sovereign immunity in Kansas

1970(K.S.A. now 1969 Supp. 16-204.) In apparent recognition of the sweeping character of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the underlying principle that a state (or a county as an arm of the state) can be sued only with its consent, this court has held that the statute has no application to judgments against the state or county. ( School District v. Kingman County Comm'rs., 127 Kan. 292 , 273 Pac. 427 ; Salthouse v. McPherson County, 115 Kan. 668 , 224 Pac. 70 ; Jackson County v. Kaul, 77 Kan. 717 , 96 Pac. 45 .

1970(K.S.A. now 1969 Supp. 16-204.) In apparent recognition of the sweeping character of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the underlying principle that a state (or a county as an arm of the state) can be sued only with its consent, this court has held that the statute has no application to judgments against the state or county. ( School District v. Kingman County Comm'rs., 127 Kan. 292 , 273 Pac. 427 ; Salthouse v. McPherson County, 115 Kan. 668 , 224 Pac. 70 ; Jackson County v. Kaul, 77 Kan. 717 , 96 Pac. 45 .

1970(K.S.A. now 1969 Supp. 16-204.) In apparent recognition of the sweeping character of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the underlying principle that a state (or a county as an arm of the state) can be sued only with its consent, this court has held that the statute has no application to judgments against the state or county. ( School District v. Kingman County Comm'rs., 127 Kan. 292 , 273 Pac. 427 ; Salthouse v. McPherson County, 115 Kan. 668 , 224 Pac. 70 ; Jackson County v. Kaul, 77 Kan. 717 , 96 Pac. 45 .

1970(K.S.A. now 1969 Supp. 16-204.) In apparent recognition of the sweeping character of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the underlying principle that a state (or a county as an arm of the state) can be sued only with its consent, this court has held that the statute has no application to judgments against the state or county. ( School District v. Kingman County Comm'rs., 127 Kan. 292 , 273 Pac. 427 ; Salthouse v. McPherson County, 115 Kan. 668 , 224 Pac. 70 ; Jackson County v. Kaul, 77 Kan. 717 , 96 Pac. 45 .

1985Brown v. State Highway Commission, 206 Kan. 49 , 476 P.2d 233 (1970); First Nat’l Bank v. Wabaunsee County Comm’rs, 145 Kan. 552 , 66 P.2d 558 (1937); School District v. Kingman County Comm’rs., 127 Kan. 292 , 273 Pac. 427 (1929); Salthouse v. McPherson County, 115 Kan. 668 , 224 Pac. 70 (1924).

1985Brown v. State Highway Commission, 206 Kan. 49 , 476 P.2d 233 (1970); First Nat’l Bank v. Wabaunsee County Comm’rs, 145 Kan. 552 , 66 P.2d 558 (1937); School District v. Kingman County Comm’rs., 127 Kan. 292 , 273 Pac. 427 (1929); Salthouse v. McPherson County, 115 Kan. 668 , 224 Pac. 70 (1924).

1975(Jackson County v. Kaul., 77 Kan. 715 , 96 Pac. 45 ; Salthouse v. McPherson County., 115 Kan. 668 , 224 Pac. 70 ; School District v. Kingman County Comm’rs., 127 Kan. 292 , 273 Pac. 427 ; First Nat’l Bank v. Wabaunsee County Comm’rs, 145 Kan. 552 , 66 P. 2d 558 ; Brown v. State Highway Commission, supra.) The rule which precludes a contracting party from recovering interest from the state or one of its political subdivisions in actions brought for breach of an express contract is based in part on a rule of the common law that the charging of interest is ipso facto abhorrent to morals and relig

1970(K.S.A. now 1969 Supp. 16-204.) In apparent recognition of the sweeping character of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the underlying principle that a state (or a county as an arm of the state) can be sued only with its consent, this court has held that the statute has no application to judgments against the state or county. ( School District v. Kingman County Comm'rs., 127 Kan. 292 , 273 Pac. 427 ; Salthouse v. McPherson County, 115 Kan. 668 , 224 Pac. 70 ; Jackson County v. Kaul, 77 Kan. 717 , 96 Pac. 45 .

