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290 Illinois opinions name it 3 courts 1953–2025 29 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302green2 sentences2022However, the Illinois Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity in 1959 (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959)). 2022However, the Illinois Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity in 1959 (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959)). | 18 | 43 |
Healy v. Vaupelgreen2 sentences2022The doctrine of sovereign immunity “affords no protection, however, when it is alleged that the State’s agent acted in violation of statutory or constitutional law or in excess of his authority, and in those instances an action may be brought in circuit court.” Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295, 308 (1990). 2022“Sovereign immunity affords no protection *** when it is alleged that the State’s agent acted in violation of statutory or constitutional law or in excess of his authority, and in those instances an action may be brought in circuit court.” Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295, 308 (1990). “[A]n action to compel a public official to perform a clear and mandatory duty is not a suit against the State.” John M. | 16 | 25 |
Senn Park Nursing Center v. Millergreen2 sentences2025The Rationale of the Exception ¶ 27 The prospective injunctive relief exception has a “long and complex history” and is founded on the principle that, “ ‘[w]here the defendant officer act[s] in excess of his statutory authority, the rights of the plaintiffs to be free from the consequences of his action outweigh the interest of the State which is served by the sovereign immunity doctrine.’ ” PHL, Inc., 216 Ill. 2d at 261 -62 (quoting Senn Park Nursing Center v. Miller, 104 Ill. 2d 169, 188 (1984)). ¶ 28 In Walker v. Chasteen, 2025 IL 130288, ¶ 21 , we suggested that cases involving the prospec 2015Senn Park Nursing Center v. Miller, 104 Ill. 2d 169, 188 (1984) (“[W]here the defendant officer act[s] in excess of his statutory authority, the rights of the plaintiffs to be free from the consequences of his action outweigh the interest of the State which is served by the sovereign immunity doctrine.”); Moline Tool Co., 410 Ill. at 37 (not all suits against state officers are barred because “[s]uch a holding would have blunted the effectiveness of many constitutional guaranties by preventing their judicial enforcement”). ¶ 112 Because the officer suit exception is limited to prospective reli | 15 | 29 |
Currie v. Laogreen2 sentences2025IDOT contended that, pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, “the State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court,” and that tort actions for money damages against state agencies are not properly brought in the circuit court. ¶ 16 IDOT further contended that the claims against Petrolis were also barred by sovereign immunity, because Longo’s allegations established that she was acting within the scope of her employment as a state employee, any duty she was alleged to have breached stemmed from that employment, and her performance as an AAG was “clearly an official 2025IDOT contended that, pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, “the State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court,” and that tort actions for money damages against state agencies are not properly brought in the circuit court. ¶ 16 IDOT further contended that the claims against Petrolis were also barred by sovereign immunity, because Longo’s allegations established that she was acting within the scope of her employment as a state employee, any duty she was alleged to have breached stemmed from that employment, and her performance as an AAG was “clearly an official | 12 | 28 |
Jackson v. Alverezgreen2 sentences2023Co., 106 Ill. 2d 135, 142 (1985). ¶ 21 “Sovereign immunity is a common-law doctrine that bars lawsuits against the government unless the government consents to be sued.” Jackson v. Alverez, 358 Ill. 2021Defendants additionally cited the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 59, 71 (1989), for the proposition that neither a state, nor its officials acting in their official capacities, are “persons” who can be sued under section 1983. ¶ 42 “Sovereign immunity is a common-law doctrine that bars lawsuits against the government unless the government consents to be sued.” Jackson v. Alverez, 358 Ill. | 9 | 11 |
Ellis v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universitiesgreen2 sentences2025Id. at 395 . ¶ 40 In a related argument, plaintiffs assert the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve “all aspects of litigation which address the constitutionality of legislation, including ordering a complete and effective remedy.” However, the sovereign immunity doctrine is intended to protect the State from interference in its performance of government functions and preserve its control over State coffers, and ordering the circuit court to adjudicate a present claim to redress a past wrong undermines that goal. 1997In discussing the limits of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, our supreme court has stated: "[I]f a plaintiff is not attempting to enforce a present claim against the State, but rather seeks to enjoin a State officer from taking future actions in excess of his delegated authority, then the immunity prohibition does not pertain.” Ellis v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities, 102 Ill. 2d 387, 395 (1984). | 8 | 12 |
