sovereign immunity in Maryland

1997P. & P. Comm’n v. Kranz, supra, 308 Md. at 622 , 521 A.2d at 731 , and cases cited therein; Godwin v. County Comm’rs, 256 Md. 326, 334-335 , 260 A.2d 295, 299 (1970); Baltimore v. State, supra, 173 Md. at 271-272 , 195 A. at 574 . *420 While the governmental immunity of counties and municipalities is much narrower than the immunity of the State, nevertheless the immunity of counties and municipalities is derived from the State’s sovereign immunity.

1997P. & P. Comm’n v. Kranz, supra, 308 Md. at 622 , 521 A.2d at 731 , and cases cited therein; Godwin v. County Comm’rs, 256 Md. 326, 334-335 , 260 A.2d 295, 299 (1970); Baltimore v. State, supra, 173 Md. at 271-272 , 195 A. at 574 . *420 While the governmental immunity of counties and municipalities is much narrower than the immunity of the State, nevertheless the immunity of counties and municipalities is derived from the State’s sovereign immunity.

2026Stern, 380 Md. at 701 (“[W]hen a governmental agency or actor can, and does, avail itself of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, no contract or tort suit can be maintained thereafter against it unless the General Assembly has specifically waived the doctrine.”); see Magnetti, 402 Md. at 558 (“Without a statutory waiver of the University’s sovereign immunity, [the plaintiff] may not maintain his action against the University.”); Bd. of Trs. of Howard Cmty. Coll. v. John K.

2026Stern, 380 Md. at 701 (“[W]hen a governmental agency or actor can, and does, avail itself of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, no contract or tort suit can be maintained thereafter against it unless the General Assembly has specifically waived the doctrine.”); see Magnetti, 402 Md. at 558 (“Without a statutory waiver of the University’s sovereign immunity, [the plaintiff] may not maintain his action against the University.”); Bd. of Trs. of Howard Cmty. Coll. v. John K.

2010On the other hand, if funds are not available, such action would be precluded by the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” Id. at 595 , 366 A.2d 360 .

2010On the other hand, if funds are not available, such action would be precluded by the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” Id. at 595 , 366 A.2d 360 .

2026Thus, in ARA Health Services, Inc., in interpreting the State’s waiver as to contract claims in State Government § 12-201, we held that the General Assembly had not waived the State’s sovereign immunity as to a contract dispute where a purported contract modification was outside the scope of the 22 relevant State agency’s authority. 344 Md. at 95 .

2011In order to determine if the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to the County Board in the underlying contract suit, we ask: “(1) whether the entity asserting immunity qualifies for the protection; and if so, (2) whether the legislature has waived immunity either directly or by necessary implication, in a manner that would render the defense of immunity unavailable.” Magnetti, 402 Md. at 557 , 937 A.2d at 224 (quoting ARA Health v. Dept. of Public Safety, 344 Md. 85, 92 , 685 A.2d 435, 438 (1996)); see also Austin v. City of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 69-71 , 405 A.2d 255, 264-66 (1979) (Eldri

2010Accord State v. Sharafeldin, 382 Md. 129, 140 , 854 A.2d 1208 (2004) (“State agencies may not, on their own, waive sovereign immunity ‘either affirmatively or by failure to plead it.’”) (quoting Dep’t of Natural Res v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 60 , 521 A.2d 313 (1986)). *692 The doctrine of sovereign immunity operates to “bar[] individuals from bringing actions against the State, thus protecting it from interference with governmental functions and preserving its control over its agencies and funds.” Condon v. State, 382 Md. 481, 492 , 632 A.2d 753 (1993).

2010Accord State v. Sharafeldin, 382 Md. 129, 140 , 854 A.2d 1208 (2004) (“State agencies may not, on their own, waive sovereign immunity ‘either affirmatively or by failure to plead it.’”) (quoting Dep’t of Natural Res v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 60 , 521 A.2d 313 (1986)). *692 The doctrine of sovereign immunity operates to “bar[] individuals from bringing actions against the State, thus protecting it from interference with governmental functions and preserving its control over its agencies and funds.” Condon v. State, 382 Md. 481, 492 , 632 A.2d 753 (1993).

