need inquiry in Florida

2003This will permit reinstatement of the procedure in federal practice and earlier Florida practice requiring a response to each amended pleading, thus simplifying the court file under the doctrine of Dee v. Southern Brewing Co., 146 Fla. 588 , 1 So.2d 562 (1941). 2003 Amendment.

2003This will permit reinstatement of the procedure in federal practice and earlier Florida practice requiring a response to each amended pleading, thus simplifying the court file under the doctrine of Dee v. Southern Brewing Co., 146 Fla. 588 , 1 So.2d 562 (1941). 2003 Amendment.

2018In Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), the court set forth a procedure for handling a request to discharge court-appointed counsel.

2004Thus, the allegations are insufficient to trigger the need for an inquiry under Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), and Hardwick v. State, 521 So.2d 1071 (Fla.1988), and their progeny on the issue of defense counsel's competency, or to require further questioning under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), regarding whether Appellant wished to proceed pro se.

1997Ruiz v. Cold Storage & Insulation Contractors, Inc., 306 So.2d 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).

1977In Ruiz v. Cold Storage & Insulation Contractors, *1219 306 So.2d 153 (Fla.2d DCA 1975), we said that it is error for a trial judge, upon request, not to instruct the jury on concurrent causation when two criteria are met: first, the facts as viewed most favorably to the plaintiff support the need for such an instruction; and second, the failure to give the instruction may mislead the jury.

1986Id.

1986Id.

1982Neither Washington nor Thompson objected to the joint representation or requested the appointment of separate counsel. 1 Since representation of joint defendants by one lawyer is not per se unconstitutional, see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla.1968), and dual representation does not in itself trigger the need for inquiry as to possible conflict by the trial court, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the only arguable ground for reversal is that the record reveals that counsel f

1982Neither Washington nor Thompson objected to the joint representation or requested the appointment of separate counsel. 1 Since representation of joint defendants by one lawyer is not per se unconstitutional, see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla.1968), and dual representation does not in itself trigger the need for inquiry as to possible conflict by the trial court, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the only arguable ground for reversal is that the record reveals that counsel f

1982Neither Washington nor Thompson objected to the joint representation or requested the appointment of separate counsel. 1 Since representation of joint defendants by one lawyer is not per se unconstitutional, see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla.1968), and dual representation does not in itself trigger the need for inquiry as to possible conflict by the trial court, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the only arguable ground for reversal is that the record reveals that counsel f

1982Neither Washington nor Thompson objected to the joint representation or requested the appointment of separate counsel. [1] Since representation of joint defendants by one lawyer is not per se unconstitutional, see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1968), and dual representation does not in itself trigger the need for inquiry as to possible conflict by the trial court, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the only arguable ground for reversal is that the record reveals that counse

1982Neither Washington nor Thompson objected to the joint representation or requested the appointment of separate counsel. 1 Since representation of joint defendants by one lawyer is not per se unconstitutional, see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla.1968), and dual representation does not in itself trigger the need for inquiry as to possible conflict by the trial court, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the only arguable ground for reversal is that the record reveals that counsel f

1982Neither Washington nor Thompson objected to the joint representation or requested the appointment of separate counsel. [1] Since representation of joint defendants by one lawyer is not per se unconstitutional, see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1968), and dual representation does not in itself trigger the need for inquiry as to possible conflict by the trial court, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the only arguable ground for reversal is that the record reveals that counse

1982Neither Washington nor Thompson objected to the joint representation or requested the appointment of separate counsel. 1 Since representation of joint defendants by one lawyer is not per se unconstitutional, see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla.1968), and dual representation does not in itself trigger the need for inquiry as to possible conflict by the trial court, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the only arguable ground for reversal is that the record reveals that counsel f

1982Neither Washington nor Thompson objected to the joint representation or requested the appointment of separate counsel. 1 Since representation of joint defendants by one lawyer is not per se unconstitutional, see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Belton v. State, 217 So.2d 97 (Fla.1968), and dual representation does not in itself trigger the need for inquiry as to possible conflict by the trial court, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the only arguable ground for reversal is that the record reveals that counsel f

2019“We decline[d] to follow the Committee’s recommendation to adopt the new provision of the Code because we question[ed] the need for the privilege to the extent that it [was] procedural.” Id. at 537 .

2017Because this law does not amount to an entire ban on a class of guns or completely prohibit the bearing of firearms in public and does not affect the right to keep arms in one’s home, “where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 , 128 S.Ct. 2783 , we conclude that Florida’s Open Carry Law does not severely burden the right.

2017Because this law does not amount to an entire ban on a class of guns or completely prohibit the bearing of firearms in public and does not affect the right to keep arms in one’s home, “where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 , 128 S.Ct. 2783 , we conclude that Florida’s Open Carry Law does not severely burden the right.

2017As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, a law that “was neither designed to nor has the effect of prohibiting the possession of any class of firearms . . . is more accurately characterized as a regulation of the manner in which persons may lawfully exercise their Second Amendment rights.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97 .

2015Subsequent to our decision in Manning and subsequent to Judge- Altenbernd pointing out in Ivey v. Department of Children and Family Services, 974 So.2d 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), the need for a rule of procedure to address the appropriate mechanism to bring an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in a Jimmy Ryce Act case, the Florida Supreme Court adopted rule 4.460, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure for Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators.

2007When a plaintiff requests a concurring cause instruction, the court commits reversible error if “[f]irst, the facts as viewed most favorably to the plaintiff support the need for such an instruction, and second, the failure to give the instruction may mislead the jury.” Roby v. Kingsley, 492 So.2d 789 , 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

2005NOTES [1] See Bill Holt Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Cousins, 904 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (revisiting prior interlocutory order determining that order on review was an appealable non-final order); see also Hialeah Hotel, Inc. v. Woods, 778 So.2d 314, 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (noting that a ruling by a motions panel of an appellate court may be revisited by the merits panel). [2] This conclusion obviated the need for an analysis as to whether the FEC has been irreparably harmed by the circuit court's order.

2004Thus, the allegations are insufficient to trigger the need for an inquiry under Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), and Hardwick v. State, 521 So.2d 1071 (Fla.1988), and their progeny on the issue of defense counsel's competency, or to require further questioning under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), regarding whether Appellant wished to proceed pro se.

2004Thus, the allegations are insufficient to trigger the need for an inquiry under Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), and Hardwick v. State, 521 So.2d 1071 (Fla.1988), and their progeny on the issue of defense counsel's competency, or to require further questioning under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), regarding whether Appellant wished to proceed pro se.

2004Thus, the allegations are insufficient to trigger the need for an inquiry under Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), and Hardwick v. State, 521 So.2d 1071 (Fla.1988), and their progeny on the issue of defense counsel's competency, or to require further questioning under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), regarding whether Appellant wished to proceed pro se.

2003The California Supreme Court recognized the need for this exception in Doyle v. Giuliucci, 62 Cal.2d 606 , 43 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 401 P.2d 1 (1965).

2003The California Supreme Court recognized the need for this exception in Doyle v. Giuliucci, 62 Cal.2d 606 , 43 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 401 P.2d 1 (1965).