21 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wiedemergreen2 sentences2025The court based its credibility finding on Hatfield’s “incredible and unbelievable” trial testimony and the fact that he could not recall any of the names of these individuals at the law library. ¶9 Finally, addressing the factors in People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 441-42 (Colo. 1993), the district court found that there were no outside influences that prevented Hatfield from seeking postconviction relief in a timely fashion and the need to challenge 3 the conviction was present “from day one.” Thus, the court concluded that the motion was untimely and that Hatfield had not alleged sufficien 2000People v. Wiedemer, supra. Here, defendant argues that, by challenging the nature of the Virginia conviction in a pre-trial motion, .at the habitual phase, and on appeal to this court, he did take advantage of the avenues of relief available to him. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hubbardgreen2 sentences1993He notes that successive Crim.P. 35(c) motions challenging the same conviction are ordinarily precluded, see Crim.P. 35(c)(3) (“The court need not entertain a second motion or successive motions for similar relief based upon the same or similar allegations on behalf of the same prisoner.”); People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 243, 249 , 519 P.2d 945, 948 (1974) (if a second or successive post-conviction relief motion is filed, it may be summarily dismissed unless trial judge finds the failure to include newly-asserted grounds for relief in first motion excusable), and that a defendant must have a pre 1993He notes that successive Crim.P. 35(c) motions challenging the same conviction are ordinarily precluded, see Crim.P. 35(c)(3) (“The court need not entertain a second motion or successive motions for similar relief based upon the same or similar allegations on behalf of the same prisoner.”); People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 243, 249 , 519 P.2d 945, 948 (1974) (if a second or successive post-conviction relief motion is filed, it may be summarily dismissed unless trial judge finds the failure to include newly-asserted grounds for relief in first motion excusable), and that a defendant must have a pre | 1 | 2 |
Close v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2015Martinez-Huerta asserted in his Crim, P. 35(c) motion that due to his reliance on his plea counsel's erroneous advice, he was unaware of the need to challenge his conviction until August 2018 when he was placed in deportation proceedings, We conclude that Martinez-Huerta has pleaded facts that warrant a hearing on justifiable excuse or excusable neglect. - A. - Standard of Review T8 "Justifiable exeuse or excusable neglect based on the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel is a matter that should be addressed, in the first instance, by the trial court." Close v. People, 180 P.3d 1015, 1019 2015Our review is limited to the question of whether the defendant "was entitled to a hearing to determine the applicability of the time bar." Id. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Browngreen2 sentences2013But see Brown, 617 F.3d at 861 (questioning whether the trustworthiness standard should be treated as a "quaint, though now irrelevant, reminder of the Court's pre-Miranda days"); United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639 , 641 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1999) ("[P]ost-Miranda, the need for the rule, especially insofar as it protects against involuntary confessions, is even more questionable."). . 2013See, eg., Brown, 617 F.3d at 863 (explaining that, under Smith, if "a defendant admits that he drove a car that had an illegal sawed-off shotgun in its trunk, it is sufficient for the independent corroborating evidence to show that he drove that particular car'"); Bryce, 208 F.3d at 355 (dividing trustworthiness issues ""into two categories" depending on whether a confession is inherently reliable so as to be "self-corroborating"); United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 591-92 (9th Cir.1992) (announcing a "two-pronged" corroboration requirement that includes a "modern corpus delicti rul | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Raul Lopez-Alvarezgreen1 sentence2013See, eg., Brown, 617 F.3d at 863 (explaining that, under Smith, if "a defendant admits that he drove a car that had an illegal sawed-off shotgun in its trunk, it is sufficient for the independent corroborating evidence to show that he drove that particular car'"); Bryce, 208 F.3d at 355 (dividing trustworthiness issues ""into two categories" depending on whether a confession is inherently reliable so as to be "self-corroborating"); United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 591-92 (9th Cir.1992) (announcing a "two-pronged" corroboration requirement that includes a "modern corpus delicti rul | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ewan Bryce, Also Known as Ian, Darren Johnson, Also Known as D-Nice, Also Known as Dgreen1 sentence2013See, eg., Brown, 617 F.3d at 863 (explaining that, under Smith, if "a defendant admits that he drove a car that had an illegal sawed-off shotgun in its trunk, it is sufficient for the independent corroborating evidence to show that he drove that particular car'"); Bryce, 208 F.3d at 355 (dividing trustworthiness issues ""into two categories" depending on whether a confession is inherently reliable so as to be "self-corroborating"); United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 591-92 (9th Cir.1992) (announcing a "two-pronged" corroboration requirement that includes a "modern corpus delicti rul | 1 | 1 |
Day v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2012We agree with Wolter that the court erred in rejecting the instruction. 118 The proffered instruction accurately states the law, see Day, 255 P.3d at 1069 ("a poor outcome does not, standing alone, constitute negligence"); the evidence provided by the expert witnesses for both sides indicated that this was a bad outcome; and Wolter's expert specifically said that the outcome could occur without negligence, trigger ing the need for the instruction. | 1 | 1 |