2016Sovereign immunity thus "enforce[s] an 31 important constitutional limitation on the power of federal courts." Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284 , 131 S. Ct. 1651 , 179 L.

2016Sovereign immunity thus "enforce[s] an 31 important constitutional limitation on the power of federal courts." Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284 , 131 S. Ct. 1651 , 179 L.

2016Specifically determining whether the State is immune also presents a solely legal question, see Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Metropolitan Topeka Airport Authority, 23 Kan.

2004In discussing the longstanding principles of sovereignty enjoyed by Indian tribes, the Kizis court stated: “Absent a clear and unequivocal waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suits for damages against a tribe.” 260 Conn, at 53-54 (quoting Romanella v. Hayward, 933 F. Supp. 163, 167 [D.

2004The Lemke court also held Congress’ Public Law 83-280, ( 18 U.S.C. § 1162 [1988]; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 [1988]), which granted Minnesota broad criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over almost all Indian country, applied to the wrongful death action at issue and gave tire state court subject matter jurisdiction. 614 N.W.2d at 246 .

1997The Lewis opinion then cited Caywood v. Board of County Commissioners, 194 Kan. 419, 421 , 399 P.2d 561 (1965), and McCoy, 196 Kan. 506 , to justify holding that “[c]ounties, being agencies of the state, partake of attributes of the state itself insofar as the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the statute of *656 limitations, and particularly the lack of ability to engage in proprietary functions and activities. [Citation omitted].

1997The Lewis opinion then cited Caywood v. Board of County Commissioners, 194 Kan. 419, 421 , 399 P.2d 561 (1965), and McCoy, 196 Kan. 506 , to justify holding that “[c]ounties, being agencies of the state, partake of attributes of the state itself insofar as the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the statute of *656 limitations, and particularly the lack of ability to engage in proprietary functions and activities. [Citation omitted].

1997The Lewis opinion then cited Caywood v. Board of County Commissioners, 194 Kan. 419, 421 , 399 P.2d 561 (1965), and McCoy, 196 Kan. 506 , to justify holding that “[c]ounties, being agencies of the state, partake of attributes of the state itself insofar as the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the statute of *656 limitations, and particularly the lack of ability to engage in proprietary functions and activities. [Citation omitted].

1994The court determined in Shapiro that the Brown holding did not control the claim for interest against the system because the doctrine of sovereign immunity should not apply to a claim based upon the breach of an express contract. 216 Kan. at 355 .

1993The appellees rely on the reasoning and logic of this court’s recent decisions in Dobson v. Larkin Homes, Inc., 251 Kan. 50 , 832 P.2d 345 (1992); Admire Bank, 250 Kan. 688 ; and Harding v. K.C.

1993The appellees rely on the reasoning and logic of this court’s recent decisions in Dobson v. Larkin Homes, Inc., 251 Kan. 50 , 832 P.2d 345 (1992); Admire Bank, 250 Kan. 688 ; and Harding v. K.C.

1993The appellees rely on the reasoning and logic of this court’s recent decisions in Dobson v. Larkin Homes, Inc., 251 Kan. 50 , 832 P.2d 345 (1992); Admire Bank, 250 Kan. 688 ; and Harding v. K.C.

1993The appellees rely on the reasoning and logic of this court’s recent decisions in Dobson v. Larkin Homes, Inc., 251 Kan. 50 , 832 P.2d 345 (1992); Admire Bank, 250 Kan. 688 ; and Harding v. K.C.

1988The Supreme Court of California, relying on Holcomb , reversed and remanded the case for trial, concluding that "[w]hen the sister state enters into activities in this state, it is not exercising sovereign power over the citizens of this state and is not entitled to the benefits of the sovereign immunity doctrine as to those activities unless this state has conferred immunity by law *446 or as a matter of comity." 8 Cal.3d at 524 .