Moline Tool Co. v. Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2015Senn Park Nursing Center v. Miller, 104 Ill. 2d 169, 188 (1984) (“[W]here the defendant officer act[s] in excess of his statutory authority, the rights of the plaintiffs to be free from the consequences of his action outweigh the interest of the State which is served by the sovereign immunity doctrine.”); Moline Tool Co., 410 Ill. at 37 (not all suits against state officers are barred because “[s]uch a holding would have blunted the effectiveness of many constitutional guaranties by preventing their judicial enforcement”). ¶ 112 Because the officer suit exception is limited to prospective reli 2015Senn Park Nursing Center v. Miller, 104 Ill. 2d 169, 188 (1984) (“[W]here the defendant officer act[s] in excess of his statutory authority, the rights of the plaintiffs to be free from the consequences of his action outweigh the interest of the State which is served by the sovereign immunity doctrine.”); Moline Tool Co., 410 Ill. at 37 (not all suits against state officers are barred because “[s]uch a holding would have blunted the effectiveness of many constitutional guaranties by preventing their judicial enforcement”). ¶ 112 Because the officer suit exception is limited to prospective reli | 6 | 12 |
SJ Groves & Sons Co. v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Groves & Sons Co. v. State, 93 Ill. 2d 397, 401 (1982). ¶ 38 With this in mind, the State cannot justifiably claim interference with its functions when the conduct complained of is unauthorized or illegal. 2016Groves & Sons Co. v. State, 93 Ill. 2d 397, 401 (1982). ¶ 38 With this in mind, the state cannot justifiably claim interference with its functions when the conduct complained of is unauthorized or illegal. | 6 | 9 |
State Building Venture v. O'Donnellgreen2 sentences2017“Based on the clear directives of these statutes, there is no dispute that claims against the state founded on a contract must be filed in the Court of Claims.” State Building Venture v. O’Donnell, 239 Ill. 2d 151, 161 (2010). ¶ 30 Sovereign immunity aims to “protect[ ] the State from interference in its performance of the functions of government and preserve[ ] its control over State coffers.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Leetaru, 2015 IL 117485, ¶ 47 . ¶ 31 On appeal, plaintiffs contend that sovereign immunity does not preclude their claims because the Governor exceeded the powers of 2017“Based on the clear directives of these statutes, there is no dispute that claims against the state founded on a contract must be filed in the Court of Claims.” State Building Venture v. O’Donnell, 239 Ill. 2d 151, 161 (2010). ¶ 30 Sovereign immunity aims to “protect[ ] the State from interference in its performance of the functions of government and preserve[ ] its control over State coffers.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Leetaru, 2015 IL 117485, ¶ 47 . ¶ 31 On appeal, plaintiffs contend that sovereign immunity does not preclude their claims because the Governor exceeded the powers of | 5 | 6 |
Leetaru v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinoisgreen2 sentences2023Leetaru, 2015 IL 117485 , ¶ 41. ¶ 18 Sovereign immunity is a common law doctrine that protects the government from being sued without its consent. 2022Parmar v. Madigan, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 17 ; Leetaru v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 2015 IL 117485, ¶ 41 . ¶ 15 The doctrine of sovereign immunity formed the basis for the circuit court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over the complaint. | 4 | 17 |
PHL, INC. v. Pullman Bank and Trust Co.green2 sentences2025The Rationale of the Exception ¶ 27 The prospective injunctive relief exception has a “long and complex history” and is founded on the principle that, “ ‘[w]here the defendant officer act[s] in excess of his statutory authority, the rights of the plaintiffs to be free from the consequences of his action outweigh the interest of the State which is served by the sovereign immunity doctrine.’ ” PHL, Inc., 216 Ill. 2d at 261 -62 (quoting Senn Park Nursing Center v. Miller, 104 Ill. 2d 169, 188 (1984)). ¶ 28 In Walker v. Chasteen, 2025 IL 130288, ¶ 21 , we suggested that cases involving the prospec 2024For the reasons that follow, we agree with defendants. ¶ 47 “The Illinois Constitution of 1970 abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity ‘[e]xcept as the General Assembly may provide by law.’ ” PHL, Inc. v. Pullman Bank & Trust Co., 216 Ill. 2d 250, 259-60 , 836 N.E.2d 351, 356 (2005) (quoting Ill. | 4 | 9 |