Carmichael v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2012Cf. Carmichael v. People, 206 P.3d 800, 809-10 (Colo.2009) (where the defendant rejected a plea bargain because his counsel misad-vised him as to possible sentencing exposure, and the defendant filed a postconviction motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on that conduct, remedy was to reverse judgment of convietion and sentence, remand for a new trial, and allow renewed plea negotiations). 125 "The need for defense counsel to be completely free from a conflict of interest is of great importance and has a direct bearing on the quality of our criminal justic | 1 | 1 |
People v. Castrogreen1 sentence1998“The need for defense counsel to be completely free from a conflict of interest is of great importance and has a direct bearing on the quality of our criminal justice system.” Allen v. District Court, 184 Colo. 202 , 205, 519 P.2d 351 , 352-53 (1973); see also People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 943-45 (Colo.1983). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stephensgreen1 sentence1998See People v. Stephens, 837 P.2d 231 (Colo.App.1992)(criminal defendants are charged with knowledge of the time limitations contained in §16-5-402 and have a present need to challenge their convictions in a timely manner). | 1 | 1 |
Koelln v. Nexus Residential Treatment Facilitygreen1 sentence1993See Koelln v. Nexus Residential Treatment Facility, 494 N.W.2d 914 (Minn.App.1993) (reason for immunity, to encourage full disclosure of facts in a judicial setting, would not be met by giving immunity to private residential treatment center). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Munizgreen1 sentence1993He notes that successive Crim.P. 35(c) motions challenging the same conviction are ordinarily precluded, see Crim.P. 35(c)(3) (“The court need not entertain a second motion or successive motions for similar relief based upon the same or similar allegations on behalf of the same prisoner.”); People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 243, 249 , 519 P.2d 945, 948 (1974) (if a second or successive post-conviction relief motion is filed, it may be summarily dismissed unless trial judge finds the failure to include newly-asserted grounds for relief in first motion excusable), and that a defendant must have a pre | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Wolfgreen2 sentences1986Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 605 , 99 S.Ct. at 3026 (brackets in original). 10 . 1986Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 605 , 99 S.Ct. at 3026 (brackets in original). 10 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Browngreen2 sentences2013But see Brown, 617 F.3d at 861 (questioning whether the trustworthiness standard should be treated as a "quaint, though now irrelevant, reminder of the Court's pre-Miranda days"); United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639 , 641 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1999) ("[P]ost-Miranda, the need for the rule, especially insofar as it protects against involuntary confessions, is even more questionable."). . 2013See, eg., Brown, 617 F.3d at 863 (explaining that, under Smith, if "a defendant admits that he drove a car that had an illegal sawed-off shotgun in its trunk, it is sufficient for the independent corroborating evidence to show that he drove that particular car'"); Bryce, 208 F.3d at 355 (dividing trustworthiness issues ""into two categories" depending on whether a confession is inherently reliable so as to be "self-corroborating"); United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 591-92 (9th Cir.1992) (announcing a "two-pronged" corroboration requirement that includes a "modern corpus delicti rul | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wittreingreen1 sentence2010But see People v. Wittrein, 221 P.3d 1076, 1087-88 (Colo.2009) (Martinez, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that, even in the absence of waiver of a privilege, a balancing is necessary of the defendant's due process rights and the need for the privilege). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Allen v. District Court
green
2 sentences1998“The need for defense counsel to be completely free from a conflict of interest is of great importance and has a direct bearing on the quality of our criminal justice system.” Allen v. District Court, 184 Colo. 202 , 205, 519 P.2d 351 , 352-53 (1973); see also People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 943-45 (Colo.1983). 1998“The need for defense counsel to be completely free from a conflict of interest is of great importance and has a direct bearing on the quality of our criminal justice system.” Allen v. District Court, 184 Colo. 202 , 205, 519 P.2d 351 , 352-53 (1973); see also People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 943-45 (Colo.1983). | 3 | 1989–2012 |
People v. Mershon
green
2 sentences2019These factual assertions, if true, would establish that: (1) there were circumstances or outside influences that prevented him from filing his motion in a timely fashion; (2) he had no reason to question the constitutionality of his conviction during the three-year limitations period; (3) although he had a present need to challenge his conviction, see People v. Mershon , 874 P.2d 1025 , 1036-37 (Colo. 1994), he neither knew his conviction was constitutionally infirm nor had reason to question its validity; and (4) the passage of time would not affect the prosecution's ability to respond to his 2019Consequently, Alvarado Hinojos was on notice that he needed to diligently investigate his counsel's advice and, if appropriate, file a timely motion challenging the validity of his conviction. ¶24 Thus, applying the Wiedemer factors, and considering Alvarado Hinojos's factual allegations (which we presume to be true) together with the plea agreement, we conclude that: (1) he had a present need to challenge his conviction, see People v. Mershon , 874 P.2d 1025 , 1036-37 (Colo. 1994), and the plea agreement gave him a reason to question the validity of his conviction; (2) he failed to diligently | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Bucci