1988The Supreme Court of California, relying on Holcomb , reversed and remanded the case for trial, concluding that “[w]hen the sister state enters into activities in this state, it is not exercising sovereign power over the citizens of this state and is not entitled to the benefits of the sovereign immunity doctrine as to those activities unless this state has conferred immunity by law or as a matter of comity.” 8 Cal. 3d at 524 .

1985Brown v. State Highway Commission, 206 Kan. 49 , 476 P.2d 233 (1970); First Nat’l Bank v. Wabaunsee County Comm’rs, 145 Kan. 552 , 66 P.2d 558 (1937); School District v. Kingman County Comm’rs., 127 Kan. 292 , 273 Pac. 427 (1929); Salthouse v. McPherson County, 115 Kan. 668 , 224 Pac. 70 (1924).

1985Brown v. State Highway Commission, 206 Kan. 49 , 476 P.2d 233 (1970); First Nat’l Bank v. Wabaunsee County Comm’rs, 145 Kan. 552 , 66 P.2d 558 (1937); School District v. Kingman County Comm’rs., 127 Kan. 292 , 273 Pac. 427 (1929); Salthouse v. McPherson County, 115 Kan. 668 , 224 Pac. 70 (1924).

1984In Cross of City of Kansas City, 230 Kan. 545, 549 , 638 P.2d 933 (1982), the court stated as follows: “[W]e are of the opinion that a municipality or one of its agencies in the operation of a public waterworks, which also serves as the water supply for fire-fighting purposes, does so in a dual capacity and the furnishing of water for fire fighting is done in a governmental capacity and therefore falls under the cloak of immunity granted by the statute.” (Emphasis added.) While Cross was specifically addressed to the issue of a municipality’s sovereign immunity from suit brought against it, th

1984In Cross of City of Kansas City, 230 Kan. 545, 549 , 638 P.2d 933 (1982), the court stated as follows: “[W]e are of the opinion that a municipality or one of its agencies in the operation of a public waterworks, which also serves as the water supply for fire-fighting purposes, does so in a dual capacity and the furnishing of water for fire fighting is done in a governmental capacity and therefore falls under the cloak of immunity granted by the statute.” (Emphasis added.) While Cross was specifically addressed to the issue of a municipality’s sovereign immunity from suit brought against it, th

1977In Whitney v. City of Worcester, Mass., 366 N.E.2d 1210 (Mass. 1977), the court decided the doctrine would be abolished unless the legislature of the State of Massachusetts acted to modify it during its 1978 *69 legislative session.

1977In Whitney v. City of Worcester, Mass., 366 N.E.2d 1210 (Mass. 1977), the court decided the doctrine would be abolished unless the legislature of the State of Massachusetts acted to modify it during its 1978 legislative session.

1976The Missouri Supreme Court, which has consistently held the issue of governmental immunity is for the legislature, said in Payne v. County of Jackson, 484 S. W. 2d 483 [Mo. 1972]: “. . . [Wholesale abrogation of the sovereign immunity doctrine could very well deplete the governmental treasury to a point where proper performance of governmental duties would be impaired. . . .” (p. 486.) Second, governmental immunity enables government to function unhampered by the threat of time, and energy consuming legal actions, which would inhibit the administration of traditional state activities.

1976The Missouri Supreme Court, which has consistently held the issue of governmental immunity is for the legislature, said in Payne v. County of Jackson, 484 S.W.2d 483 [Mo. 1972]: "... [W]holesale abrogation of the sovereign immunity doctrine could very well deplete the governmental treasury to a point where proper performance of governmental duties would be impaired...." (p. 486.) Second, governmental immunity enables government to function unhampered by the threat of time and energy consuming legal actions, which would inhibit the administration of traditional state activities.

1973The following cases since the Carroll case indicate that sovereign immunity from tort and nuisance lives on in this state with respect to governmental functions: Smith v. Board of Education, 204 Kan. 580 , 464 P. 2d 571 ; Woods v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 205 Kan. 770 , 472 P. 2d 219 ; Daniels v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 206 Kan. 710, 713 , 482 P. 2d 46 ; and Allen v. City of Ogden, 210 Kan. 136 , 499 P. 2d 527 .