People Ex Rel. Manning v. Nickersongreen2 sentences2014Thus, the State is not liable to pay any portion of any judgment against the Fund, even when there are insufficient monies in the Fund to satisfy the judgments entered against it. 4 ¶ 16 The claimant also argues that section 19(f)(1) bars judicial review in this case because one of the purposes of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is “to preserve and protect State funds” (citing People ex rel Manning v. Nickerson, 184 Ill. 2d 245, 248 (1998)), and the moneys in the Fund are “state funds.” In support of this argument, the claimant notes that section 4(d) of the Act provides that the Fund “shal 2013Thus, the State is not liable to pay any portion of any judgment against the Fund, even when there are insufficient monies in the Fund to satisfy the judgments entered against it.4 ¶ 16 The claimant also argues that section 19(f)(1) bars judicial review in this case because one of the purposes of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is "to preserve and protect State funds" (citing People ex rel Manning v. Nickerson, 184 Ill. 2d 245, 248 (1998)), and the moneys in the Fund are "state funds." In support of this argument, the claimant notes that section 4(d) of the Act provides that the Fund "shall | 4 | 6 |
In Re Special Education of Walkergreen2 sentences2022The State’s consent to be sued must be “clear and 6 1-21-1091 unequivocal.” In re Special Education of Walker, 131 Ill. 2d 300, 303 (1989) (quoting Martin v. Giordano, 115 Ill. 2013In re Special Education of Walker, 131 Ill. 2d 300, 304 (1989); Department of Revenue v. Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, 67 Ill. 2d 392, 396 (1977). ¶ 20 Sovereign immunity “protects the State from interference in its performance of the functions of government and preserves its control over State coffers.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State Building Venture v. O’Donnell, 239 Ill. 2d 151, 159 (2010). | 4 | 4 |
Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainorgreen2 sentences2010This court held that sovereign immunity did not bar the action because the corporation was not “attempting to enforce a present claim against the State but, rather, seeks to enjoin the defendant from taking actions in excess of his delegated authority and in violation of plaintiff’s protectable legal interests.” Bio-Medical Laboratories, 68 Ill. 2d at 548 . 2010This court held that sovereign immunity did not bar the action because the corporation was not “attempting to enforce a present claim against the State but, rather, seeks to enjoin the defendant from taking actions in excess of his delegated authority and in violation of plaintiffs protect-able legal interests.” Bio-Medical Laboratories, 68 Ill. 2d at 548 . | 3 | 13 |
Parmar v. Madigangreen2 sentences2025Sovereign immunity generally prohibits the State of Illinois from being “made a defendant or party in any court.” 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 2022); see Parmar v. Madigan, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 19 , 106 N.E.3d 1004 (“[T]he General Assembly adopted the State -5- Lawsuit Immunity Act, reinstituting the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”). 2025Sovereign immunity generally prohibits the State of Illinois from being “made a defendant or party in any court.” 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 2022); see Parmar v. Madigan, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 19 , 106 N.E.3d 1004 (“[T]he General Assembly adopted the State -5- Lawsuit Immunity Act, reinstituting the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”). | 3 | 6 |
Racich v. Andersongreen2 sentences2002Racich v. Anderson, 241 Ill.App.3d 336, 339-40 , 181 Ill.Dec. 721 , 608 N.E.2d 972, 974 (1993) (whether defendant would be entitled to invoke a sovereign immunity defense is a separate question). 2002App. 3d 336, 339-40 , 608 N.E.2d 972, 974 (1993) (whether defendant would be entitled to invoke a sovereign immunity defense is a separate question). | 3 | 5 |
DeSMET EX REL. v. County of Rock Islandgreen2 sentences2012DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (2006). 2012DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (2006). | 3 | 5 |
| Williams v. Davetgreen | 3 | 3 |
| Martin v. Giordanogreen | 3 | 3 |
| People v. Philip Morris, Inc.green | 3 | 3 |
| Farmer v. McCluregreen | 3 | 3 |
| Illinois County Treasurers' Ass'n v. Hamergreen | 3 | 3 |
| Children's Memorial Hospital v. Muellergreen | 3 | 3 |
Sass v. Kramergreen2 sentences2015The doctrine of sovereign immunity “affords no protection, however, when it is alleged that the State’s agent acted in violation of statutory or constitutional law or in excess of his authority, and in those instances an action may be brought in circuit court.” Id. (and cases cited therein). 2015The doctrine of sovereign immunity “affords no protection, however, when it is alleged that the State’s agent acted in violation of statutory or constitutional law or in excess of his authority, and in those instances an action may be brought in circuit court.” Id. (and cases cited therein). | 2 | 10 |