2026Sovereign immunity may be waived only “directly or by necessary implication.” Katz, 284 Md. at 507-08 . “[T]o avoid weakening the doctrine of sovereign immunity by judicial fiat,” Stern v. Bd. of Regents, Univ.

2026Sovereign immunity may be waived only “directly or by necessary implication.” Katz, 284 Md. at 507-08 . “[T]o avoid weakening the doctrine of sovereign immunity by judicial fiat,” Stern v. Bd. of Regents, Univ.

2026Stern, 380 Md. at 701 (“[W]hen a governmental agency or actor can, and does, avail itself of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, no contract or tort suit can be maintained thereafter against it unless the General Assembly has specifically waived the doctrine.”); see Magnetti, 402 Md. at 558 (“Without a statutory waiver of the University’s sovereign immunity, [the plaintiff] may not maintain his action against the University.”); Bd. of Trs. of Howard Cmty. Coll. v. John K.

2026Sovereign immunity “prohibits suits against the State or its entities absent its consent.” Magnetti v. Univ. of Maryland, 402 Md. 548, 557 (2007).

2026Therefore, we have consistently refused to judicially abrogate sovereign immunity, and we have stated that any waiver of immunity must come from the legislature.” (citation modified)); Jekofsky v. State Roads Comm’n, 264 Md. 471, 474 (1972) (explaining that “it is desirable and in the public interest that any change in the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the legislative branch of the State Government rather than from the judicial branch” due to the “fiscal considerations, administrative difficulties[,] and other problems in balancing the rights of the State and its agencies” wi

2000In a similar cause of action, the “doctrine of sovereign immunity,” as the basis for dismissal of a suit, was upheld in Jekofsky v. State Roads Comm’n, 264 Md. 471 , 287 A.2d 40 (1972).

2011In order to determine if the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to the County Board in the underlying contract suit, we ask: “(1) whether the entity asserting immunity qualifies for the protection; and if so, (2) whether the legislature has waived immunity either directly or by necessary implication, in a manner that would render the defense of immunity unavailable.” Magnetti, 402 Md. at 557 , 937 A.2d at 224 (quoting ARA Health v. Dept. of Public Safety, 344 Md. 85, 92 , 685 A.2d 435, 438 (1996)); see also Austin v. City of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 69-71 , 405 A.2d 255, 264-66 (1979) (Eldri

2011In order to determine if the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to the County Board in the underlying contract suit, we ask: “(1) whether the entity asserting immunity qualifies for the protection; and if so, (2) whether the legislature has waived immunity either directly or by necessary implication, in a manner that would render the defense of immunity unavailable.” Magnetti, 402 Md. at 557 , 937 A.2d at 224 (quoting ARA Health v. Dept. of Public Safety, 344 Md. 85, 92 , 685 A.2d 435, 438 (1996)); see also Austin v. City of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 69-71 , 405 A.2d 255, 264-66 (1979) (Eldri

2011The doctrine of sovereign immunity “prohibits suits against the State or its entities absent its consent.” Magnetti v. University of Md., 402 Md. 548, 557 , 937 A.2d 219, 224 (2007) (citing Deft of Natural Resources v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 58-59 , 521 A.2d 313, 315 (1986)); see also Proctor v. WMATA, 412 Md. 691, 709 , 990 A.2d 1048, 1058 (2010) (stating that sovereign immunity is applicable to the State, and its agencies and instrumentalities); Stem v. Board of Regents, 380 Md. 691, 700 , 846 A.2d 996, 1001 (2004) (“The doctrine of sovereign immunity has long been recognized as applicable in ac

2011The doctrine of sovereign immunity “prohibits suits against the State or its entities absent its consent.” Magnetti v. University of Md., 402 Md. 548, 557 , 937 A.2d 219, 224 (2007) (citing Deft of Natural Resources v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 58-59 , 521 A.2d 313, 315 (1986)); see also Proctor v. WMATA, 412 Md. 691, 709 , 990 A.2d 1048, 1058 (2010) (stating that sovereign immunity is applicable to the State, and its agencies and instrumentalities); Stem v. Board of Regents, 380 Md. 691, 700 , 846 A.2d 996, 1001 (2004) (“The doctrine of sovereign immunity has long been recognized as applicable in ac

1990The Bradshaw Court then stated at 304, 396 A.2d 255 : This analysis would seem to indicate that the state is, in effect, the principal of the police officers, and that the officer is protected from liability for his non-malicious tortious conduct by an extension of the state’s sovereign immunity, and not by the umbrella of the county’s gov *335 ernmental immunity.

