sovereign immunity in California

2018Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211 (repudiating judicial doctrine of sovereign immunity). 19 Health & Saf.

1991Enacted in 1963, the Tort Claims Act is the result of a study conducted by the California Law Review Commission (the Commission) in response to our decision in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 359 P.2d 457 ], abolishing the doctrine of sovereign immunity in tort actions in California.

2015Sovereign Immunity for Indian Tribes and Their Officials “The federal government has ‘plenary and exclusive power’ to deal with Indian tribes.” (Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 632, 635 (Trudgeon).) Under Public Law 280 ( 18 U.S.C. § 1162 , 28 U.S.C. § 1360 , 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 ), Congress has extended to California and five other states “jurisdiction over civil causes of action . . . to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country” in those states, and further that the “civil laws of such State that are of general application to private per

2015Sovereign Immunity for Indian Tribes and Their Officials “The federal government has ‘plenary and exclusive power’ to deal with Indian tribes.” (Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 632, 635 (Trudgeon).) Under Public Law 280 ( 18 U.S.C. § 1162 , 28 U.S.C. § 1360 , 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 ), Congress has extended to California and five other states “jurisdiction over civil causes of action . . . to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country” in those states, and further that the “civil laws of such State that are of general application to private per

2007(See Lamere v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1063, fn. 2 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 ] [lack of formal judicial remedy for alleged injustice is “sometimes an inevitable consequence ... of the tribe’s sovereign immunity”].) For the benefit of future litigants in cases under the ICWA, we will take this opportunity to comment briefly on how this problem might be avoided.

2007(See Lamere v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1063, fn. 2 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 ] [lack of formal judicial remedy for alleged injustice is “sometimes an inevitable consequence ... of the tribe’s sovereign immunity”].) For the benefit of future litigants in cases under the ICWA, we will take this opportunity to comment briefly on how this problem might be avoided.

1975Dist. (1953) 41 Cal.2d 33, 36 [ 257 P.2d 22 ].) The doctrine of sovereign immunity had become so riddled with exceptions and inconsistencies that in Muskopf the court swept it entirely aside, declaring “that it must be discarded as mistaken and unjust.” (55 Cal.2d at p. 213.) The sovereign immunity abolished in Muskopf was based on grounds entirely different from those relied upon for immunizing employees from discretionary acts undertaken within the scope of their authority.

1975Dist. (1953) 41 Cal.2d 33, 36 [ 257 P.2d 22 ].) The doctrine of sovereign immunity had become so riddled with exceptions and inconsistencies that in Muskopf the court swept it entirely aside, declaring “that it must be discarded as mistaken and unjust.” (55 Cal.2d at p. 213.) The sovereign immunity abolished in Muskopf was based on grounds entirely different from those relied upon for immunizing employees from discretionary acts undertaken within the scope of their authority.

2023Specifically, Corrales points out that the trial court’s minute order cited Great Western Casinos, Inc. v. Morongo Band of Mission Indians (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1407 (Great Western) for the proposition that “when faced with a claim of sovereign immunity, the court may look beyond the pleadings if needed and engage in a factual inquiry to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute.” (Italics added.) According to Corrales, the trial court erred because the issue presented was not the Tribe’s sovereign immunity but rather whether the trial court lacked subject matter juri

2023Specifically, Corrales points out that the trial court’s minute order cited Great Western Casinos, Inc. v. Morongo Band of Mission Indians (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1407 (Great Western) for the proposition that “when faced with a claim of sovereign immunity, the court may look beyond the pleadings if needed and engage in a factual inquiry to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute.” (Italics added.) According to Corrales, the trial court erred because the issue presented was not the Tribe’s sovereign immunity but rather whether the trial court lacked subject matter juri

2011(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 623 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 ] (C & L).) Courts construe waivers of a tribe’s sovereign immunity strictly and hold a strong presumption against them.

2011(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 623 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 ] (C & L).) Courts construe waivers of a tribe’s sovereign immunity strictly and hold a strong presumption against them.