In Re Lawrence M.green2 sentences1998Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d at 527 . 1998Lawrence M. , 172 Ill. 2d at 527 . | 2 | 6 |
Hudgens v. Deangreen2 sentences2015Officer Suit Exception to Sovereign Immunity ¶ 23 Assuming, arguendo, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the award of attorney fees and costs against the State, we agree with the circuit court that the award of attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs was proper since the officer suit exception to sovereign immunity applied in this case. ¶ 24 “[T]he determination of whether a suit is against the State is dependent on the issues involved and the relief sought rather than by the formal identification of the parties.” Herget -5- National Bank of Pekin v. Kenney, 105 Ill. 2d 405, 408 2015Officer Suit Exception to Sovereign Immunity 8 No. 1-13-0267 ¶ 23 Assuming, arguendo, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the award of attorney fees and costs against the State, we agree with the circuit court that the award of attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs was proper since the officer suit exception to sovereign immunity applied in this case. ¶ 24 "[T]he determination of whether a suit is against the State is dependent on the issues involved and the relief sought rather than by the formal identification of the parties." Herget National Bank of Pekin v. Kenney, 105 Ill. | 2 | 5 |
Rockford Mem v. Dept. of Human Rightsgreen2 sentences2012App. 3d 751, 756-57 (1995). “[I]n determining whether sovereign immunity applies to a particular case, substance takes precedent over form.” Id. at 757 . ¶ 28 Sovereign immunity exists only if the defendant is an arm of the State, the plaintiff’s action constitutes a present claim that could subject the State to liability and no exception exists. 2002App. 3d 751 , 755 (1995), the court labeled this exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity the “prospective injunctive relief exception” and stated that it applies “where a plaintiff seeks to enjoin a State agency or official from taking actions in excess of his statutory or constitutional authority.” Rockford Memorial Hospital, 272 Ill. | 2 | 5 |
Herget National Bank of Pekin v. Kenneygreen2 sentences2015Officer Suit Exception to Sovereign Immunity 8 No. 1-13-0267 ¶ 23 Assuming, arguendo, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the award of attorney fees and costs against the State, we agree with the circuit court that the award of attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs was proper since the officer suit exception to sovereign immunity applied in this case. ¶ 24 "[T]he determination of whether a suit is against the State is dependent on the issues involved and the relief sought rather than by the formal identification of the parties." Herget National Bank of Pekin v. Kenney, 105 Ill. 2015Officer Suit Exception to Sovereign Immunity 8 No. 1-13-0267 ¶ 23 Assuming, arguendo, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the award of attorney fees and costs against the State, we agree with the circuit court that the award of attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs was proper since the officer suit exception to sovereign immunity applied in this case. ¶ 24 "[T]he determination of whether a suit is against the State is dependent on the issues involved and the relief sought rather than by the formal identification of the parties." Herget National Bank of Pekin v. Kenney, 105 Ill. | 2 | 4 |
| City of Springfield v. Allphingreen | 2 | 4 |
| C.J. v. Department of Human Servicesgreen | 2 | 3 |
| Barnett v. Zion Park Districtgreen | 2 | 3 |
| Zimmerman v. Village of Skokiegreen | 2 | 3 |
| Senn Park Nursing Center v. Millergreen | 2 | 3 |
| American Family Ins. Co. v. Seebergreen | 2 | 3 |
| Williams v. Medical Center Commissiongreen | 2 | 3 |
| Hickey v. Hubergreen | 2 | 3 |
| Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Boardgreen | 2 | 3 |
| Feres v. United Statesgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Carmody v. Thompsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| Ind. Prot. and Adv. Servs. v. Ind. Family and Soc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schwing v. Miles
green
