sovereign immunity in Missouri

2025In Kubley v. Brooks, 141 S.W.3d 21 (Mo. 2004), the Missouri Supreme Court drew a sharp distinction between “the doctrine of sovereign immunity from liability in tort,” and “the separate, but related, doctrine that the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent.” Id. at 29 .

2025In Kubley v. Brooks, 141 S.W.3d 21 (Mo. 2004), the Missouri Supreme Court drew a sharp distinction between “the doctrine of sovereign immunity from liability in tort,” and “the separate, but related, doctrine that the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent.” Id. at 29 .

1994Id. 725 S.W.2d at 260 (citations omitted).

1983The majority opinion, in Bartley , appears to attach no significance to the difference in terminology for it says, at p. 870, “Sovereign immunity is only waived in the two areas provided by § 537.600 and then only to the extent that the public entity acquires insurance for such purposes.” (Emphasis added.) That cities are included in the language of § 537.600 et seq., seems to be implicit in Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286,295 (Mo.App.1983).

2023See id.; see also Russell, 843 S.W.2d at 360 ; Langley v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 73 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) (insurance policy that expressly stated “[n]othing in this [policy] shall be construed as a waiver of any governmental immunity” retained the public entity’s sovereign immunity).

2021One of the statutes provided: 5It is undisputed that the University is a state employer and its employees are state employees. "[T]he Board of Curators of the University of Missouri is invested by constitutional mandate as a public entity with the status of a governmental body and, as such, is immune from suit for liability in tort in the absence of an express statutory provision." Krasney v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 765 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989). "'Section 537.600, RSMo1994, provides that the doctrine of sovereign immunity remains the general rule in Missouri protecting publi

2025City of Grandview v. Grate, 490 S.W.3d 368, 369 (Mo. banc 2016).

2019City of Grandview v. Grate, 490 S.W.3d 368, 369 (Mo. banc 2016) (“Sovereign immunity is not a defense to suit but, rather, it is immunity from tort liability altogether, providing a basis for prohibition.”).

2000Sovereign immunity is uniquely applicable to a governmental entity and is not applicable to an individual public official who acts as an agent of the state. 2 Rustici v. Weidemey er, 673 S.W.2d 762, 768 (Mo. banc 1984); Larabee v. City of Kansas City, 697 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Mo.App.

1992Sovereign immunity is “uniquely applicable to governmental entities and is not transferable to an agent of that entity.” Rustici v. Weidemeyer, 673 S.W.2d 762, 768 (Mo. banc 1984).

1975Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446 (Mo.1963), and the Smith case, supra, declined to abolish the doctrine, and said ( 484 S.W.2d 483, 486 ): “We are not unaware that the doctrine of sovereign immunity continues to be under bitter assault and violent attack by some writers and law review commentators.

1975If it is reasonable to say, and it is, that the existence of liability insurance does not create liability where none exists, then it is also reasonable to say that the inability to have satisfaction of a judgment does not create or support exemption from liability where exemption does not otherwise exist.” Finally, in Payne v. County of Jackson, 484 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Mo.1972), it was suggested that the doctrine of sovereign tort immunity should be continued because its termination could threaten the financial stability of government, the court saying: “Conversely, wholesale abrogation of the s

2021Cottey v. Schmitter, 24 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (holding that "[w]hile the state enjoyed the limitation on liability under the sovereign immunity provisions, [the state's employee sued by an injured party] did not").

2019“Sovereign immunity is uniquely applicable to a governmental entity and is not applicable to an individual public official who acts as an agent of the state.” Cottey v. Schmitter, 24 S.W.3d 126, 128 (Mo.App. 2000). 3 State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. banc 1971). 3 State ex rel.

1997As noted in my separate opinion in Richardson v. State Highway & Transportation Commission, 863 S.W.2d 876, 882-84 (Mo. banc 1993)(Holstein, J., concurring in result), the doctrine of sovereign immunity is of questionable common law origin and is not supported by sound reason.

1997As noted in my separate opinion in Richardson v. State Highway & Transportation Commission, 863 S.W.2d 876, 882-84 (Mo. banc 1993)(Holstein, J., concurring in result), the doctrine of sovereign immunity is of questionable common law origin and is not supported by sound reason.

2025Resources, 308 S.W.3d 331, 334 (Mo.App. [W.D.] 2010).

2025Maune v. City of Rolla], 203 S.W.3d [802,] 804 [(Mo. App. S.D. 2006)].[] [Appellant’s] burden as plaintiff was “to establish a sovereign immunity waiver as part and parcel of any pleaded theory against [Employees].” Id.

2015Missouri codified sovereign immunity in Section 537.600, This section came about after the Missouri Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity altogether in Jones v. State Highway Commission, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. banc 1977).