2015(Warburton, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1181 [limited discovery may be required to determine whether sovereign immunity applies]; Great Western, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418 [“‘Where the motion to dismiss is based on a claim of . . . sovereign immunity, which provides protection from suit and not merely a defense to liability . . . the court must engage in sufficient pretrial factual and legal determinations to “‘satisfy itself of its authority to hear the case’ before trial”’”].) We emphasize the appropriate inquiry is not whether Defendants properly exercised their authority, but only w

2015“Under federal law, an Indian tribe is a sovereign authority and, as such, has tribal sovereign immunity, not only from liability, but also from suit. [Citations.] Pursuant to tribal sovereign immunity principles, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has so authorized or where the Tribe has waived its immunity by consenting to suit. [Citation.] Absent such authorization or consent, the courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over suits against a tribe. [Citation.]” (Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1368 (Lawrence); see Warbur

2004She relies upon 28 United States Code section 1360 , and correctly asserts that Indian tribes are “semi-independent . . . with the power of regulating their internal and social relations.” (White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker (1980) 448 U.S. 136, 142 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 665 , 100 S Ct. 2578] [Indian tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over their members and territories]; Boisclair v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1140, 1147 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 62 , 801 P.2d 305 ] [“deeply rooted” policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control].) Maria also points out that section 1360 is not

2004She relies upon 28 United States Code section 1360 , and correctly asserts that Indian tribes are “semi-independent . . . with the power of regulating their internal and social relations.” (White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker (1980) 448 U.S. 136, 142 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 665 , 100 S Ct. 2578] [Indian tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over their members and territories]; Boisclair v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1140, 1147 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 62 , 801 P.2d 305 ] [“deeply rooted” policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control].) Maria also points out that section 1360 is not

2018Rather, as the Constitution's structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today ...." ( Alden v. Maine (1999) 527 U.S. 706 , 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240 , [ 144 L.Ed.2d 636 , 654] ( Alden ).) An important limit on the sovereign immunity principle was established in Ex parte Young (1908) 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , [ 52 L.Ed. 714 ] ( Young ). *783 That case involved a challenge to a Minnesota l

2018Rather, as the Constitution's structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today ...." ( Alden v. Maine (1999) 527 U.S. 706 , 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240 , [ 144 L.Ed.2d 636 , 654] ( Alden ).) An important limit on the sovereign immunity principle was established in Ex parte Young (1908) 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , [ 52 L.Ed. 714 ] ( Young ). *783 That case involved a challenge to a Minnesota l

2021(See Lawrence v. 34 Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1368 ; Ameriloan, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 97 ; Agua Caliente, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 247–248; Great Western, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426 ; 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (7)(A).) As a result, if we were to decide the Tribes have standing as “persons” under the UCL, the Tribes would be permitted to use the statute as a sword against private California companies, while being shielded from such complaints themselves.8 In the absence of an express statement to the contrary, we will not presume the California Legisla

2015“Under federal law, an Indian tribe is a sovereign authority and, as such, has tribal sovereign immunity, not only from liability, but also from suit. [Citations.] Pursuant to tribal sovereign immunity principles, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has so authorized or where the Tribe has waived its immunity by consenting to suit. [Citation.] Absent such authorization or consent, the courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over suits against a tribe. [Citation.]” (Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1368 (Lawrence); see Warbur

2021(See Kiowa Tribe, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 754 [“As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.”]; Ameriloan, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 97 [finding tribal immunity extends to certain for-profit commercial entities that function as “ ‘arms of the tribes,’ ” including casino operators].) But as noted, California state courts likely would not have jurisdiction over claims asserted against a tribe, or an entity acting as an “arm of the tribe,” particularly in the context of tribal gaming, due to both

2012U.S. Grant, LLC, Is Not an Arm of the Sycuan Tribe Protected by Tribal Sovereign Immunity The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is “settled law” developed through years of United States Supreme Court precedent (Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. (1998) 523 U.S. 751 , 756 [ 140 L.Ed.2d 981 , 118 S.Ct. 1700 ] (Kiowa)), and is based on the premise that “Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations’ that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories.” (Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Potawatomi Tribe (1991) 498 U.S. 505, 509 [ 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 , 111 S.C

2024(Los Angeles, at p. 48.) The state was leasing its property for a “revenue-producing activity” that had “no relation to the governmental function of the university.” (Id. at p. 50, italics added; see also Guidi v. State (1953) 41 Cal.2d 623, 625 , 627–628 [state agricultural society that was organized and operated to interest and educate the general public in agricultural and industrial subjects not immune from tort liability when conducting fireworks show and operating horse arena on government property].) Other courts have similarly concluded the Regents are not entitled to sovereign immunit

2024(Los Angeles, at p. 48.) The state was leasing its property for a “revenue-producing activity” that had “no relation to the governmental function of the university.” (Id. at p. 50, italics added; see also Guidi v. State (1953) 41 Cal.2d 623, 625 , 627–628 [state agricultural society that was organized and operated to interest and educate the general public in agricultural and industrial subjects not immune from tort liability when conducting fireworks show and operating horse arena on government property].) Other courts have similarly concluded the Regents are not entitled to sovereign immunit