1979I The doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit, rooted in the ancient common law, is firmly embedded in the law of Maryland. 2 See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294 , 396 A. 2d 255 (1979); American Structures v. City of Balto., 278 Md. 356 , 364 A. 2d 55 (1976); University of Maryland v. Maas, 173 Md. 554 , 197 A. 123 (1938).

2011In reaching the last mentioned conclusion, the Kee Court examined the legislative history of the Maryland Tort Claims Act and noted that the Senate Committee’s report concerning the 1981 version of the MTCA “expressly stated with regard to § 5-403(a)(4): ‘the waiver in *595 this paragraph is the broadest of the six and therefore overlaps to some extent most of the others.’ ” The MTCA, as initially enacted was, in the words of Carl F. Eastwick, Chief Legislative Officer for the Governor, but “a cautious beginning in the effort to abolish the sovereign immunity doctrine,” See, Sovereign Immunity

2007Stern v. Board of Regents, 380 Md. 691, 700 , 846 A.2d 996, 1001 (2004) (“The doctrine of sovereign immunity has long been recognized as applicable in actions against the State of Maryland and its official representatives.”); Maryland State Highway Admin, v. Kim, 353 Md. 313, 333 , 726 A.2d 238, 248 (1999) (“We have recognized, and continue to note that, in Maryland, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is applicable not only to the State itself, but also to its agencies and instrumentalities, unless the General Assembly has waived the immunity either directly or by necessary implication.”); ARA

2004To be sure, “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity ... precludes such a damages action [for wrongful discharge] against the ‘State of Maryland’ absent legislation consenting to suit.” Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 369 , 597 A.2d 432 (1991).

2004To be sure, “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity ... precludes such a damages action [for wrongful discharge] against the ‘State of Maryland’ absent legislation consenting to suit.” Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 369 , 597 A.2d 432 (1991).

2026Brohawn & Bros., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Chesapeake Coll., 269 Md. 164, 165-66 (1973) (“By [the doctrine of sovereign immunity], a litigant is precluded from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause of action against this sovereign State or one of its agencies which has inherited its sovereign attributes, unless expressly waived by statute or by a necessary inference from such a legislative enactment.”).

2026Brohawn & Bros., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Chesapeake Coll., 269 Md. 164, 165-66 (1973) (“By [the doctrine of sovereign immunity], a litigant is precluded from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause of action against this sovereign State or one of its agencies which has inherited its sovereign attributes, unless expressly waived by statute or by a necessary inference from such a legislative enactment.”).

1989We made clear in Bd. of Education v. Alcrymat Corp., 258 Md. 508, 516 , 266 A.2d 349, 353 (1970) that .. the law is well established that counsel for the State or one of its agencies may not either by affirmative action or by failure to plead the defense, waive the defense of governmental immunity in the absence of express statu *161 tory authorization, or by necessary implication from a statute____’ We must consider whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity is applicable in this case even though it was not previously raised by the parties.” (Footnote omitted.) The question then becomes, what

1989We made clear in Bd. of Education v. Alcrymat Corp., 258 Md. 508, 516 , 266 A.2d 349, 353 (1970) that .. the law is well established that counsel for the State or one of its agencies may not either by affirmative action or by failure to plead the defense, waive the defense of governmental immunity in the absence of express statu *161 tory authorization, or by necessary implication from a statute____’ We must consider whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity is applicable in this case even though it was not previously raised by the parties.” (Footnote omitted.) The question then becomes, what

2010“Grounded in ancient common law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars individuals from bringing actions against the State, thus protecting it from interference with governmental functions and preserving its control over its agencies and funds.” Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 492 , 632 A.2d 753 (1993).

2010“Grounded in ancient common law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars individuals from bringing actions against the State, thus protecting it from interference with governmental functions and preserving its control over its agencies and funds.” Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 492 , 632 A.2d 753 (1993).