2003This conclusion is buttressed by the history of attacks and consideration of the doctrine of sovereign immunity leading up to its abrogation in tort cases in Jones v. State Highway Commission, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. banc 1977) and the subsequent legislative reinstatement of sovereign immunity in tort with certain exceptions in RSMo. § 537.600.

1997Louis County, 649 S.W.2d 864, 868 (Mo.banc 1983). *920 The City contends in its point relied on that, contrary to the trial court’s judgment, its purchase of insurance should not have been found to constitute a waiver of the sovereign immunity doctrine for two reasons.

1990Louis County, 649 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. banc 1983), this Court held that Jones was no longer the law because: Section 537.600 states that the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it existed at common law in Missouri ... remains in full force and effect.

1983Since plaintiffs have chosen to sue the municipalities rather than the police officers themselves, the issue here is sovereign immunity, not official immunity. 10 Application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to municipalities has led to a “maze” of inconsistent decisions “which defy understanding” O’Dell v. School District of Independence, 521 S.W.2d 403, 417 (Mo. banc 1975) (Finch, J., dissenting).

1983See O'Dell v. School District of Independence, supra at 417-419 for a collection of logically inconsistent applications of the sovereign immunity test.

2021Even if we ignore this fundamental difference in purpose, it is highly persuasive that our courts have not characterized the entirety of the service provided by the SLEF as a "traditional governmental service." In Dixon, the State Treasurer and the Commissioner of Administration argued that a suit against the SLEF to recover a judgment entered against a state employee violated the state's sovereign immunity protection. 923 S.W.2d at 378 .

2021Thus, a claim to recover a judgment entered against a state officer or employee from the SLEF "[does] not violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity." Id.; see also Betts-Lucas, 87 S.W.3d at 327-28 ("'The doctrine of sovereign immunity is not an issue' in a claim by a plaintiff seeking recovery from the [SLEF]." (quoting Dixon, 923 S.W.2d at 379 )); State ex rel.

2021In Krasney, the Western District held section 105.850 operates as “an express legislative disclaimer” that neither section 287.030 8 nor section 287.780 waive the Curators’ sovereign immunity. 765 S.W.2d at 650 .

2021Wille claims she sufficiently pled her claim falls within an exception to sovereign immunity because section 287.780 itself waives the Curators’ sovereign immunity from workers’ 3 See Krasney v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 765 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989) (“A retaliatory discharge in violation of § 287.780 . . . constitutes an independent tort. . . .”); Cook v. Hussmann Corp., 852 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Mo. banc 1993) (“§ 287.780 created a judicially cognizable independent tort”). 7 compensation retaliatory discharge claims.

2009W.D.2003) (declining to apply Greene County); Brennan By and Through Brennan, 942 S.W.2d at 436 (“Sovereign immunity may be an affirmative defense, but, other than Greene County, there is little authority for that proposition.”). 5 .

2006Although the Western District treated sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense in Greene County v. State, 926 S.W.2d 701 (Mo.App.1996), it questioned that conclusion, and proposed instead that a plaintiff must plead and prove a sovereign immunity waiver as part of its case, in Brennan v. Curators of the University of Missouri, 942 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Mo.App.1997) and State ex rel.

2006Id.

1990Sovereign immunity is discussed in each of those cases in only very general terms as being possible impetus for some courts calling this type claim a “cause of action ex contractu.” Sanders, supra, at 845 ; Ideker, supra, at 621.

2004Id. at 834 .

1996See Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 835 .

2025Safety v. Russell, 91 S.W.3d 612, 615 (Mo. banc 2002)). “‘Sovereign immunity, if not waived, bars suits against employees in their official capacity, as such suits are essentially direct claims against the state.’” Id. (quoting Betts-Lucas v. Hartmann, 87 S.W.3d 310, 327 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002)).

2021Thus, a claim to recover a judgment entered against a state officer or employee from the SLEF "[does] not violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity." Id.; see also Betts-Lucas, 87 S.W.3d at 327-28 ("'The doctrine of sovereign immunity is not an issue' in a claim by a plaintiff seeking recovery from the [SLEF]." (quoting Dixon, 923 S.W.2d at 379 )); State ex rel.

2025Safety v. Russell, 91 S.W.3d 612, 615 (Mo. banc 2002)). “‘Sovereign immunity, if not waived, bars suits against employees in their official capacity, as such suits are essentially direct claims against the state.’” Id. (quoting Betts-Lucas v. Hartmann, 87 S.W.3d 310, 327 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002)).

2025Safety v. Russell, 91 S.W.3d 612, 615 (Mo. banc 2002)). “‘Sovereign immunity, if not waived, bars suits against employees in their official capacity, as such suits are essentially direct claims against the state.’” Id. (quoting Betts-Lucas v. Hartmann, 87 S.W.3d 310, 327 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002)).