2012U.S. Grant, LLC, Is Not an Arm of the Sycuan Tribe Protected by Tribal Sovereign Immunity The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is “settled law” developed through years of United States Supreme Court precedent (Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. (1998) 523 U.S. 751 , 756 [ 140 L.Ed.2d 981 , 118 S.Ct. 1700 ] (Kiowa)), and is based on the premise that “Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations’ that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories.” (Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Potawatomi Tribe (1991) 498 U.S. 505, 509 [ 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 , 111 S.C

2012U.S. Grant, LLC, Is Not an Arm of the Sycuan Tribe Protected by Tribal Sovereign Immunity The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is “settled law” developed through years of United States Supreme Court precedent (Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. (1998) 523 U.S. 751 , 756 [ 140 L.Ed.2d 981 , 118 S.Ct. 1700 ] (Kiowa)), and is based on the premise that “Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations’ that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories.” (Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Potawatomi Tribe (1991) 498 U.S. 505, 509 [ 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 , 111 S.C

2026(R.L., at p. 113, italics added, quoting Quigley, at p. 812.) One of these statutes was the legislation at issue in Chapman, which “eliminated the state’s procedural immunity to suit, thus opening the courts to the adjudication of the specified claims.” (Quigley, at p. 811, italics added, citing Denning v. State (1899) 123 Cal. 316, 319 [discussing February 1893 act at issue in Chapman]; see Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. at p. 693 ; R.L., at p. 113.) “Under the law existing at the time of the Government Claims Act’s enactment, a claim presentation requirement was viewed as the mechanism by which th

2026(R.L., at p. 113, italics added, quoting Quigley, at p. 812.) One of these statutes was the legislation at issue in Chapman, which “eliminated the state’s procedural immunity to suit, thus opening the courts to the adjudication of the specified claims.” (Quigley, at p. 811, italics added, citing Denning v. State (1899) 123 Cal. 316, 319 [discussing February 1893 act at issue in Chapman]; see Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. at p. 693 ; R.L., at p. 113.) “Under the law existing at the time of the Government Claims Act’s enactment, a claim presentation requirement was viewed as the mechanism by which th

2014(E.g., Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 856, 892 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 ] [“Because the CHP [as an instrumentality of the state] is absolutely immune from liability under section 1983, plaintiffs have failed to plead a viable section 1983 cause of action against it.”]; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218, 234 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 ] [district attorney not a person under § 1983 and may not be found liable under that statute “by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity”]; Bougere v. County of

2014(E.g., Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 856, 892 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 ] [“Because the CHP [as an instrumentality of the state] is absolutely immune from liability under section 1983, plaintiffs have failed to plead a viable section 1983 cause of action against it.”]; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218, 234 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 ] [district attorney not a person under § 1983 and may not be found liable under that statute “by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity”]; Bougere v. County of

2013Public entities in California are not liable for tortious injury unless liability is imposed by statute. (§ 815.) “[Sovereign immunity is the rule in California; governmental liability is limited to exceptions specifically set forth by statute.” (Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 405, 409 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 1 ].) Section 844.6, subdivision (a)(2) establishes the State’s immunity to liability for injuries to prisoners.

2013Public entities in California are not liable for tortious injury unless liability is imposed by statute. (§ 815.) “[Sovereign immunity is the rule in California; governmental liability is limited to exceptions specifically set forth by statute.” (Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 405, 409 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 1 ].) Section 844.6, subdivision (a)(2) establishes the State’s immunity to liability for injuries to prisoners.

1988In Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 359 P.2d 457 ], for example, we judicially abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity from tort liability, overruling earlier decisions which had expressly held that “abrogation or restriction of this doctrine is primarily a legislative matter . . . .” (Vater v. County of Glenn (1958) 49 Cal.2d 815, 820 [ 323 P.2d 85 ]; see also Talley v. Northern San Diego Hosp.

1988In Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 359 P.2d 457 ], for example, we judicially abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity from tort liability, overruling earlier decisions which had expressly held that “abrogation or restriction of this doctrine is primarily a legislative matter . . . .” (Vater v. County of Glenn (1958) 49 Cal.2d 815, 820 [ 323 P.2d 85 ]; see also Talley v. Northern San Diego Hosp.

2025(Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 829 [“states and state officers sued in their official capacity are not considered persons under section 1983 and are immune from liability under the statute by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity”].) The County may be held liable under § 1983 only for intentionally misleading the court to detain children.

