need hearing in Connecticut

2016The decision whether to grant a hearing requires the exercise of sound judicial discre- tion.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1 , 21–22, 751 A.2d 298 (2000).

2016The decision whether to grant a hearing requires the exercise of sound judicial discre- tion.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1 , 21–22, 751 A.2d 298 (2000).

2004This case calls to mind the policy that although “[t]he trial court should carefully weigh the need for a hearing in each case . . . this is not to say that a hearing should be available on demand.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn. App. 59, 86 , 782 A.2d 149 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923 , 782 A.2d 1251 (2001); State v. Janice, 20 Conn. App. 212, 214 , 565 A.2d 553 , cert. denied, 213 Conn. 811 , 568 A.2d 795 (1989).

2004This case calls to mind the policy that although “[t]he trial court should carefully weigh the need for a hearing in each case . . . this is not to say that a hearing should be available on demand.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn. App. 59, 86 , 782 A.2d 149 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923 , 782 A.2d 1251 (2001); State v. Janice, 20 Conn. App. 212, 214 , 565 A.2d 553 , cert. denied, 213 Conn. 811 , 568 A.2d 795 (1989).

1993The decision to grant a hearing requires the exercise of sound judicial discretion.” State v. Lloyd, 199 Conn. 359, 366 , 507 A.2d 992 (1986); State v. Johnson, supra, 488-89 .

1993The decision to grant a hearing requires the exercise of sound judicial discretion.” State v. Lloyd, 199 Conn. 359, 366 , 507 A.2d 992 (1986); State v. Johnson, supra, 488-89 .

2024Subsequently, the privilege was expanded to bar a variety of retaliatory civil claims arising from communications or communicative acts 10 As explained in more detail by our Supreme Court in Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650 , 974 A.2d 669 (2009), ‘‘[t]rial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case.’’ The court in Conboy agreed with analogous federal jurisprudence that ‘‘[l]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complai

2024Subsequently, the privilege was expanded to bar a variety of retaliatory civil claims arising from communications or communicative acts 10 As explained in more detail by our Supreme Court in Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650 , 974 A.2d 669 (2009), ‘‘[t]rial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case.’’ The court in Conboy agreed with analogous federal jurisprudence that ‘‘[l]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complai

2024The trial court should carefully weigh the need for a hearing in each case, but this is not to say that a hearing should be available on demand.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Norris, 213 Conn. App. 253 , 268–69, 277 A.3d 839 , cert. denied, 345 Conn. 910 , 283 A.3d 980 (2022).

2020We subsequently granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to determining (1) whether ‘‘the Appel- late Court properly decline[d] to review the petitioner’s claim that the definition of ‘custody’ in . . . § 52-466 should include individuals in the petitioner’s circum- stances, when the first opportunity to raise that claim was in the petitioner’s reply brief because the petitioner had no notice that the respondent would raise an unpre- served alternative ground to affirm the habeas court’s judgment,’’ and (2) whether ‘‘§ 52-466 include[s] habeas petitioners whose se

2020We subsequently granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to determining (1) whether ‘‘the Appel- late Court properly decline[d] to review the petitioner’s claim that the definition of ‘custody’ in . . . § 52-466 should include individuals in the petitioner’s circum- stances, when the first opportunity to raise that claim was in the petitioner’s reply brief because the petitioner had no notice that the respondent would raise an unpre- served alternative ground to affirm the habeas court’s judgment,’’ and (2) whether ‘‘§ 52-466 include[s] habeas petitioners whose se

2018The doctrine then developed to encompass and bar defamation claims against all participants in judicial proceedings, including judges, attorneys, parties, and witnesses.... [Our Supreme Court] further noted that, [l]ike other jurisdictions, Connecticut has long recognized the litigation privilege, and that [t]he general rule is that defamatory words spoken upon an occasion absolutely privileged, though spoken falsely, knowingly, and with express malice, impose no liability for damages recoverable in an action in slander .... *992 "Furthermore, in Rioux v. Barry , [ 283 Conn. 338 , 343-44, 927

2018The doctrine then developed to encompass and bar defamation claims against all participants in judicial proceedings, including judges, attorneys, parties, and witnesses.... [Our Supreme Court] further noted that, [l]ike other jurisdictions, Connecticut has long recognized the litigation privilege, and that [t]he general rule is that defamatory words spoken upon an occasion absolutely privileged, though spoken falsely, knowingly, and with express malice, impose no liability for damages recoverable in an action in slander .... *992 "Furthermore, in Rioux v. Barry , [ 283 Conn. 338 , 343-44, 927

2017Germaine , 77 Conn.App. 846 , 848, 825 A.2d 827 , cert. denied, 267 Conn. 901 , 838 A.2d 210 (2003). "[T]he doctrine of absolute immunity originated in response to the need to bar persons accused of crimes from suing their accusers for defamation....