green
2 sentences1993He notes that successive Crim.P. 35(c) motions challenging the same conviction are ordinarily precluded, see Crim.P. 35(c)(3) (“The court need not entertain a second motion or successive motions for similar relief based upon the same or similar allegations on behalf of the same prisoner.”); People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 243, 249 , 519 P.2d 945, 948 (1974) (if a second or successive post-conviction relief motion is filed, it may be summarily dismissed unless trial judge finds the failure to include newly-asserted grounds for relief in first motion excusable), and that a defendant must have a pre 1993He notes that successive Crim.P. 35(c) motions challenging the same conviction are ordinarily precluded, see Crim.P. 35(c)(3) (“The court need not entertain a second motion or successive motions for similar relief based upon the same or similar allegations on behalf of the same prisoner.”); People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 243, 249 , 519 P.2d 945, 948 (1974) (if a second or successive post-conviction relief motion is filed, it may be summarily dismissed unless trial judge finds the failure to include newly-asserted grounds for relief in first motion excusable), and that a defendant must have a pre | 2 | 1988–1993 |
United States v. Dickerson, Mark A.
green
1 sentence2013But see Brown, 617 F.3d at 861 (questioning whether the trustworthiness standard should be treated as a "quaint, though now irrelevant, reminder of the Court's pre-Miranda days"); United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639 , 641 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1999) ("[P]ost-Miranda, the need for the rule, especially insofar as it protects against involuntary confessions, is even more questionable."). . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Buckley Powder Co. v. State
green
1 sentence1997The court of appeals stated that “need, which is not a delineated requirement of C.R.C.P. 23(b)(2) and C.R.C.P. 23(b)(3), lies outside the scope of the rule and cannot be invoked as a basis for denying class certification.” Buckley Powder, 924 P.2d at 1136 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Fagerholm
green
1 sentence1994The Stephens court held that enactment of § 16-5-402 and the establishment of a five-year grace period by our supreme court in People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689 (Colo.1989) for any collateral attack on convictions entered prior to July 1, 1984, created a present need to challenge those convictions by July 1, 1989. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Wilson v. People
green
2 sentences1994We found that although section 17-27-114 7 “does *399 not explicitly require a hearing, ... the need for a hearing of some sort is implicit in the language of the statute.” Id. at 641 . 1994With regard to resentencing after revocation of the defendant’s placement in community corrections, we held that “the defendant should have the opportunity to present evidence of any such facts and circumstances in mitigation and to argue the relevance of such information with respect to the sentence to be imposed.” Id. at 643 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Moland v. People
green
1 sentence1993He notes that successive Crim.P. 35(c) motions challenging the same conviction are ordinarily precluded, see Crim.P. 35(c)(3) (“The court need not entertain a second motion or successive motions for similar relief based upon the same or similar allegations on behalf of the same prisoner.”); People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 243, 249 , 519 P.2d 945, 948 (1974) (if a second or successive post-conviction relief motion is filed, it may be summarily dismissed unless trial judge finds the failure to include newly-asserted grounds for relief in first motion excusable), and that a defendant must have a pre | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Bravo
green
1 sentence1993The defendant also relies on People v. Bravo, 692 P.2d 325 (Colo.App.1984), which held that the prosecution may assert a claim of laches as a bar to Crim.P. 35(c) relief when a defendant unconscionably delays enforcing his rights and the prosecution suffers a resultant prejudice. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Hampton
green
2 sentences1988Hampton, 187 Colo. at 134 , 528 P.2d at 1312 . 1988Hampton, 187 Colo. at 134 , 528 P.2d at 1312 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Kitto v. Gilbert
green
1 sentence1985Second, the presumption eliminates the need for an instruction patterned after C.J.I.-Civ.2d 9:12 which states: “The occurrence of an accident does not raise any presumption of negligence on the part of either the plaintiff or the defendant.” See Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo.App. 374 , 570 P.2d 544 (1977). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Public Service Co.
green
1 sentence1984In Federal Insurance, the court observed that compelling reasons continue to exist to warrant the highest degree of care on the part of electrical utility companies because: "(1) electrical energy possesses inherently dangerous properties, (2) electric utilities possess expertise in dealing with electrical phenomena and in operating facilities for delivery of electricity, and (3) the general public is not able to recognize and guard against the dangerous potential of certain situations.” 194 Colo, at 112, 570 P.2d at 242 . 11 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.