2010“The sovereign immunity statute must be strictly construed.” Dierker, 961 S.W.2d at 61 .

2008See 961 S.W.2d at 61 .

2004Moses v. County of Jefferson, 910 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Mo.App.1995) (citing Wood v. County of Jackson, 463 S.W.2d 834 (Mo.1971)).

2004Moses v. County of Jefferson, 910 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Mo.App.1995) (citing Wood v. County of Jackson, 463 S.W.2d 834 (Mo.1971)).

2000Sovereign immunity is uniquely applicable to a governmental entity and is not applicable to an individual public official who acts as an agent of the state. 2 Rustici v. Weidemey er, 673 S.W.2d 762, 768 (Mo. banc 1984); Larabee v. City of Kansas City, 697 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Mo.App.

1987Cf. Larabee v. City of Kansas City, 697 S.W.2d 177 (Mo.App.1985); Allen v. Salina Broadcasting, Inc., supra. On June 29, 1984, the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not extend to a breach of that duty.

2017Id. (emphasis added). 7 Given the coverage limits specified in § 537.610.1, reference to “the extent of coverage” in Kunzie, 184 S.W.3d at 574 , necessarily limits recovery to coverage amounts at or less than the statutory limits of $2,000,000 “for all claims arising out of a single occurrence” and $300,000 “for any one person in a single accident or occurrence[.]” § 537.610.1; see Kubley v. Brooks, 141 S.W.3d 21 , 29 n.9 (Mo. banc 2004).

2008Topps opposed the City’s motion for summary judgment, arguing the City’s MOPERM coverage applies to her lawsuit and that the City’s procurement of that coverage waived the City’s sovereign immunity to the extent of that coverage, pursuant to Kunzie v. City of Olivette, 184 S.W.3d 570 (Mo. banc 2006).

2009We note that Plaintiff cites to Greene County v. State, where the court held that sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which must be pled and proved by the defendant. 926 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Mo.App.

2006Although the Western District treated sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense in Greene County v. State, 926 S.W.2d 701 (Mo.App.1996), it questioned that conclusion, and proposed instead that a plaintiff must plead and prove a sovereign immunity waiver as part of its case, in Brennan v. Curators of the University of Missouri, 942 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Mo.App.1997) and State ex rel.

2023See id.; see also Russell, 843 S.W.2d at 360 ; Langley v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 73 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) (insurance policy that expressly stated “[n]othing in this [policy] shall be construed as a waiver of any governmental immunity” retained the public entity’s sovereign immunity).

1999The Supreme Court held that the hospital did not waive its sovereign immunity because “[t]he endorsement disclaiming coverage of any claim barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity avoids any waiver of sovereign immunity in this suit.” Id.

2023Moreover, the Directors and Officers Policy contained additional disclaimer language that was almost identical to a provision in the insurance policy at issue in Topps v. City of Country Club Hills, and the Eastern District found the Topps policy language “act[ed] to retain the City’s sovereign immunity.”7 272 S.W.3d at 418 .

2023The disclaimer provision present in the municipality's insurance policy in Topps v. City of Country Club Hills, 272 S.W.3d 409, 417-18 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008), acted to retain the city's sovereign immunity because it expressly stated "that the policy should not be construed to broaden the liability of the City beyond the sovereign immunity provisions of Sections 537.600 to 537.610, nor 'to abolish or waive any defense at law which might otherwise be available' to the City." The language in Callaway County's disclaimer provision is nearly identical to the municipality's disclaimer provision in Top

2019Official immunity, on the other hand, protects public officials sued in their individual capacities “from liability for alleged acts of negligence committed during the course of their official duties for the performance of discretionary acts.” Id. 6 At issue here is the doctrine of official immunity, which this Court has long held protects a public official from liability if that official acts within the course of his official 6 Sovereign immunity originally was a matter of common law but now is codified in sections 537.600 through 537.650.

2017MSHP was shielded from liability on Throneberry’s claims of recklessness and negligent failure, to train, instruct, and supervise Trooper Lyle (Counts .Ill and IV of the Petition) by sovereign immunity “[Sovereign immunity is a tort protection for governmental entities.... ” Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 610 .

2002“Section 537.600, RSMo 1994, provides that the doctrine of sovereign immunity remains the general rule in Missouri protecting public entities from liability for negligent acts.” Fantasma v. Kansas City, Mo., Board of Police Comm’rs, 913 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Mo.App.

2000The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects public entities, such as the MHTC, from liability for negligent acts. § 537.600; Fantasma v. Kansas City, Mo., Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 913 S.W.2d 388 , 391 (Mo.App.1996).