2010Accordingly, we hold that, in the context of this case, the Board is a “unit” of the State pursuant to S.G. § 12-201, and this statute waives its right to the defense of sovereign immunity in contract actions. 26 Necessary Funds to Satisfy Judgment Having found a legislative waiver of the doctrine of sovereign immunity with respect to contract claims, we turn to the third step, whether there are “ ‘funds available for the *710 satisfaction of the judgment’ or the agency has been given the power ‘for the raising of funds necessary to satisfy recovery against it.’ ” Stern, 380 Md. at 701 , 846 A

2010Accordingly, we hold that, in the context of this case, the Board is a “unit” of the State pursuant to S.G. § 12-201, and this statute waives its right to the defense of sovereign immunity in contract actions. 26 Necessary Funds to Satisfy Judgment Having found a legislative waiver of the doctrine of sovereign immunity with respect to contract claims, we turn to the third step, whether there are “ ‘funds available for the *710 satisfaction of the judgment’ or the agency has been given the power ‘for the raising of funds necessary to satisfy recovery against it.’ ” Stern, 380 Md. at 701 , 846 A

2004Sovereign immunity defense barred. (a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by a law of the State, the State, its officers, and its units may not raise the defense of sovereign immunity in a contract action, in a court of the State, based on a written contraed that an official or employee executed for the State or 1 of its units while the official or employee was acting within the scope of the authority of the official or employee. (b) In an action under this subtitle, the State and its officers and units shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-522(d) of the Courts and Jud

2004Sovereign immunity defense barred. (a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by a law of the State, the State, its officers, and its units may not raise the defense of sovereign immunity in a contract action, in a court of the State, based on a written contraed that an official or employee executed for the State or 1 of its units while the official or employee was acting within the scope of the authority of the official or employee. (b) In an action under this subtitle, the State and its officers and units shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-522(d) of the Courts and Jud

2026See, e.g., Maryland State Highway Admin. v. Kim, 353 Md. 313, 332 (1999) (“[Sovereign immunity] precludes a litigant from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause of action[.]”); Charles E.

2011In reaching the last mentioned conclusion, the Kee Court examined the legislative history of the Maryland Tort Claims Act and noted that the Senate Committee’s report concerning the 1981 version of the MTCA “expressly stated with regard to § 5-403(a)(4): ‘the waiver in *595 this paragraph is the broadest of the six and therefore overlaps to some extent most of the others.’ ” The MTCA, as initially enacted was, in the words of Carl F. Eastwick, Chief Legislative Officer for the Governor, but “a cautious beginning in the effort to abolish the sovereign immunity doctrine,” See, Sovereign Immunity

2023Auth., 412 Md. 691, 709 (2010) (noting that the State’s sovereign immunity “is applicable not only to the State itself, but also to its agencies and instrumentalities, unless the General Assembly has waived the immunity either directly or by necessary implication” (quoting Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 284 Md. 503 , 507–08 (1979))).

2011The doctrine of sovereign immunity “prohibits suits against the State or its entities absent its consent.” Magnetti v. University of Md., 402 Md. 548, 557 , 937 A.2d 219, 224 (2007) (citing Deft of Natural Resources v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 58-59 , 521 A.2d 313, 315 (1986)); see also Proctor v. WMATA, 412 Md. 691, 709 , 990 A.2d 1048, 1058 (2010) (stating that sovereign immunity is applicable to the State, and its agencies and instrumentalities); Stem v. Board of Regents, 380 Md. 691, 700 , 846 A.2d 996, 1001 (2004) (“The doctrine of sovereign immunity has long been recognized as applicable in ac

2008Sovereign immunity “derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution itself.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 , 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999).

2008Sovereign immunity “derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution itself.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 , 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999).

2026Similarly, in State v. Rich, we held that the General Assembly had not effectively waived the State Highway Commission’s sovereign immunity because the Commission could not “rightfully apply any of the funds in its hands to the payment of claims for personal injuries,” nor was it “invested with any authority to raise money for that purpose.” 126 Md. 643, 647 (1915).

1972We cited with approval the decision of our predecessors in State v. Rich, 126 Md. 643 , 95 A. 956 (1915) in which the sovereign immunity of the State in tort was held to apply to the State Roads Commission.