1973The following cases since the Carroll case indicate that sovereign immunity from tort and nuisance lives on in this state with respect to governmental functions: Smith v. Board of Education, 204 Kan. 580 , 464 P. 2d 571 ; Woods v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 205 Kan. 770 , 472 P. 2d 219 ; Daniels v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 206 Kan. 710, 713 , 482 P. 2d 46 ; and Allen v. City of Ogden, 210 Kan. 136 , 499 P. 2d 527 .

1973The following cases since the Carroll case indicate that sovereign immunity from tort and nuisance lives on in this state with respect to governmental functions: Smith v. Board of Education, 204 Kan. 580 , 464 P. 2d 571 ; Woods v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 205 Kan. 770 , 472 P. 2d 219 ; Daniels v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 206 Kan. 710, 713 , 482 P. 2d 46 ; and Allen v. City of Ogden, 210 Kan. 136 , 499 P. 2d 527 .

1973The following cases since the Carroll case indicate that sovereign immunity from tort and nuisance lives on in this state with respect to governmental functions: Smith v. Board of Education, 204 Kan. 580 , 464 P. 2d 571 ; Woods v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 205 Kan. 770 , 472 P. 2d 219 ; Daniels v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 206 Kan. 710, 713 , 482 P. 2d 46 ; and Allen v. City of Ogden, 210 Kan. 136 , 499 P. 2d 527 .

1973The following cases since the Carroll case indicate that sovereign immunity from tort and nuisance lives on in this state with respect to governmental functions: Smith v. Board of Education, 204 Kan. 580 , 464 P. 2d 571 ; Woods v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 205 Kan. 770 , 472 P. 2d 219 ; Daniels v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 206 Kan. 710, 713 , 482 P. 2d 46 ; and Allen v. City of Ogden, 210 Kan. 136 , 499 P. 2d 527 .

1973The following cases since the Carroll case indicate that sovereign immunity from tort and nuisance lives on in this state with respect to governmental functions: Smith v. Board of Education, 204 Kan. 580 , 464 P. 2d 571 ; Woods v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 205 Kan. 770 , 472 P. 2d 219 ; Daniels v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 206 Kan. 710, 713 , 482 P. 2d 46 ; and Allen v. City of Ogden, 210 Kan. 136 , 499 P. 2d 527 .

1973The following cases since the Carroll case indicate that sovereign immunity from tort and nuisance lives on in this state with respect to governmental functions: Smith v. Board of Education, 204 Kan. 580 , 464 P. 2d 571 ; Woods v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 205 Kan. 770 , 472 P. 2d 219 ; Daniels v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 206 Kan. 710, 713 , 482 P. 2d 46 ; and Allen v. City of Ogden, 210 Kan. 136 , 499 P. 2d 527 .

1973The following cases since the Carroll case indicate that sovereign immunity from tort and nuisance lives on in this state with respect to governmental functions: Smith v. Board of Education, 204 Kan. 580 , 464 P. 2d 571 ; Woods v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 205 Kan. 770 , 472 P. 2d 219 ; Daniels v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 206 Kan. 710, 713 , 482 P. 2d 46 ; and Allen v. City of Ogden, 210 Kan. 136 , 499 P. 2d 527 .

1969The difficulties which this court will encounter in determining whether the activity of government giving rise to possible tort liability is governmental or proprietary are myriad; In Grover v. City of Manhattan, 198 Kan. 307 , 424 P. 2d 256 , a ten year old boy was attacked by a coyote which had escaped from a city zoo.

1969The difficulties which this court will encounter in determining whether the activity of government giving rise to possible tort liability is governmental or proprietary are myriad; In Grover v. City of Manhattan, 198 Kan. 307 , 424 P. 2d 256 , a ten year old boy was attacked by a coyote which had escaped from a city zoo.