2017Germaine , 77 Conn.App. 846 , 848, 825 A.2d 827 , cert. denied, 267 Conn. 901 , 838 A.2d 210 (2003). "[T]he doctrine of absolute immunity originated in response to the need to bar persons accused of crimes from suing their accusers for defamation....

2017Germaine , 77 Conn.App. 846 , 848, 825 A.2d 827 , cert. denied, 267 Conn. 901 , 838 A.2d 210 (2003). "[T]he doctrine of absolute immunity originated in response to the need to bar persons accused of crimes from suing their accusers for defamation....

2017Germaine , 77 Conn.App. 846 , 848, 825 A.2d 827 , cert. denied, 267 Conn. 901 , 838 A.2d 210 (2003). "[T]he doctrine of absolute immunity originated in response to the need to bar persons accused of crimes from suing their accusers for defamation....

2016Connecticut has long recognized the litigation privilege, and our Supreme Court has stated that the privilege "extends to judges, counsel and witnesses participating in judicial proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 537, 69 A.3d 880 , quoting Blakeslee & Sons v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223 , 232, 29 A. 473 (1894), overruled in part on other grounds, Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243 , 510 A.2d 1337 (1986). 12 In Blakeslee & Sons, our Supreme Court explained that the privilege was "founded upon the principle that in certain cases it is advantageous for the public interest that person

2016Connecticut has long recognized the litigation privilege, and our Supreme Court has stated that the privilege "extends to judges, counsel and witnesses participating in judicial proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 537, 69 A.3d 880 , quoting Blakeslee & Sons v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223 , 232, 29 A. 473 (1894), overruled in part on other grounds, Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243 , 510 A.2d 1337 (1986). 12 In Blakeslee & Sons, our Supreme Court explained that the privilege was "founded upon the principle that in certain cases it is advantageous for the public interest that person

2016Connecticut has long recognized the litigation privilege, and our Supreme Court has stated that the privilege "extends to judges, counsel and witnesses participating in judicial proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 537, 69 A.3d 880 , quoting Blakeslee & Sons v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223 , 232, 29 A. 473 (1894), overruled in part on other grounds, Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243 , 510 A.2d 1337 (1986). 12 In Blakeslee & Sons, our Supreme Court explained that the privilege was "founded upon the principle that in certain cases it is advantageous for the public interest that person

2016Connecticut has long recognized the litigation privilege, and our Supreme Court has stated that the privilege "extends to judges, counsel and witnesses participating in judicial proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 537, 69 A.3d 880 , quoting Blakeslee & Sons v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223 , 232, 29 A. 473 (1894), overruled in part on other grounds, Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243 , 510 A.2d 1337 (1986). 12 In Blakeslee & Sons, our Supreme Court explained that the privilege was "founded upon the principle that in certain cases it is advantageous for the public interest that person

2015(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Furthermore, the authority on which the court in Skakel relied for this premise was State v. Velez, supra, 215 Conn. 674 , which predated this court’s decision in Barton, upholding a finding of proba- ble cause based on an informant’s tip that included a statement against penal interest and lacked independent police corroboration. 8 We presume that officers provide all of the relevant facts in the affidavit to enable the issuing judge to undertake an independent evaluation of an informant’s credibility, lest the state risk the possibility o

2015(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Furthermore, the authority on which the court in Skakel relied for this premise was State v. Velez, supra, 215 Conn. 674 , which predated this court’s decision in Barton, upholding a finding of proba- ble cause based on an informant’s tip that included a statement against penal interest and lacked independent police corroboration. 8 We presume that officers provide all of the relevant facts in the affidavit to enable the issuing judge to undertake an independent evaluation of an informant’s credibility, lest the state risk the possibility o

2011A trial court’s opinion, therefore, of the competency of a defendant is highly significant.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Connor, 292 Conn. 483, 523-24 , 973 A.2d 627 (2009).

2011A trial court’s opinion, therefore, of the competency of a defendant is highly significant.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Connor, 292 Conn. 483, 523-24 , 973 A.2d 627 (2009).

2009The decision whether to grant a hearing requires the exercise of sound judicial discretion.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation *660 marks omitted.) State v. DesLaurier, 230 Conn. 572, 585-86 , 646 A.2d 108 (1994).

2009The decision whether to grant a hearing requires the exercise of sound judicial discretion.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation *660 marks omitted.) State v. DesLaurier, 230 Conn. 572, 585-86 , 646 A.2d 108 (1994).

