMITH rejected the control test, in large part, [20] because it *666 "failed to achieve either uniformity or certainty." He recognized that "[t]he administration o

1985As our Court of Appeals aptly stated in McKissic v Bodine, 42 Mich App 203, 208 ; 201 NW2d 333 (1972), 'the problem with economic reality is that it is a conclusion, and it is not a test in the sense that there are any well-defined criteria upon which an objective determination can be based.’ ” Justice Talbot Smith, in his influential dissent in Powell, supra, pp 471-474 , emphasized the need for a standard with a "definite meaning.” Smith rejected the control test, in large part, 20 because it "failed to achieve either uniformity or certainty.”' He recognized that "[t]he administration of an

1985As our Court of Appeals aptly stated in McKissic v Bodine, 42 Mich App 203, 208 ; 201 NW2d 333 (1972), 'the problem with economic reality is that it is a conclusion, and it is not a test in the sense that there are any well-defined criteria upon which an objective determination can be based.’ ” Justice Talbot Smith, in his influential dissent in Powell, supra, pp 471-474 , emphasized the need for a standard with a "definite meaning.” Smith rejected the control test, in large part, 20 because it "failed to achieve either uniformity or certainty.”' He recognized that "[t]he administration of an

1985As our Court of Appeals aptly stated in McKissic v Bodine, 42 Mich App 203, 208 ; 201 NW2d 333 (1972), 'the problem with economic reality is that it is a conclusion, and it is not a test in the sense that there are any well-defined criteria upon which an objective determination can be based.’ ” Justice Talbot Smith, in his influential dissent in Powell, supra, pp 471-474 , emphasized the need for a standard with a "definite meaning.” Smith rejected the control test, in large part, 20 because it "failed to achieve either uniformity or certainty.”' He recognized that "[t]he administration of an

1982In People v Murray, 72 Mich 10, 16 ; 40 NW 29 (1888), the Court stated: "Without any requests from counsel it is the duty of *687 the circuit judge to see to it that the case goes to the jury in a clear and intelligent manner, so that they may have a clear and correct understanding of what it is they are to decide, and he should state to them fully the law applicable to the facts.

1982In People v Murray, 72 Mich 10, 16 ; 40 NW 29 (1888), the Court stated: "Without any requests from counsel it is the duty of *687 the circuit judge to see to it that the case goes to the jury in a clear and intelligent manner, so that they may have a clear and correct understanding of what it is they are to decide, and he should state to them fully the law applicable to the facts.