2 sentences1994The sovereign immunity of the State has been extended to actions in which a State department or agency is named as a party defendant. ( Smith v. Jones (1986), 113 Ill.2d 126, 132 , 100 Ill.Dec. 560, 562 , 497 N.E.2d 738, 740 ; Noorman v. Department of Public Works & Buildings (1937), 366 Ill. 216, 219 , 8 N.E.2d 637, 638 ; Schwing v. Miles (1937), 367 Ill. 436, 441 , 11 N.E.2d 944 , 947.) The supreme court has stated "[a] department of State government is commonly known as a part, or division, of the government" and as such is granted sovereign immunity. ( Noorman, 366 Ill. at 220 , 8 N.E.2d a 1965Paul and Pacific Railroad Co. 376 Ill. 346 , an injunction proceeding against a State agency, we stated (p. 351) : “Since the property of the State is involved, the State is directly and adversely affected by the suit and decree, and the decree must be held to be against the State.” (See also Schwing v. Miles, 367 Ill. 436, 444 , and Noorman v. Department of Public Works and Buildings, 366 Ill. 216 ; Moline Tool Co. v. Department of Revenue, 410 Ill. 35, 37 .) The tax purchaser is here in the anomalous position of arguing that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not applicable because the de | 8 | 1965–2014 |
List v. O'CONNOR
green
2 sentences1996This court disapproved of such an analysis as applied to park districts, stating that "the decision in the Molitor case, in discussing the doctrine of sovereign immunity, dismisses as immaterial any distinction between governmental or proprietary functions.” List, 19 Ill. 2d at 340 ; see Blankenship, 269 Ill. 1996This court disapproved of such an analysis as applied to park districts, stating that "the decision in the Molitor case, in discussing the doctrine of sovereign immunity, dismisses as immaterial any distinction between governmental or proprietary functions.” List, 19 Ill. 2d at 340 ; see Blankenship, 269 Ill. | 6 | 1961–1996 |
Smith v. Jones
green
2 sentences2004Our last consideration is defendants' contention that the Illinois Gaming Board should have been dismissed as a defendant (a) based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as described in Smith v. Jones, 113 Ill.2d 126 , 100 Ill.Dec. 560 , 497 N.E.2d 738 (1986), or (b) because section 11-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits actions to be brought against only state officers. 2004Our last consideration is defendants' contention that the Illinois Gaming Board should have been dismissed as a defendant (a) based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as described in Smith v. Jones, 113 Ill.2d 126 , 100 Ill.Dec. 560 , 497 N.E.2d 738 (1986), or (b) because section 11-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits actions to be brought against only state officers. | 5 | 1994–2004 |
CGE Ford Heights, L.L.C. v. Miller
green
2 sentences2017Thus, the court construed the complaint as alleging that the defendants “acted in violation of statutory or constitutional law or in excess of their authority” (id. ¶ 50), and therefore the court held that sovereign immunity did not apply. ¶ 24 In CGE Ford Heights, L.L.C. v. Miller, 306 Ill. 2017Thus, the court construed the complaint as alleging that the defendants “acted in violation of statutory or constitutional law or in excess of their authority” (id. ¶ 50), and therefore the court held that sovereign immunity did not apply. ¶ 24 In CGE Ford Heights, L.L.C. v. Miller, 306 Ill. | 4 | 2004–2017 |
Noorman v. Department of PubLic Works & Buildings
green
2 sentences1994The sovereign immunity of the State has been extended to actions in which a State department or agency is named as a party defendant. ( Smith v. Jones (1986), 113 Ill.2d 126, 132 , 100 Ill.Dec. 560, 562 , 497 N.E.2d 738, 740 ; Noorman v. Department of Public Works & Buildings (1937), 366 Ill. 216, 219 , 8 N.E.2d 637, 638 ; Schwing v. Miles (1937), 367 Ill. 436, 441 , 11 N.E.2d 944 , 947.) The supreme court has stated "[a] department of State government is commonly known as a part, or division, of the government" and as such is granted sovereign immunity. ( Noorman, 366 Ill. at 220 , 8 N.E.2d a 1994The sovereign immunity of the State has been extended to actions in which a State department or agency is named as a party defendant. ( Smith v. Jones (1986), 113 Ill.2d 126, 132 , 100 Ill.Dec. 560, 562 , 497 N.E.2d 738, 740 ; Noorman v. Department of Public Works & Buildings (1937), 366 Ill. 216, 219 , 8 N.E.2d 637, 638 ; Schwing v. Miles (1937), 367 Ill. 436, 441 , 11 N.E.2d 944 , 947.) The supreme court has stated "[a] department of State government is commonly known as a part, or division, of the government" and as such is granted sovereign immunity. ( Noorman, 366 Ill. at 220 , 8 N.E.2d a | 4 | 1965–2005 |
| Alden v. Maine green | 4 | 2002–2003 |
| Bartholomew v. Crockett green | 4 | 1991–1994 |
| Campbell v. White green | 3 | 1993–2023 |
| Oppe v. State of Missouri green | 3 | 1991–2008 |
| Madden v. Kuehn green | 3 | 1993–2003 |
| Brando Construction, Inc. v. Department of Transportation green | 3 | 1992–2002 |
| Roumbos v. City of Chicago green | 2 | 2016–2016 |
| Culver v. City of Streator green | 2 | 2016–2016 |
| Lynch v. Department of Transportation green | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| Lake v. State green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| President Lincoln Hotel Venture v. Bank One green | 2 | 1995–2012 |
| Kiersch v. Ogena green | 2 | 1993–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.