need defense in Delaware

2016Indeed, Dr. Finkelstein testified that he did not necessarily have full confidence that he received “all the matters about [Reyes’] factual history.”200 197 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 . 198 See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009) (the United States Supreme Court explained that a “fatalistic or uncooperative [client] . . . does not obviate the need for defense counsel to conduct some sort of mitigation investigation.”); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 , 381- 83, 89–90 (2005) (determining that the defense counsel’s mitigation investigation was deficient notwithstanding the defen

2015In Porter v. McCollum,77 the United States Supreme Court explained that a “fatalistic or uncooperative [client] . . . does not obviate the need for defense counsel to conduct some sort of mitigation investigation.”78 Similarly, in Rompilla v. Beard,79 the United States Supreme Court determined that the defense counsel’s mitigation 76 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 . 77 558 U.S. 30 (2009). 78 Id. at 40 (alterations in original). 79 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 21 investigation was deficient notwithstanding the defendant’s minimal contributions and unwillingness to address his past.80 J.

2023Were the Court to need a hearing on postconviction—where Mr. Goodman shoulders the burden (see supra note 28)—the State would be permitted to supplement its earlier- abbreviated sentencing presentation to counter Mr. Goodman’s now-minted prejudice claim; that is, to show Mr. Goodman is not due relief because he was, in fact, due the § 1448(e)(1)(c) enhancement. 44 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”); Peters, 283 A.3d at 697 (for this

2016Indeed, Dr. Finkelstein testified that he did not necessarily have full confidence that he received “all the matters about [Reyes’] factual history.”200 197 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 . 198 See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009) (the United States Supreme Court explained that a “fatalistic or uncooperative [client] . . . does not obviate the need for defense counsel to conduct some sort of mitigation investigation.”); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 , 381- 83, 89–90 (2005) (determining that the defense counsel’s mitigation investigation was deficient notwithstanding the defen

2016Indeed, Dr. Finkelstein testified that he did not necessarily have full confidence that he received “all the matters about [Reyes’] factual history.”200 197 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 . 198 See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009) (the United States Supreme Court explained that a “fatalistic or uncooperative [client] . . . does not obviate the need for defense counsel to conduct some sort of mitigation investigation.”); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 , 381- 83, 89–90 (2005) (determining that the defense counsel’s mitigation investigation was deficient notwithstanding the defen

2015In Porter v. McCollum,77 the United States Supreme Court explained that a “fatalistic or uncooperative [client] . . . does not obviate the need for defense counsel to conduct some sort of mitigation investigation.”78 Similarly, in Rompilla v. Beard,79 the United States Supreme Court determined that the defense counsel’s mitigation 76 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 . 77 558 U.S. 30 (2009). 78 Id. at 40 (alterations in original). 79 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 21 investigation was deficient notwithstanding the defendant’s minimal contributions and unwillingness to address his past.80 J.

2025Ass’n v. Paul, 503 A.2d 636, 645 (Del.

2023Were the Court to need a hearing on postconviction—where Mr. Goodman shoulders the burden (see supra note 28)—the State would be permitted to supplement its earlier- abbreviated sentencing presentation to counter Mr. Goodman’s now-minted prejudice claim; that is, to show Mr. Goodman is not due relief because he was, in fact, due the § 1448(e)(1)(c) enhancement. 44 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”); Peters, 283 A.3d at 697 (for this

2022Va. July 18, 2011) (“Plaintiff cannot meet the standard of ‘exceptional circumstances’ because it cannot even meet the lower threshold of ‘substantial need.’”); U.S. v. 22.80 Acres of Land, 107 F.R.D. 20, 23 (N.D.

2021Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1218 (Del. 2012) (noting that contractual provisions establishing a fiduciary standard in the limited liability company agreement may preclude the need for analysis of statutory standards). 64 See, e.g., Pls.’ OB 6. 65 See Fortis Advisors LLC v. Allergan W.C.

2019Therefore, whether Tingle had waived his right to counsel was not an issue, and no separate colloquy on the topic of self-representation was required. 31 Id. at 107 (emphasis in original). 9 Second, Tingle’s argument hinges on what he characterizes his “tacit request to represent himself at trial.”32 He claims that his questioning of the trial judge about whether he could make an objection triggered the need for an inquiry into whether Tingle wished to exercise his right to self-representation.

2017Third, the Heller Court's statement that “the need for defense of self, family, and property” is "most acute” in the home, 554 U.S. at 628 , 128 S.Ct. 2783 (emphasis added), suggests that the need must be less acute elsewhere—-but nonetheless present.

2017Third, the Heller Court's statement that “the need for defense of self, family, and property” is "most acute” in the home, 554 U.S. at 628 , 128 S.Ct. 2783 (emphasis added), suggests that the need must be less acute elsewhere—-but nonetheless present.

1990See generally, Riggs, supra. Moreover, “[t]he more general and important right of those who look to fiduciaries to safeguard their interests, to be able to determine the proper functioning of the fiduciary, outweighs the need for the privilege and its base of attorney-client confidence.” Valente, 68 F.R.D. at 369-70, n. 16 .

1990See generally, Riggs, supra. Moreover, “[t]he more general and important right of those who look to fiduciaries to safeguard their interests, to be able to determine the proper functioning of the fiduciary, outweighs the need for the privilege and its base of attorney-client confidence.” Valente, 68 F.R.D. at 369-70, n. 16 .