2024“The MTCA was enacted in 1981 as a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity for tortious acts or omissions committed within the scope of the public duties of ‘state personnel’ and committed without malice or gross negligence.” Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 173 , 935 A.2d 699 (2007).

2024“The MTCA was enacted in 1981 as a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity for tortious acts or omissions committed within the scope of the public duties of ‘state personnel’ and committed without malice or gross negligence.” Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 173 , 935 A.2d 699 (2007).

2009Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 583 , 366 A.2d 360, 362 (1976), “[w]e must consider whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity is applicable in [a] case even though it was not previously raised by the parties.” See, e.g., Johnson v. Maryland State Police, supra, 331 Md. at 299 , 628 A.2d at 169 (Sovereign “ ‘immunity is a non-waivable defense’ ”); Kee v. State Highway Admin., 313 Md. 445, 460 , 545 A.2d 1312, 1320 (1988); Calvert Associates v. Department, 277 Md. 372, 378 , 357 A.2d 839, 842 (1976); Chas.

2009Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 583 , 366 A.2d 360, 362 (1976), “[w]e must consider whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity is applicable in [a] case even though it was not previously raised by the parties.” See, e.g., Johnson v. Maryland State Police, supra, 331 Md. at 299 , 628 A.2d at 169 (Sovereign “ ‘immunity is a non-waivable defense’ ”); Kee v. State Highway Admin., 313 Md. 445, 460 , 545 A.2d 1312, 1320 (1988); Calvert Associates v. Department, 277 Md. 372, 378 , 357 A.2d 839, 842 (1976); Chas.

2004Although the governmental immunity enjoyed by counties and municipalities “derived from the State’s sovereign immunity,” it was “much narrower than the immunity of the State.” Board of Educ. v. Town of Riverdale, 320 Md. 384, 390 , 578 A.2d 207 (1990).

2004Although the governmental immunity enjoyed by counties and municipalities “derived from the State’s sovereign immunity,” it was “much narrower than the immunity of the State.” Board of Educ. v. Town of Riverdale, 320 Md. 384, 390 , 578 A.2d 207 (1990).

2026Therefore, we have consistently refused to judicially abrogate sovereign immunity, and we have stated that any waiver of immunity must come from the legislature.” (citation modified)); Jekofsky v. State Roads Comm’n, 264 Md. 471, 474 (1972) (explaining that “it is desirable and in the public interest that any change in the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the legislative branch of the State Government rather than from the judicial branch” due to the “fiscal considerations, administrative difficulties[,] and other problems in balancing the rights of the State and its agencies” wi

1972Cf. Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98 , 271 A. 2d 547 (1970) where we declined to extend the doctrine of sovereign immunity in tort to public school teachers, they not being public officials, but indicated our determination to adhere to our prior decisions sustaining the doctrine where applicable, citing Godwin with approval.

1979See, for example, State v. Baltimore County, 218 Md. 271, 273 , 146 A.2d 28 (1958); Weisner v. Bd. of Education, 237 Md. 391, 395 , 206 A.2d 560 (1965); Godwin v. County Comm’rs, 256 Md. at 333 ; Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98, 104 , 271 A.2d 547 (1970); Robinson v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 262 Md. 342, 345 , 278 A.2d 71 (1971); Jekofsky v. State Roads Comm’n, 264 Md. 471, 474 , 287 A.2d 40 (1972); Quecedo v. Montgomery County, 264 Md. 590, 595 , 287 A.2d 257 (1972); Spriggs v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 267 Md. 679, 685 , 298 A.2d 442 (1973); Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. at 300.

1979See, for example, State v. Baltimore County, 218 Md. 271, 273 , 146 A.2d 28 (1958); Weisner v. Bd. of Education, 237 Md. 391, 395 , 206 A.2d 560 (1965); Godwin v. County Comm’rs, 256 Md. at 333 ; Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98, 104 , 271 A.2d 547 (1970); Robinson v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 262 Md. 342, 345 , 278 A.2d 71 (1971); Jekofsky v. State Roads Comm’n, 264 Md. 471, 474 , 287 A.2d 40 (1972); Quecedo v. Montgomery County, 264 Md. 590, 595 , 287 A.2d 257 (1972); Spriggs v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 267 Md. 679, 685 , 298 A.2d 442 (1973); Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. at 300.