2009Id., at 579 , 881 A.2d 290 .

2009Id., at 579 , 881 A.2d 290 .

2007Although we recognize that . . . there may be circumstances in which the trial court perceives a need for an inquiry exceeding the scope of voir dire, we conclude that, as in Brown, the form and scope of the court’s inquiry, if any, into possible taint of a venire panel before voir dire depends on the circumstances of the case and it is to be determined by the trial court within the exercise of its discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vazquez, 87 Conn. App. 792, 805-806 , *196 867 A.2d 15 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 934 , 875 A.2d 544 (2005).

2007Although we recognize that . . . there may be circumstances in which the trial court perceives a need for an inquiry exceeding the scope of voir dire, we conclude that, as in Brown, the form and scope of the court’s inquiry, if any, into possible taint of a venire panel before voir dire depends on the circumstances of the case and it is to be determined by the trial court within the exercise of its discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vazquez, 87 Conn. App. 792, 805-806 , *196 867 A.2d 15 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 934 , 875 A.2d 544 (2005).

2007Although we recognize that . . . there may be circumstances in which the trial court perceives a need for an inquiry exceeding the scope of voir dire, we conclude that, as in Brown, the form and scope of the court’s inquiry, if any, into possible taint of a venire panel before voir dire depends on the circumstances of the case and it is to be determined by the trial court within the exercise of its discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vazquez, 87 Conn. App. 792, 805-806 , *196 867 A.2d 15 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 934 , 875 A.2d 544 (2005).

2007Although we recognize that . . . there may be circumstances in which the trial court perceives a need for an inquiry exceeding the scope of voir dire, we conclude that, as in Brown, the form and scope of the court’s inquiry, if any, into possible taint of a venire panel before voir dire depends on the circumstances of the case and it is to be determined by the trial court within the exercise of its discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vazquez, 87 Conn. App. 792, 805-806 , *196 867 A.2d 15 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 934 , 875 A.2d 544 (2005).

2007The alleged spoliator, a police officer, kept the tortfeasor, who had taken drugs, from the accident scene until his condition had improved so that the investigating officer was not alerted to the need to test the tortfeasor’s blood or urine for drugs. 17 Id. *675 A Florida court allowed a plaintiff to amend her complaint to include a third party intentional spoliation claim in Kimball v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., supra, 901 So. 2d 296 .

2005The majority states that the information sought in Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 137 Ariz. 327 , consisted only of nonprivileged materials prepared in anticipation of litigation to which the substantial need standard applies, implying that it has no relevance to the present case.

2005Co. did not concern a claim of bad faith; therefore, it is not controlling on the issue of whether we should recognize a new exception in the present case other than to warn against doing it on the basis of need alone. [3] The majority states that the information sought in Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 137 Ariz. 327 , 670 P.2d 725 , consisted only of nonprivileged materials prepared in anticipation of litigation to which the substantial need standard applies, implying that it has no relevance to the present case.

2004This case calls to mind the policy that although “[t]he trial court should carefully weigh the need for a hearing in each case . . . this is not to say that a hearing should be available on demand.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn. App. 59, 86 , 782 A.2d 149 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923 , 782 A.2d 1251 (2001); State v. Janice, 20 Conn. App. 212, 214 , 565 A.2d 553 , cert. denied, 213 Conn. 811 , 568 A.2d 795 (1989).

2004This case calls to mind the policy that although “[t]he trial court should carefully weigh the need for a hearing in each case . . . this is not to say that a hearing should be available on demand.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn. App. 59, 86 , 782 A.2d 149 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923 , 782 A.2d 1251 (2001); State v. Janice, 20 Conn. App. 212, 214 , 565 A.2d 553 , cert. denied, 213 Conn. 811 , 568 A.2d 795 (1989).

2004This case calls to mind the policy that although “[t]he trial court should carefully weigh the need for a hearing in each case . . . this is not to say that a hearing should be available on demand.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn. App. 59, 86 , 782 A.2d 149 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923 , 782 A.2d 1251 (2001); State v. Janice, 20 Conn. App. 212, 214 , 565 A.2d 553 , cert. denied, 213 Conn. 811 , 568 A.2d 795 (1989).

2004This case calls to mind the policy that although “[t]he trial court should carefully weigh the need for a hearing in each case . . . this is not to say that a hearing should be available on demand.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn. App. 59, 86 , 782 A.2d 149 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923 , 782 A.2d 1251 (2001); State v. Janice, 20 Conn. App. 212, 214 , 565 A.2d 553 , cert. denied, 213 Conn. 811 , 568 A.2d 795 (1989).