2023Code, §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4.) Finally, quoting Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 829 , that, “[S]tates and state officers sued in their official capacity are not considered persons under section 1983 and are immune from liability under the statute by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity,” the court sustained the demurrer to the five causes of action that purported to assert section 1983 claims.

2018"The general expression of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that the state may not be sued without its consent. [Citation.]" ( People v. Superior Court (1947) 29 Cal.2d 754 , 757, 178 P.2d 1 .) In California, "[s]uits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law." ( Cal. Const., art.

2018"The general expression of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that the state may not be sued without its consent. [Citation.]" ( People v. Superior Court (1947) 29 Cal.2d 754 , 757, 178 P.2d 1 .) In California, "[s]uits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law." ( Cal. Const., art.

2007Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 815, p. 167.) As our Supreme Court has explained, “the intent of the [California Tort Claims Act] is not to expand the right of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various requirements of the act are satisfied.” (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 838 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 453 , 548 P.2d 1125 ].) Sovereign immunity is the rule in California.

2007Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 815, p. 167.) As our Supreme Court has explained, “the intent of the [California Tort Claims Act] is not to expand the right of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various requirements of the act are satisfied.” (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 838 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 453 , 548 P.2d 1125 ].) Sovereign immunity is the rule in California.

1952The Supreme Court reviewed the earlier cases dealing with the doctrine of sovereign immunity, including those cited by appellants, and said at page 759: “Denning v. State (1899), 123 Cal. 316 [ 55 P. 1000 ], directly involved the question of prospective operation of the act of 1893 on state liability for tort.

1952The Supreme Court reviewed the earlier cases dealing with the doctrine of sovereign immunity, including those cited by appellants, and said at page 759: “Denning v. State (1899), 123 Cal. 316 [ 55 P. 1000 ], directly involved the question of prospective operation of the act of 1893 on state liability for tort.

2023(See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill. (2010) 561 U.S. 742, 778 ; District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 (Heller).) 10 Although his prayer for relief requested an award of damages, Regina now concedes he has no right to damages in an action against the State or its Attorneys General in their official capacities under title 42 United States Code section 1983 (see Howlett v. Rose (1990) 496 U.S. 356, 366 [states and state officers sued in their official capacities are not considered persons under section 1983 and are immune from liability under the statute by virtue of the Eleventh A

2014(See Arizonans, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 69; Howlett, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 376 ; Ngiraingas, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 192, fn. 12 .) While the court in Venegas cited to Will , it did not focus on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in that case that states (including state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacity) are not “persons” as that term is used in section 1983. ( Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 829-839.) Rather, the California court folded the Eleventh Amendment into its discussion, stating, for example, “states and state officers sued in their official capacity

2008In the context of a sovereign immunity case, the United States Supreme Court in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58, 71 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 45 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 ], observed: “Obviously, state officials literally are persons.

2008In the context of a sovereign immunity case, the United States Supreme Court in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58, 71 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 45 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 ], observed: “Obviously, state officials literally are persons.

2026(R.L., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 113–114.) As explained in R.L., “ ‘[a]t common law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity had two strands: a procedural immunity from suit without the government’s consent and a substantive immunity from liability for the conduct of government.’ ” (Id. at pp. 112–113, italics added, quoting Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 811 .) “Starting in the late 19th century, the state ‘would disentangle the two strands of sovereign immunity’ [citation] by passing statutes ‘granting legislative consent to suit’ ”—i.e., waiving the state’s procedural immunity.

2026(R.L., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 113–114.) As explained in R.L., “ ‘[a]t common law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity had two strands: a procedural immunity from suit without the government’s consent and a substantive immunity from liability for the conduct of government.’ ” (Id. at pp. 112–113, italics added, quoting Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 811 .) “Starting in the late 19th century, the state ‘would disentangle the two strands of sovereign immunity’ [citation] by passing statutes ‘granting legislative consent to suit’ ”—i.e., waiving the state’s procedural immunity.

2016(Bay Mills, supra, 134 S.Ct. 29 at pp. 2034-2035.) Citing Ex parte Young (1908) 209 U.S. 123 and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49 (Santa Clara Pueblo), the Court also noted that the tribe's sovereign immunity would not necessarily prevent a suit for injunctive relief against the individual tribal officials.

2016(Bay Mills, supra, 134 S.Ct. 29 at pp. 2034-2035.) Citing Ex parte Young (1908) 209 U.S. 123 and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49 (Santa Clara Pueblo), the Court also noted that the tribe's sovereign immunity would not necessarily prevent a suit for injunctive relief against the individual tribal officials.